

~~Confidential~~

33



Research Project

*The Potential for Political Violence in
Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand:*

Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model

Progress Report No. 5

~~Confidential~~

3.5(c)

May 1975

Copy

N^o 28

Page Denied

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Progress Report No. 5

May 1975

The Potential for Political Violence in Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand: Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model

This is the fifth in a series of reports on the testing of an analytical model of political violence adapted from Ted Robert Gurr's frustration-aggression theory (*Why Men Rebel*, Princeton University Press, 1970). The Gurr theory is based on the proposition that political violence is the product of group frustrations reinforced by the belief that violence is justified and by the capability to turn the resulting politicized anger into collective aggression. The form of the ensuing violence—*turmoil* (riots or demonstrations), *insurgency* (terrorist acts or small-scale guerrilla operations), *conspiracy* (attempted coups), or *internal war* (large-scale revolutionary actions or civil war)—will depend upon the kinds of relationships which are found to exist among various types of groups in the country under examination. A complete description of the theory and of the procedures devised to operationalize it as an analytical tool is contained in an earlier OPR report of an experimental, *ex post facto* test of the model in the Chilean situation of mid-1973 (OPR 502, Revised, November 1974).

The purpose of this second phase of the project is to test the value of the Gurr model as a technique for assessing the nature and potential for political violence in societies of varying stages of development and with quite different cultural heritages and political institutions. The three countries chosen—Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand—seem to meet our requirements: Each represents a different stage of development in a distinct geographic area, and each is confronted with domestic unrest or political conflict.

For each of the three countries, a panel of five CIA analysts assigns numerical evaluations at regular intervals to the model's key variables—relative deprivation or collective frustration, belief in the justification for violence, coercive force, and institutional support. The evaluations are made for each group or "actor" which, in the panel's judgment, represents a significant political force in the country. The country's actors are also assessed in terms of their identification with four basic actor-categories: Pro-regime, mass-oriented (PR-MO); pro-regime, elite-oriented (PR-EO); anti-regime, mass-oriented (AR-MO); and anti-regime, elite-oriented (AR-EO). At each point of assessment during the test period, the panel's evaluations are combined statistically, using computerized procedures devised in the Office of Political Research, to produce overall evaluations of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV) and of the conditions conducive to particu-

3.5(c)

NOTE: Comments or questions on this project will be welcomed by its author

Office of Political Research,

3.5(c)

1
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

lar types of violence in the country under observation. The three panel's evaluations are made on a monthly schedule, and the entire test series is expected to run until mid-1975.

The summary below presents the principal findings from the sixth set of assessments made by the country panels in mid-May 1975. The graphs on succeeding pages displays trends based on the six sets of assessments made to date. A final progress report, based on mid-June evaluations, will complete the present test phase. A subsequent wrap-up report will examine trend changes over time in the panel's scoring patterns, and thus in the model's projections of the potential and form of political violence, compared with actual developments in each country during the test period.

Summary of Principal Findings

(NOTE: The data cited below and in the following graphs are keyed to each country's Potential for Political Violence or PPV, as reflected by the median PPV score of each five-member country panel. *The figures should not be regarded as representing either probabilities or absolute quantities; they should be interpreted merely as indicating relative status or strength, compared to other variables in the model assessed by the same country panel or to corresponding variables assessed by the other two country panels.*)

General:

1. The country panels' mid-May assessments confirmed the marked shifts in potential for political violence recorded for the three countries in April. Ethiopia continued to display the greatest potential, followed closely by Thailand, while Argentina showed a relatively lower potential.

2. Conditions conducive to particular types of political violence continued to vary among the three countries. While all three showed tendencies toward internal war, Thailand displayed an equal tendency toward insurgency and an even stronger tendency toward turmoil. In Ethiopia, conditions favorable to conspiracy appeared to equal those favorable to internal war.

3. In all three countries, anti-regime actors were judged to have a greater potential for political violence than pro-regime actors. In Argentina and Thailand, anti-regime *mass* actors seemed to have the largest potential; in Ethiopia anti-regime *elite* actors showed the greatest potential.

4. Of the three countries, Ethiopia continued to display the greatest political frustration, Argentina the least. In all three countries the capability to translate this frustration into actual political violence remained stable, with Thailand and Ethiopia displaying somewhat greater capability than Argentina.

5. In the April-May period, the range of variation in assessments decreased among members of the Ethiopian panel but remained relatively constant among members of the Argentine and Thai panels. In all three panels, divergencies between one or two outliers and other panel members were apparent.

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**Argentina:**

In the April-May period the potential for political violence in Argentina declined slightly (from a PPV score of 48 to one of 46 in May). Within the limits of that relatively low and stable potential, the conditions conducive to internal war gained somewhat (from 14 to 16), while those favorable to conspiracy, insurgency, and turmoil all declined slightly (to 11, 9, and 10, respectively). The potential for political violence among anti-regime actors edged upward (anti-regime mass actors moved from 15 to 16, anti-regime elite actors from 12 to 13), while the potential among pro-regime actors declined (pro-regime elite actors from 11 to 8, pro-regime mass actors from 10 to 9). The motivation and capability of all actors to engage in political violence remained fairly constant during the period: though politicized frustration in the country showed a slight gain (from 30 to 31), the capability to turn that frustration into actual violence declined somewhat (coercive force from 9 to 7, institutional support from 9 to 8). The range of variation among Argentine panel members in May remained about the same as in April (a range of 42 around a PPV median score of 48 in April, a range of 44 around a median PPV score of 46 in May). Though somewhat reduced, the divergence apparent over the past several months between the two panel members from OPR and DDO (Analysts A and B, respectively) at the low end of the PPV scale and the three members from CRS, OER, and OCI (Analysts C, D, and E, respectively) at the upper end of the scale continued to characterize the panel's assessments in May.

Ethiopia:

The potential for political violence in Ethiopia remained fairly high and stable during the April-May period (a PPV score of 73 in April, 72 in May). Within the limits of that potential, the conditions favorable to internal war edged upward again in May, matching those for conspiracy (both with PPV scores of 22), and together the conditions for these two types of political violence continued to hold a strong edge over those conducive to insurgency (16) and turmoil (12). While the potential for political violence among pro-regime mass actors increased somewhat during the April-May period (from 9 to 12), that for pro-regime elite actors, declined (from 17 to 13). The potential of both types of pro-regime actors, however, continued to be considerably below that of anti-regime actors (a PPV score of 26 for anti-regime elite actors, 21 for anti-regime mass actors). Politicized frustration decreased somewhat during the period (from 52 to 48), while the capability to translate that frustration into actual political violence edged upward (from 10 to 12 for coercive force, from 11 to 12 for institutional support). The range of variation among members of the Ethiopian panel narrowed during the period (from a range of 41 around the April median PPV score of 73, to a range of 35 around the May median PPV score of 72).

Thailand:

In May the potential for political violence in Thailand continued at a relatively high level following the sharp March-April increase. (A PPV score of 66, compared to 67 in April, and only 44 in March.) Within the limits of that enlarged potential, conditions conducive to turmoil (22), insurgency (18), and internal war (18) continued to outweigh those for conspiracy (8). While con-

3
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


ditions for the last three types of violence remained relatively stable, those favorable to turmoil declined (from 30 to 22). There were only minor shifts in PPV among Thai actors during the period: pro-regime elite actors (19) and anti-regime mass actors continued to display the largest potential for political violence, despite the drop in PPV among the latter group (from 28 to 24). Politicized frustration in the country continued at the new high level (40) recorded in April, while the capability to transform that frustration into actual political violence remained stable (13 for coercive force, 13 for institutional support). The range of variation among Thai panel members widened somewhat during the period (from a range of 41 around a median PPV score of 67 in April, to a range of 44 around a median PPV score of 66 in May). The increased variation was due mainly to the outlying assessment of Analyst E at the top of the PPV scale (at 101), compared to those of other panel members bunched closer to the mid-range.

4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Conditions Conducive to Particular Types of Political Violence






Shaded areas represent, within the limits of each country's potential for political violence (PPV), the degree to which that country panel's median scores on key variables fulfill the conditions hypothesized by the Gurr theory as conducive to each type of political violence.

T - Turmoil
I - Insurgency
C - Conspiracy
IW - Internal War

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

566013 5-75 CIA

5
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) for Each Type of Actor**


Shaded areas represent each country panel's median scores for PPV for each actor category.

PR-MO-Pro-Regime, Mass-Oriented Actors
 PR-EO-Pro-Regime, Elite-Oriented Actors
 AR-MO-Anti-Regime, Mass-Oriented Actors
 AR-EO-Anti-Regime, Elite-Oriented Actors

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

56 6014 5-75 CIA

6
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) in Terms of Key Variables in the Gurr Model**

Shaded areas represent sums of each country panels' median scores for each key variable for all actor categories.

IS - Institutional Support
 CF - Coercive Force
 PF - Politicized Frustration
 (relative deprivation x
 justification for violence)


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

566015 5-75: CIA

~~7
CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Individual Analysts' Assessments of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

565016 5-75 CIA

8
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~