


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MCO



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# MEMORANDUM

## *The Situation in Vietnam*



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2 November 1967

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## WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.



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Information as of 1600  
2 November 1967

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HIGHLIGHTS

The Communists are continuing their costly assaults against allied positions in northern Binh Long Province.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

Another abortive assault on Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province early on 2 November resulted in heavy enemy casualties (Paras. 1-3). A series of enemy attacks southwest of Da Nang on 2 November caused heavy damage to a South Vietnamese refugee center (Paras. 4-8). The North Vietnamese 2nd Division is regrouping in a heavily forested hill area just west of Que Son in southern Quang Nam Province (Paras. 9-10).

[redacted]

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III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:

There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. Other Communist Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Another abortive assault on allied positions at Loc Ninh in northern Binh Long Province was launched by Communist troops early on 2 November.

2. The two-pronged attack was directed at two battalions of US reinforcements near the Loc Ninh airstrip and at a nearby Special Forces camp and South Vietnamese outpost. Heavy allied artillery and mortar fire forced the enemy to withdraw shortly after day-break leaving behind 238 dead thus raising the five-day toll of enemy killed to nearly 850. Allied casualties during the attacks were light. Twenty-five allied soldiers have been killed (eight US) and 118 wounded (32 US) during the five days of enemy attacks.

3. According to preliminary interrogation of an enemy soldier captured earlier this week, there is a large Communist base camp less than five miles north of Loc Ninh, just south of the Cambodian border. The prisoner claimed that the camp was receiving supplies daily from Cambodia. He said that two or three French-made ten-wheel trucks transported rice and foodstuffs across the border to the depot. The supply area allegedly houses an estimated 1,000 soldiers.

Enemy Attack on Dai Loc

4. A series of well-coordinated enemy attacks in coastal Quang Nam Province some 15 miles west of Hoi An resulted in extensive damage to a South Vietnamese refugee village early on 2 November.

5. The activity began with a mortar attack followed by a ground assault on the Dai Loc bridge by an estimated 100 Communist soldiers. The attackers were finally forced to withdraw by a heavy concentration of US artillery and air support. The Communists then shifted their target to a nearby US Marine position. Mortars, automatic weapons, grenades, and satchel charges were used during a fierce one-hour attack. Simultaneously, two other nearby allied positions--another Marine night defensive position and a combined action platoon--came under heavy attack which included intense small arms fire.

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6. During these actions, a group of enemy troops entered the refugee center at Dai Loc and burned 160 of the homes. The Communists then went to a populated area just to the northwest and burned another 180 homes. Casualties for the entire episode included ten Marines killed and nine wounded; nine South Vietnamese civilians were also killed. Only four enemy bodies were found in an initial sweep of the area.

7. This tactic of multiple small-unit attacks concentrated on a cluster of military and civilian targets, although not new, is being used increasingly by Communist troops throughout South Vietnam. This tactic, involving several dispersed incidents within a short time, tends to restrict the effectiveness of allied reaction forces. Additionally, the tactic gives the enemy a greater psychological impact on the area and may also divert attention from the movement of supplies or personnel for future offensive activities.

8. This trend also encompasses closer coordination among main force, local force, and guerrilla units throughout the country. The close coordination displayed in a series of attacks last week in the delta suggests they were planned and controlled at the province level. This may have been the case in the latest action in Quang Nam Province.

#### North Vietnam's 2nd Division Regrouping

9. The headquarters of the North Vietnamese 2nd Division and all three of the division's subordinate regiments are now concentrated in a heavily forested hill complex just west of the Que Son valley in southern Quang Nam Province [redacted]. The 3rd Regiment has apparently extricated itself from its vulnerable position of last week in the coastal plains. The 2nd Division may be in the highlands to reorganize and receive replacements as it did in early October.

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10. During the past two months the 2nd Division has been the most active enemy division in South Vietnam. Since the first week in September nearly 300 US troops have been killed fighting it and local Viet Cong forces along the Quang Nam - Quang Tin border. Over 2,000 enemy soldiers have been reported killed in this sector.

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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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