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The United States Senate

R1729

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thursday, October 16, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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CONTENTSTESTIMONY OFPAGE

Sidney Gottlieb (resumed)

--accompanied by--

Terry F. Lenzner,

Counsel.

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EXHIBITSNUMBER

Gottlieb Exhibit No. 1

41

Gottlieb Exhibit No. 2

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Gottlieb Exhibit No. 3

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Gottlieb Exhibit No. 4

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## STAFF INTERVIEW

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Thursday, October 16, 1975

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United States Senate,  
 Select Committee to Study Governmental  
 Operations with Respect to  
 Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Staff met, pursuant to notice, at 12:45 p.m., in  
 Room S. 406, the Capitol.

Present. Elliot Maxwell, Ted Ralston, Frederick Barch,  
 and Joseph diGenova, Professional Staff Members.

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1 Mr. Maxwell. We will resume the testimony of Dr.  
2 Gottlieb.

3 TESTIMONY OF SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, (resumed)

4 ACCOMPANIED BY TERRY F. LENZNER, COUNSEL

5 Mr. Maxwell. Dr. Gottlieb, again for the record I  
6 would like to remind you that you do retain your Constitutional  
7 rights and the right to remain silent. And I take it you  
8 are being accompanied by counsel is an indication that you are  
9 exercising your right to counsel.

10 And you have a right, as has been made clear before, to  
11 have a Senator present during your testimony. And I take  
12 it that until you so indicate otherwise that you agreeable to  
13 testifying under oath without the presence of the Senator?

14 Dr. Gottlieb. That is right.

15 Mr. Lenzner. WE stipulate to the same advice of counsel  
16 that you gave us yesterday word for word, and we agree with  
17 it, to save time.

18 Dr. Gottlieb. There is one thing I want to put on the  
19 record, as a result of the stuff you were kind enough to give  
20 me to read this morning. And that is that I feel, looking  
21 over that material, as I told you informally before, there is  
22 only a small fraction of it that I can give you first-hand  
23 information about. As to the rest, if I have an independent  
24 recollection of a part from reading the memos, it would only  
25 be hearsay. But in fact it has been so long ago that I

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1 telling you I feel I am in the role of a consultant rather  
2 than an interrogee, or witness. And my response is, if  
3 that is what you want, I will be glad to be useful that way.

4 Mr. Maxwell. I appreciate that. And I think the best  
5 thing to do before we begin is to say that you are setting  
6 out to the best of your recollection those events that you  
7 are participating in aside from the question of the relation-  
8 ship with the Bureau of Narcotics, and you are testifying that  
9 it was conducted by the Bureau of Narcotics.

10 Dr. Gottlieb. I haven't read anything on that in this  
11 series, and the remarks I made don't refer to that.

12 Mr. Maxwell. You have, though, reviewed the material  
13 that you have available on the Bureau of Narcotics?

14 Dr. Gottlieb. I think Terry did that.

15 Mr. Maxwell. I think you did.

16 Mr. Lenzner. There were some memoranda on the meeting  
17 he had. But may I suggest that we are taking more time  
18 doing this than if we were questioning.

19 Why not go ahead with the questioning?

20 Mr. Maxwell. I want the record to show that the material  
21 that we have available on the Bureau of Narcotics has been  
22 seen by Dr. Gottlieb.

23 Dr. Gottlieb. Was that yesterday?

24 Mr. Lenzner. It was after the session last Thursday.

25 I think since we are going specifically into the memoranda

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1 as I recall them that refer to meetings that Dr. Gottlieb  
 2 had with other officials in the government, I think Mr.  
 3 Giordano and others --

4 Mr. Maxwell. The memorandum also included a  
 5 memorandum prepared at the time of Dr. Olsen's death in  
 6 regard to the availability of LSD to a Mr. George White.

7 Mr. Lenzner. In other parts of the world, or something.

8 Dr. Gottlieb. I remember that now.

9 Mr. Lenzner. There is no question but what we saw that.

10 Dr. Gottlieb. I had actually forgotten that, because I  
 11 was tired.

12 Mr. Maxwell. I think it might be useful if you would  
 13 like to put on the record those incidents in which you were  
 14 involved, and we can later flush them out, and if there are  
 15 questions about other operations in which you were not directly  
 16 involved, or about which you might have some information, we  
 17 will ask those questions later.

18 Dr. Gottlieb. I want to make it clear that I wasn't  
 19 objecting to this role that I labeled as a consultant, if  
 20 that is useful to you, that is fine.

21 Mr. Maxwell. It may be. That can be determined.

22 And would you like to begin with those things that you recall?

23 Dr. Gottlieb. If we are talking about the material that  
 24 I read this morning, the easiest way for me to do it, since  
 25 you have them neatly dovetailed into piles, is to say, I was

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1 personally involved in this file, and in this one I was not,  
2 and so on.

3 (Discussion off the record.)

4 Mr. Maxwell. Why don't you go ahead with these files?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. The first file is drug use policy.  
6 And that seems to comprise several memoranda, mostly in the  
7 fifties, about policy records.

8 Mr. Maxwell. Was it your desire to go through all of  
9 those files chronologically? Because if that is what you  
10 intend to do, then I would prefer to put that off for a moment.

11 Dr. Gottlieb. I was only going to make a remark about  
12 each in terms of my personal involvement with it.

13 Mr. Maxwell. I misunderstood what you would like to  
14 do. But could we put that off for a little while? It may be  
15 useful for your counsel to review those while the other  
16 part of the discussion is going on.

17 Dr. Gottlieb. Fine.

18 Mr. Lenzner. I will be glad to do it any way you want.

19 Mr. Maxwell. I would like to go through some of the  
20 remaining memoranda in the time period, particularly on  
21 Artichoke, and then proceed into the operational use.

22 There is a memorandum dated--

23 Dr. Gottlieb. Am I to understand that these are opera-  
24 tional use so that I can put them aside?

25 Mr. Maxwell. That is correct.

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1 There is a memorandum dated 15 April 1953 to the Chief  
2 of the Security Research staff, the subject being the Artichoke  
3 conference of 19 March 1953. On page 3, at paragraph 14, the  
4 memorandum indicates that:

5 "Dr. Gottlieb discussed the chemical seruinim, and gave  
6 a detailed report of TSS efforts along these lines."

7 Apparently this chemical referred to was LSD.

8 Dr. Gottlieb. When I read that all I could say is that  
9 I don't have the slightest recollection of it.

10 Mr. Maxwell. There is a memorandum -- I don't think  
11 that you have it, but I will read it in substance -- dated  
12 May 13, 1953, for the Director of Central Intelligence, from  
13 [REDACTED] on the subject of the briefing for the  
14 psychological strategy board. Paragraph 2 says:

15 "The Agency is performing research on a drug called  
16 'seruinim' (lysergic acid diethylamide, commonly called LSD)".

17 Dr. Gottlieb. I just didn't retain a memory of it,  
18 and I don't remember now that LSD was ever referred to in that  
19 way.

20 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the meeting?

21 Dr. Gottlieb. I do not.

22 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall in March of 1953 what  
23 efforts were being made by TSS in regard to LSD?

24 Dr. Gottlieb. I think I wrote in that prepared state-  
25 ment, or read into the record, the fact that we certainly had

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1 some contracts let to try to uncover some of the properties  
2 of LSD. But what they were and who they were with I don't  
3 remember.

4 Mr. Maxwell. That same meeting also mentions that you  
5 discussed the material from Latin America obtained by [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED] and stated it was now being tested and would be fully  
7 exploited.

8 Do you recall whether in fact any of that material was  
9 used operationally?

10 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't recall any of it being used  
11 operationally. If what you are referring to is these  
12 botanicals that were collected in an effort to just see whether  
13 there were other operationally useful materials, that was an  
14 experimental effort, and we are screening materials. But  
15 I don't remember anything that came out of that that was  
16 useful.

17 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall what research was done in  
18 the screening? Was screening done on human volunteers in  
19 regard to the botanicals at the Agency or by contracts  
20 outside?

21 Dr. Gottlieb. I wouldn't think so. I would think the  
22 first effort would be to determine the physiological activity  
23 on animals. And I really don't remember how far they  
24 got.

25 But I would think -- well, that is speculative, and I

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1 don't think it would be helpful to you.

2 Could you restate your question? I understood your  
3 question to mean, this testing exploitation, I think the  
4 word was. Did you mean were they tested on human subjects?

5 Mr. Maxwell. Divided into two forms. The testing it-  
6 self, which I took to mean -- and which I might not have made  
7 clear -- in regard to research either with universities, hos-  
8 pitals, mental hospitals, prisons, jails, institutions for the  
9 criminally insane, operational use, I took to mean an operation  
10 for either special interrogation or to change the behavior of  
11 an individual or groups of individuals who the Agency wanted  
12 to affect.

13 Dr. Gottlieb. The reason I am raising the question again  
14 is that although I don't have a specific recollection in the  
15 research program of these botanicals, the psilocybins  
16 and that sort of thing, they could well have been tested on  
17 humans.

18 And if you are talking about operational exploitation,  
19 I think this chap was the fellow that brought us back this  
20 **1.3(a)(4)** **C** [redacted] that I was telling you about, the [redacted] **C**  
21 that certainly was used operationally. But I don't remem-  
22 ber it ever being tested. I think we put some on ourselves  
23 to see if it [redacted] and that was the test.

**1.3(a)(4)**

24 Mr. Maxwell. Was that [redacted] or [redacted]

25 Dr. Gottlieb. [redacted] grew it for us later, but

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1 it well could have been [REDACTED] who first came across it.

2 Mr. Maxwell. Would you define for the record how you  
3 would interpret the term operational use in order that we  
4 might have that made clear?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. My understanding of the term operational  
6 use would be any use that would be made in conjunction with  
7 supporting an approved operation of the Central Intelligence  
8 Agency.

9 Mr. Maxwell. And how would you define testing?

10 Dr. Gottlieb. Testing would be a case where we were  
11 trying to get information on the properties of a material by  
12 using facilities that had nothing to do with it.

13 Now, there is such a thing as operationally testing. And  
14 that is where the two get combined.

15 Mr. Maxwell. Would you define that for the record?

16 Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I would define that as a case  
17 where two things are happening. One is, it is being potentially  
18 useful to an approved operation of the Agency, and the  
19 other is, it is providing what I would call research information  
20 in a testing sense.

21 Mr. Maxwell. There is a memorandum that I would like  
22 call your attention to dated 11 May 1953 for the Chief, Security  
23 Research Staff, Mr. Morse Allen, the subject being the Antichoke  
24 Conference of 16 April 1953.

25 Paragraph one indicates that you were in attendance re-

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1 presenting TSS.

2 Paragraph 2 recalls a report by [REDACTED] on the  
3 subject of continued "Artichoke experimentation and research,  
4 particularly on criminals passing through the cities psycho-  
5 pathic clinic". Do you recall that report or re-  
6 search done for Artichoke in such a setting?

7 Dr. Gottlieb. I can only say I don't remember it, and  
8 I doubt very much if it had anything to do with the TSS.

9 This [REDACTED] never worked for me. And I would only assume  
10 he was with one of the other units that coordinated in the  
11 Artichoke program.

12 Mr. Maxwell. Do you remember receiving information from  
13 other units in the Agency on experimentation performed at  
14 mental hospitals, prisons, and penal institutions?

15 Dr. Gottlieb. I remember generally receiving such  
16 information, but I don't remember where they were or  
17 when the information was given to me, or who performed the  
18 work, what unit performed it. And I may right now be confused  
19 by what I am reading here. It is one of those situations.

20 Mr. Maxwell. Do you have a general awareness of testing  
21 that went on under TSS or TSD auspices at hospitals, mental  
22 hospitals, prisons, jails, and institutions for the criminally  
23 insane?

24 Dr. Gottlieb. I certainly wouldn't say yes if you  
25 mean all of those. If you mean any of those, the answer is yes.

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1 Mr. Maxwell. Do you have a particular recollection of  
2 experimentation that went on in one or more of those, and if  
3 so, which ones, as categories rather than as particular in-  
4 stitutions.

5 Dr. Gottlieb. Excuse me, I would like to consult  
6 with my counsel.

7 (Witness confers with counsel.)

8 Dr. Gottlieb. I apparently misunderstood the question.  
9 I understood your question to mean, could I name a specific  
10 institution in which this kind of work was done, or institu-  
11 tions.

12 Mr. Lenzner. I understood the question to mean, do you  
13 know whether it was done in hospitals, institutions for the  
14 criminally insane, or institutions for criminals, or any  
15 other institutions generally.

16 Mr. Maxwell. At this point it is a general question in  
17 regard to categories rather than a particular institution.

18 Dr. Gottlieb. I misunderstood it.

19 Could you restate it, and I will try to answer as accu-  
20 rately as I can.

21 Mr. Maxwell. If it would be helpful we can do it in session.

22 Do you recall any general research being done under TSS  
23 auspices at hospitals?

24 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

25 Mr. Maxwell. With psychochemicals?

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

2 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall experiments with psychochemi-  
3 cals on human subjects being done in prisons under TSS  
4 auspices?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I am having trouble with the term  
6 "prisons".

7 (Witness confers with counse.)

8 Dr. Gottlieb. The reason for the confusion here is  
9 that there were institutions or institutes that I have trouble  
10 defining. I wouldn't call it a prison. It had people  
11 with criminal background in it, but they were not confined  
12 as they would be in a prison. And I would call it more of a  
13 treatment facility.

14 Mr. Ralson. Would this be a halfway house?

15 Dr. Gottlieb. Something like that, yes. It was a  
16 hospital, but it was not a hospital for the criminally insane.  
17 It was just one of these definition problems.

18 Mr. Maxwell. Is it an institution run by the U.S.  
19 Public Health Service?

20 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

21 Mr. Maxwell. At this point I am not going to pursue  
22 the specifics, but that may well be considered in the future.

23 Dr. Gottlieb. I will cope with it when it comes.

24 Mr. Maxwell. The memo also indicates in paragraph

25 Dr. Gottlieb. Excuse me. I want to comment on something.

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1 I hope you understand, I am not trying to be obstructive  
2 here, I am just extremely sensitized to this leak business.  
3 And I am extremely sensitized to words like criminals and  
4 criminally insane. And that is what is going through my  
5 mind. I want to answer the questions very carefully for  
6 that reason.

7 Mr. Maxwell. Fine. It is my understanding that your  
8 response was that in regard -- let me try to make clear what  
9 I believe the response is.

10 There was some confusion on the part of Dr. Gottlieb  
11 as to whether the institution that he had in mind where  
12 psychochemicals were tested on human subjects was accurately  
13 described as either a prison or a hospital or an institution  
14 for the criminally insane or any other institution, that it  
15 might well have crossed lines in the definitions he would have  
16 set up for those, and that in fact it was an institution that  
17 he had in mind when he was responding that it might best be  
18 called a treatment facility rather than either necessarily a  
19 hospital or a prison, and that it may well be that the in-  
20 dividuals utilizing that treatment facility had engaged part  
21 of that time in criminal acts, or might have been convicted  
22 criminals, but it would not be accurately described as a  
23 detention center.

24 Mr. Lenzner. I think that is a fair statement. In the  
25 previous answer he did say that he recalled that hospitals as

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1 institutions generally had also been--

2 Mr. Maxwell. That is right.

3 He has not yet responded to the question as to whether  
4 there were, to his recollection, under TSS auspices, experi-  
5 ments on human subjects with psychochemicals in prisons.

6 Dr. Gottlieb. My answer to that is that to the best of  
7 my recollection, no.

8 Mr. Maxwell. To the best of your recollection -- and  
9 here I would call attention to a previous memo -- to the best  
10 of your recollection, given the minutes of the Artichoke  
11 conference of 19 February 1953, where they were testing under  
12 TSS auspices psychochemicals on human subjects at universities --

13 Dr. Gottlieb. Could you point to the paragraph in  
14 that that you are referring to?

15 Mr. Maxwell. Paragraph 3.

16 Dr. Gottlieb. Paragraph 8 only tells me that the  
17 category -- there would seem to be five, but there were  
18 various universities and hospitals. And mine doesn't have  
19 anything.

20 Mr. Maxwell. That is correct. I am just asking generally  
21 for the category.

22 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't think that would have been one of  
23 them, to the best of my recollection prisons would not have  
24 been one of those categories.

25 Mr. Maxwell. Now, I am referring to universities.

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. What was your question?

2 Mr. Maxwell. The question is whether you recall testing  
3 on human subjects involving psychochemicals under TSS auspices  
4 at universities.

5 Mr. Lenzner. Before you answer that, do you have an  
6 unsanitized version that lists specific institutions?

7 Mr. Maxwell. I do not have that with me. I have access  
8 to it if I desire. My understanding is that this represents  
9 a fair paraphrase of the specific material.

10 Dr. Gottlieb. I am having trouble with that one, be-  
11 cause some of the individuals that we worked with surely had  
12 university affiliations. But the work with human subjects  
13 was done in hospitals.

14 So, when you say universities, it is again one of  
15 these confusing terms that I would like to be accurate about.

16 Mr. Lenzner. This paragraph does not indicate, this  
17 paragraph C, that tests were being conducted on humans.

18 Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 Mr. Lenzner. Back on the record.

21 We are now going to answer the question.

22 Mr. Maxwell. We will break for lunch.

23 (Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., a recess was taken, the  
24 hearing to be resumed the same day.)

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## AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

## TESTIMONY OF SIDNEY GOTTLIEB (resumed)

Mr. Maxwell. I will frame the question, and you may respond.

Do you have any recollection of testing on human subjects under TSS Auspices of psychochemicals at universities in general?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think my response to that would be, not to my recollection, with a comment that there was some of the work involving such testing that went on at hospitals that were affiliated with universities, and might have used university students as a source of volunteers.

Mr. Maxwell. I would like to call your attention to paragraph 3 of the same memo of 11 May 1953, in which it notes that:

"All hands agreed that a great deal of work was necessary" -- and this was in reference to the Artichoke work -- "and it was essential to find an area where large numbers of bodies would be used for research and experimentation".

Do you recall that discussion, or do you recall other discussions among either the Artichoke Committee or members of the TSS staff on the need to have large numbers of bodies available for research and experimentation in regard to psychochemicals?

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember a discussion like that,  
2 no.

3 Mr. Maxwell. In paragraph 7 it indicates that there was  
4 a general discussion concerning the problem of the returning  
5 POW's from Korea.

6 Was any of the work done in TSS directed at research relat-  
7 ing to POW's returning, or directed at POW's returning from  
8 Korea?

9 Dr. Gottlieb. Is the specific meaning of your question  
10 using those people as subjects, or debriefing them?

11 Mr. Maxwell. First, debriefing them, and secondly,  
12 using them as subjects for other than psychochemicals.

13 And third, using them as subjects for testing by psycho-  
14 chemicals?

15 Dr. Gottlieb. My answer would be that I have no  
16 recollection of the latter two categories. And the former,  
17 I have a faint remembrance that in someway either we got this  
18 kind of information about their debriefing in a project we  
19 had that was interested in fathering intelligence on  
20 possible brainwashing.

21 And I do sort of remember that we had access to some of  
22 the debriefing reports.

23 Mr. Maxwell. Was one of the concerns of Artichoke, if  
24 you can remember, independent of their material, the question  
25 of brainwashing of POW's, or one of the concerns of the Agency.

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1 this concern?

2 Dr. Gottlieb. Certainly it was one of the concerns of the  
3 Agency. Whether it was a concern of Artichoke -- I would  
4 have to say yes, in its general thrust, and again mostly  
5 reminded by what I read here. I think that term came up in  
6 the minutes a couple of times.

7 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall at all my discussions involv-  
8 ing particular POW's at Valley Forge and proposals to interro-  
9 gate them?

10 Dr. Gottlieb. Is this a TSS effort?

11 Mr. Maxwell. This was an Artichoke Committee effort.

12 And it is detailed in a memo dated 8 June 1953 to  
13 the Chief, Security Research Staff on the subject of the  
14 Artichoke Conference of 21 May 1953.

15 If you don't have it I will hand it to you.

16 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember reading about that.

17 Mr. Maxwell. Here it is.

18 (Handing document to Dr. Gottlieb.)

19 And I call your attention to paragraph 2.

20 Dr. Gottlieb. Are you asking me whether I have an  
21 independent recollection of that?

22 Mr. Maxwell. Well, the memorandum does not show you as  
23 in attendance at that meeting. The question comes to mind,  
24 because of the reference in the paragraph that sodium amytal  
25 and sodium pentathol was ruled out for use with the returning

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1 POW's by the Surgeon General.

2 And the question is what possible reasons he, meaning  
3 the Surgeon General, might have had for preventing the use of  
4 those two chemicals on returning POW's?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. I wouldn't begin to know that. I wouldn't  
6 even have a speculative answer. And I certainly wouldn't have  
7 an absolute answer.

8 Mr. Maxwell. Had any questions about the medical  
9 effects of either of those chemicals been raised in the  
10 Artichoke Conferences?

11 Dr. Gottlieb. Sodium amytal and pentathol?

12 Mr. Maxwell. That is correct.

13 Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I can't believe the medical  
14 effects weren't brought up. It would be impossible to talk  
15 about them. But if you are asking me whether I specifically  
16 remember discussions of negative effects or counter indications  
17 or bad side effects, I don't remember such discussions.

18 Mr. Maxwell. The question arises because those in fact  
19 were drugs that were being used in Artichoke.

20 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

21 Mr. Maxwell. And it is of particular importance, given  
22 the concern of the Surgeon General that these not be used when  
23 in fact these continued to be used subsequent to this dis-  
24 cussion by the Artichoke Committee?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. Well, my answer has to be that I don't

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1 know what was in the Surgeon General's mind when he wrote  
2 these out.

3 Mr. Lenzner. When you say they would continue to be used,  
4 you mean used abroad?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. Used abroad by this Artichoke group  
6 that was run by the Office of Security.

7 Mr. Maxwell. I wouldn't limit my comment to being used  
8 abroad by the Artichoke Committee. There were at least  
9 proposals as to Artichoke techniques which by implication may  
10 well have included sodium pentathol and sodium amytal  
11 in regard to individuals located within the U.S. There is  
12 no indication that we have at this point that such material  
13 was used against American citizens within the U.S.

14 There is a memorandum dated 15 July 1953 to the Chief,  
15 Security Research Staff, in regard to the ARTichoke conference  
16 of 18 June 1953. It shows you in attendance representing TSS.

17 Paragraph 5 is of interest to us. And it reads:

18 "Following this, Dr. Gottlieb gave a very brief report on  
19 some of the activities of the special work carried on by  
20 [REDACTED] in which his division is  
21 materially interested, and also commented on the work of the  
22 Army Chemical Corps in lines of interest to Artichoke".

23 I was wondering which particular work of [REDACTED] was of  
24 particular interest to TSS, and whether you can recall which  
25 particular work of the Army Chemical Corps was referenced.

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. I have no specific remembrance of that.  
 2 Again, in a speculative way, if it is at all helpful to you, I  
 3 would imagine that the [REDACTED], as I remember it,  
 4 was doing a lot of synthetic organic chemical work on com-  
 5 pounds of biological interest. And they still do as far as  
 6 I know. And this must have referred to some compounds they  
 7 were making that had some, I would imagine,

8 psychogenic interest. And the same would apply to the Army  
 9 Chemical Corps.

10 Mr. Maxwell. When you use the term Army Chemical Corps  
 11 in a discussion such as is reflected in this memorandum, would  
 12 that refer to any units specifically within the Army Chemical  
 13 Corps?

14 Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I think it would refer to work  
 15 either under contract or in their own labs that the Army  
 16 Chemical Corps was doing. I can't recall in this context  
 17 a specific group.

18 Mr. Maxwell. Did SDO fall under the generic term of the  
 19 Army Chemical Corps?

20 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I don't think I would, just by the  
 21 context, have been referring to SDO.

22 Mr. Maxwell. But what other units in particular, if  
 23 there were such, would be included in a reference such as the  
 24 Army Chemical Corps?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. The Army Chemical Corps, more out of

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1 Edgewood than Frederick, if I remember correctly, had a  
 2 large and active program of testing in various ways on  
 3 humans and otherwise, but they had companies synthesize materials  
 4 of interest to them from their chemical warfare point of  
 5 view, and they were specifically interested, as I deposed  
 6 earlier, in LSD.

7 Mr. Maxwell. Were you the person who was involved in  
 8 liaison with the Army Chemical Corps at this time?

9 Dr. Gottlieb. I think -- as I remember that time, I  
 10 certainly wasn't the principal point of contact, but one of the  
 11 people that worked with me or close to me was.

12 Mr. Maxwell. Who would that be?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember. Could be any one of  
 14 several, Dr. Lashbrook, or [REDACTED] would be two possi-  
 15 bilities. I just don't remember specifically.

16 Can I consult with my counsel?

17 (Witness confers with counsel.)

18 Mr. Maxwell. Does the reference in Paragraph 16 to  
 19 the results that had been obtained from the botanicals  
 20 brought back by [REDACTED] refresh your recollection at  
 21 all?

22 Dr. Gottlieb. Not specifically. I would surmise some  
 23 tests had been run on these psychogenic materials, whether  
 24 they were tests where we had just extracted them and said,  
 25 yes, they were there, or some other kinds of results. I can't

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23

1 recall or get my memory refreshed from that.

2 Mr. Maxwell. In paragraph 22 is the first reference that  
3 I have seen to a program under carefully controlled conditions  
4 of testing techniques in chemicals on CIA officers. It was  
5 raised by Colonel Edwards at this meeting which indicates that  
6 you were present. And I was wondering if you can recall the  
7 circumstances of the proposal or the discussion at the time.

8 Dr. Gottlieb. Say that again, please. I was still read-  
9 ing it when you posed your question.

10 Mr. Lenzner. The question is, do you remember what the  
11 specific proposal was.

12 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I don't remember that.

13 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the circumstances in which it  
14 was raised or your first reaction to it, or the discussion  
15 that followed?

16 Dr. Gottlieb. No recollection.

17 Mr. Lenzner. I think the witness testified yesterday  
18 that substances were given to people who were overseas or  
19 going overseas so that they could become familiar with the  
20 effects of certain drugs.

21 Is this the same?

22 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I believe that happened later than  
23 this. And I don't correlate this project proposal or mentioning  
24 of the desirability of that with that activity.

25 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall this being in any way connected

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24

1 with the experimenting that you were doing on yourself  
2 and other personnel at TSS?

3 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I do not.

4 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall in the context of this pro-  
5 posal discussing with the Artichoke Committee the experiments  
6 that you were performing on yourself or on other TSS staffs?

7 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember whether we did or we didn't  
8 bring this up to Artichoke. And I saw no reference here that  
9 would indicate we did or did not.

10 Mr. Maxwell. In order to perhaps continue the process of  
11 trying to refresh your recollection about the proposal, in  
12 paragraph 6 of a 30 July 1953 memo, the Artichoke Conference of  
13 15 July, it again references Colonel Edwards proposal. It  
14 gives it in slightly more detail.

15 It should be noted for the record that you are not  
16 shown in attendance at this meeting, but that Dr. Gibbons  
17 was representing TSS.

18 I would like to ask you whether in fact this helps you  
19 recall the proposal made around that time?

20 Dr. Gottlieb. No, it really doesn't. I read this  
21 with quite a bit of interest. And if I had an awareness of  
22 it, I have forgotten all about it. And I am even now re-  
23 considering in my mind -- they may have been the forerunners  
24 of this project Mr. Lenzner mentioned, but I can't testify  
25 with any assurance as to whether even that was true.

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1 Mr. Maxwell. Did Dr. Gibbons know of the experiment  
2 that you were conducting on yourself and other TSS staffs?

3 Dr. Gottlieb. Oh, yes.

4 Mr. Maxwell. The record should show that there is no men-  
5 tion that Dr. Gibbons raised that issue, and apparently there  
6 was an agreement that this should be referred to the training  
7 branch as to whether they considered the matter feasible and  
8 sound?

9 Dr. Gottlieb. I didn't understand the point that you just  
10 made.

11 Mr. Maxwell. That Dr. Gibbons, who was chief of the service  
12 in which you were employed, had considered this idea at least  
13 worthy of being explored with the training branch, and there  
14 is no indication in the minutes that the testing which you  
15 testified he knew about was brought to the attention of the  
16 people proposing the test.

17 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

18 Mr. Maxwell. Was the testing that you were conducting  
19 on yourself and other TSS staffs or other staffs performed by  
20 members of the CIA medical staff?

21 Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember. I think I  
22 deposited in the prepared statement that some of them had a  
23 physician -- researcher in attendance, and some didn't. And  
24 I really can't remember now whether those were medical staff  
25 people from the CIA or some of the researchers we were working

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1 with on the outside.

2 Mr. Maxwell. Also I will recall your attention to  
3 paragraph 10, which notes that Dr. Gibbons pointed out that  
4 working with the [REDACTED] scientific people might be "very  
5 advantageous, since he stated that the [REDACTED] Government  
6 permitted certain activities which were not permitted by the  
7 U.S. Government (i.e., experiments on anthrax, et cetera)."

8 Was any of the research done by TSS performed by the  
9 researchers outside of the U.S.?

10 Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my knowledge.

11 Do you mean, did we have research going on outside the  
12 borders of the U.S.? And I understand you mean similar to  
13 contract research. Not to my remembrance.

14 Mr. Maxwell. Your understanding of contract research  
15 would mean simply where you were farming out a contract or  
16 a particular research project?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. A piece of work, yes, we weren't doing  
18 it ourselves.

19 Mr. Maxwell. And obviously there was operational  
20 research in the way we define --

21 Dr. Gottlieb. Operational testing.

22 Mr. Maxwell. Operational testing, going on outside.

23 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

24 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall any instance under either  
25 NKULTRA or any other TSS research program where research was

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1 contracted out in order to avoid restrictions --  
2 where research was contracted out which could not be performed  
3 within the Continental U.S.?

4 Dr. Gottlieb. I will be glad to answer that. But the  
5 former question you asked me was even more inclusive, whether  
6 we had any. And now you are asking me whether we had any for  
7 this purpose. And I am saying, we didn't have any. So that  
8 would include both questions. Or do I not understand you  
9 right?

10 Mr. Maxwell. No, I wanted it specifically for the record.

11 There is a memorandum dated 16 July 1953 to Artichoke  
12 representatives from the Director of Security on the  
13 subject "Artichoke restatement of program". This was  
14 proposed by the Director of Security in order that the alle-  
15 gation of responsibilities be made clear, and that all the  
16 participants in the Artichoke program under the aims of the  
17 program. And I would like you to look over the restatement of  
18 aims found in paragraph 6, and as best you can recall tell us  
19 whether this accurately summarizes the aims as you knew them at  
20 the time. These aims included: to perfect techniques  
21 utilizing existing drugs, hypotheses and other elements for the  
22 extraction of information from individuals, whether willing  
23 or not, as well as working in coordination with TSS and the  
24 medical staff for research and experimentation within TSS  
25 and the medical staff for the development of means for the

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1 control of the activities and mental capacities of individuals  
2 whether willing or not, as well as liaison and research in  
3 fields and areas not within the capabilities of TSS and the  
4 medical staff for the development of ideas and possible means  
5 of exerting control over the activities and mental capacities  
6 of individuals.

7 Dr. Gottlieb. My answer is that I don't have a recollec-  
8 tion independent of what I just read and you just read of that  
9 kind of a restatement of aims, but it sort of fits in with my  
10 general remembrance of what Artichoke was all about.

11 Mr. Maxwell. There is an undated memorandum to the  
12 Director of Central Intelligence from the Director of Security  
13 on the subject of "experimental project utilizing training  
14 volunteers". I was wondering if you would look that over  
15 and see if that refreshes your recollection about the proposal  
16 that was discussed in the earlier Artichoke meetings.

17 The notes that the technical staff -- in this case the  
18 Technical Services Staff -- will participate actively in this  
19 program, and would furnish new substances and advice as to their  
20 utilization.

21 Dr. Gottlieb. That doesn't jog my memory.

22 Let me comment here that I assume when you bring up a  
23 question like you just did, what you are asking me is, do I  
24 remember anything beyond what I am reading here.

25 Is that it?

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1 Mr. Maxwell. It would include both, if you remembered that --  
 2 Dr. Gottlieb. And the answer is, all this material -- I  
 3 guess there might be an exception or two -- but I have forgotten  
 4 and can't remember the details like the ones mentioned here.  
 5 And I read them and say, yes, they could have happened, and  
 6 probably did happen, under Artichoke. I see no reason why  
 7 Allen would so record them otherwise.

8 (Discussion off the record.)

9 Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

10 There is a memorandum dated 16 November 1953 for the Chief,  
 11 Security Research Staff --

12 Dr. Gottlieb. I have one 19 November, but I don't have  
 13 a 16 November one.

14 Mr. Maxwell. The subject is the Artichoke conference of  
 15 22 October 1953. You will note in paragraph 5 that [REDACTED]  
 16 stated a draft of the proposal for an experimental project using  
 17 specially screened trainee volunteers would also be given  
 18 to the Artichoke conference members at the same time. I believe  
 19 that refers to the training proposal that I just showed you.  
 20 And it indicates: [REDACTED] requests all members to examine  
 21 the draft, make any notes, corrections, additions, and be  
 22 prepared to discuss the proposals at the following Artichoke  
 23 Conference."

24 Do you recall that proposal be circulated in TSS?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. Not independent of what I read here.

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1 Mr. Maxwell. Would it be likely that when you returned  
2 from the Artichoke Conference that you would describe to the  
3 people you were working with in TSS what had occurred at the  
4 conference?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. You note that I wasn't there. Gibbons  
6 and Lashbrook were. So you are not being specific as far as  
7 this goes.

8 Mr. Maxwell. That is correct.

9 Dr. Gottlieb. Okay.

10 Mr. Maxwell. When you were in attendance at an Arti-  
11 choke Conference or a meeting like that, would it be likely  
12 that you would do essentially a memorandum of conversation or  
13 a memorandum of the meeting to speculate to other individuals  
14 within TSS?

15 Dr. Gottlieb. One of two things probably would have  
16 happened. Either I would have brought the minutes, if they  
17 were given to me, back for people whom I considered needed to  
18 know them to read, or I would have probably orally briefed  
19 those people that I thought needed to know this, one or the  
20 other.

21 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall doing that in regard, not neces-  
22 sarily to the Artichoke meeting, but to other events like that?

23 Dr. Gottlieb. That is such a general question. That was  
24 the normal mode of operation.

25 Mr. Maxwell. Was that also true with other members of

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1 TSS doing that as well?

2 Dr. Gottlieb. I am sure not. I am sure that Dr.  
3 Gibbons had some other way of doing it, he being Chief of the  
4 Division he probably would have just mentioned it orally to  
5 me, say, and felt that I would do whatever further dissemination  
6 was necessary. And that varied, depending on who was there.  
7 If Colonel Drum was there he probably had a slightly different  
8 variation on that theme.

9 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the particular mode adopted  
10 by Colonel Drum or by Dr. Gibbons?

11 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I don't. Except I don't remember having  
12 a feeling that they were withholding information from me  
13 that I ought to know.

14 Mr. Maxwell. That same memorandum -- the record should show  
15 that Frederick Baron of the Senate Select Committee staff has  
16 just come into the hearing room.

17 On that same memorandum it notes that under  
18 consideration was the purchase of 10 kilograms of LSD?

19 Dr. Gottlieb. Are you referring to the memorandum you  
20 just showed me?

21 Mr. Maxwell. I will just sum up that memorandum and  
22 several succeeding ones.

23 Dr. Gottlieb. Because I see on other ones.

24 MR. Maxwell. At the meeting on 22 October a proposal was  
25 discussed to purchase ten kilograms of LSD supposedly held by

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Subsequent to that [REDACTED] described a meeting with the Director at which the Director approved the purchase of ten kilograms of LSD from [REDACTED]

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Later information derived by Mr. Roosevelt from a visit to [REDACTED] indicated that there was in fact no amount near that available, and that it was possible to purchase 10 grams of LSD rather than 10 Kilograms.

Would it be the normal procedure for purchases like that or operations like that to be approved at the level of the Director?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think I can best respond to your question by telling you what I know about that whole incident.

Would that be appropriate? Or would you rather I narrowly confine myself to your question?

I can answer your question off the record by saying I can't answer it, because it was such an unusual situation that it can't be compared to, was it the usual practice?

Mr. Maxwell. Why don't we do that on the record?

Dr. Gottlieb. You mean just comment on the whole thing? Because it was a fairly involved incident, and I have a bizarre memory of it.

Mr. Maxwell. Okay.

Dr. Gottlieb. My memory of the incident involving an

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1 attempt to purchase a large quantity of LSD from [REDACTED]  
 2 which I must admit have some inaccuracies due to the length of  
 3 time between then and now -- involved a report from a military  
 4 attache [REDACTED] intelligence report, that said the  
 5 Russians either had or were in negotiation with this company to  
 6 essentially purchase the world supply of LSD. And that came  
 7 in as an intelligence report. And with the level of our in-  
 8 terest and the interest of several components of the U.S.  
 9 Government in LSD, it created quite a start.

10 One of the sequelae of this whole business was a dis-  
 11 cussion of whether we shouldn't pre-emptively buy it on the  
 12 basis that this material had either posed a sinister threat to  
 13 the U.S.A., or could give the Russians some advantage. We  
 14 didn't know what the answer to that was. It would seem  
 15 that if the price wasn't too high that it would be wise just in  
 16 a defensive way to pre-emptively buy it.

17 So that in a series of meetings and so on, I don't remem-  
 18 ber the specifics, but as I remember it Mr. Roosevelt, with an  
 19 official of a U.S. drug firm that had a background in this  
 20 kind of material, and was known and would be trusted by the  
 21 [REDACTED] company, went there to make his purchase after it was  
 22 approved.

23 And as you said, it had to be approved by the DCI, because  
 24 the amount of money was not piddling, as I remember, it was a  
 25 couple of million dollars, as I remember it, it was a large

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1 amount of money. And it wasn't that we knew how much it would  
2 cost. They were authorized, after discussion with this  
3 American firm, to go that high if they had to.

4 And the result of the whole thing was something like you  
5 said, I don't remember the details, but the whole report was  
6 probably a garble, with the attache mixing grams for kilograms,  
7 and no one later, I don't think, was ever able to confirm the  
8 Russian interest in that specific thing.

9 But no material, as I remember it, was ever bought  
10 in that sense. And that is what my remembrance of that inci-  
11 dent was.

12 Mr. Maxwell. Let the record show that Joseph diGenova,  
13 staff counsel for the Senate Select Committee, is also now in  
14 attendance.

15 There is an agenda for an Artichoke meeting of  
16 19 November 1953, with the first heading being a discussion of  
17 LSD.

18 Can you recall, Dr. Gottlieb, whether that discussion  
19 refers to the --

20 Dr. Gottlieb. Excuse me. I am a little confused.  
21 The memo I have dated 19 November 1953 doesn't seem to fit  
22 the one you are talking about.

23 I see. It is the one before that.

24 Mr. Maxwell. I would like to know, Dr. Gottlieb, if you  
25 can recall whether Item No. 1, the discussion of LSD, referred

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1 to the purchase of LSD that we just described, or the  
 2 projected purchase of LSD as we just described, or whether it might  
 3 have referred to the testing of LSD which took place several  
 4 days after this?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. I couldn't tell you that. There is nothing  
 6 in here that allows me to refresh my memory.

7 There is a handwritten note here which I gather was  
 8 done by your staff saying "Purchase next to LSD".

9 Mr. Maxwell. That is right.

10 Mr. Lenzner. That was added by the staff of the Committee?

11 Mr. Maxwell. Yes.

12 Dr. Gottlieb. That is what I assumed.

13 Mr. Maxwell. Underneath it says "purchase", question mark  
 14 "Olsen test brought up".

15 Dr. Gottlieb. Mine doesn't have that much.

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16 Mr. Maxwell. There is a memorandum for the record based  
 17 on that meeting from, I believe, [REDACTED], which doesn't  
 18 clarify that point. It only discussed the proposed re-  
 19 statement of program that you saw before and the experimental  
 20 project utilizing training of volunteers. And I call your  
 21 attention to paragraph 2, where [REDACTED] recommended, as the  
 22 representative of the medical office, that the testing  
 23 program not be confined merely to male volunteer trainee  
 24 personnel, but that it be broadened to include all the com-  
 25 ponents of the Agency.

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1 Does that refresh your recollection at all as to  
 2 whether that program ever went forward, or whether it was  
 3 discussed subsequently?

4 Dr. Gottlieb. It does not.

5 As I said before, this suggested program may have been the  
 6 forerunner of the one that I referred to in my deposition. But  
 7 I don't know for sure. There is nothing here that reminds me of  
 8 it.

9 Mr. Maxwell. I would like the record to show that both  
 10 Dr. Gottlieb and his counsel have had an opportunity to review  
 11 the entire report from [REDACTED] that was referred to  
 12 in testimony yesterday.

13 I would also like to add one comment from that, and  
 14 to get Dr. Gottlieb's response to that comment.

15 It concerns the same meeting, the same series of  
 16 meetings that was discussed yesterday, in which it was brought  
 17 out that [REDACTED] had stated that he knew of no incidents  
 18 that had occurred in regard to LSD, when later a colleague of  
 19 [REDACTED] indicated that there had been at least one  
 20 incident connected to LSD.

21 [REDACTED] indicated to [REDACTED] that, "We might  
 22 use up to 200 gamma per subject, [REDACTED] says to. [REDACTED]  
 23 suggested that if there is no severe psychic change in a normal  
 24 individual with one gamma per kilogram, go to two gamma  
 25 per kilogram."

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1 I was wondering if you could provide any information on  
2 dosages that you recall using in the test that you conducted  
3 either on yourself or with other members of TSS?

4 Dr. Gottlieb. I can only say, if you will accept the  
5 comment, that it is not a precise statement, that the range was  
6 probably from 60 to 100 micrograms at one administration.

7 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the one --

8 Mr. Ralston. May I clarify something?

9 Sixty to 100 micrograms per kilogram of bodyweight?

10 Dr. Gottlieb. No. That would be an enormous dosage.

11 Mr. Ralston. We are talking about micrograms and  
12 not grams?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. Micrograms per individual. That is the total  
14 does.

15 Just to clarify this, the reference that you just read  
16 to me of one microgram per kilogram for the average human  
17 would be about 70 micrograms. So that is the range that  
18 we are talking about.

19 Mr. Maxwell. What would you set as the parameter, the  
20 kind of safe range in regard to LSD, as you can recall it  
21 at that time?

22 Dr. Gottlieb. That is a little hard for me. I can only  
23 remember what you were using. We felt the range I mentioned  
24 was a very safe range. And I guess we had information about  
25 people being given five, six, seven times that much, with

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1 apparently no ill effects.

2 Mr. Maxwell. There is an indication in this report that:

3 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] agreed that LSD 25 keeps well, but  
4 not in solution. Solutions can be kept and used for a week,  
5 according to [REDACTED], for several months, according  
6 to [REDACTED]. They mentioned a report that an Italian worker  
7 had used 700 gamma without disaster. There is a good possi-  
8 bility that his solution had disintegrated."

9 Does that square with your recollection of what you knew  
10 at the time?

11 Dr. Gottlieb. I could only comment that you are talk-  
12 ing about a period of time when work was beginning in this  
13 field, and there were all sorts of conflicting reports, and  
14 it wouldn't be unusual to read of discussions such as this,  
15 where one person said this, and the other said this, and he  
16 said, that is probably due to the fact that it was decomposed  
17 and he wasn't really getting that much.

18 Mr. Maxwell. Your recollection is that it was probably  
19 between sixty or seventy micrograms that was being used in  
20 experiments done on his staff or on yourself?

21 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

22 Mr. Maxwell. I think the understanding is that this  
23 part of the deposition will be terminated, and Mr. Baron and  
24 Mr. diGenova will continue questions in regard to other  
25 subjects. When they have completed their questioning we will  
reconvene to continue on the question of drug testing.

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1 Mr. Lenzner. Before we close up, to complete the record,  
2 because of the references you made, this memorandum at page 10  
3 also indicates that [REDACTED] also believed that the  
4 application of this material would be useful in "freeing"  
5 depressed patients.

6 And I think that ought to be included in the record,  
7 since reference was made to the fact that it might have an  
8 effect on other depressed patients, that observation was made  
9 by another doctor in the same report.

10 Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

11 (Discussion off the record.)

12 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

13 Dr. Gottlieb, what I intend to do for the next hour or so  
14 is go over a series of excerpts from the Inspector General's  
15 report of 1967 which mention various schemes for action against  
16 Fidel Castro that involve devices or materials developed  
17 in CIA laboratory i's by CIA scientists. In some of these  
18 cases your name was mentioned as one of the people who was  
19 interviewed by the Inspector General's office and who did have  
20 a recollection about the events. In other cases you are not  
21 mentioned, but because of your position in the CIA at the time  
22 we were interested in what light you might be able to shed on  
23 these developments.

24 And I think the record should reflect that your counsel  
25 has had a chance to read these documents over at length, and

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1 before you answer any questions on any of the excerpts from  
2 the IG report today, we will give you the opportunity to read  
3 them over as carefully as you would like.

4 Mr. Lenzner. For the record, we have talked about  
5 my review of the records with Dr. Gottlieb. So he has had some  
6 information about the reports.

7 Mr. Baron. Also one more item for the record.

8 'You are willing, are you not, to continue to testify  
9 under oath in the absence of a Senator?

10 Mr. Lenzner. Yes, we have been through all that earlier  
11 on the record this morning. WE assume we are following the  
12 same guidelines.

13 Mr. Baron. So you are still willing?

14 Mr. Lenzner. Yes.

15 Mr. Baron. The first excerpt I would like to turn to  
16 is from page 10 of the IG report of 1967. And it is headed:  
17 "Aerosol attack on radio station".

18 And then there is an attachment from page 11 headed:  
19 "Contaminated Cigars".

20 And I think we will deal with those two first before we  
21 move on.

22 Mr. Lenzner. And the question is, what is his recollec-  
23 tion of this incident?

24 Mr. Baron. Generally the question would be, do you recall  
25 anything about those specific incidents or about the preparation

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1 of similar substances for similar purposes.

2 Dr. Gottlieb. My response to your question is that  
3 aside from a faint memory trace of a radio station and aerosol,  
4 the information in this paragraph is really more than I can  
5 independently remember. So, I can't add anything to it.

6 Mr. Baron. For the record let's introduce as Gottlieb  
7 Exhibit 1 pages 10 through 13 of the Inspector General's  
8 report.

(The document referred to was  
9 marked Gottlieb Exhibit No. 1  
10 for identification.)  
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1 Mr. Baron. You say you do have a faint recollection of  
2 aerosol sprays being used with LSD?

3 Dr. Gottlieb. Not being used. I have a faint recollec-  
4 tion of something about a radio station and a suggestion  
5 that we use an aerosol spray. I don't remember the LSD.  
6 And I don't remember any active involvement in this.

7 Mr. Baron. And there would be a discussion that an  
8 aerosol spray be used against Castro in a radio station that  
9 you remember?

10 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I don't remember him as a target.  
11 Reading this, I have one of these hazy recollections that comes  
12 up that brings up radio studio and aerosol, but that is about  
13 all.

14 Mr. Baron. And do you have any knowledge of aerosol  
15 sprays being used to disorient or incapacitate or kill any  
16 foreign leader?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. Being used?

18 Mr. Baron. Or developed for use against a foreign leader?

19 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember any discussion of  
20 planning or use of aerosol sprays in this connection.

21 Mr. Baron. And was there any discussion of or planning for  
22 use of LSD against foreign leaders as a means of incapacita-  
23 tion or disorientation?

24 Dr. Gottlieb. I certainly don't remember anything in  
25 terms of a specific foreign leader. The generic subject has

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1 been talked about certainly in discussions of how you might  
2 use LSD. But I don't remember either the specific discussions,  
3 or when they took place, and I don't remember the discussion  
4 being in terms of any specific leader.

5 Mr. Baron. Who was party to those discussions?

6 Dr. Gottlieb. I can't help you on that. Those were dis-  
7 cussions in connection with just discussions of this intelli-  
8 gence tool that was being talked about.

9 Mr. Lenzner. There is a certain overlap here obviously  
10 between the prior interrogation and this interrogation. And  
11 we have just gone over in great depth defensive and offensive  
12 use of LSD both, how it can be used against the U.S. leaders  
13 and how it can be used for interrogation purposes. And we  
14 will continue to do that at great length. And so there is that  
15 overlap.

16 Mr. Baron. I appreciate that. And ask you to bear  
17 with me because I haven't been privy to that entire interro-  
18 gation.

19 Moving on to the section on contaminated cigars, on  
20 page 11 of the IG report, pages 11 and 12, the question is  
21 whether you remember anything about the treatment of a box of  
22 cigars which was stored in Jake Esterline's safe to be used  
23 against Castro.

24 Dr. Gottlieb. May I finish reading this?

25 Mr. Baron. Please.

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't think I can add anything to that.  
 2 And had you not showed this to us I probably wouldn't have been  
 3 able to recall this about it. I am settling on the clarity of  
 4 my memory business.

5 Mr. Baron. You are referring to the first full paragraph  
 6 on page 12 which begins:

7 "Sidney Gottlieb of TAD claims to remember distinctly a  
 8 plot involving cigars."

9 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. And my remembrance is that I was  
 10 not personally involved in it, but was just made aware of it by  
 11 somebody, who might have been [REDACTED], who might have been  
 12 aware of what was going on.

13 Mr. Baron. Who was this officer who is mentioned in the  
 14 IG report, but is not named here as the person that you recall  
 15 approaching you with a scheme to treat cigars?

16 Dr. Gottlieb. That is why I said I was lighting on  
 17 that particular sentence.

18 Can I go off the record for a minute here?

19 Mr. Baron. Sure.

20 (Discussion off the record.)

21 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

22 Now, Dr. Gottlieb, is it fair to say that your recollec-  
 23 tion of the officer who approached you with a scheme to treat  
 24 cigars does not go beyond what is printed here in the IG  
 25 report?

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. I think that is fair to say.

2 Mr. Baron. Can you add anything to the note in the IC  
3 report that refers to the fact that you remember the plan "being  
4 concerned with killing, not merely with influencing behavior"?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. Well, the only thing I can add is based  
6 on knowledge that remembrances that were stimulated by what  
7 I have heard about this recently. I now see that I could  
8 have been confusing other events with this, namely, the  
9 botulism toxin, and that sort of thing, with this particular  
10 episode which could have involved LSD.

11 Mr. diGenova. Let me ask you a question about that,  
12 Doctor.

13 When this report was written -- this is 1967, about eight  
14 years ago, and it is referring to incidents which would have  
15 been a little bit closer in time then when you were being  
16 interviewed than they are now.

17 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, they are eight years old.

18 Mr. diGenova. Just so we understand, are you saying  
19 from your testimony just a second ago that when you told the  
20 Inspector General's office what they have written down now,  
21 you then may have had confused in your mind with other drug-  
22 related activities other than the plots to kill foreign  
23 leaders?

24 Dr. Gottlieb. No, that is not what I meant.

25 Mr. diGenova. All right, let's try to clarify again.

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1 for your benefit what you mean when you said what you just  
2 said.

3 Dr. Gottlieb. I think I could best do this by your re-  
4 stating the question.

5 Mr. Baron. I want to know if you can add anything  
6 to the note in the IG report that refers to you as saying that  
7 these cigar schemes "were concerned with killing, not merely  
8 with influencing behavior".

9 In other words, do you have any recollection about dis-  
10 cussions of treating cigars as a means of killing a foreign  
11 leader?

12 (Witness confers with counsel)

13 Dr. Gottlieb. I simply mean to say that I could have  
14 been confused between what I said here and other discussions  
15 that were going on about Castro that I either was involved  
16 in or had heard about. I can't take it any further than that.

17 And I now see, Mr. diGenova, what you mean. And my  
18 answer to what you were saying should have been yes, that  
19 I am referring to confusion.

20 Mr. diGenova. At the time you made the statement to  
21 the Inspector General?

22 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

23 Mr. Lenzner. But not about other foreign leaders?

24 Dr. Gottlieb. Solely about Castro.

25 Mr. Lenzner. What the witness is saying, I think, is

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1 that he had a distinct recollection at the time of discussions  
 2 involving killing Castro, but he now thinks that it didn't  
 3 necessarily relate solely to cigars, it may have come out of  
 4 other discussions he had with regard to other means that I  
 5 think you will get into.

6 Mr. diGenova. That is fine. That is exactly what I wanted  
 7 you to be able to clarify your thoughts on about that.

8 I would just like to go into that for a second. And you  
 9 can help explain some of this.

10 I am going to quote from it. And you have a copy in  
 11 front of you as an exhibit. It says:

12 "Sidney Gottlieb of TSD claims to remember distinctly  
 13 a plot involving cigars. To emphasize the clarify of his  
 14 memory, he named the officer, then assigned to [REDACTED] who  
 15 approached him with the scheme."

16 And then skinning over the middle section of that  
 17 which deals with who this person was, it goes on:

18 "Gottlieb remembers the scheme as being one that was  
 19 talked about frequently, but not widely, and as being con-  
 20 cerned with killing, not merely with influencing behavior."

21 Now, this discussion in the Inspector General's report  
 22 appears in that part of that report dealing with the attempts  
 23 and the plans related to Castro. When it says in here that  
 24 you -- when it quotes you -- it doesn't quote you, it attributes  
 25 to you the statement that you remembered the scheme as being one.

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1 that was talked about frequently but not widely, do you re-  
2 call what you may have meant when you said that about, were those  
3 discussions within TSD, were those discussions outside of  
4 TSD, what you were referring to when you gave this information  
5 to the Inspector General, or any information which might  
6 help explain what this sentence means on page 12 of the In-  
7 spector General's report?

8 It talked about frequently but not widely. That has  
9 the implication of being very tightly held, but nonetheless being  
10 talked about repeatedly within a very limited framework of  
11 individuals.

12 Dr. Gottlieb. My best remembrance is that it had solely  
13 to do with the Castro situation, and that schemes or talks about  
14 cigars that somehow might be related to killing Castro -- and  
15 I don't remember now whether it was using one substance or  
16 another substance or several substances, but just using this  
17 vehicle as a means of getting at Castro -- were frequently,  
18 but not widely talked about.

19 And when you ask me, within TSD, I would have to say,  
20 no, I meant between people in TSD and the operators.

21 Mr. diGenova. That was the next question I was going  
22 to ask you.

23 First of all, would this have been to maybe help you more  
24 clearly get in your mind who, if anyone, might have been the  
25 person who would have approached you about such ideas?

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1 When, if you can remember, was the first time anyone,  
2 even if you can't remember who that person was, ever approached  
3 you with information concerning a scheme, a plot, a plan, look-  
4 ing for an operational capacity concerning Castro and his  
5 possible assassination?

6 Dr. Gottlieb. I can't assign a date to that. I am  
7 sorry.

8 Mr. diGenova. Do the dates mentioned here in this part  
9 of the report, which would have been sometime in 1960 --  
10 does that ring a bell with you, that year?

11 Dr. Gottlieb. Certainly that specific year doesn't.  
12 About all I can say in response to that is that there is nothing  
13 in my remembrance that says that. I have no other remem-  
14 brance to add to it.

15 Mr. Baron. Do you recall who first approached you  
16 about such a scheme?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. No. The only thing I recall with some  
18 specificity is that the idea of cigars first came up in  
19 this discussion with apparently an unidentified officer.

20 Mr. diGenova. Let's see if I give you several names  
21 which may assist you?

22 Dr. Gottlieb. Try to say things which sound like Ober.

23 Mr. diGenova. I am going to give you names which I know  
24 are directly related to certain things, and if in fact they  
25 sound like Ober, so be it.

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1 Did you ever hear of anything called the Branch 4 Task  
2 Force within the Western Hemisphere?

3 Dr. Gottlieb. ~~I am~~ I am sorry, not by that term. Task force  
4 was a term associated with this whole Castro period.

5 Mr. diGenova. Do you remember J.C. King?

6 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

7 Mr. diGenova. Who was Chief of the Western Hemisphere  
8 Division, and whose main concern was Latin America and South  
9 America?

10 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

11 Mr. diGenova. Do you ever remember J.C. King speaking  
12 to you about the need to eliminate Fidel Castro?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. I have no remembrance of that now.

14 Mr. diGenova. Mr. King broached that subject at a  
15 meeting of the Branch 4 Task Force on March 19, 1961, which is  
16 the first recorded piece of information which we have on  
17 assassination conferences which have been materialized in  
18 the form of letters or some documents.

19 Do you ever remember discussing the concept of assassina-  
20 tion with a fellow named George McManus?

21 Dr. Gottlieb. I know who McManus is or was.

22 Mr. diGenova. Mr. McManus was for many years in  
23 Europe in cover. In Berlin he came back and became a special  
24 assistant to Mr. Helms for Cuba operations during the pre-  
25 Bay of Pigs and the post-Bay of Pigs time, and he was with

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1 Mr. \_\_\_\_\_ and did much of the work in that area.

2 Do you ever remember discussing it with him?

3 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I do not.

4 Mr. diGenova. I am trying this to help you remember by  
5 giving you some names I know are directly related to it and  
6 whose names appear during the period of time when the Inspec-  
7 tor General's report is talking about.

8 Do you remember ever talking about it with Tracy Barnes?

9 Dr. Gottlieb. I can't say when or where, but I think  
10 my answer to that would be, I have a memory of that, a vague  
11 memory.

12 Mr. diGenova. A vague memory, speaking about the  
13 concept of assassinating Castro?

14 Dr. Gottlieb. Something related to this whole situation  
15 with Tracy Barnes.

16 Mr. diGenova. Do you remember anything at all about it?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. I am afraid not, except that it had to do  
18 with this general subject.

19 Mr. diGenova. In a situation like that, Dr. Gottlieb,  
20 you certainly would never have approached Mr. Barnes to  
21 talk about anything like that, would you?

22 Dr. Gottlieb. No.

23 Mr. diGenova. In other words, someone would have  
24 approached you?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

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1 Mr. diGenova. You were not in a policy-making position,  
2 and individuals who wanted information concerning something  
3 would have to initiate the generating of information with you,  
4 would they not?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. The only exception I make to that is,  
6 they might have had such an initial conversation with a  
7 subordinate of mine, who was a specialist in this field. That  
8 I might have followed up.

9 He might have come back to me and said, he is talking  
10 about this, maybe he had better go and talk from this.

11 Mr. diGenova. Aside from the actual contact with a  
12 person like that your memory would be, from practice and from  
13 procedure, and from your own independent recollection, that  
14 Mr. Barnes would have come to you to talk about something  
15 like that?

16 Dr. Gottlieb. That is certainly true.

17 Mr. diGenova. You would not have gone to him?

18 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

19 Mr. diGenova. And is it your testimony at this time,  
20 however, that you have no independent recollection of either  
21 when the conversation took place and what specifically it was  
22 concerned with?

23 Dr. Gottlieb. Aside from what I said before, that is not  
24 to do with this general topic, I do not have any other recollection.  
25

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1 Mr. diGenova. When you say general topic, what do you mean?  
 2 Dr. Gottlieb. I mean the problem of getting rid of Castro.  
 3 Mr. diGenova. And when you say getting rid of, what do  
 4 you mean?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't know, because I am a little  
 6 confused now as to when they were talking about incapacitation,  
 7 and when they were talking about killing and that sort of  
 8 thing. But it could have included either or both of those.

9 Mr. diGenova. Let me help you, then.

1.3(a)(4)  
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10 On July 21, 1960, the headquarters sent to [REDACTED]  
 11 [REDACTED] a cable which was approved by Mr. Barnes and Mr. King  
 12 and Mr. Bissell which said in its first paragraph:

13 "Possible removal top three leaders (Cuba) being given  
 14 serious consideration at headquarters."

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15 Now, that is a time frame. And that quote is  
 16 from an Agency cable sent to the [REDACTED]  
 17 [REDACTED] which indicated that  
 18 when they were talking about removal and the cable later, that  
 19 its entirely indicates that they were talking with assassinating  
 20 all three individuals, Raul Castro, Fidel Castro and Che  
 21 Guevara. So that at that time, to assist you, this was the  
 22 way it was being formulated within the Agency.

23 In other words, when they said removal, when they were  
 24 talking about removal, they mean assassination.

25 Does that assist you in any way in terms of a time frame?

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. Not really.

2 Mr. Lenzner. It might help to indicate that Dr. Gottlieb  
3 testified in front of the Committee last week. And I didn't  
4 see you there.

5 Mr. diGenova. I was not there.

6 Mr. Lenzner. You probably are not familiar with all of  
7 his testimony. He testified that he had conversations with Mr.  
8 Bissell in the spring of 1960 which related to elimination and/or  
9 incapacitation of foreign leaders generally, and what  
10 capabilities I think TSD had.

11 Dr. Gottlieb. And that would be in that general time.

12 Mr. diGenova. In fact that would fit in perfectly with  
13 the initial discussion in March.

14 Mr. Lenzner. And also, I guess, directly preceding the  
15 July telegram you just spoke about.

16 Mr. diGenova. This was a few months before there  
17 was a lot going on in the special groups.

18 Dr. Gottlieb. I think I testified that to the best of  
19 my remembrance, this first briefing of Bissell's that had  
20 no reference to a specific leader took place in the early  
21 summer or late spring, wasn't it, of 1960?

22 Mr. diGenova. Were you present, Mr. Baron?

23 Mr. Baron. Yes.

24 Dr. Gottlieb. It is on the record.

25 Mr. diGenova. I don't mean to repeat certain things, but

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1 I am trying to do this for a reason, which is to help you,  
2 if at all possible, to focus in. And I don't want to get  
3 too far astray from the specifics of the report.

4 Now, this may seem like a silly question.

5 Do you remember any conversations with Jake Esterline  
6 about this topic of assassination, the removal, incapacitation?

7 Dr. Gottlieb. I am confused about that. I do associate  
8 Jake Esterline in my mind with that period, and with Cuba,  
9 but I can't say that I remember any specific conversation  
10 with him.

11 Mr. diGenova. And the reason I asked that is not because  
12 his name appears in the report, but because his name appears as  
13 a person being present at the March 9, 1960, meeting which I  
14 alluded to presently where J.C. King, in addressing their large  
15 task force which was concerned within the Agency with covert  
16 operations against Cuba, was told all about the possible  
17 plans which they were going to begin to develop, and that the  
18 elimination, quote unquote, in a package deal of the three  
19 infamous Cuban leaders was something which had to be given  
20 serious consideration if any sort of covert program was to  
21 succeed.

22 And that is why I asked it, because he was there. And  
23 shortly after that Mr. King attended with Mr. Bissell and Mr.  
24 Dulles a meeting of the National Security Council, where we  
25 believe these matters were discussed.

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1 And this is to pinpoint for you possibly anything  
2 that may assist you in remembering from something that has  
3 happened 15, 16 or 17 years ago.

4 Mr. Baron, would you like to go through some of those  
5 areas more specifically? I have a couple of other things that  
6 I would like to ask the doctor, but I think it would be fairer  
7 to the Doctor to ask them later.

8 Mr. Baron. Returning to the same passage on page 12 of  
9 the I.G. report, it continues from the point where Mr. diGenova  
10 was quoting to say:

11 "As far as Gottlieb knows, this idea never got beyond the  
12 talking stage. TSD may have gone ahead and prepared the  
13 cigars just in case, but Gottlieb is certain that he did not  
14 get the DDP's (Richard Bissell) personal approval to release  
15 them, as would have been done if the operation had gone that  
16 far".

17 Can you tell us anything about the substance of any  
18 conversation between yourself and Richard-Bissell where the  
19 treatment of cigars for use against Castro was discussed?

20 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't really remember anything about  
21 that. I don't remember a specific discussion with Richard  
22 Bissell concerning cigars.

23 Mr. Baron. In this passage that I have just read the  
24 IG's report said, the cigars may have been prepared just in  
25 case.

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1 Were any cigars treated to your knowledge for use against  
2 Castro?

3 Dr. Gottlieb. I can't tell now whether I know this  
4 because of things I have heard about in the last few weeks,  
5 through what you gave us to read. But I think if I hadn't  
6 read that my answer to that probably would have been no.  
7 But I do know now that cigars were prepared. But that is not  
8 an independent recollection.

9 Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection in the  
10 last few weeks by discussions with our staff and with your  
11 counsel based on his reading of these documents, do you have  
12 any further recollection of talks with anyone at the Agency  
13 about treating cigars?

14 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't have a recollection of talks as  
15 much as I have a recollection of the events having happened  
16 that cigars were prepared.

17 Mr. Baron. And it was clear that these cigars were  
18 prepared for use against Castro?

19 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

20 Mr. Baron. How far did those preparations go?

21 Dr. Gottlieb. I can't testify precisely as to that.  
22 Again, I am having trouble picking apart what I now know and  
23 what I knew before I read those things. And I think that is  
24 the best I can say.

25 Mr. Lenzner. But you have some subsequent memoranda on

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1 that subject, do you not, that would be helpful?

2 Mr. Baron. Yes.

3 Mr. Lenzner. I don't want to push it too fast.

4 Mr. Baron. Before we continue with the subject of treating  
5 the cigars, which is picked up in a later section of the I.G.  
6 report, let's consider the paragraph on page 13 of the I.G.  
7 report that you have in front of you headed "Depilatory".

8 Dr. Gottlieb. I think this thing was talked about  
9 really just as something -- and I don't remember it in  
10 specific connection with Castro -- we had talked about it in  
11 general within TSD among the people that get involved in  
12 such things.

13 Mr. Baron. When you say talked about it, you are  
14 referring to --

15 Dr. Gottlieb. The use of thalium salts as depilatories.

16 Mr. Baron. And when you talked about it in general in TSD  
17 was it in the context of use against foreign leaders?

18 Dr. Gottlieb. It certainly wouldn't have been in that  
19 context, it would have been just as a general technique  
20 that might be useful sometime.

21 In other words, what I am trying to say is that I have  
22 an awareness independent of this memorandum of that technique  
23 of it being understood to be available if it was useful any  
24 time, and being talked about not to a great extent, because  
25 clearly it doesn't have a lot of general applicability.

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1 Mr. Baron. Do you have a memory independent of this  
2 memorandum of preparations for the use of this technique  
3 against Castro?

4 Dr. Gottlieb. I do not.

5 Mr. Baron. Or against any other foreign leader?

6 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I do not.

7 Mr. Baron. In this passage from the I.G. report it

8 says:

9 "The right dosage causes depilation; too much produces  
10 paralysis."

11 Would thalium salts ever have been viewed as a means of  
12 incapacitation or killing of a person as opposed to being  
13 viewed as a depilatory?

14 Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my knowledge.

15 Mr. Baron. Despite the fact that it might produce  
16 paralysis?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. I am just remembering now, for what-  
18 ever it is worth, either thalium or gallium being mentioned  
19 by a Soviet KGB defector who had a mission to handle some-  
20 body in that dissident group, and he fed the person radioactive --  
21 as I say, I can't remember whether it was thalium or gallium.  
22 That comes to mind, but it doesn't have anything to do with this.

23 My answer to your question is clearly no, I don't  
24 ever remember thalium being considered as an incapacitating  
25 agent, other than its use as a depilatory.

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(Witness confers with counsel.)

Dr. Gottlieb. My counsel brought up the point that it may well have been that a discussion of this KCB operation may have gotten us first to look into thalium. And that could have been the beginning of that kind of consideration of this kind of capability. This has nothing to do with Castro again.

Mr. DiGenova. Do you remember that that might have happened with respect to Castro?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, because the two incidents I can't relate in time to each other.

Mr. Baron. Let's turn to a portion of the I.G. report that we will mark Gottlieb Exhibit No. 2, pages 20 to 26.

(The document referred to was marked Gottlieb Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

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1 Mr. Baron. Why don't you view those, Dr. Gottlieb,  
2 as a whole before we start discussing them?

3 Dr. Gottlieb. What is the name on line 2?

4 Mr. diGenova. Roselli.

5 (Discussion off the record.)

6 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

7 Dr. Gottlieb. One thing that comes to mind which might  
8 be helpful to you in general is to consider, as I  
9 have just been doing, where I was in this time period. You  
10 remember I had nothing originally to do with TSD?

11 Mr. Baron. This is during the fall and early winter of  
12 1960 you are saying?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

14 Mr. Baron. And you were at that time science advisor to  
15 Richard Bissell?

16 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. And I would have nothing whatso-  
17 ever to do with whatever the chain of command in TSD was,  
18 which would have been from the Chief of TSD to, if you are talk-  
19 ing about the Chemical Division, to [REDACTED], who was  
20 at the Chemical Division, to Ray Treichler, who worked in  
21 that Division.

22 Mr. Baron. And the Chief of the Division at that point  
23 would have been Cornelius Roosevelt?

24 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

25 Mr. Baron. Were you nonetheless in direct contact with

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1 each of the three people that you just mentioned during this  
2 period of time?

3 Dr. Gottlieb. What do you mean by "direct contact"?

4 I certainly had contact with them in connection with  
5 the work I was doing.

6 Mr. Baron. So that if you received an assignment  
7 from Richard Bissell to consider the means of conducting a  
8 covert action against a foreign leader like Castro, means  
9 including the use of certain technical devices, you might then  
10 consult with Roosevelt or Gunn or [REDACTED]

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11 Dr. Gottlieb. That is my point. I am trying to piece  
12 in my mind during that period what my role was, if any, in  
13 connection with this,

14 Did Bissell in fact say, Gottlieb, now here is a problem,  
15 I want you to flush it out, go see the right people, and so on.  
16 I don't remember that ever happening. I think what happened  
17 is, it was my briefing Bissell, the time that I mentioned, and  
18 perhaps other times, but this particular time. And then he  
19 proceeded, as I remember it, not through me, to contact  
20 Roosevelt and other people to get this done.

21 Mr. Baron. When you refer to your briefing of Bissell,  
22 you are referring to the general briefing that you gave to  
23 Bissell at his behest in the spring or summer of 1960 concerning  
24 assassination or incapacitation abilities?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. Right, without my knowing of any specific

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1 target.

2 Mr. Baron. And when you gave Bissell that briefing,  
3 would you have discussed with him techniques like contaminating  
4 cigars with materials that could either produce death or dis-  
5 orientation of a foreign leader?

6 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember talking about cigars,  
7 but I certainly would have in the course of such a briefing  
8 mentioned techniques like that. I don't remember the cigars.  
9 But certainly part of that briefing, and probably in response  
10 to questions or discussion, the topic would have come up,  
11 how do you get this stuff to the individual.

12 Mr. Baron. When you say techniques like that, you mean  
13 that you would have discussed with Bissell various technical  
14 means of incapacitating or killing a foreign leader?

15 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, although I am saying again, I don't  
16 specifically remember cigars coming up. They may have.

17 Mr. diGenova. Do you remember anything coming up?  
18 Do you remember any specific means that were discussed  
19 with Bissell?

20 Dr. Gottlieb. No.

21 My remembrance, however it happened -- and I can't remem-  
22 ber how it happened -- is that I got somehow to be aware second-  
23 hand, either by a conversation with [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] or  
24 Roosevelt even, although I don't remember specifically who  
25 it was, about their botulism toxin being prepared. And

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1 I can't remember whether I was acting specifically in a staff  
 2 capacity for Bissell -- I know I wasn't following the whole  
 3 thing, because I would remember that thing, I think. Bissell  
 4 said, look, Gottlieb, I want to depend upon you as the fellow  
 5 that is going to follow this, I certainly didn't have that  
 6 mission.

7 Mr. Baron. But you did remember that Gunn and [REDACTED]  
 8 were involved in treating cigars with botulinum toxin?

9 Dr. Gottlieb. My knowledge of Gunn's being involved  
 10 in this came either during these last few weeks, when I have  
 11 been made privy to some of this discussion --

12 Mr. Baron. By the committee?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

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14 -- but it is [REDACTED] involvement that I remember  
 15 being aware of.

16 Mr. Baron. And what do you remember about [REDACTED]  
 17 involvement in this scheme?

18 Dr. Gottlieb. Only that botulinum -- and I was going  
 19 to say maybe cigars -- were involved, but certainly botulinum  
 20 was.

21 Mr. Baron. And you remember it as being a scheme  
 22 calculated to produce the death of whoever smoked those cigars?

23 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

24 Mr. Baron. Or even put those cigars in his mouth?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. Sure.

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1 Mr. Baron. And were you aware at that time that these  
2 were being prepared for use against Castro?

3 Dr. Gottlieb. I think so.

4 Mr. Baron. Would the order to treat cigars in this  
5 manner have come to Gunn or [REDACTED] from Richard Bissell?

1.3(a)(4)

6 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't really know that. And I don't

7 think it would help you if I speculated on it, would it?

8 Mr. Baron. I think it would help us. Because I think  
9 you would qualify in this situation as an expert in terms of  
10 the chain of command at that time.

11 Dr. Gottlieb. All right.

12 If you will label this clearly speculation and not my  
13 specific knowledge, I would think the way the matter would work  
14 at least in the initial instance, Roosevelt would have  
15 validated Bissell's request to [REDACTED] and that having been  
16 done, [REDACTED] might have worked directly around the two of  
17 them and dealt with the task force people, if that is what  
18 they were called then.

1.3(a)(4)

19 Mr. Baron. The task force were people who were running  
20 operations against Cuba?

21 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

22 But at least in the first instance -- now, this is specu-  
23 lative, because I was not in TSD at the time, and I am not  
24 sure, but I can't believe it would have happened any other  
25 way -- that Roosevelt would have been contacted by Bissell,

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2 that Roosevelt would have told [REDACTED], look, this is what the  
3 WH people are interested in, and I am telling you that you have  
4 my authority through Bissell to go ahead with this --  
5 meaning to prepare this material.

6 Mr. Baron. Moving away from speculation now to your  
7 own memory, do you have any knowledge of the source of the  
8 orders or authority for the preparation of these lethal cigars?

9 Dr. Gottlieb. I do not.

10 Mr. Baron. Were you involved in any way in the pre-  
11 paration of these cigars, or the procurement of the cigars  
12 for operational purposes?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. I can certainly say definitely not. I  
14 have to qualify that, it has been this long ago, but I have  
15 absolutely no remembrance of that at all.

16 Mr. Baron. On page 23 of the I.G. report the various  
17 recollections of Edwards, who would be Sheffield Edwards,  
18 head of the Office of Security at that point, and Roosevelt  
19 and Bissell are discussed.

20 Now, when you were speculating a moment ago about the  
21 chain of command, at that time you said that orders for the  
22 preparation of cigars probably would have come from Bissell  
23 through Roosevelt to the lab technicians.

24 Do you have any knowledge of Sheffield Edwards' involve-  
25 ment at this time in operations against Castro?

26 Dr. Gottlieb. None at all.

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1 In fact, that is another one of the individuals whose  
2 names I found with some surprise when I first read this material.

3 In fact, I think I read that in the newspapers sometime  
4 ago. And I remember being surprised that Edwards was in-  
5 volved.

6 Mr. Baron. Turning now to the last paragraph on page  
7 23, the report refers to Roosevelt's memory that four  
8 possible approaches for killing Castro by technical means were  
9 considered.

10 Number one, something highly toxic, such as shellfish  
11 poison.

12 And number two, bacterial material in liquid form.

13 And number three, bacterial treatment of a cigarette or  
14 cigar.

15 And number four, a handkerchief treated with bacteria.

16 And then Roosevelt went on to remember as best he could  
17 that the decision was to use bacteria in liquid form, despite  
18 the fact that, as we see in the rest of the report, pills were  
19 subsequently the substance that was actually developed.

20 Do you have any recollection about this decision-making  
21 process, the weighing of these alternative means of moving  
22 against Castro?

23 Dr. Gottlieb. Absolutely none.

24 Mr. Baron. Were you a party to any discussions of any  
25 of these four means of acting against Castro?

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. Certainly not, no. I was only going to  
 2 qualify it by saying, in a briefing for Bissell's such as  
 3 the one I described to you similar alternatives might have  
 4 been mentioned, but never in terms of a specific target.

5 Mr. Baron. Turning now to pages four through 26, let  
 6 me give you a moment to review those pages which refer to the  
 7 development of poison pills.

8 (Discussion off the record.)

9 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

10 Dr. Gottlieb, now that you have had a chance to review  
 11 this section of the I.G. report, do you have any recollection  
 12 independent of this section of the I.G. report of the develop-  
 13 ment of poison pills for use against Castro?

14 Dr. Gottlieb. These details that are mentioned here I  
 15 had nothing to do with, and don't have an independent recol-  
 16 lection of. And I note here even in one place that ~~Gunn~~  
 17 put me in touch with Edwards, and I see it says here, and I  
 18 have no recollection of being involved here, and I have no  
 19 recollection now.

20 Mr. Baron. Aside from the details that are mentioned  
 21 here, do you have any knowledge of the development of poison  
 22 pills for use against Castro?

23 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I do not.

24 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the development  
 25 of poison pills for use against any foreign leader?

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I do not.

2 Mr. Baron. Are we understanding each other that when  
3 I say poison pills I am using a rather gross ordinary phrase for  
4 my pill that would be potentially lethal?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. Sure, absolutely.

6 Mr. Lenzner. What was that last question?

7 Mr. Baron. I just wanted to make sure that when I would  
8 ask my questions about poison pills: ~~it was clear that I wanted~~  
9 to cover any more technical description for a pill that would  
10 be potentially lethal or incapacitating.

11 Mr. diGenova. A question on page 26, Dr. Gottlieb.  
12 It is a sort of a tool up on what we talked about before.  
13 There is a sentence there that says:

14 "Gunn's notes record that his last action on the opera-  
15 tion came on 10 February 1961 when he put Gottlieb in touch  
16 with Edwards. Gottlieb has no recollection of being involved,  
17 an impression that is supported by Bissell, who states that  
18 Gottlieb's assignments were of a different nature."

19 When it recites that your assignments were of a  
20 different nature, is that alluding to what we have talked about  
21 previously, that your concerns were of a more general  
22 nature --

1.3(a)(4) 23 Dr. Gottlieb. No. My assumption would be that he was  
24 talking about the [REDACTED] operation.

25 Again, I can only assume.

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1 Mr. diGenova. I didn't want to suggest that to you ,  
2 but that was my impression also.

3 Dr. Gottlieb. He said that and I didn't, and I can only  
4 conjecture.

5 Mr. Baron. Were you ever put in touch with Sheffield  
6 Edwards to discuss or plan the use or development of technical  
7 means for action against a foreign leader?

8 Dr. Gottlieb. Never.

9 Mr. Baron. Do you have any idea what Dr. Gunn's notes  
10 would have been referring to when they recorded the fact that  
11 Gunn put you in touch with Sheffield Edwards?

12 Dr. Gottlieb. I can only speculate that he is confusing  
13 me with whoever it was in TSD that he was. Because by the  
14 time this inspection report happened, I was already Chief of  
15 TSD, and had been Deputy Chief for four years. And I can see  
16 where he would associate my name with TSD.

17 Mr. Baron. The details that are discussed in this  
18 section of the I.G. report in reference to the testing of these  
19 poison pills on guinea pigs and monkeys are rather vivid de-  
20 tails that I think might bring about a recollection if you had  
21 any involvement with it.

22 Having read this document, do you have any refreshed recoi-  
23 lection about the testing or development of such pills?

24 Dr. Gottlieb. I was simply not aware of that.

25 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of Sam Giancana's

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1 involvement with the CIA in any operation against Castro?

2 Dr. Gottlieb. Absolutely none.

3 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the relaying  
4 of an opinion of Sam Giancana about the advisability of a  
5 certain technique of getting rid of a foreign leader to the  
6 CIA or to CIA lab technicians?

7 Dr. Gottlieb. I do not.

8 Mr. Baron. I am referring here to the fact that Giancana  
9 apparently told somebody at the CIA that he didn't think  
10 firearms was a good idea, and he recommended the use of  
11 pills.

12 Dr. Gottlieb. I have no such recollection.

13 Mr. Baron. We will take a break.

14 (Recess.)

15 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

16 Dr. Gottlieb, while we were off the record you mentioned  
17 that you thought Richard Bissell, in referring to the fact  
18 that this cigar scheme would have been outside the parameters  
19 of your assignments at that time, might have been referring  
20 to something other than your assignment against Lumumba.

21 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, that was a later thought I had.

22 And that would have to do with a whole series of assignments,  
23 rather major ones, that I had having nothing to do with this  
24 area and my role as his scientific advisor.

25 Mr. diGenova. And indeed having nothing to do with the

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1 incapacitation of anyone, but rather with the development of  
 2 technological means for increasing, for example, the  
 3 frequency power of Radio-Free Europe, which would be a non-  
 4 personal type of technological development?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. Right.

6 Mr. Baron. To finish with this exhibit we have been  
 7 dealing with, without even reference to specific parts of the

8 I.G. report, the name of Santos Trafficante has come up in  
 9 connection with the Castro operation being run out of the  
 10 CIA.

11 Do you have any knowledge of any connection between Santo  
 12 Trafficante and the CIA?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. As a matter of fact, right now is the first  
 14 time I have heard of that name.

15 Mr. Baron. If I refreshed your recollection by telling  
 16 you that Trafficante was alleged to be connected with the  
 17 criminal syndicate in America, and to have gambling interests  
 18 in Havana, does that bring back any memory of his involvement  
 19 in an operation against Fidel Castro?

20 Dr. Gottlieb. To me none whatsoever.

21 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the involve-  
 22 ment of a man named Varona in any operation against Castro?

23 Dr. Gottlieb. I remember reading his name in an  
 24 account in either Time or Newsweek in the last several months,  
 25 and that is the only time I have ever seen it.

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1 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the involve-  
2 ment of Tony Varona in a CIA connected matter against  
3 Castro?

4 Dr. Gottlieb. I have no recollection of that.

5 Mr. Baron. Did you ever talk with Robert Maheu or  
6 John Roselli in connection with an operation against Castro?

7 Dr. Gottlieb. I never did.

8 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that Maheu was involved with  
9 the Agency in the early sixties in an operation against Castro?

10 Dr. Gottlieb. I will have to rephrase that question,  
11 because I am hearing, was I aware in the early sixties.

12 Mr. Baron. Yes.

13 Dr. Gottlieb. I wasn't aware then, and I wasn't aware  
14 until I read his name in the public media that he was connected  
15 with this operation.

16 Mr. Baron. And that would have been recently?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

18 Mr. Baron. Did you have any knowledge in the early six-  
19 ties of John Roselli's involvement in a CIA plot against Cas-  
20 tro?

21 Dr. Gottlieb. I did not.

22 Mr. Baron. Do you know Jim O'Connell, who was a CIA  
23 officer in the Office of Security of the CIA at this period  
24 of time?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. There is a confusion there, because it

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1 just so happens that A.J., Jim, O'Connell -- and it could have  
2 been the same fellow -- was later an security officer of TSD  
3 after this period. And I would have to check as to whether  
4 or not it was the one that you say. When you say I knew  
5 Jim O'Connell, I knew Jim O'Connell very well.

6 Mr. diGenova. I don't think they were the same.

7 Mr. Baron. Was your Jim O'Connell named Big Jim?

8 Dr. Gottlieb. No, he never would have been named  
9 Big Jim. He wasn't that kind. I remember him having a big  
10 wife who ran him ragged.

11 Mr. diGenova. That is not the Jim O'Connell to which you  
12 refer?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. It must have been two different people.

14 Mr. Baron. Were you aware in the early sixties of any  
15 connection between a CIA officer named Jim O'Connell  
16 and a plot to assassinate Castro?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. Absolutely not.

18 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge relating to the  
19 development of a pencil designed as a concealment device for  
20 delivering pills to Cuba? ;

21 Dr. Gottlieb. I do not.

22 Mr. Baron. Let's move, then, to a portion of the I.G.  
23 report that we will call Gottlieb Exhibit 4, which is headed  
24 "Schemes in Early 1963", and begins on page 75 of the I.G.  
25 report, and continues to page 77 of the I.G. report.

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1           Let's review the first two pages first, and then we will  
 2           turn to the seashell incident separately.

3                               (The document referred to was  
 4                               marked Gottlieb Exhibit No. 3  
 5                               for identification.)  
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1 Mr. Lenzner. Can we go ahead and read that, then?

2 Mr. Baron. Yes.

3 (Discussion off the record.)

4 Mr. Baron. You have just read pages 75 and 76 of the  
5 I.G. report that deal with a plan to treat a skindiving suit  
6 with a fungus that would produce a disabling and chronic skin  
7 disease called Medra, and to contaminate the breathing appara-  
8 tus of the skindiving suit with tubercule bacilli.

9 The I.G. report says:

10 "According to Sidney Gottlieb, this scheme progressed  
11 to the point of actually buying a diving suit and readying it  
12 for delivery."

13 And then this continues later on:

14 "Gottlieb does not remember what came of the scheme or  
15 what happened to the scuba suit."

16 Can you add anything to the record about the kinds of  
17 preparations that were made to deliver this diving suit to  
18 Fidel Castro?

19 Dr. Gottlieb. If I hadn't read this and heard a little  
20 bit about it from my counsel before -- there is this funny  
21 kind of a block in memory -- I would have said that I didn't  
22 know anything about it. And I certainly now have no other  
23 remembrance of it.

24 Mr. diGenova. Do you remember telling the Inspector  
25 General this in 1967?

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, I do, now I do. And I remember  
 2 having a discussion with him about it. And I am sure at that  
 3 time I told him everything I knew about it at the time.  
 4 And the only thing that has happened since then is an erosion  
 5 of even that memory.

6 Mr. Baron. So can you bring back any part of the basis  
 7 for those statements in the I.G. report?

8 Dr. Gottlieb. Specifically, no, I could only speculate  
 9 that this was probably discussed with me by people who worked  
 10 in TSD, and that from what they said there was actually a  
 11 suit brought.

12 And by readying it for delivery, I don't even know now  
 13 whether that means it was actually dusted with a fungus or not,  
 14 I just couldn't testify as to that.

15 Mr. Baron. Did you discuss this scheme with Desmond  
 16 FitzGerald?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't have a specific memory now of  
 18 discussing it with FitzGerald. I might have. But I don't have  
 19 that memory now.

20 Mr. Baron. Did you discuss it with Sam Halpern?

21 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember that.

22 Mr. Baron. And do you have any memory of discussing this  
 23 scheme with [REDACTED]

24 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I have no memory of that. It may  
 be that somebody that worked for me like [REDACTED] did, may

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1 have talked with these people about it, but I have no specific  
2 memory of that either.

3 Mr. Baron. Do you remember discussing this scheme with  
4 anyone in particular at the CIA?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I don't. And the point is that I  
6 didn't myself work on this. My remembrance is that I just  
7 had a supervisory capacity. At that time I guess I was  
8 deputy Chief of TSD.

9 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that your knowledge of this  
10 scheme came from [REDACTED]

11 Dr. Gottlieb. That would be an assumption. I have no  
12 specific memory. But that would be a good assumption.

13 Mr. Baron. Who was specifically assigned to develop this  
14 skin diving suit?

15 Dr. Gottlieb. I am again assuming. I don't remember  
16 specifically, but it might well have been [REDACTED]

17 Mr. Baron. Would tubercule bacilli be lethal or potentially  
18 lethal if administered to a breathing apparatus?

19 Dr. Gottlieb. Well, they would be lethal only in  
20 the sense, or potentially lethal, I would think, if  
21 the person contracted TB and died from it. What I mean is,  
22 it is an important point, because in these days of effective  
23 antibiotics tuberculosis is not often a very bad disease, if  
24 you catch it early almost everybody gets cured.

25 Mr. Baron. Would the treatment of a skin diving suit

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1 in this manner have accomplished the assassination of in-  
2 capacitation of Castro as a probable result of his using the  
3 skin diving suit?

4 Dr. Gottlieb. In this case, for whatever it is worth,  
5 I would call this an incapacitation effort.

6 Mr. Baron. Rather than an assassination effort?

7 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, definitely. Because you would be  
8 so terribly unsure -- to me it would only be an off chance

9 that anybody would die from anything like that, except as in the  
10 case of something like a misdiagnosis of what he had.

11 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection as to why the  
12 skin diving plot didn't move forward?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. None except what I read here, I have no  
14 independent recollection.

15 Mr. Baron. Let's turn, then, to page 77 of the report  
16 that refers to a bocby-trapped seashell.

17 Do you have any knowledge of discussions of or planning  
18 for the use of a bocby-trapped seashell against Castro?

19 Dr. Gottlieb. Absolutely none.

20 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that Desmond FitzGerald ever  
21 contemplated such a scheme?

22 Dr. Gottlieb. I was not. You mean before now? I  
23 keep adding that.

24 Mr. Baron. Let's introduce, then, as Gottlieb Ex-  
25 hibit No. 4. And it starts on page 91 of the Inspector

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1 General's report and it is entitled "20 November 1960".

2 (The document referred to was  
3 marked Gottlieb Exhibit No. 4  
4 for identification.)  
5  
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1 Dr. Gottlieb. I have read this.

2 Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb, do you have any independent  
3 recollection of the development of a poison pen that is a  
4 pen equipped with a hypodermic syringe for the injection of a  
5 poison for use against Fidel Castro?

6 Dr. Gottlieb. I do not.

7 I might comment on something I read in here. There is

8 a ference to an organizational unit called FID, and there was  
9 a mention of a workshop. And I want to make it very clear,  
10 you probably know it already, that was a completely different  
11 organizational entity with a different mission than TSD, it  
12 was not subordinated to TSD, and it had nothing to with TSD.

13 Mr. Baron. Dr. Gunn was in the Office of Medical Services  
14 at this time, and also had no formal tie to Staff D, is that  
15 correct?

16 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

17 Mr. Baron. So far as that point goes, I would presume  
18 someone in TSD would have equal access to the Staff D workshop  
19 as Gunn would have had.

20 Dr. Gottlieb. Not quite. That needs to be explained  
21 just a little bit.

22 Dr. Gunn had a pretty close routine working relationship

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And Dr. Gunn would worry about that sort of thing.

Mr. diGenova. What did [REDACTED] stand for?

Mr. Baron.

Mr. diGenova. I just wanted to hear Dr. Gottlieb say it.

Dr. Gottlieb. You are absolutely right. I wanted so say

I had forgotten. But you are absolutely right. It was a component of the Foreign Intelligence staff, and put there for housing and quarters. It was an operation analysis, very compartmented, and for that reason it was on a staff that would normally never have anything like that.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the development of an insecticide called Blackleaf 40 at the CIA for use against

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1 foreign leaders?

2 Dr. Gottlieb. Blackleaf 40 is something that my ac-  
3 quaintance with has more to do with my garden than the CIA. It  
4 is a commercial product. I have used it. If you ever had  
5 problems with leaf hoppers in gardens you would have used it.  
6 So it is not an intelligence product.

7 Mr. Baron. And were you aware that it was ever contem-  
8 plated for use against a human target at the CIA?

9 Dr. Gottlieb. I was not.

10 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that an instrument like a  
11 poison pen equipped with a hypodermic syringe was ever develop-  
12 ed at the CIA for use against a human target?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I think there has been testimony,  
14 and I remember something about it, but not a great deal about  
15 it, a dart gun -- not the one that was shown in these tele-  
16 vised hearings -- being developed at [REDACTED] Camp Dietrich.  
17 But that bears no relationship to what I read here, either to  
18 this operation or this pen or anything like that.

19 And I am not sure that was a pen. But it was a thing  
20 about the size of a pen, as I remember.

21 Mr. Baron. Let's split the problem in two, then.

22 First, were you aware of the development or use of any  
23 pen equipped with a hypodermic syringe for any purpose at  
24 the CIA?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. The answer to that would have to be no

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1 Mr. Daron. And now turning to the dart gun that you  
2 mentioned, which we think may have been shaped like a pen,  
3 what was the purpose for which that was developed?

4 Dr. Gottlieb. That was either a pressure or electrically  
5 operated fleschette projector.

6 In other words, it would fire a little -- the best way to  
7 describe it is as a little drill, a microdrill with a certain  
8 fine shape, to be able to penetrate the skin. And the case --  
9 that was used mostly was for dogs in our case, to get some in-  
10 capacitating material into the dog. And I don't even remember  
11 whether it was camouflaged as a pen, but it was about that size

12 I would like to comment --and this may take it a little  
13 far afield from what you are talking about, but it is related  
14 enough -- and I have been looking for an opportunity to put  
15 this comment on the record, because I think it will straight-  
16 ten the matter out -- and that has to do with a gun that was  
17 displayed prominently on television in the press on the  
18 occasion of the Senate public hearings of this Committee in  
19 relation to the retention of these toxins.

20 Mr. diGenova. It wasn't a very effective gun, was it?

21 Mr. Gottlieb. The comment that I want to make is that  
22 I felt very bad, as I viewed that, and particularly bad in  
23 the next few days as I saw the public impact it had, not  
24 because anybody meant it to be, but it was such a fantastic  
25 misrepresentation. And the misrepresentation was that this

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1 was a CIA developed or stimulated weapon, when in fact it  
 2 was a standard military weapon, and Mr. Sensency I remember  
 3 clearly so testified, but that testimony got lost somehow, and  
 4 the impression that was left, I think, with most of the public  
 5 that was exposed to those telecasts or reading the press re-  
 6 ports of it was that the CIA had had Camp Detrich develop this  
 7 covert weapon, which it wasn't, for human assassination pur-  
 8 poses. And somehow specifically sinisterly tied in with this  
 9 shellfish toxins. And I want to put on the record that that  
 10 wasn't the case at all. This was a military weapon developed  
 11 for military objectives that they shared with us, they said,  
 12 we have it, and we in fact used it to test these darts on  
 13 dogs, because there was always a problem in connection with  
 14 radio operations and other surreptitious need that we had  
 15 overseas to get dogs out of the way.

16 So, to summarize, I just want to put on the record that  
 17 I think it was quite a misrepresentation to cast that weapon as  
 18 a CIA weapon.

19 In the first place, it is so uncovert and so weird and  
 20 so strange looking it could never be such a weapon.

21 Mr. Baron. I appreciate your putting that on the record.

22 To your knowledge, were any kinds of dart guns ever used  
 23 against human targets by CIA operatives?

24 Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my knowledge. There was a great  
 25 deal of discussion of that during the Vietnam war, in specific

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1 respect to knocking out, not killing, but incapacitating  
 2 couriers who were carrying what we had reason to believe were  
 3 Vietcong messages, and the problem was to be able to knock them  
 4 out enough to capture them, but not kill them. And there  
 5 was a discussion of this as a vehicle. But to my remembrance  
 6 it was never used and there was no effective knockout capabil-  
 7 ity developed.

8 Mr. Daron. Were dart guns such as the one you have  
 9 described as a military dart gun, which was the one depicted  
 10 in National Magazines subsequent to our hearings, or this  
 11 smaller fleschette projector that you described, ever discussed  
 12 or developed as part of plans for use against a foreign leader.

13 Dr. Gottlieb. Never to my knowledge.

14 Mr. diGenova. What was the range of a fleschette pro-  
 15 jector?

16 Dr. Gottlieb. I think it was in the range of 50  
 17 yards, something like that, of the very best ones that I  
 18 remember. Their big trouble was that they couldn't be accurate,  
 19 the ballistics of this little drill was so light. And those  
 20 were the kind of problems with it. And I may be wrong about  
 21 the 50 yards. That sounds like a long way.

22 Mr. diGenova. I was just going to ask you, wasn't the  
 23 problem with some of those the fact that it was very difficult  
 24 to maintain a trajectory and that they would actually spin  
 25 off?

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. Exactly.

2 Mr. diGenova. So that they were actually very useless  
3 weapons for anything over a very short distance?

4 Dr. Gottlieb. Except for one case, and this has nothing  
5 to do with the CIA -- that there was a development by the  
6 company, MB Associates, for military purposes, not for the  
7 CIA, of what they called fleschette weapons, they were calling

8 these little projectiles fleschettes. And whether it was  
9 ever used or not -- I was given to understand that they had  
10 a use and capability over distances about like I mentioned,  
11 50 yards, to send a salvo of these things, and to get over the  
12 inaccuracy by a buckshot effect, where one of them would have  
13 to hit you. But maybe I shouldn't have put that on the record.  
14 It had absolutely nothing to do with CIA, it was a military  
15 weapon.

16 Mr. Baron. Returning now to this portion of the I.G.  
17 report that deals with the development of a poison pen for  
18 use against Castro, did you ever discuss such a project with

19 [REDACTED]  
20 [REDACTED]  
21 [REDACTED]

22 Dr. Gottlieb. I never did. I know who [REDACTED]  
23 was, but I never discussed this with him.

24 Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss with [REDACTED]  
25 any technical support for operations against Castro?

26 Dr. Gottlieb. I never did.

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1 Mr. Baron. Did you ever have such discussions with --  
 2 Dr. Gottlieb. To the best of my recollection, because  
 3 I have had things to do with [REDACTED] later on than just  
 4 routine technical support.

5 Mr. Baron. Did you ever have such discussions with  
 6 [REDACTED] who was also at a different period of time  
 7 a CIA case officer for a high-ranking Cuban military officer  
 8 who was involved in a plot against Castro?

9 Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my recollection. I don't even  
 10 know who [REDACTED] is.

11 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that in the early sixties  
 12 and until the mid-sixties the CIA had an operational contact  
 13 with a man who was known at the CIA as AMELASH 1?

14 Dr. Gottlieb. I did not.

15 Mr. Baron. Who was a high-ranking Cuban military  
 16 officer with access to Castro?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. I did not. AMELASH 1?

18 Mr. Baron. Yes.

19 Dr. Gottlieb. No.

20 Mr. Baron. I just have a couple of more general ques-  
 21 tions about technical support for operations against Castro.

22 Did you ever have discussions with [REDACTED] about  
 23 technical means that might be used to assassinate or incapac-  
 24 itate Castro?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. Not about Castro.

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1 Mr. diGenova. About anybody else?

2 Dr. Gottlieb. Well, you were going to talk to me about  
3 a meeting that I had with [REDACTED] to brief him on this executive  
4 action group. But that is what I had reference to.

5 (Witness confers with counsel)

6 Dr. Gottlieb. My counsel reminded me that in [REDACTED]  
7 notes the name of [REDACTED] Castro and [REDACTED] were mentioned.

8 But I don't have a specific recollection of talking about them  
9 as targets.

10 Mr. Baron. Aside from the various technical devices  
11 and materials that we have discussed today, did you have -- did  
12 you know of any other technical means that were considered  
13 for use against Castro to assassinate or incapacitate him?

14 Dr. Gottlieb. I do not. In fact, this rich variety  
15 was more than I thought was talked about.

16 Mr. Baron. I have no further questions at this point.

17 Mr. diGenova. I have no further questions.

18 Mr. Baron. WE will go off the record.

19 Dr. Gottlieb. I want to put on the record before we  
20 close that I appreciate your letting me take a break. It  
21 was very helpful.

22 (Discussion off the record.)

23 Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

24 The record should reflect that Mr. diGenova and Mr.  
25 Baron have completed their part of the deposition, and have now

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1 left. And Mr. Balston is working on Committee business, and  
2 so is not present.

3 I would like to call your attention to a memorandum  
4 for the record from [REDACTED] dated 19 July 1955.

5 Dr. Gottlieb. I think you are off of my collection  
6 now.

7 Mr. Maxwell. The memorandum indicates that a CIA  
8 officer had been approached about CIA activities related to  
9 Artichoke. And the officer, when requested to respond as  
10 to CIA activity by DoD officials, evaded the question, and then  
11 returned to the Agency and suggested that it might be useful  
12 to set up an informal committee that could include representa-  
13 tives of the various CIA components in order that there could  
14 be a consistent policy of disclosure, and so that other  
15 individuals in the group could know what was going on in this  
16 particular area of research interest.

17 The memo also indicates that an informal group was  
18 in the process of being set up. And what I would like you to  
19 do is to try to recall, if you can, any groups such as the  
20 Artichoke group that was continued or reconstituted at around  
21 that time, in 1955.

22 Dr. Gottlieb. I think the only thing I can say there  
23 what would be helpful was, I don't have a specific memory of  
24 anything like that, but that it would be something that we  
25 at least in the DDP and the TSD would have tried very hard to

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1 shy away from, and if there was an Agency representative, I  
2 doubt whether it would be us. We were very leery of the  
3 security weakness of a group like that.

4 Mr. Maxwell. And that would be including other Agency  
5 components?

6 Dr. Gottlieb. No. I think it was the DoD you were talking  
7 about. That is what I meant. I missed the whole thrust of  
8 it.

9 Mr. Maxwell. It was done by our request from DoD to  
10 a CIA officer. But the CIA officer was concerned about  
11 consistent Agency policy, and suggested that there be a  
12 Committee within the Agency.

13 Dr. Gottlieb. I am just confused even by the way this is  
14 worded as to whether they meant an intra-Agency or an inter-  
15 Agency group, I am just confused by what that means.

16 Mr. Maxwell. In regard to the project, the operational  
17 use of drugs that you were involved in -- and you differentiated  
18 earlier between P-1 and Artichoke --

19 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

20 Mr. Maxwell. Was there such a Committee for those projects  
21 either in the approval process or in discussions of the kinds  
22 of research that might take place to supplement it, or the  
23 kind of operational uses which might be made of such products.

24 Dr. Gottlieb. Aside from the Artichoke group?

25 Mr. Maxwell. That is correct.

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1 Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my remembrance.

2 Mr. Maxwell. So that in fact in regard to the use of  
3 P-1 by TSS-TSD, to the best of your recollection there was  
4 no group outside of the group that would have been required to  
5 authorize the use?

6 Dr. Gottlieb. With one exception. I am just remember-  
7 ing now. We had in effect a research and development board,

8 people that Admiral DeFlores pulled together, who were aware  
9 of this activity, and made suggestions -- research suggestions,  
10 they had nothing to do with any operational applications,  
11 of course.

12 Mr. Maxwell. This was around what time period?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. I think the research board, as it was  
14 called, started in 1952 or 1953 and continued for the next  
15 six or seven years.

16 Mr. Maxwell. When did Admiral DeFlores leave the Agency,  
17 if you recall.

18 Dr. Gottlieb. I really haven't a clear memory of  
19 that. Someone like Corny Roosevelt would know that.

20 Mr. Maxwell. Was there any organization within the  
21 Agency or affiliated with the Agency that succeeded the Re-  
22 search Board?

23 Dr. Gottlieb. Not specifically, but I remember many  
24 discussions of the pros and cons of such a Board. Now, I am  
25 only talking about in respect to TSD's activities. I am aware

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1 that the DDS and the Board had a board or boards. Our experience  
 2 was finally that unless we could figure out some way of simply  
 3 getting more attention and help from such a board, that it was  
 4 a gesture as far as we were concerned based on our experience,  
 5 and also a political gesture. It may make some people happy,  
 6 but it doesn't do anything.

7 Mr. Maxwell. I just want to make sure that I understand  
 8 your testimony.

9 Is it fair to say, then, that unlike the Artichoke  
 10 Committee, either the one that we have been discussing using  
 11 the minutes of the Committee, or what apparently was a  
 12 reconstituted Artichoke Committee, as mentioned in the  
 13 memo that I just showed you --

14 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't read this memo that way. But go  
 15 ahead.

16 Mr. Maxwell. There was no similar Committee that dis-  
 17 cussed or participated in the approval of the use of LSD or  
 18 Meretran by TSD.

19 Dr. Gottlieb. Except -- your statement is correct,  
 20 except that while I was going overseas -- and I had forgotten  
 21 this apparently -- there was such a group constituted under the  
 22 Deputy Chief of the CI staff. I just read that today. I  
 23 was interested in that because it happened while I was gone.  
 24 And if it existed by the time I got back I don't have a remem-  
 25 brance of it.

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1 Mr. Maxwell. There is a memorandum dated 31 May 1956  
 2 which included a staff memorandum prepared at the operations  
 3 research office of the [REDACTED] on the subject  
 4 of covert use of psychochemicals and other agents to influence  
 5 national policy.

6 What I would like to call your attention to is paragraph  
 7 5 of the staff paper which says that:

8 "More definite data will be available shortly, as the  
 9 chemical warfare laboratories of the Chemical Corps are institu-  
 10 ting tests of some of these agents in men. They are pro-  
 11 posing to test them in Air Force personnel, using  
 12 ground simulation equipment."

13 I take it this refers to psychochemicals as described  
 14 in paragraph 14?

15 Dr. Gottlieb. Shall I read the whole thing?

16 Mr. Maxwell. I don't think you need to.

17 Dr. Gottlieb. Now this would be a military --

18 Mr. Maxwell. A military testing?

19 Dr. Gottlieb. I am talking about this group, the Opera-  
 20 tions and Research Office is an Army planning research group  
 21 in the same sense that the Rand Corporation works for the  
 22 Air Force, and not a CIA related activity.

23 Am I correct?

24 Mr. Maxwell. I don't have any evidence about that, I  
 25 can't speak for that. I don't think in this context that is an

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1 important point. But if you feel it is, we can  
2 explore that.

3 Dr. Gottlieb. I am just saying that if it is I have no  
4 knowledge of such a relationship.

5 Mr. Maxwell. What I am interested in is whether you can  
6 recall learning about the tests that are referred to in the  
7 memorandum conducted using Air Force personnel or any tests  
8 using psychochemicals conducted by the Chemical Warfare Labora-  
9 tories?

10 Dr. Gottlieb. I am aware, as you probably are, from  
11 reading newspapers in the last few months --

12 Mr. Maxwell. Independent of that?

13 Dr. Gottlieb. -- that the military were doing things  
14 like that. But relating it to this I have no information.

15 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall learning in 1955 of military  
16 tests of LSD?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I don't recall that.

18 Mr. Maxwell. There is only one more document that I  
19 would like to go over with you before we proceed to discuss the  
20 operational material -- there are two more.

21 One is an excerpt from a scientific intelligence  
22 memorandum which is dated 5 August 1954 and entitled "Potential  
23 New Agent for Unconventional Warfare". This was attached to  
24 a memorandum to Frank Wisner from [REDACTED] And on  
25 page 1 it says in paragraph 2:

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1 "Data, although still very limited, are available which  
2 indicate its usefulness for eliciting true and accurate  
3 statements from subjects under its influence during interroga-  
4 tion."

5 And this reference to LSD as referenced at the  
6 top. And I would like to ask whether you can recall seeing  
7 this memorandum or learning of it, learning about that state-  
8 ment, and if so, whether you can recall what the basis for the  
9 statement was, or rather what the data was for that.

10 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember reading this report.  
11 I think I would have, had I read it at that time, have objected  
12 to it, based on what we thought we knew at the time.

13 Mr. Maxwell. Which was --

14 Dr. Gottlieb. Which was that there was no indication  
15 that you could get true and accurate statements reliably under  
16 the drug. So, my answer is, I don't remember reading this.  
17 I certainly don't know what data they were talking about.

18 Mr. Maxwell. The last item I would like to show you is  
19 unevaluated information which was distributed as part of the  
20 CIA intelligence gathering process on [REDACTED] and also  
21 on the subject of the Soviet Bloc, the subject being research  
22 on LSD at Sandoz, and the apparent lack of LSD work in the  
23 Soviet Bloc. And I call your attention to paragraph 4 which  
24 states that "While many of the Sandoz people have in the past  
25 taken LSD, most are now of the opinion that experimentation on

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1 human being is too dangerous to be done routinely."

2 This is dated 11 December 1956.

3 It also states on paragraph 8 that apparently there is  
4 no LSD research going on in Soviet Bloc countries. I was  
5 wondering whether you can recall seeing this report, and if  
6 you could, as you did previously, indicate your response, what  
7 your response would have been at the time in regard to the  
8 two conclusions.

9 Mr. Lenzner. While he is reading that, would you note  
10 on the record that the prior memorandum that you showed Dr.  
11 Gottlieb has a distribution list on it?

12 Mr. Maxwell. I didn't.

13 Mr. Lenzner. And Dr. Gottlieb's name is not on the dis-  
14 tribution list, that is, the memorandum which was entitled  
15 "Potential New Agent, Unconventional Warfare".

16 Mr. Maxwell. No inference is meant to be drawn that  
17 he in fact read it, which is why I asked if he had in fact  
18 seen it.

19 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't specifically remember reading  
20 this. And I don't know, my comment would be, it seems a little--  
21 it is an unevaluated report, and it is really just talking  
22 about a traveling U.S. pharmacologist reporting what he heard  
23 from some [REDACTED] scientist. I would tend to discount the sig-  
24 nificance of Sandoz saying they are not aware of research  
25 work being done on LSD in the Soviet Union.

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1 If the work had anything to do with the intelligence  
2 organization, and they felt it wasn't in their interest to  
3 have that known widely, it certainly wouldn't be. That is  
4 my reaction.

5 Mr. Maxwell. In regard to the first conclusion?

6 Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I just accept that as their  
7 conclusion. I think there is a lot of semantics involved.

8 To be done routinely, I don't know what routinely means. You  
9 seem to be asking me whether I felt at that time, would  
10 agree with that statement. And if routinely means to take  
11 LSD twice a week on your own just to get a high, I think I  
12 would agree with them. I don't think I ever felt that LSD,  
13 like any drug, doesn't have its hazards. And there needs to be  
14 a purpose for using it or taking it.

15 Mr. Lenzner. I am a little confused about what this  
16 document is supposed to represent. What is this document  
17 supposed to represent?

18 Mr. Maxwell. The document is solely introduced as  
19 a piece of datum that was available at CIA without any asser-  
20 tion that it represents finished intelligence on the part of the  
21 Agency. As it is one piece of intelligence that came back to  
22 the Agency is in regard to the question of LSD. There is  
23 very little information retained in the Agency records that  
24 the Agency has been able to locate for us about experiments  
25 in LSD. And it is designed in this context to elicit Dr.

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1 Gottlieb's reaction to pieces that he may or may not have seen,  
2 and his reaction as to whether in fact he has seen it.

3 Dr. Gottlieb. I don't think I saw it -- I don't remember  
4 seeing it, I have no recollection of it.

5 Mr. Lenzner. I would just like to tell you what my con-  
6 fusion is. I don't know what file this came out of, what  
7 distribution it had, and when it came into the Agency, and

8 whether it was circulated. It doesn't identify the source  
9 of the information specifically, although it does say it is un-  
10 evaluated information.

11 And I am just wondering what probative value, if any,  
12 it has. What file did it come out of?

13 Mr. Maxwell. It came out of a security research  
14 staff file which is entitled ~~TOP SECRET~~

15 Mr. Lenzner. All I can say is that Dr. Gottlieb's testi-  
16 mony is that he has no recollection of ever seeing it.  
17 There is no indication on the memorandum that it was ever  
18 circulated. It doesn't even indicate that it was a CIA  
19 memorandum, does it?

20 Dr. Gottlieb. That number would indicate that it was  
21 a memorandum that came from debriefing a U.S. scientist that  
22 travelled abroad. Somebody has cut off all the normal  
23 Agency identifiers.

24 I think I am really tired now. And I am not suggesting  
25 we stop, but I would like to just comment on the record that I

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1 find a memo like that -- upon looking at it, I have no  
 2 knowledge, it doesn't involve me or things that I was involved  
 3 with, and I think my really best reaction, any more than say-  
 4 ing I hadn't seen it, would be that I have no comment on  
 5 the things in it.

6 Mr. Maxwell. I have no objection to your taking that  
 7 position. The question is solely to attempt as best we can  
 8 to recall your position at that time in regard to the testing  
 9 of LSD. And it is obviously a question of importance to  
 10 you and to the Committee, that the testing of LSD continued  
 11 for some time after that. And that memorandum is not put for-  
 12 ward as the conclusion of the Committee that in fact it was  
 13 dangerous, however it is defined, but solely as a way of jogging  
 14 your memory if at all possible in regard to what people were  
 15 saying at that time.

16 And they had great difficulty in trying to reconstruct  
 17 what was being said throughout the Agency because of the  
 18 absence of records in regard to LSD testing.

19 Mr. Lenzner. That may or may not be true. But my  
 20 suggestion would be that the Committee, in evaluating all this  
 21 information, for whatever report it makes, has to seriously  
 22 consider what probative value a memorandum has where the  
 23 source is unidentified. And there is no indication of  
 24 whether the sources are expert in this area or not. And  
 25 there is no way to cross-examine him. And he is restating;

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1 hearsay information from sources that are also not available for  
 2 cross-examination. And the information is not apparently cir-  
 3 culated widely and the memorandum I showed you before showed  
 4 that it wasn't circulated to this witness.

5 Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

6 (Discussion off the record.)

7 Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

8 I think the distinction should be made between circula-

9 tion lists for memoranda and the opportunity that individuals  
 10 had to read memoranda. And there is no inference being drawn  
 11 that individuals have read particular pieces of information now  
 12 available to the Committee. And in each circumstance wit-  
 13 nesses are going to be given the opportunity to say whether  
 14 they have or have not read material, or whether they can re-  
 15 call that.

16 I think probably the most useful thing would be if you  
 17 would like to proceed through this material on operational  
 18 use.

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 Mr. Maxwell. Why don't you proceed in chronological  
 21 order through the files?

22 Dr. Gottlieb. Are they so arranged?

23 Mr. Maxwell. They are, putting aside the drug policy  
 24 and procedures.

25 Dr. Gottlieb. I am starting with the file labeled

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

102

Phone (Area 202) 344-6000

1.3(a)(4)(X)

c

1 [REDACTED] And you and I both know that this is histori-  
 2 cal only. I was not in the Agency in 1950. I know nothing  
 3 about it.

4 Do you want to talk further about it?

5 Mr. Maxwell. If you know nothing about it I have no de-  
 6 sire to ask you questions about it.

7 Dr. Gottlieb. No chance. It seems to be sort of an ex-  
 8 perimental use of this Artichoke technique. I don't even  
 9 want to say that. That is only from my reading. I have no  
 10 independent knowledge.

1.3(a)(4)

c

11 [REDACTED] 1951 is the next one. The B team visited [REDACTED]  
 12 between the period 11 January and 24 January 1951 and parti-  
 13 cipated in the interrogation of an individual [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED] I was not in the Agency at  
 15 that time, I don't know anything about that.

1.3(a)(4)

c

16 This is [REDACTED] June 1952. And it is a case called  
 17 [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

c

18 Let me glance through it a minute to see whether I can  
 19 add anything.

20 It seems to me to be a case having no involvement by  
 21 me or by TSS using barbituates and hypnosis to induce a hypnotic  
 22 trance followed by interrogation. And I don't know any more  
 23 about it than that.

24 Is this useful? And I gather you will ask questions  
 25 if you wish to.

~~TOP SECRET~~

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

~~TOP SECRET~~

103

1 The next file is labeled "[REDACTED]"  
 2 1952".

3 About all I could say about this one, based on what I read  
 4 here, is the same comment as the last one, it seems to be a  
 5 reference without a lot of detail to an interrogation using  
 6 the Artichoke technique of barbituates and hypnosis that I have  
 7 no knowledge of independe of what I read in the file, and it  
 8 doesn't seem to involve myself or TSS.

9 The next file is one called "[REDACTED] Request for Artichoke,  
 10 1.3(a)(4) February 1953".

11 And it comprises really only two agenda, or what are  
 12 called progress reports here, of the Artichoke group.

13 Mr. Maxwell. You can supplement that with one piece of  
 14 information, which is that in the minutes it shows that you  
 15 attended this particular meeting of the Artichoke Committee.  
 16 And on paragraph 15 it states that:

17 1.3(a)(4) [REDACTED] announced that the case of the [REDACTED]  
 18 presently in Washington who was to be given Artichoke  
 19 treatment was cancelled upon instruction from very high officials  
 20 in the [REDACTED] Division, although all operations people agreed  
 21 1.3(a)(4) that this was a case in which Artichoke treatment would have  
 22 been very valuable."

23 I was wondering whether you can recall anything about  
 24 either the proposal or the cancellation?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. I really can't, I just don't have

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

104

1 any recollection of anything you are describing it that  
 2 was slated to get the Artichoke treatment and then was can-  
 3 celled. I have no information on that.

4 These are on the [REDACTED] 1953.

1.3(a)(4)

5 Mr. Maxwell. The information there is very spotty.  
 6 And what I would like to do is to try to recall your own travels  
 7 during that year. There is an indication in a memorandum for

8 the file from Inspector General Kirkpatrick detailing a  
 9 conversation he had with [REDACTED] following the death of [REDACTED]  
 10 [REDACTED] that indicated that you had been in the [REDACTED] in  
 11 1953. And there is also an indication in a memorandum  
 12 dated 15 November 1962 for the record that there were three sets  
 13 of [REDACTED] interrogations [REDACTED] including one  
 14 in 1953.

1.3(a)(4)2

15 What I would like you to attempt to recollect is whether  
 16 in fact you did travel [REDACTED] in particular to  
 17 [REDACTED], in that year, and if so, were you involved in  
 18 a MKDELTA interrogation [REDACTED]

19 Dr. Gottlieb. Shall I read this first?

20 (Discussion off the record.)

21 Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

22 Dr. Gottlieb, perhaps you would tell the story as best  
 23 you can.

24 Dr. Gottlieb. [REDACTED]  
 25 [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**

105

Phone (Area 2) 544-6000

1.3(a)(4)

C

1 [REDACTED]  
 2 [REDACTED]. To the best of my recollection, I was approached  
 3 by an individual from the headquarters desk involved that  
 4 the approval of such a trip and such a series of technically  
 5 assisted interrogations -- and by technically assisted I mean  
 6 using LSD -- consisted of approval by the Branch Chief,  
 7 the Division Chief, and the DDP.

1.3(a)(4)

C

8 [REDACTED] I discussed with [REDACTED]  
 9 the nature of the assistance that LSD could provide in this  
 10 interrogation. And there was some cables exchanged, I  
 11 believe, although I can't remember that in detail now, again  
 12 getting approval from headquarters to do it. And I was put  
 13 in touch [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)(S)

C

14 [REDACTED]  
 15 [REDACTED] And I can't remember the specific  
 16 arrangement, whether I was looking through it through a mirror  
 17 or anything like that, I know that I saw the interrogations.

18 The number of individuals that were interrogated I  
 19 don't remember, but I would guess -- and this is a wild guess --  
 20 between six and 12. I just don't remember.

1.3(a)(4)(S)

C

21 [REDACTED]  
 22 [REDACTED] And there were no untoward side effects  
 23 or injuries. And I came home and reported to the desk involved.

**TOP SECRET**

410 First St., S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

106

1 Mr. Maxwell. Is it your recollection that the primary im-  
2 pulse for this technical interrogation was [REDACTED]

3 1.3(a)(4)(S) [REDACTED]?

4 C Dr. Gottlieb. I really can't tell that. [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]  
6 [REDACTED] that they had any wonder drugs I don't know.

7 Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection of how the

8 [REDACTED] came to know about this capability on the part

9 1.3(a)(4)(S) of the Agency?

10 C Dr. Gottlieb. I really have no specific recollection.

11 I would just guess that it probably happened that either

12 [REDACTED] was back at headquarters and found out

13 1.3(a)(4) about it from me or somebody else, or some operations

14 C officer going out there carried it out.

15 Mr. Maxwell. Can you place it in 1953 at all in a  
16 more specific way?

17 Dr. Gottlieb. No, I really can't.

18 Mr. Maxwell. And do you recall the dosage that was  
19 involved?

20 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, I do recall that, because I know  
21 what we thought was the right dosage. And it was in this  
22 range of 60 to 100 micrograms per individual.

23 Mr. Maxwell. Were the individuals under interrogation  
24 under 24-hour observation, do you recall?

25 Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember that. I remembe

TOP SECRET



~~TOP SECRET~~

107

1 they were always interrogated, first without the drug, and then  
2 with the drug.

3 Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall whether there were  
4 medical personnel involved in the interrogation?

5 Dr. Gottlieb. They certainly weren't involved in the  
6 interrogation, as I remember. There were medical facilities  
7 involved in case anybody needed that kind of help.

8 Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

9 (Discussion off the record.)

10 Mr. Maxwell. On the record.

11 We will break until 10:30 tomorrow.

12 ((Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the Interview was adjourned,  
13 to reconvene at 10:30 a.m., Friday, October 17, 1975.)

14 ---

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Gratias 3*  
*10-16-75*

Aerosol Attack on Radio Station

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] of TSD, remembers discussion of a scheme to contaminate the air of the radio studio where Castro broadcast his speeches with an aerosol spray of a chemical that produces reactions similar to those of lysergic acid (LSD). Nothing came of the idea. [REDACTED] said he had discouraged the scheme, because the chemical could not be relied upon to be effective. [REDACTED] also of TSD,

1.3(a)(4)

- 10 -

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

recalls experimentation with psychic energizers but cannot relate it to Castro as a target. We found no one else who remembered anything of this plot, with the possible exception of Jake Esterline who may have it confused with other schemes.

Contaminated Cigars

Jake Esterline claims to have had in his possession in pre-Bay of Pigs days a box of cigars that had been treated with some sort of chemical. In our first interview with him, his recollection was that the chemical was intended to produce temporary personality disorientation. The thought was to somehow contrive to have Castro make one before making a speech and then to make a public spectacle of himself. Esterline distinctly recalls having had the cigars in his personal safe until he left W/4 and that they definitely were intended for Castro. He does not remember how they came into his possession, but he thinks they must have been prepared by [REDACTED].

In a second interview with Esterline, we mentioned that we had learned from first speaking with him of a scheme to cause Castro's beard to fall out. He then said that his cigars might have been associated with that plan. Esterline finally said that, although it was what that he no longer remembered the intended effect of the plan, he was positive they were not lethal. The cigars were never

- 11 -

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

used, according to Esterline, because WII/II could not figure out how to deliver them without danger of blowback on the Agency. He says he destroyed them before leaving WII/II in June 1961.

7 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 3 2 0

Sidney Gottlieb, of TSD, claims to remember distinctly a plot involving cigars. To emphasize the clarity of his memory, he named the officer, then assigned to WII/CA, who approached him with the scheme. Although there may well have been such a plot, the officer Gottlieb named was then assigned in India and has never worked in VII Division nor had anything to do with Cuba operations. Gottlieb remembers the scheme as being one that was talked about frequently but not widely and as being concerned with killing, not merely with influencing behaviour. As far as Gottlieb knows, this idea never got beyond the talking stage. TSD may have gone ahead and prepared the cigars just in case, but Gottlieb is certain that he did not get the DD/P's (Richard Bissell) personal approval to release them, as would have been done if the operation had gone that far. We are unable to discover whether Esterline and Gottlieb are speaking of a single cigar episode or of two unrelated schemes. We found no one else with firm recollections of lethal cigars being considered prior to August 1960.

- 12 -

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

1.3(a)(4)  
C1.3(a)(4)  
C1.3(a)(4)  
CDepilatory

[REDACTED] recalls a scheme involving thallium salts, a chemical used by women as a depilatory--the thought being to destroy Castro's image as "The Beard" by causing the beard to fall out. The chemical may be administered either orally or by absorption through the skin. The right dosage causes depilation; too much produces paralysis. [REDACTED] believes that the idea originated in connection with a trip Castro was to have made outside of Cuba. The idea was to dust thallium powder into Castro's shoes when they were put out at night to be shined. The scheme progressed as far as procuring the chemical and testing it on animals. [REDACTED] recollection is that Castro did not make the intended trip, and the scheme fell through. [REDACTED] remembers consideration being given to use of thallium salts (perhaps against Castro) and something having to do with boots or shoes. [REDACTED] does not remember with whom he dealt on this plot. He found no one else with firm knowledge of it.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

*Cottrell #2*

Est: Early Winter 1960

Very early in the operation, well before the first contact with  
 the machinery for readying the means of assassination was  
 initiated. The sequence of events is not clear, but it is  
 known that a number of methods were considered. Preparation of  
 materials went ahead without express approval.

(Comment: It should be noted that TSD maintains a stock  
 of equipment and materials for operational use. When queries are  
 made of TSD technicians about materials or devices that are not  
 stock items, it is not unusual for the technicians to go  
 ahead with the preparation of the materials or devices against  
 the event that there is a formal request for them. Because of  
 this, undue significance should not be attached to advance  
 preparations for this operation. It should also be noted that

- 20 -

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~  
~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

it was not unusual at the time in question for the Chief of TSD to be by-passed in operations involving his people. While Cornelius Roosevelt, then Chief of TSD, has the clear impression that all requests were levied through him, instances were cited in the course of this inquiry where such was not the case. The practices and procedures in existence at the time may account, at least in part, for the differing recollections of what did and what did not happen and for the differing degrees of significance given developments in the minds of the participants.)

Dr. Edward Gunn, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical Services, has a notation that on 16 August 1960 he received a box of Cuban cigars to be treated with a lethal material. He understood them to be Fidel's favorite brand, and he thinks they were given to him by Chef Edwards. Edwards does not recall the incident. Gunn has a notation that he contacted [REDACTED] of TSD, on 6 September 1960. [REDACTED] remembers experimenting with some cigars and then treating a full box. He cannot now recall whether he was initially given two boxes, experimenting with one and then treating the other; or whether he bought a box for experimentation, after which he treated the box supplied him by Gunn. He does not, in fact, remember Gunn as the supplier of any cigars. He is positive, though, that he did contaminate a full box of fifty cigars with botulinum toxin, a virulent poison that

- 21 -

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~



1.3(a)(4)

produces a fatal illness some hours after it is ingested. [REDACTED] distinctly remembers the flaps-and-seals job he had to do on the box and on each of the wrapped cigars, both to get at the cigars and to erase evidence of tampering. He kept one of the experimental cigars and still has it. He retested it during our inquiry and found that the toxin still retained 94% of its original effectiveness. The cigars were so heavily contaminated that merely putting one in the mouth would do the job; the intended victim would not actually have to smoke it.

1.3(a)(4)

Gunn's notes show that he reported the cigars as being ready for delivery on 7 October 1960. [REDACTED] notes do not show actual delivery until 13 February 1961. They do not indicate to whom delivery was made. Gunn states that he took the cigars, at some unspecified time, and kept them in his personal safe. He remembers destroying them within a month of Sheriff Edwards' retirement in June 1963.

1.3(a)(4)

(Comment: Others recall the cigar scheme, but only as an idea that was considered and then discarded. Roosevelt, Chief of TSD at the time, and O'Connell, the case officer, recall the cigar scheme, but feel that it was never considered seriously. To Gunn and [REDACTED] who gave it a good deal of time but did not participate in the broader operational discussions, the cigars loom as important.)

SECRET-NOV 1961



Edwards recalls approaching Roosevelt after Bissell had already spoken to Roosevelt on the subject; Roosevelt recalls speaking to Edwards after Bissell discussed it with Edwards. Bissell does not recall specific conversations with either of them on the technical aspects of the problem, but he believes that he must have "closed the loop" by talks with both Edwards and Roosevelt. Roosevelt recalls his first meeting with Edwards as being in Edwards' office. Edwards remembers asking to be introduced to a chemist. He is sure that he did not name the target to Roosevelt, but Roosevelt says he knew it was Castro. Roosevelt believes that he would have put Edwards in touch with [REDACTED] then chief of TSD's Chemical Division, but [REDACTED] has no recollection of such work at that time. [REDACTED] recalls other operations at other times, but not this one. Roosevelt did say that, if he turned it over to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could have assigned it to [REDACTED].

Roosevelt remembers that four possible approaches were considered: (1) something highly toxic, such as shellfish poison to be administered with a pin (which Roosevelt said was what was supplied to Gary Powers); (2) bacterial material in liquid form; (3) bacterial treatment of a cigarette or cigar; and (4) a handkerchief treated with bacteria. The decision, to the best of his recollection, was that bacteria in liquid form was the best means. Bissell recalls the same decision,

- 23 -

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

tying it to a recollection that Castro frequently drank tea, coffee, or bouillon, for which a liquid poison would be particularly well suited.

January - February 1961

Despite the decision that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets. [REDACTED] remembers meeting with Edwards and O'Connell in Edwards' office to discuss the requirement. The specifications were that the poison be stable, soluble, safe to handle, undetectable, not immediately acting, and with a firmly predictable end result. Botulin comes nearest to meeting all of those requirements, and it may be put up in either liquid or solid form. [REDACTED] states that the pill form was

1.3(a)(4) chosen because of ease and safety of handling.

(Comment: The gangsters may have had some influence on the choice of a means of assassination. O'Connell says that in his very early discussions with the gangsters (or, more precisely, Mahon's discussions with them) consideration was given to possible ways of accomplishing the mission. Apparently the Agency had first thought in terms of a typical, gangland-style killing in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana was flatly opposed to the

- 24 -

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job, because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Glusman stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Trafficante ("Joe, the courier") was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as Juan Orta who was then Office Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister (Castro). The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since lost that source of income, and needed the money.)

When Edwards received the pills he dropped one into a glass of water to test it for solubility and found that it did not even disintegrate, let alone dissolve. [REDACTED] took them back and made up a new batch that met the requirement for solubility. Edwards at that point wanted assurance that the pills were truly lethal. He called on Dr. Guma to make an independent test of them. Edwards gave Guma money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. Guma had a record of a conversation with [REDACTED] on 6 February 1961. It may have related to the tests, but we cannot be sure. What appears to have happened is that Guma tested the pills on the guinea pigs and found them ineffective.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ *Sattler Ex # 3*

Schemes in Early 1963

Skin Diving Suit

At about the time of the Donovan-Castro negotiations for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners a plan was devised to have Donovan present a contaminated skin diving suit to Castro as a gift. Castro was known to be a skin diving enthusiast. We cannot put a precise date on this scheme. Desmond FitzGerald told us of it as if it had originated after he took over the Cuba task force in January 1963. Samuel Halpern said that it began under William Harvey and that he, Halpern, briefed FitzGerald on it. Harvey states positively that he never heard of it.

According to Sidney Gottlieb, this scheme progressed to the point of actually buying a diving suit and readying it for delivery. The technique involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus that would produce a disabling and chronic skin disease (Madura foot) and contaminating the breathing apparatus with tubercle bacilli. Gottlieb does not remember what came of the scheme or what happened to the scuba suit. Sam Halpern, who was in on the scheme, at first said the plan was dropped because it was obviously impracticable. He later recalled that the plan was abandoned because it was overtaken by events: Donovan had already given Castro a skin diving suit on his own initiative. The scheme may have been mentioned to Mike Niskovsky, who worked with Donovan, but FitzGerald has no recollection that it was.

1.3(a)

Halpern says that he mentioned the plan to [REDACTED] then  
a special assistant to the DD/P (Helms). [REDACTED] later told Halpern  
that he had mentioned the scheme to Mr. Helms. Those who were involved  
in the plot or who were identified to us by the participants as being  
witting are the following:

Richard Helms

William Earvey (denies any knowledge)

Desmond FitzGerald

Samuel Halpern

George McManus

Sidney Gottlieb

1.3(b)

Becky-Armored Sea Shell

Some time in 1963, date uncertain but probably early in the year, Desmond FitzGerald, then Chief, SAS, originated a scheme for doing away with Castro by means of an explosives-rigged sea shell. The idea was to take an unusually spectacular sea shell that would be certain to catch Castro's eye, load it with an explosive triggered to blow when the shell was lifted, and submerge it in an area where Castro often went skin-diving.

He's bought two books on Caribbean Mollusca. The scheme was soon found to be impracticable. None of the shells that might conceivably be found in the Caribbean area was both spectacular enough to be sure of attracting attention and large enough to hold the needed volume of explosive. The midget submarine that would have had to be used in emplacement of the shell has too short an operating range for such an operation.

FitzGerald states that he, Sam Halpern, and [REDACTED] had several sessions at which they explored this possibility, but that no one else was ever brought in on the talks. Halpern believes that he had conversations with TSD on feasibility and using a hypothetical case. He does not remember with whom he may have spoken. We are unable to identify any others who knew of the scheme at the time it was being considered.

Gottlieb Ex #4

7 5 0 0 0 5 0 3 4 0

20 November 1963

Thus far, this account of the Cubela project has been based almost

- 91 -

SECRET - EYES ONLY

wholly on documents found in the project file. Beginning here is an account of an episode in the Cubela operation on which there is no documentary evidence. Dr. Gunn has a record of nine contacts and their dates; otherwise, this summary is drawn from the recollections of those involved.

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] says that, while Cubela was anxious to do away with Castro, Cubela was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro's. What Cubela really wanted was a high-powered, silenced

rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards.

Cubela finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was), he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try.

Samuel Halpern and [REDACTED] approached Dr. Gunn for

1.3(a)(4)

assistance. Although none of the participants specifically so stated,

it may be inferred that they were seeking a means of assassination

of a sort that Cubela might reasonably have been expected to have

devised himself. What they settled upon was Black Leaf 40, a common,

easily-obtainable insecticide containing about 40% nicotine sulphate.

Nicotine is a deadly poison that may be administered orally, by injection,

or by absorption through the skin. It is likely that there also were

discussions of means of administering the poison, because Gunn was ready

to move when asked.

1.3(a)(4)

The plan reached the action stage when Halpern and [REDACTED] contacted

SECRET - EYES ONLY



1.3(a)(4)

Gunn again on the morning of 20 November 1963 and told him that the device for administering the poison (a ballpoint pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for [REDACTED] to catch a plane at noon the next day. Gunn says that he went immediately to the FI/D workshop and spent the rest of the day and most of that night fabricating the device. Those in FI/D who worked with him knew what he was trying to make but not for whom it was intended. Eventually, after seven or eight failures, he succeeded in converting a Paper-Mate pen into a hypodermic syringe that worked. He said that the needle was so fine that the victim would hardly feel it when it was inserted--he compared it with the scratch from a shirt with too much starch. He delivered the workable device to [REDACTED] the

1.3(a)(4)

following morning and retained two of the later prototypes. He states

that they are still in his safe. He does not know what happened to the device he gave [REDACTED] he does not remember its having been

1.3(a)(4)

turned to him. He believes he was told that Cubela refused to accept the device. He says he would not now be able to differentiate the final pen from the earlier prototypes that are in his safe.

22 November 1963

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] arrived in Paris on the morning of 22 November and met with Cubela late that afternoon. [REDACTED] states that he