

#### THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

23 October 1970

#### PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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On Page 5, we comment on the Soviet handling of the landing in the USSR of three US officers and a Turkish colonel.

The Burmese Government appears concerned that outside aid may encourage U Nu's efforts to spark uprisings. (Page 6)

Four truck battalions are about to enter southern Laos from North Vietnam. (Page 7)

Our comment on the attempted assassination of Chile's army commander appears on Page 7.


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## SOUTH VIETNAM



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
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
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#### USSR-US-TURKEY

In announcing the landing in the USSR of three American officers and a Turkish colonel, TASS emphasized the violation of Soviet territory by a US military aircraft. This suggests that Moscow will use the incident to highlight the dangers of foreign bases near the borders of the USSR. The Soviets can also be expected to warn Turkey that if it continues to play host to the US military, there are distinct limits as to how far Soviet-Turkish relations can improve. The subject of US bases in Turkey touches a particularly sensitive nerve in Turkish domestic politics, and the Soviets never fail to play on this theme.

Nevertheless, we would expect the Soviets to permit the safe return of the men and the aircraft as soon as these propaganda points have been scored. In that way, Moscow will have made the best out of a fortuitous incident: an opportunity to warn the US and one of its NATO allies regarding the dangers of foreign bases near the Soviet border, and a chance to play the role of international good guy at a time of hijacking incidents and Soviet-American exchanges of bad faith.

The presence of the Turkish officer aboard the aircraft, however, offers the Soviets the opportunity to make a stronger pitch for the return of the two Lithuanians who hijacked a Soviet airliner last week. The Russians have already orchestrated a propaganda campaign toward this end, and Turkish authorities are still trying to decide what to do with the hijackers. Moscow may well segregate the Turkish officer from his American colleagues as an implicit bargaining chip for the return of the hijackers.

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5

#### BURMA

A government statement printed by all Rangoon papers yesterday scoffed at reports that U Nu had gone underground in Burma from his Thai exile and said that his efforts to spark uprisings would continue to be futile.

key Burmese insinuations of foreign involvement suggest, however, that Rangoon is concerned over the encouragement that outside assistance would give U Nu and is prepared to speak out against such help.

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#### NOTES

Laos-Vietnam: Four truck battalions possibly totaling about 400 vehicles, some pulling artillery, are about to enter Laos from North Vietnam using routes around the western edge of the Demilitarized Zone, according to an intercept. Support units in the panhandle have been ordered to assess road conditions and provide camouflage and concealment by 24 October. This movement apparently reflects increased logistics requirements for Communist forces in Cambodia and South Vietnam. Other recent messages have revealed that a "large volume" of unspecified "technical" equipment and vehicles, including Soviet-built medium tanks, would be moving through the panhandle this season.

Chile: The attempted assassination of Army Commander in Chief Rene Schneider yesterday has raised tensions but is unlikely to affect the congressional confirmation of Salvador Allende as president-elect tomorrow. General Carlos Prats, who was named to fill Schneider's post temporarily, has resisted all efforts to enlist him in plots against Allende. The Frei government will not hesitate to use the emergency powers that it immediately invoked if necessary to maintain order.

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
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
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


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
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
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