

# The President's Daily Brief

Top Secret 27 November 1967

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#### DAILY BRIEF 27 NOVEMBER 1967

#### 1. Cyprus

The spotlight is back on Ankara's side of the stage as the Turks consider the latest counterproposals from Athens. We have not yet heard how Mr. Vance fared at his breakfast meeting with the Turkish foreign minister.

The Greeks are suggesting complete demilitarization of the island, and the Turks, who distrust Makarios, want to keep their 650-man detachment there. This issue is likely to cause a snag. Makarios, too, may prove somewhat difficult once he feels free from the threat of an immediate invasion.

Tensions are still high in Turkey, but there was some moderation noted in press material over the weekend.

#### 2. Japan

Sato's new cabinet is potentially the strongest combination since he took office in 1964. The eleven new men named over the weekend represent different factions of the Liberal Democratic Party and tend to balance the seven ministers Sato kept on.

This solid front combination should be particularly useful in staving off opponents of US-Japanese security ties—the treaty is up for reconsideration in 1970—and for getting the party through upper-house elections next year.

3. South Vietnam

Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Director General of National Police, has submitted his resignation. He gave fatigue as the reason.

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4. Organization of American States

The OAS will try again to pick a secretary general today. Earlier balloting produced no one candidate—there now are three—with enough votes to carry the election. Galo Plaza, the suave Brooklyn—born Ecuadorean supported by the US, is within a few votes of the necessary twelve.

5. Cambodia

Sihanouk has told all foreign journalists to get out of Cambodia and he will let no more in after 1 December. The Prince's pique stems from the articles written by two American correspondents about Viet Cong bases in Cambodia.

6. International Communism

A conclave of Communist parties has been called for next February in Budapest. The ostensible purpose is to lay the groundwork for a subsequent international party conference.

Invitations to Budapest have gone out to all parties, but several important ones are likely to send regrets. They will see the Budapest meeting as another Soviet try at re-establishing Moscow's leadership over the world Communist movement.



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## 8. Communist China

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Militant Red Guards are still making trouble in some areas, although the over-all level of disorder in China is relatively low.


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# FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam

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# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only

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### I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

| More on the Hanoi Bridges:  | 3.3(h)(2)  |
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| both the  |            |
| Paul Doumer and the Canal des Rapides bridges are now back in full operation. there has | 3.3(h)(2)  |
| been a sizable increase in the number of antiaircraft                                   | 0.0(11)(2) |
| emplacements at both ends of the Paul Doumer Bridge.                                    |            |
| truck traffic was "extremely heavy" last Friday night on the road from the Canal        | 3.3(h)(2)  |
| des Rapides toward Hanoi.   |            |
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|                         | * * *  |               |
| Stokely<br>was still in | y Carmichael's Whereabouts: Carmich<br>Tanzania as of last Friday. | ael           |
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There are more signs that Stokely is wearing out his welcome in Dar es Salaam. Last week classroom blackboards at the local university were seen with the message, "Emotional Stokely, Childish Carmichael, go home."

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Ambassador to Hanoi Soon: The 3.3(h)(2)

Embassy in Peking informed its foreign ministry
on Thursday that "the ambassador plans to fly to
Hanoi next month" and requested that his credentials
be "expedited." Apparently the plan to 3.3(h)(2)
follow up quickly the recent agreement with Hanoi
raising the respective missions to embassies.

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# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Hanoi Continues on US "False Optimism": radio's English language broadcast on Saturday summarized an authoritative editorial of that day in the official daily Nhan Dan. The main pitch was an effort to refute the "chorus of optimism, sung with gusto but undeniably tinted with pessimism" which has been coming out of Washington in recent weeks. Hanoi's editorial quotes the New York Times of 19 November to buttress its argument that the recent statements by US leaders are based on "tall stories" and are designed simply to refute the "spreading wave of national pessimism" in Hanoi also suggested that a desire to strengthen the administration for next year's elections is behind the new "optimism."

The editorial went on to claim that this optimism cannot fool anyone—and it certainly cannot change the facts. It is, Hanoi declared, simply "a product of utilitarianism" and will "boomerang."

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More Hanoi Comment on US Antiwar Campaign: In an official statement in Hanoi's army newspaper on Friday, the North Vietnamese claimed they expect no change in US war policy after next year's elections. The article went on to say, however, that "we highly value the struggle of the American people." The antiwar effort is an expression of the American people's struggle "for their own vital interests" as well as assistance to the "Vietnamese in their just fight." The decisive factor in the war, however, will be the struggle of "our own people," the article concluded.

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