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(Forthcoming: ZJL-745, 746, 747.)
References: ZJL-689, 696, 714, 724, 725, 736, 737.

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. This is the second in a series of major interior reports on the chief figures and groups involved in the rearmament question and in haggling over future leadership of the Japanese army. By reference to the cover letter to ZJL-737, you will observe that this report was originally to be numbered ZJL-737B, which has been changed in order to conform with headquarters practice and procedure.
2. As the investigative efforts of [] concerning this problem of rearmament and the figures connected to it have unveiled even further in the past two months, it becomes increasingly apparent that he places no complete trust in any one of the individuals with whom he deals and from whom he gains information, even his most trusted friends. The information has a definite slant in some cases in favor of AKIYORI Takushiro, it is true, but we view this as the unavoidable expression of a natural prejudice in favor of a long-time intimate friend, especially in view of [] forthcoming reports utilizing sub-sources from the "other side of the fence". Although that is most evident in the reporting technique employed in ZJL-749 rather than in this report, it is a thought which we feel should be applied to all of the reports in this series, and we therefore remind you of it in this occasion.
3. You are reminded that this is information which has been elicited, but that it has a definite flavor of inside information elicited by someone in complete trust from the sub-sources he utilizes. The claim is maintained that the sub-sources have no idea as to the ultimate destination of the information.

8* November 1951

Classification

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Subject: Military Figures Connected with Rearmament and Conflicting Intrigues re the HATTORI Plan: TANIDA Isamu and Associates
Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan 谷田勇

Report No: ZJI-744
(FD-313)
Date of Information: As stated

Date Acquired: As stated

Evaluation: C-3

Date of Report: 8 November, 1951

Source: Sub-sources as stated.

1. (Sub-source for para. 1: HANEKE Yoshitane, elicited from TATSUMI Eiichi on 5 October; acquired on 7 October.)

During the late fall of 1950 and up till January 1951, (former Lt. General) TANIDA Isamu, graduate in the 27th class of Army Officers' School, and classmate of TATSUMI Eiichi, was closely connected to the latter in rearmament planning, and had some liaison as well to General SHIMOMURA Sadamu. During all of this time, TANIDA consistently reviled HATTORI Takashiro, and attempted to undermine HATTORI's reputation with SHIMOMURA and TATSUMI. This attempt was quite unsuccessful. Although TANIDA was a classmate of TATSUMI Eiichi, he was paid little respect by TATSUMI, who considers him a person of low character and inferior ability. Although TANIDA, reportedly offering information coming from HATTORI's subordinate in the Historical Records Section of the Demobilization Bureau, submitted information which tended to show General SHIMOMURA that HATTORI was taking a very unilateral approach to the problem of rearmament, TANIDA was not successful in convincing SHIMOMURA of any duplicity or undue ambition on HATTORI's part. That occurred in November, 1950.

2. (Sub-source HATTORI Takashiro; Date of info: As of 17 September, 1951; Date acquired: 21 September, 1951.)

HATTORI had previously disclosed to SHIMOMURA Sadamu the outline of his plans for rearmament shortly after HATTORI had first been commissioned for that task by General Willoughby. SHIMOMURA had given HATTORI some very pertinent advice on the plan, even though he was not aware of the details. SHIMOMURA, in November 1950, confronted HATTORI with TANIDA's accusations that HATTORI was ambitiously planning to use his excellent position of trust from General Willoughby to advance himself as the new top man in the reconstructed Japanese Army. He showed HATTORI details including names and figures which had been submitted by TANIDA to prove that HATTORI was taking a very unilateral course regarding rearmament. HATTORI was able to deny the charges against him and to show excellent reasons for his choices of personnel and to prove that he in no way sought the top post for himself. SHIMOMURA had not lost confidence in HATTORI, but from these events, HATTORI learned that his subordinate, X HORIBA Kazuo, had been furnishing TANIDA with information on the HATTORI plan.

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- 3. (Date of information: 25 September; Sub-source HATTORI Takushiro; Date acquired: 1 October 1951.)

TANIDA Isamu graduated in the 27th class from Army Officers' School, and subsequently graduated from the Army War College, in the Engineering Curriculum, and was a classmate and long time associate of TATSUMI Eiichi. HATTORI Takushiro first met TANIDA at about the end of 1935, when the former was stationed as an Assistant Military Attache in France. TANIDA and a few other Japanese field grade officers came over to France at that time for an inspection tour. HATTORI guided them to the various battle-grounds and memorials of World War I. Although HATTORI had no further contact with TANIDA from that time until the Surrender in 1945, TANIDA stuck out in his mind even then as an unpleasant and most unpredictable person. TANIDA's assignments and record in World War II are not clearly known, except that he was Chief of Staff of an Army in the area of Rabaul in the South Seas at the end of the Pacific war in 1945. After the Surrender of Japan was announced, and before TANIDA was returned to Japan, he advocated as a result the abdication of the Emperor. For this reason he lost considerable popularity in the Army, and in fact he was not even chosen as troop commander when he and his troops were shipped back from Rabaul, since his subordinates were violently opposed to being directed by him in any way at all. Even after he landed in Japan, TANIDA went around quite busily advocating the abdication of the Emperor to "save face" as a result of the Surrender. He made these same assertions even before the Demobilization Board. Since very few of the Japanese Army officers have any such beliefs and are quite definitely opposed to persons who maintain them, many officers consider TANIDA to be "a bit insane".

(Sub-source, date of info, and date acquired same as for para. 3.)

In the early fall of 1950, HATTORI Takushiro was invited to a dinner by a certain Chinese who happened to have been a classmate of his at the Japanese Army War College. This Chinese had come to Japan after the Surrender as a member of the Chinese Mission, and is at present a commercial trader. Among several Japanese guests who had been invited, was TANIDA. When the Chinese host had attended Army War College, TANIDA was a strategy instructor teaching communications techniques. Among the Japanese invited, TANIDA was the oldest, and as a former Lt. General, the highest in rank. TANIDA talked so much at the banquet that the other guests hardly had any chance to speak at all. Then all of a sudden TANIDA began to needle HATTORI. In fact he became embarrassingly abusive. He charged that HATTORI, in his use of influence with Americans of G-2 GHQ, had been attempting to exclude former Navy officers from the Maritime Safety Agency on the grounds that they should not hold public offices. He insinuated that this was because of HATTORI's well-known bitterness against Navy officers dating from World War II days. HATTORI did not like the idea of having a debate at a formal function with any guests present. Therefore he promised TANIDA that he would be glad to discuss the matter with him later on at his office. In a few days, TANIDA visited HATTORI at the Demobilization Bureau. There HATTORI attempted to explain to the older man the reasons behind the rumor of his advocacy of

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exclusion of former Navy officers from NSA. He stated that although he and his group had taken upon themselves the mission of creating the Police Reserve under the orders of Major General Willoughby, a group of American officials under Major General Wittney, Chief of the Government Section of SCAP at that time, were quite strongly opposed to any participation in the Police Reserve by former regular Army officers. Opinions on that point were quite sharply divided between G-2 and Government Section in GHA. HATTONI related to TANIDA that a certain staff officer in G-2 had asked him, "Government Section maintains that the employment of former Army officers in government organizations constitutes a violation of the purged directive, but isn't there any conclusive evidence to prove the inconsistency of their assertion?" HATTONI stated that he had replied that he did not know whether Government Section was aware of the fact or not but that large numbers of former regular officers in the Navy had been employed for quite some time in the Maritime Safety Agency. He did not consider that it was a violation of the purged directive, however, because that directive provides that even purgees can be permitted to assume government work as exceptions in the event that the execution of certain duties by non-purged personnel would be too difficult. Therefore if that provision permits the employment as exceptions former Navy officers in NSA, it should likewise permit former Army officers to join the National Police Reserve. HATTONI had pointed out to the American officer and reiterated to TANIDA that it was because of the applications of that provision for special employment that non-purgees would be unable to accomplish suitably, that he and his associates were at present in the service of the Demobilization Bureau even though that was of course a government organization. HATTONI added to TANIDA that his explanation on his part to G-2 GHA was obviously misinterpreted and in the course of passing from one person to another had become the malicious rumor that HATTONI was conducting a campaign for "the exclusion of former Navy officers from NSA." TANIDA appeared to be satisfied to a certain extent with HATTONI's explanation, but even though the matter little concerned him directly, he was very unpleasant throughout the entire interview. During the interview, HONIMA Kazuo was right next to HATTONI and TANIDA, but did not speak one word in refutation of HATTONI's statement. Later, HATTONI came to the conclusion from that attitude of HONIMA, that possibly TANIDA had already secretly formed a close connection to HONIMA even at that time.

5. (sub-source, date of info, and date acquired for info in paras. 5-8: Same as for paras. 1-4.)

TANIDA Isamu has made many boasting statements since the beginning of 1951 to the effect that he and Lt. General TATSUMI Eiichi are engaged in collaboration on a variety of preparations for the rearmament of Japan. He has further indicated that both TATSUMI and himself have the complete confidence of Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru and the Japanese Government, and that any plan for rearmament which is to be official will require their sanction. TANIDA claims that TATSUMI is busily occupied as YOSHIDA's chief military advisor, with TANIDA closely assisting TATSUMI. TANIDA describes himself in such talk as the "Executive Officer of the TATSUMI KIKAN", and has urged all field officers and junior officers wherever they are throughout Japan to submit their ideas and wishes to TANIDA because he would without fail refer them to the Japanese Government and to TATSUMI.

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Both HATTORI and TATSUMI, each in his own way, has called these assertions of TANIDA's lies out of whole cloth. Even KOBAYASHI Kazuo does not trust TANIDA any more. Nevertheless, there are many junior officers who are duped by TANIDA's boasting into believing that he is a man of great influence with TATSUMI and with top leaders of the present Japanese Government.

Those who trust TANIDA greatly and who are working for him in a certain organization are the following persons:

8. A man called MATSUDA (fnu), former Lt. Colonel in the army. MATSUDA appears to be about 38 or 40 years old, and was apparently a graduate in the 42nd class at Army Officers School. He is reported to have been previously assigned to the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry. MATSUDA has been actively seeking the opinions concerning rearmament of former regular Army officers, on TANIDA's behalf, and has been publicizing TANIDA's exploits and propaganda for him quite devotedly.

9. KOBAYASHI Kazuo (小林一男). KOBAYASHI Kazuo has been frequently observed coming in and out of the residence of a former regular Army officer named KOBAYASHI Kazuo, who is now running a stationery shop. KOBAYASHI is believed to have been a major or a Lt. Colonel. Under his direction at the present time, he has the services of a certain HATTORI (羽鳥真) (fnu). These three men, MATSUDA, KOBAYASHI and HATTORI comprise TANIDA's own clique.

10. In the early spring of 1951 (it is believed; the exact date is not known), TANIDA paid a visit to General SHIOMURA Sadamu and to (Lt. General) KAWABE Torashiro for consultation on the rearmament issue. During that interview he attempted to make the usual boasts concerning his close relations to TATSUMI and the Japanese Government concerning rearmament, and likewise to revile and undermine HATTORI Takushiro. Since SHIOMURA and KAWABE had been fully acquainted with TANIDA's character and ability for a long time, however, they placed no faith in his words from the beginning. They took no serious notice of his accusations and boasts. This apparently was made quite obvious by subsequent events, and as a result TANIDA has since that time maintained a great antipathy towards both SHIOMURA and KAWABE, even though he has claimed to recommend SHIOMURA as future Chief of Staff publicly.

11. It has been reported that TANIDA came into contact with the Special Investigations Bureau of the Attorney General's Office, and established a good liaison with them sometime during the summer of 1951. At that time, he reputedly warned the SIB to keep a strict watch upon the conduct and activities of SHIOMURA Sadamu, KAWABE Torashiro, and naturally, HATTORI. TANIDA seems to have been attempting to get the SIB to indict the above three men on the charge of engaging in activities in defiance of purged ordinances so that their political prestige would collapse automatically. To date, no one appears to have taken these charges very seriously.

9. Source Opinion: In spite of the fact TANIDA was originally responsible for the security breach concerning the HATTORI Plan by his utilization

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of HOKURA Kazuo, it would appear that his chief function in this rearmament problem is that of a rather addled crank. Even if one does not accept MATSUDA's opinion of HOKURA, there is plenty of confirmatory opinion concerning HOKURA, all of it rather unfavorable, from such individuals as MATSUDA, SAKURAI, MATSUDA Torashiro, ~~SATO Yasunobu~~, and most other regular army officers. The possibility that HOKURA is able to offer information to any agency whatsoever concerning MATSUDA or any other individual connected with rearmament, is a very dangerous factor, chiefly because HOKURA is a person of obviously unreliable nature and reputation.

Low Comment: We tend to agree with MATSUDA's opinion expressed in para. 9; in the event of opposition to HOKURA's character and low opinion of his ability, we judge that he is in no way a component of MATSUDA in the same sense that HAKURO or even ISUMI are.

Field Comment: Your attention is invited to the cover letter (51-59) of 201-737 (formerly numbered 201-737A), which outlines the method in which MATSUDA's rearmament group figures involved in it are being reported to SACMIB. It will be quite apparent that this report was the one originally intended as 201-737B. Details of the utilization of HOKURA Kazuo by MATSUDA appear in 201-746, in a discussion of MATSUDA's rearmament group.

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