

From: Tokyo, Japan Report No: ZJL-713 Local File No: PD-268

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Report Made By: [] Approved By: []

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Orally to: []

Source Cryptonym: [] References: ZJL-689; 685; PD-226.

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. In between the receipt of the 10 August report and that of the 25 August report, a rather snide note (which was returned by courier, sealed) was sent to [] on the subject of the 10 August report concerning TSUJI's remarks and one report used for ZJL-689 concerning HATTORI Takushiro's remarks. The note paralleled the attitude expressed in PD-226 by [] concerning what to do about []
2. Apparently the rasp contained in that note had some effect, because [] promptly compiled the 25 August report which contains the real meat of this report, and has not stopped yet. His subsequent reports have not been processed fully as yet, but are uniformly good in quality and detail. Even this report, though it gives us details on TSUJI's tribulations rather than his activities, concerning which we get mainly hints, certainly gives us a close-up of TSUJI. Furthermore, it is followed up by another recent report which gives more details on the items discussed in paras. 4p and in 6 of this report and on SATO Katsuro's alleged "mis-use" of TSUJI.
3. Re para. 3: A [] report of this week, not yet processed, identifies the NIPPON YUKAN SHA as a subsidiary interest of the prominent Rightist, MIURA Gichi, who is a good friend and recent collaborator of SATOMI Hajime and who is the backer of the NIPPON KOKUMIN MINSHUSHUGI DANTAI of HANADA Binji, HOMMA Kenichiro, SASAKI Takeo, OYAMA Ryoshi and others of the SHIMPEITAI Incident fame. NIPPON YUKAN SHA is one of the sources of funds for the former God's Troopers.
4. Re para. 10: This is the most clear of many references throughout the report as to TSUJI's actual picture of himself as a spiritual descendant of the Army and Navy mutineers of the pre-war "Incident" days — his firm desire, not to evade arrest or trial, but rather to use it, whether obviously guilty or obviously not (we choose the former obviously), to broadcast his political views and play the martyr. TSUJI's application of this time-honored Japanese Rightist device for gaining public sympathy is not quite so comic-operatic as it appears at first glance to the untrained Western view; in fact, we can be very grateful, as probably the prosecuting attorney was also, that his illness prevented it.

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-2- (ZJL-713: COVER LETTER; PD-268)

5. This more-or-less diary form of account on the activities of his good friends HATTORI and TSUJI has been continued by [] and will appear in later reports. Details on HATTORI's organization are now appearing.
6. In []'s quaint way, he appears to be trying (a) to save his job by producing desired information on his friends (b) to vindicate or at least alleviate the suspicion concerning his friends and (c) to show that he recognizes the need his friends have for help and to heed them —simultaneously. [] KNOWS that TSUJI was guilty of violating the Espionage Ordinance, and he reports TSUJI as tacitly admitting it; however, [] puts up a good red-herring case for TSUJI's blunt frankness and even indicates that such was the intended basis for his defense in court. Yet [] quite definitely does NOT condone all of TSUJI's views, and quite deftly steered TSUJI away from the "martyr"-style defense of himself in court which would have been ludicrous but also effective propaganda too. We feel certain that [] is being honest at least in saying that he did not and does not want to see the "TSUJI Case" (from which he nevertheless tries to absolve TSUJI of direct blame by claiming it is TSUJI's ATO Publishing Office subordinates who are the real villains) used for political purposes, NOR does he agree with TSUJI's political views as TSUJI has himself stated them (but [] claims those views, if irresponsible, are due to bad influences around TSUJI) (in a later report there are details on this.) There is something akin to a conflict of loyalties - personal and ideological - in which the ideological wins out a bit, fortunately for us. A thorough study of this report will reveal many more interesting personal angles which we do not feel need to be pointed out to you here.

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Subject: Activities of Former Colonel
TSUJI Masanobu

Report No: ZJI-713 (PD-268)

Date of Information: 3 Mar - 21 Aug 51

Background Info: As stated

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 10 and 25 Aug 51

Evaluation: C-2, except as stated Date of Report: 10 September 51

Source: C 3

(Field Note: This report is based upon two reports received from Source. The first, received on 10 August, purported to give the main points of TSUJI Masanobu's alleged account on 25 July of his activities and attitudes (para. 4a-p below); the second, written by C 3 in the first person, was rec'd on 25 August and consisted of a running account of daily developments in the TSUJI Case plus operational data concerning background of the case. Since the developments in the TSUJI Case are almost inseparably connected with Source's own part in it and his relations with HATTORI Takushiro and TSUJI, and since the pertinent operational details are therefore in themselves intelligence information to us, we have preserved in the following report C 3's own account in the first person, with a minimum of editing. Our comments appear in the cover letter.)

1. Very few persons in Japan knew of the intimate relationship between TSUJI Masanobu and myself, which began when I was an Army Engineer captain (about 1930). We seldom met in pre-war days, but we trusted and liked each other very much nevertheless. Our longtime intimacy was publicized through inclusion of brief anecdotes concerning me in TSUJI's two books, "Three Thousand Leagues (RI) of Secret Escape" and "One to Fifteen". Shortly after my return to Japan last year, an article in the left-wing magazine "SHINSO", in the August 1950 issue, I believe, stated that TSUJI and I were plotting the rearmament of Japan. That article was later reprinted in the Chinese Hongkong weekly, "Newspaperdom" (新聞天地). According to TSUJI himself, even then the Attorney General's Special Investigations Bureau had begun to investigate him, even putting a surveillance around his own house. Not wishing to be caught in the surveillance nor to draw public notice, I tried to minimize my contacts to TSUJI. From late March until 25 July 1951, I did not meet him directly anywhere. (Last sentence: C-4)
2. The lecture that TSUJI delivered before members of the Liberalists Club (JIYUJIN KURABU) on 3 March 1951 attracted public attention in early April 1951. At that time, some of my friends told me they hoped I would caution TSUJI. Others asked me if TSUJI would be arrested or not on the charge of violating the Purge Ordinance. Although I was not fully familiar with the contents of his lecture, I personally entertained little anxiety, because TSUJI had once told me that he checked closely in advance with officials of the Special Investigations Bureau to insure approval of his actions by

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ZJL-713 (PD-268)

that agency. (C-3) When I heard that the Communist Party was making ill use of TSUJI's remarks, I relaxed even more, feeling certain that TSUJI, an ardent anti-Communist, could hardly say anything which would be favorable to the JCP. I concluded, therefore, that TSUJI's lecture was merely being misquoted and a grossly distorted version of it being publicized. (C-3)

3. The rumors and opinions concerning TSUJI's lecture are still rampant, and in fact, the voices in opposition to TSUJI in July 1951 seem to be stronger. In its 22 July 1951 issue, the NIPPON YUKAN (Japan Evening News) boldly attacked TSUJI's speech with a strong rebuttal against it. Until that time, I had been very reticent concerning my own attitude and non-committal concerning the comments of friends on the TSUJI question. But I began to wonder if those persons who have long held strong dislikes for TSUJI might not be working out a malicious plot against him purposely, using TSUJI's indiscreet speech as a basis.
4. (Date of Info: 25 July 1951). When I had met TSUJI in March 1951 he told me to phone him at the ATO (佐藤 勝郎) Publishing Office if contact were desired, since he was usually there during the daytime. Therefore, on 25 July 1951, I made a phone call to that office, for the first time (last phrase: C-4), and asked if TSUJI were there. The person answering the phone demanded my name and address and then attempted to brush me off, telling me TSUJI was not there and was expected to be hospitalized for an ulcer that day. I felt certain that TSUJI was at the ATO Publishing Company office and the receptionist of the phone call did not want me to see TSUJI without knowing my connections to TSUJI. I immediately went to TSUJI's home, and his wife told me that he was at the ATO office, which I then visited for the first time (C-3). The man who answered the phone earlier, SATO Katsuro (佐藤 勝郎), excused his previous lie by saying that TSUJI had just returned, even before I introduced myself. TSUJI was in a drawing room at the rear. At first glance, I could see that he was greatly debilitated and urged him to go to bed immediately. Afterwards I talked with him for about four hours as he rested. The main points of TSUJI's remarks were as follows:

(Date of Info for the following: 25 July 1951; Sub-source: TSUJI Masanobu; Evaluation: C-3)

- a. The lecture which TSUJI delivered on 3 March 1951 to the Liberalists Club seems to have aroused undue criticism from various circles and to have been misused widely as a topic for fomenting social gossip.
- b. The purpose of the lecture which he made before the Liberalists Club has been variously interpreted and misunderstood by the public. Inasmuch as he had often been requested by the club chairman to give a lecture to its members, on the condition that it would be kept off-the-record and not publicized, TSUJI finally acceded to that request. He did not volunteer to make the speech nor solicit the opportunity for any purposes. There has never been any connection between TSUJI and

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the Liberalists Club except that its chief comes from TSUJI's native county. TSUJI prepared three alternative themes or topics, leaving the final choice up to the members. Consequently, he did not actually choose the lecture topic himself. (C-4)

- c. Since he rankled at the constant close watch of the S.I.B., he usually contacted that Bureau in advance deliberately to tell them whenever he was making a trip, much less a speech. (C-4) He told the S.I.B. that he was going to make this speech too. (C-3) However, afterwards, TSUJI was approached by a man from the S.I.B. who told him that a certain NAOI Takeo (直井武雄) had secretly informed the S.I.B. about his lecture, describing it as "outrageous" and urging the S.I.B. to definitely punish TSUJI. The S.I.B. investigator inquired and was furnished full details of the speech. After that, the investigator reassured TSUJI that if such were the contents of his lecture, there was no case to prosecute.
- d. Soon after this, the JCP and affiliated leftist organs began to draw public attention to TSUJI's speech, which was spot-quoted in pamphlets and JCP wildcat newspapers.
- e. When the Club first asked TSUJI to make the speech, he declined it because of restrictions upon him as a purges and because he feared misinterpretation of the lecture, causing grave repercussions for the future. However, the Liberalists Club is a private group of persons who are all cultured, no one but club members could attend, and TSUJI had been promised that there would be no publicity of the speech. So he delivered it.
- f. NAOI Takeo proved to be a member of the Liberalists Club. TSUJI wrote NAOI a letter stating that he desired to take action against NAOI if the report were true that the latter had maliciously informed S.I.B. of TSUJI's lecture subject. NAOI replied that the report of his informing S.I.B. about details of the speech was completely groundless and false. Yet, TSUJI found out from S.I.B. contacts that NAOI had secretly brought them TSUJI's letter to NAOI, which the latter termed "a letter of intimidation."
- g. Unknown to TSUJI, his speech was apparently taken down in shorthand. Since the stenographic copy of his speech was later circulated among the members, it seems quite likely that some of the members are either Communists or are closely connected to the JCP, which later used excerpts of this text. (C-4; a wild counter-accusation at best.) The Liberalists Club seems to be absolving itself of blame for publicizing TSUJI's speech using the remark in the speech as an alibi: "Because what I am discussing is my own firm conviction, I would feel no shame wherever it might be presented." As a result, TSUJI was startled by the lowness of their intelligence and morality.
- h. Five months after the speech was given, TSUJI heard constantly the rumor that he will be arrested momentarily; in fact, on 24 July he was told

SECRET

ZJL-713 (FD-268)

that the National Rural Police would arrest him the next day, but his own query of the S.I.B. and the N.R.P. as to their plans proved this false. All sorts of rumors have been spreading concerning TSUJI's activities and ideas which annoyed him very much: rumors that he was engaged in secret political activities and building up an ultra-nationalist or Rightist group, or most typically, that he was planning formation of a nation-wide Armed Action Unit or other operations preparatory to rearmament. At first TSUJI worried about these, fearful that persons ignorant of the true circumstances would misjudge him, but the situation had developed so badly to date that he was in a despairing mood, even unwilling to defend or explain himself. As a result, he would welcome arrest by the police or other (GHQ) authorities and a conclusive interrogation so that the true facts might come to light and people could judge him by the facts and not by gossip. TSUJI's opinions are based, he states, upon the Japanese Constitution and General of the Army MacArthur's encouragement of Japan to become the "Switzerland of Asia." Since TSUJI was acting for no ulterior political purpose (C-4), a fair investigation would reveal his innocence. Also, because of a suspected ulcer of the stomach, he would welcome arrest as affording a bit of peace and quiet while awaiting trial. However, since S.I.B. stated it was not going to arrest him, TSUJI planned to consult in a few days with a noted doctor on the Izu Peninsula and undergo a dietary cure, both recommended to him by former Maj. Gen. MIYOSHI Yasuyuki (三好 康之). (C-2)

- j. TSUJI had already been asked for interviews by Mr. Joseph FROMM, American representative of U.S. News and World Report, Mr. Robert MARTIN, "ONA" (sic) special correspondent, and representatives of Canadian and Australian newspapers. With the permission of S.I.B., TSUJI aired his views and defense arguments to them. (C-2) The reporters all listened attentively and unanimously expressed their appreciation of his frankness, indicating to TSUJI that it was the first time they had heard such opinions (C-4) and that many Japanese might very naturally feel similarly but not be truthful in stating their views. (C-2) TSUJI felt that they might have been flattering him to some extent but that they genuinely appreciated his blunt truthfulness more than his own countrymen. The Canadian newspaperman happened to be a War Crimes Investigator who had worked on apprehension of TSUJI in 1945, but even he was impressed. (Cf. Cover letter)
- k. TSUJI wants to clear up the case of his Liberalists Club speech and to vindicate himself and to obtain the opportunity to voice his opinions officially as well. Therefore he will never avoid arrest. (C-2)
- l. Concerning SUGII Mitsuru, TSUJI did not even faintly recall such a person, though admitting that he might have met him a few times since they were both in the Burma Area during the war, but denied any current connection to him. Any rumor that TSUJI is using SUGII as an operative would be the result of false boasting on SUGII's part.
- m. When TSUJI heard in mid-July that Lt. General IWAKURO Hideo had reproached HATTORI Takushiro and TSUJI, he visited IWAKURO to scold him about this.

SECRET

INAKURO looked most embarrassed but stated that he had never spoken anything but good of TSUJI to other people, which TSUJI did not believe. (C-2) TSUJI felt it disgraceful that former superiors and senior officers should make irresponsible derogatory remarks about their one-time subordinates; it was most ungentlemanly and unmilitary to defame a person without saying a word directly to the man himself. A similar case occurred recently when ailing General OKAMURA Yasut-sugu (or Masiji), former Commander-in-chief of the China Expeditionary Army, warned the police that Lt. Colonel ASAGI (PH 73) should be investigated as a Communist. ASAGI was a staff lieutenant colonel, and TSUJI's subordinate. Since he was greatly concerned with Russia, he was probably doing research on Russia or might have discussed Russia, and a portion of his discussion may have praised certain points about Russia. That does not make him a Communist. TSUJI visited OKAMURA and upbraided him for his accusation, asking for evidence, of which OKAMURA gave none but rumor. (C-4)

- n. TSUJI has no knowledge of HATTORI Takushiro's rearmament plans, which has nothing to do with TSUJI's work. (C-4). Despite a longtime intimate personal relationship, HATTORI and TSUJI are separate in their work, and unless HATTORI explained about his work or asked TSUJI's opinion on something, the latter would not inquire about it. Therefore, it is quite possible that TSUJI might be opposed to details of HATTORI's rearmament plans. (C-4, entire para.)
 - o. TSUJI does not feel that either the present Police Reserve nor any other rearmament plan to date is sufficient to defend Japan. He feels that the revival of the ideals and guiding principles of the Japanese Army is the main problem. Only when dire need for defense of the fatherland by the Japanese themselves, in the form of a Russian invasion or a JCP revolution, will true patriots gather and full rearmament might be effected. (C-4) The revival of a military organization would be a waste unless there is actually danger to Japan herself. Yet reliance upon the National Police Reserve would be foolish. Rearmament can only be seriously considered in the imminence of an enemy.
 - p. Under present circumstances, the East Asia League (TOA RENAI) of General ISHIIHARA should be revived and reorientated. It should not be left as it is now. The Japanese must make a detailed and serious review of Asianism as it is advocated by the various present Asiatic countries and then establish a union and policy common and acceptable to all of the countries concerned. The reason why ISHIIHARA's East Asia League was not acceptable to the other countries of Asia was that he advocated it from the standpoint that Japan, as a nation superior to the others in Asia, should be the leader of Asia. (End of account with TSUJI as Sub-source.)
5. As TSUJI and I were talking, a Metropolitan Policeman came to the bedroom and asked for an interview with TSUJI. After a few words, the policeman left, taking with him several books from the ATO Publishing Office output. The policeman's visit seemed to be merely to confirm whether TSUJI were at home or not.

SECRET

6. A man whom I thought I recognized in the ATO Office was described by TSUJI as TANABE Shinichi (or Arayuki: 田辺 新之助). TANABE is in charge of editing the ATO Monthly Report (ATO SHOBO GEPPO). TSUJI gave no further explanation concerning this publication, but it seems that this monthly report is put out by SATO Katsuro and TANABE to publicize TSUJI and increase his following. The articles in it are written anonymously and propagandize and play up TSUJI's books and political articles and opinions. These are hardly the functions of a normal book store running a small publishing office on the side, and it seems obvious that the ATO SHOBO (Publishing Office) is involved in some kind of political operation or activity, using TSUJI's relationship to it to gain popular support. TSUJI's connection to it needs further scrutiny. (C-opinion)
7. (Date of Info: 27 July 1951). TSUJI went to the hospital on the Isu Peninsula specializing in a dietary cure which had been recommended by General MIYOSHI Yasuyuki. It did not seem to be a very modern medical treatment, but what could one expect from MIYOSHI? (NOTE: We admit that this last remark is "out of place" here, but it does show Source's persistency in applying personal prejudices any way he possibly can.)
8. (Date of Info: 28 July 1951). I called on SATO Katsuro at the ATO SHOBO (Publishing Office) in the afternoon and asked about his relationship with TSUJI in the course of talk. It was as follows: (Following, Sub-source: ☐ Evaluation: F-3)
 - a. In 1934, when SATO was attending Army Officers School, TSUJI was his instructor and company commander. SATO's name appears in records of the so-called "October Incident," as "Cadet-Officer SATO". A group of those officers who later provoked the February 26 Incident in 1936 were working upon the Army Officers' School cadets already in 1934, in order to recruit fellow-conspirators. SATO was one of those approached. After many contacts and agreements with these officers, SATO came to perceive that they were plotting a conspiracy for armed revolution and to get the cadets involved in its execution. He then tried to warn his fellow-students not to participate in such a campaign, but did not succeed. Firm in his ideas, SATO related the whole affair to TSUJI, who immediately took counter-measures which resulted in a major re-shuffle of Army School personnel. However, SATO finally was subjected to dismissal from Cadet School himself. He joined the Manchurian Army later, and became an officer. SATO began the publishing business at ATO in 1950, and at first received considerable aid from TSUJI.
9. (Date of Info: 2 August 1951). The ASAHI Shinbun (Newspaper) reported that the S.I.B. had indicted TSUJI on the charge of violating the Purge Ordinance. TSUJI had returned to Tokyo on this very day. Reading about the indictment, I contacted a friend of mine, YOSHIE Chiyo (shi), a lawyer, and requested him to prepare the brief for defense of TSUJI in the indictment in case TSUJI would agree to retain him. YOSHIE agreed. YOSHIE Chiyo(shi) (吉江 知子) stated that TSUJI's case was supposed to be handled only by the Special Surveillance Section of the Tokyo District Attorney General's office.

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ZJL-713 (PD-268)

Moreover, it was originally planned that the case should be handled as a closely-guarded secret session. However, since the ASAHI News had scooped the case, the authorities were in a quandary as to what to do. (Sub-source: YOSHIE; Evaluation: P-3). YOSHIE was formerly a criminal prosecutor who was sent to Shanghai in about 1940 by the pre-war Justice Ministry. My association with him started at that time. I could see that he was a man of fine intellect and character. After 1942, he served at the Tokyo Court of Appeals as prosecuting attorney for ideological cases. Our friendship grew very strong. In 1944, he was appointed the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Aomori District Court, and later transferred to Maebashi District Court in the same capacity. Purged after the war, he set himself up in private law. He belongs to the Tokyo Dai Ichi Lawyers Association (TOKYO DAI ICHI BENGOSHI KAI). His address is #703, 2-chome, Denenchofu Machi, Tamagawa, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo, phone number 02-3537.

10. (Date of Info: 3 August 1951). Early in the morning I called on TSUJI and urged him to hire a lawyer, but TSUJI appeared determined to fight the case all by himself. I advocated Mr. YOSHIE and tried to make TSUJI see common sense; TSUJI seemed more interested in Mr. YOSHIE's background than in hiring him as a lawyer. He stated he would visit the highly-recommended YOSHIE that afternoon. I advised YOSHIE of TSUJI's plans. In the evening I again visited TSUJI at his home to hear the outcome. TSUJI's statements to me were as follows: (Sub-source for the following (a & b): TSUJI Masanobu; Evaluation: C-3)
 - a. TSUJI was not particularly desirous of being sentenced guilty, but neither had he been too anxious to claim his innocence. His chief desire had been to appear in court as soon as possible, namely, prior to opening of the peace treaty conference in early September, in order to give forth with his beliefs and opinions in full. (C-2) TSUJI felt that his bold statements in court would be of great help to deepening public attention and consideration to the articles of the peace treaty, and that he could make at least that meager contribution to the Japanese people. For that purpose, he could see no point in getting a lawyer to help him. (C-2)
 - b. Until he had met Mr. YOSHIE, he had not any intention of asking for help in his defense, but merely wanted to know the man. TSUJI felt that YOSHIE was as great and fine a man as I had said, and was grateful for the recommendation. TSUJI had entrusted his defense to Mr. YOSHIE and asked him for the quickest possible opening of a trial.
11. (Date of Info: 4 August 1951). TSUJI met YOSHIE again and signed the documents making YOSHIE his attorney in the case. I asked YOSHIE privately for his version of the talk with TSUJI. YOSHIE indicated that he was basically opposed to defending individuals who are not resolutely determined to and prepared to defend their own innocence from the beginning but who have ulterior motives; nevertheless, he added, since he liked TSUJI's determination to face this charge and felt friendly toward TSUJI, he accepted the case. He planned to defend TSUJI by basing his plan upon the fundamental ideas advocated by TSUJI and proving the innocence of the ideas themselves. (C-2)

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12. (Date of Info: 7 August 1951). I went to the ATO Publishing Office in the evening and met with SATO Katsuro. TSUJI had told him that he was very grateful to me, and had also told him that I had secured YOSHIE's help for him and was handling the defense fee and bonus fee payments to that SATO should keep out of that entire affair. TSUJI had met with Mr. Joseph FROMM on 6 August at the Tokyo Correspondents Club. TSUJI was expected to have an examination that evening by a medical specialist at his own residence. TSUJI had been quite adamant in refusing medical treatment earlier, but SATO had arranged for a doctor to go there and examine him by force if necessary. SATO had had a sub-poena from the S.I.B. and had been interrogated as a witness in the TSUJI Case. (Sub-source for para. 12: ☐ Evaluation: F-3)
13. (Date of Info: 8 August 1951). I called on TSUJI and SATO at the ATO Publishing Office in the afternoon. When SATO had reported to the S.I.B. at 10:00 that morning, the prosecuting attorney for TSUJI's case, Mr. SAKUMA, had asked him about TSUJI's physical condition, which SATO described in detail as very grave. The prosecutor had then stated that no matter how anxious TSUJI might be to get the case straightened out, it would be absolutely out of the question for the procurator to deal with a sick person. He therefore asked SATO to advise TSUJI that the questioning would be postponed until TSUJI was completely recovered. TSUJI was then receiving treatment at the Tokyo Red Cross Hospital (SEKI JUJI HYOIN), where SATO informed him of this. Already the press was on to the news of TSUJI's hospitalization—a Mainichi Shinbun reporter there mistook SATO for TSUJI and was given the brush-off by the former without ever recognizing TSUJI right there. SATO was again interrogated by the prosecutor's office that afternoon. (Sub-source: SATO Katsuro; Evaluation: F-2). (Sub-source for the following: TSUJI Masanobu; Evaluation: C-3) The diagnosis of the highly suspected case of ulcers revealed not only ulcers but also cancer of the stomach and on 9 August TSUJI was to be operated upon at the Red Cross Hospital. HATTORI wished to let me know that he was very grateful to me; (TSUJI did not state "why"!.) TSUJI had met Joseph FROMM on the afternoon of 6 August. FROMM, scheduled to return to America shortly, had asked TSUJI to put his views on current affairs in writing, which TSUJI anxiously had completed before his operation, not knowing the outcome. The views were written on 150 pages, had been translated into English, and were given to FROMM on 6 August under the title of "Message to Those of the Ages of Twelve to Forty-Five" (the number "45" may be an error). FROMM was quite worried about the recent indictment case against TSUJI and offered to appear in court himself as a witness for TSUJI's defense. TSUJI merely answered that he would have to visit him the next time in jail and refused FROMM's offer with gratitude. FROMM again offered to help in any event in any way possible. A Canadian newsman was present during all of that interview.
14. (Date of Info: 9 August 1951). TSUJI was sent to the Japan Red Cross Hospital for his series of operations. SATO was again interrogated by the public prosecutor, SAKUMA, concerning his relations with TSUJI.

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SECRET

ZJL-713 (FD-268)

15. (Date of Info: 11 August 1951). TSUJI had his entire stomach removed. HATTORI asked me to have a talk with him on 13 August concerning the case and other matters.
16. (Date of Info: 12 August 1951). TSUJI had his appendix and his caecum removed in a double operation.
17. (Date of Info: 13 August 1951). I met with HATTORI Takushiro at his home. We discussed the TSUJI Case and then talked about his rearmament operations for about four hours.
18. (Date of Info: 15 August 1951). I visited the lawyer, YOSHIE, and presented him with £30,000 which I furnished him for case expenses. YOSHIE did not want to accept the money but finally did so at my persuasion.
19. (Date of Info: 21 August 1951). TSUJI wanted to see me, and I visited him in his room at the hospital for the first time since he had been entered. He was very weak, though protesting his good health, and could eat nothing and had to be fed intravenously. The doctor stated that it may be a full year before they find out for certain if TSUJI will recover or not. TSUJI requested me to make arrangements for a place for him to stay at ATAMI at a rest hotel beginning a week from that date.

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C. 7.