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Terrorism Review



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13 December 1984

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


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The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta: Gone But Not Forgotten

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The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta: Gone But Not Forgotten [redacted]

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In some ways a terrorist group can be likened to a living organism—it is born, it matures, it gets old, it dies. Unlike a cow or a fish, however, which shortly after its demise begins giving increasingly pungent evidence of it, a terrorist group often just fades away without our noticing. There are some well-known exceptions: the West German 2nd of June Movement and the Italian Prima Linea publicly announced their own disbandment; and the West German and British police put an end to the Kexel-Hepp Group through the simple expedient of arresting all but one of its members. Yet it is likely that a good number of the terrorist groups found on most lists of such groups really do not belong there any longer. Following is a description of how one such group has maintained a ghostly presence in the files of counterterrorism organizations of several governments.

The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) was formed in 1974 by several like-minded South American terrorist groups in an effort to facilitate international cooperation.¹ Initially, this group seemed to pose a formidable threat to several governments in the region. It did in fact carry out—or was anyway implicated in—a number of terrorist incidents. The last known event that may have involved the JCR was recorded in 1977. [redacted]

Recently, inconsistencies in the file prompted a thorough review of available information concerning the JCR. One thing uncovered was a 1979 study of the JCR that concluded the group was “moribund at best” and should no longer be considered a terrorist threat. Similarly, current issues of CIA publications that list terrorist and insurgent groups no longer

¹ The founders of the JCR were:

- The People’s Revolutionary Movement (ERP) of Argentina.
- The National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros) of Uruguay.
- The Army of National Liberation (ELN) of Bolivia.
- The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) of Chile.

contain references to the JCR; and a recent DIA compendium that contains a useful historical treatment of the group notes a dearth of current information concerning the group’s leadership, strength, weapons, equipment, and funding. At the same time, however, a number of fairly recent reports [redacted]

appeared in the aggregate to provide confirmed information that the JCR was still functioning. 3.3(b)(1)

A closer examination, however, revealed a pattern of circular reporting that tended to provide false verification because of time delays and variances in details. [redacted]

It is not unlikely, moreover, that some creative writing crept into these reports. Where details were present, they were of the sort that anyone who knew something about terrorism and read current newspapers could easily invent. The motivation is understandable: it is often convenient for a security service to have a [redacted]

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scapegoat that cannot respond to or refute accusations, one that can be accused of exerting external influence on a country's internal problems, one which poses such a threat as to justify an increase in the service's budget.

Earlier this year, an unsourced report carried in a South American newspaper prompted a series of intergovernmental queries, the responses to which nearly "confirmed" the existence of a nonexistent terrorist group. Under the pressure of short deadlines,

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[redacted] with information of dubious accuracy and relevancy as if it were pertinent fact. An assumption that the group existed caused certain information to be interpreted as evidence the group existed, when in fact the contrary interpretation was more appropriate and should have led the assumption to be challenged.

These cases suggest that it may not be uncommon for terrorist groups to be perpetuated in reporting long after they cease in actuality.

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