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SUBJECT : Developments in the TRIDENT Project

1. As a result both of the policy outlined by Washington representatives for dealing with the Ukrainian question and of the conclusions previously reached by the Munich SC Detachment, activities of the TRIDENT Project changed considerably in January 1947. All direct contact with Ukrainian groups was completely broken off, and the only contact retained was one man, SARPEDON, who was not a member of any Ukrainian organization. Through him as a cutout, however, it was arranged to keep in touch with CADMUS, vice president and western European controlling personality of UHVR; NESTOR, UPA representative at Munich; and DAEDALUS, Security (SB - Sluzba Bezpeka) chief of OUN. These three, easily the most important individuals in the joint UHVR-OUN-UPA confederation, were understood to comprise the TRIDENT Group.

2. Although no direct contact was provided, communication with the TRIDENT Group through SARPEDON continued on a fairly regular basis. Through this means, the arrival of SLAVKO was reported and the information he brought forwarded to AB-43. (MSC/RIR/421, MSC/RIR/428, MSC/RIR/429) It was also arranged that information collected by UPA or UHVR couriers returning from the Ukraine would be thus passed on to AB-43 after the courier had been debriefed by DAEDALUS or NESTOR.

3. Several problems immediately arose as a result of the official severing of relations with the Ukrainian leaders. The first was the matter of couriers. It is understood that no attempt is to be made to brief couriers on targets of American interest and that no suggestions will be made to any Ukrainians on what information is most desired by American interests. On the other hand, any courier's information which appeared to the Ukrainians to be of possible use to American agencies is to be passed on to AB-43 via SARPEDON. Before this arrangement had been established, however, it had been projected to send a courier to the Ukraine with a joint American-Ukrainian brief, although the American instigation, handled through UHVR, would be unknown to the courier. On the basis of this agreement, the TRIDENT group selected a courier and asked AB-43's assistance in procuring Polish papers for him; they supplied the necessary Czech papers. They refused, however, to divulge the courier's name upon request, first on the grounds that it was of no

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interest until his return, and then, when AB-43 announced a complete dissociation from all Ukrainian activities, on the grounds that the courier was traveling solely on Ukrainian business. It had already been decided to refuse the Polish papers, and from the American side, the courier question was then considered closed. According to the understanding with the TRIDENT group, however, SARPEDON will notify AB-43 of the courier's return and will pass on any information of interest, exclusive of the official UHVR assignments.

4. The second, and greater, problem is SARPEDON himself. He was selected by the TRIDENT Group as a person with whom they could trust information to be forwarded to AB-43, although he did not belong to the UHVR, UPA, or OUN organizations. It was completely agreed and thoroughly understood, however, that SARPEDON was in no sense an agent of the TRIDENT Group but was working exclusively for AB-43, at his direction, and under his orders. The only reservation made was that SARPEDON should not be required to do any work against the interests of Ukrainian nationalism or Ukrainian groups; for example, he would not be required to supply information on such matters as the whereabouts of BANDERA or UHVR-OUN secret plans and meetings, AB-43 had two meetings with SARPEDON (3 and 7 February 1947) intended to establish a firm relationship and brief SARPEDON on his duties.

5. Throughout their conferences, AB-43 emphasized the points already made with the TRIDENT Group: that Americans are not collaborating with the Ukrainians against the USSR as a common enemy; that Americans are not supporting any Ukrainian groups or aspirations; and that no Ukrainian group is in any way working for American interests or as American agents. This line was designed to reinforce the change of policy which prevented the establishment of resident agents in the Ukraine previously discussed by SARPEDON and AB-43.

6. In matters of information on Ukrainian affairs, SARPEDON had been thoroughly cooperative; it was through him that DAEDALUS' reports of an MGB agent in Munich reached AB-43. The situation has an undesirable element, however, which appeared in the development of the case. SARPEDON had given DAEDALUS his personal promise that he would not divulge the real name of the MGB man, who is operating under the alias SLAVKO. Although he agreed that no breach of Ukrainian security was involved and that no Ukrainian secrets would be affected, SARPEDON refused to break his word. AB-43 agreed with him that he should not betray his promise, but that he should not permit himself to be placed in a situation where he would have to withhold legitimate information from AB-43. This difficulty had been foreseen, since it was obvious that any person acceptable to the TRIDENT Group as a cutout would owe his primary allegiance to Ukrainian nationalism rather than to an American employer. SARPEDON, however, is adhering rather too closely to the letter of his loyalty, and some method must be devised to assure his closer adherence to American interests. It is possible that some other system of cutouts will have to be arranged to insure the passage of necessary information.

7. There are two projects still pending in relation to the Ukrainian group which make it advisable to maintain some connection with the TRIDENT personnel until they can be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The first is the use of SLAVKO as a double agent, since according to DAEDALUS, he is ripe for defection. The only possible

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approach to SLAVKO, as long as his identity remains unknown, and the most plausible approach, after his identity is revealed, is through DAEDALUS or SARPEDON as cutout. It is possible that one of these two might be used to interrogate SLAVKO and in controlling him for future activities.

8. The second project is the penetration of the Munich Bunker. Interest in this obvious priority target was somewhat overshadowed for a time by the more intensive activities under discussion in other fields, but the situation is approximately ready for a new development. The arrest of several of the Bunker personnel by CIC in a raid in August was, unfortunately, not productive of either results or leads. Several possibilities for handling the Bunker exist and are under discussion: arrest of all the suspected personnel and a consequent attempt to break some of them; arrest of whichever person appears to be the leading force and an attempt to turn that individual; or an attempt to use one of the leaders as a double agent without a formal arrest. All these proposed measures require current information on the positions and activities of members of the Bunker; these are now being collected. As soon as a clear estimate of Bunker personalities is available, one of the plans of control will go into immediate effect.

9. The sole aim underlying the TRIDENT project is to maintain a working arrangement with the TRIDENT Group, and hence the organizations they represent, for the double purpose of keeping track of the activities of those organizations and of assuring an unrestricted flow of CE information from already functioning Ukrainian sources such as the UHVR courier service and the Sluzba Bezpeka (Security Service of OUN) in Munich. These contacts, already made, can be continued with no more than nominal attention and payment, such as travel permits in other occupation zones, limited medical and food supplies given to individuals, and occasional protection. Through this means, access is provided to information of CE value such as possible defection cases, identity and activities of RIS personnel, and operations of RIS services, and information is also available as to the extent of RIS penetration of Ukrainian groups.

nothing tangible so far

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