Approved for Release: 2022/12/19 C06983556 (b)(3)CONFIDENTIAL 5 April 2004 (b)(3)**Talking Points for Vice President Cheney on** China's Knowledge of A. Q. Khan's Transfers to North Korea We are gravely concerned about recent (b)(3)revelations that A. Q. Khan transferred uranium enrichment technology and materiel to North Korea. A Pakistani official reported that Khan signed a document that says he transferred centrifuges, drawings, technical data, and uranium hexafluoride. Given the relationship between Khan and (b)(3)North Korea and Khan's involvement in providing Chinese designs for Libya's nuclear program, Khan has likely transferred Chinese weapons technology to North Korea, facilitating Pyongyang's efforts to construct deliverable nuclear weapons. The uranium-based nuclear warhead design documents Khan passed to Libya originated in China. The packet of documents that Libya turned over to the IAEA included drawings and blueprints as well as instructions on how to assemble a bomb and its essential components. Some of these documents contained text in Chinese, and the designs were found to closely resemble the warheads that China tested in the late 1960s and that were later passed on to Pakistan in the early 1980s. It has been reported that the deal to pardon Khan in exchange for a public apology was in part aimed at preventing details of China's nuclear weapons assistance to Pakistan from becoming public. (b)(3)Wholesale transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to another country is contrary to international proliferation controls. (b)(3)(b)(1)We are also troubled by North Korea's (b)(3)ballistic missile delivery system. It has been reported in the press that North Korean technicians collaborated with Khan's laboratory on missiles in 1998 (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(1)(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2022/12/19 C06983556

CONFIDENTIAL

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2022/12/19 C06983556

CONFIDENTIAL		
	•	

2

CONFIDENTIAL

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)