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U.S.-PRC Political Negotiations, 1967-1984

An Annotated Chronology (U)

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December 1985

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PREFACE

This classified annotated chronology was developed to assist U.S. government officials responsible for managing relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and government analysts of the Chinese political scene. It was prepared as part of a larger study of PRC political negotiating behavior.¹ The chronology summarizes the evolution of the "normalization" dialogue between the United States and the PRC between 1967 and 1979 and post-normalization negotiations between Washington and Beijing on the issue of American arms sales to Taiwan. The annotated summaries of the senior-level exchanges also document exchanges on international political and defense issues of concern to the two governments.

NOTE ON CLASSIFICATION

This report has been given the overall classification of SECRET per review and decision by the National Security Council Staff of September 24, 1985.

Much of the NSC-controlled original source material for this analysis, primarily negotiating records, was initially classified TOP SECRET. The decision to downgrade the classification of this study reflects a number of considerations: that such negotiating records, as controlled by the Department of State, are normally handled at the SECRET level of classification; that the sensitivity of the documents has declined somewhat with the passage of more than a decade; and that a study of these materials at the SECRET level would be more readily accessible--and therefore of greater value--to a broader range of the official community.

¹ See Richard H. Solomon, *Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior, 1967-1984: An Interpretive Assessment (U)*, The RAND Corporation, R-3299, December 1985 (Secret).

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Many officials and former officials of the U.S. government gave generously of their time in helping the author assemble the documentary record of U.S.-PRC negotiations. Particular appreciation is due Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; David Laux, Brenda Reger, and Donna Sirko of the National Security Council staff; Assistant Secretary of State Paul D. Wolfowitz; M. Charles Hill, Executive Secretary of the Department of State; and Elijah Kelly, Jr., of the Executive Secretariat. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and General Brent Scowcroft were helpful in enabling the author to gain access to the records of the Nixon and Ford administrations. And Professor Michel Oksenberg assisted in assembling the key documents from the Carter administration.

Anna Sun Wynston, my research assistant, provided timely and ever-productive assistance in assembling materials for the project; and my secretary Mary Yanokawa is due special credit not only for typing and producing this and the other two manuscripts of this project, but also for organizing my work effort and providing professional support throughout that effort.

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I. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND: A STUDY OF CHINESE POLITICAL NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR

This annotated chronology of senior-level political exchanges between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was prepared as part of a larger study of Chinese political negotiating behavior.¹ At the beginning of that study, the author constructed a brief, descriptive chronology of negotiating encounters to assist in reconstructing the record of official exchanges between senior Chinese and American political leaders, especially those encounters related to the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations between 1971 and 1978, and to negotiations with Chinese authorities over the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in 1981 and 1982.

The working chronology turned out to be of sufficient value that the author was asked to prepare an elaborated version, including extensive summaries of the substantive issues discussed in each negotiating encounter and a review covering the period 1967 to 1984, the years in which the United States and the PRC gradually moved away from the hostility and confrontation of the 1950s and 1960s to establish diplomatic ties and to conduct the full range of normal state-to-state political, economic, and--in limited form--security relations.

A CHRONOLOGICAL REFERENCE AND RUNNING HISTORY

This classified chronology is designed to assist U.S. government analysts concerned with the Sino-American relationship and "operational" officials responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. China policy and conducting negotiations with their counterparts from the PRC. It establishes a concise historical framework for the evolution of normal U.S.-PRC relations, highlighting the primary negotiating encounters between senior Chinese and American officials during this 17-year period and summarizing the key issues discussed and the major policy departures put forward by each side. This chronology is the only comprehensive survey of this negotiating record based on official documents that are now scattered among collections held by the White House, the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, the libraries of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, and the Kissinger collection in the Library of Congress.

SCOPE: A COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF SENIOR-LEVEL POLITICAL EXCHANGES

It is important to define the scope of the documentary assessment this chronology is based on:

It is comprehensive, but not complete. The documents reviewed for the chronology represent something on the order of 95 percent of the official record of senior-level U.S.-PRC political negotiating encounters for the years covered. Some documentation has either been lost or is accessible only with great difficulty, but virtually all critical negotiating encounters have been located.

¹ See Richard H. Solomon, *Chinese Political Negotiating Behavior, 1967-1984: An Interpretive Assessment* (U), The RAND Corporation, R-3299, December 1985 (Secret).

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Some especially sensitive exchanges, particularly those of a political nature, were never recorded on paper. For example, a discussion between PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and President Carter and a few senior officials in Washington on January 29, 1979, which concerned China's intent to "teach a lesson" to Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia, was never recorded. Also, Chinese and American officials would occasionally raise particularly sensitive matters while sightseeing, in dinner-table conversations, during car rides to or from airports, or in asides at the end of formal negotiating sessions. Most of the issues discussed in such off-the-record encounters, however, appear in subsequently recorded discussions.

It must also be emphasized that full control over this negotiating record is rendered almost impossible by the documentary control procedures of the U.S. government. Each relevant agency--primarily the White House, the National Security Council, and the Departments of State and Defense--has its own documentary control systems. The agencies normally do not exchange negotiating records, except perhaps on an informal or "bootleg" basis. There is no central repository of this negotiating record within the U.S. government. Moreover, within each agency there are various "levels" of documentary control. For example, the Department of State's normal secret-level cables are given fairly wide internal circulation and extensive distribution in the field to relevant embassies and consulates, in contrast to the highly restricted "NODIS" (no distribution) channels at either secret or top-secret levels of classification. Similarly, the National Security Council has a "normal" system of documentary control, while particularly sensitive materials are handled in an "outside the system" accountability control process, or in a "really outside the system" (i.e., totally unrecorded) manner. The White House, in addition, has a highly controlled "back channel" system of telegraphic communications with U.S. embassies abroad by which ambassadors can communicate directly with the President or his National Security Adviser in a highly restricted and secure manner.

Further complicating the problem of access to the full documentary record is the fact that over time documentary collections are dissipated, destroyed, or removed to various governmental libraries or storage centers. As a result of the normal turnover of government officials and the limits of documentary storage space there is probably not much more than a three- to five-year "institutional memory" of official documents readily available to operational officials at any given time. And it has become fairly standard practice for an administration, in its waning hours, to remove its politically most sensitive documents to the retiring President's library or, as in the case of the Kissinger collection, to the Library of Congress, where the material is subject to controlled access. Finally, much documentation, including transcripts of telephone conversations, sensitive "back channel" telegraphic messages, or uncontrolled memoranda, are virtually beyond retrieval except through extraordinary effort and highly controlled usage.

The author of this chronology gained authorized access to the record of U.S.-PRC political exchanges in part because of the support of senior officials of the Reagan administration, in part because of his prior exposure to most of this material as a staff member of the National Security Council during the years 1971-1976 and subsequent work as a consultant to the NSC and the Departments of State and Defense, and because of the support of former senior officials who, in their formal roles in the decisionmaking and implementing process, created much of this negotiating record.

The problems of gaining full documentary control have been partially compensated for by the growing corpus of memoirs prepared by former government officials, which draw upon their own records as well as their recollections of events in which they participated. This chronology draws upon a fairly extensive collection of such memoirs (see Appendix A), which have been used to check and supplement the formal documentary record. In addition, more than 30 detailed interviews were conducted with former senior officials involved in the development of Sino-American relations, both to check certain aspects of the formal record and to gain the officials' impressions of the manner in which Chinese officials manage the negotiating process--the primary concern of this project.

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The chronology focuses on senior-level, Executive Branch political negotiating encounters with PRC counterpart officials. It does not include internal U.S. government policy deliberations; it is largely a record of the face-to-face negotiating exchanges between Chinese and American officials in which the policy positions of each side were formally communicated to the other.

This record is thus based largely on the English-language memoranda of conversations, the "memcons" which are the formal and official record of negotiating encounters.² (It should be noted that such records, while generally accurate, are not always precise verbatim transcripts; and on rare occasions, they have been altered prior to distribution in governmental channels because of some special policy or operational sensitivity.)

The chronology is largely a record of senior-level negotiations by Presidents, Secretaries of State, National Security Advisers, and Assistant Secretaries or Ambassadors acting on behalf of their principals. It contains few references to exchanges between senior Chinese officials and Congressional delegations, except where such encounters contain especially important political "signals." And there are limited inclusions of press statements by American or Chinese leaders where such public material was clearly used by the officials concerned as part of the negotiating process.

The chronology does not include detailed assessments of negotiating encounters by Cabinet-level officials (such as the Secretaries of the Treasury or Commerce) or other senior negotiators in which the subjects under discussion are not relevant to the political normalization of U.S.-PRC relations, management of the Taiwan issue, or Sino-American exchanges on international political and security issues. Similarly, the chronology does not include much of the increasingly voluminous "middle-level" communication between Chinese and American officials, which is largely relevant to the process of implementing policies set by their superiors, except in instances where such communications shed light on Chinese negotiating practices.

PHASES IN THE EVOLUTION OF U.S.-PRC RELATIONS

The text below puts the period covered (1967-1984) in a broader historical context of Sino-American relations and describes briefly the periods, or phases of the U.S.-PRC political dialogue. There are distinct differences in the political character of these periods, as well as variations in the style of the negotiating process and the channels of communication involved.

In broadest terms, the U.S. government's dealings with the Chinese Communist movement--which after 1949 was institutionalized as the government of the People's Republic of China--fall into four distinct phases. The first covers the "pre-liberation" years, especially the 1930s and 1940s, when official contact was established through the U.S. Army's "Dixie Mission" to the Communist capital of Yanan during World War II, the Chinese Communist Party mission in the Nationalist Chinese government's wartime capital of Chungking (Chongqing), and after the defeat of Japan in 1945, via a range of contacts with the soon-to-be-victorious Communist authorities during the Civil War period (particularly the mission of General George C. Marshall to mediate the Communist-Nationalist civil war).

The second phase is the two-decade period of adversarial confrontation from the founding of the PRC in 1949 through the Korean War years, the military confrontation over Taiwan, and the Vietnam War

² The Chinese counterpart officials in this negotiating relationship keep their own verbatim records of these same exchanges--but of course in the Chinese language. Except in rare instances, no effort has been made to verify that the English-language transcript of a negotiating encounter (which is a record of the English-language presentation by the U.S. official and a translation into English of the Chinese-language presentation by a PRC official) is the same as the Chinese-language record held by the PRC.

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period. During this time, U.S.-PRC official contact was maintained primarily through ambassadorial-level exchanges at Geneva and Warsaw.

The third phase is the period of efforts by senior leaders in Washington and Beijing (Peking)³ to initiate and conduct a process of normalizing the Sino-American relationship covering the years 1967 (when presidential candidate Richard Nixon published an article in *Foreign Affairs* calling on the United States to "come urgently to grips" with the problem of the U.S.-PRC confrontation) through 1978, when Sino-American diplomatic relations were finally established.

The fourth phase of Sino-American relations begins with formal recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979, and continues to the present day.

This chronology covers the last two of these phases in the U.S.-PRC relationship. It should also be noted that within the years 1967 to 1984 there are several distinct periods of official communication between Washington and Beijing. From 1967 through mid-July 1971 communication was largely indirect, either through unilateral public statements and gestures (e.g. the Nixon article noted earlier, or Chairman Mao's reception in 1970 of American Edgar Snow atop Tien An Men on October 1, the PRC national day celebration) or the exchange of messages through intermediary governments, primarily the Romanian and Pakistani. This period also covers the last two of the "Warsaw Talk" ambassadorial-level exchanges, in which the United States and the PRC each proposed the establishment of a direct, senior-level, secure dialogue in either Beijing or Washington.

The next period begins with National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger's historic secret trip to Beijing for three days of direct talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai in early July 1971 and runs up to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979. Communications in this period were most visibly conducted during eight more trips to the Chinese capital by Kissinger in his roles as the President's National Security Adviser and, after September 1973, as Secretary of State, and by trips to the PRC by Presidents Nixon (in 1972) and Ford (in 1975).

There were, in addition, several important overt and covert supporting channels of communication during these years which carried the bulk of political communications recorded in this chronology: a publicly acknowledged channel of contact through the U.S. and Chinese embassies in Paris; a secret "Paris channel" established in July 1971, involving special Presidential envoy General Vernon A. Walters (and occasionally Kissinger) and PRC Ambassador to France Huang Zhen; another secret channel established in New York City in October 1971, when the PRC was first admitted to the United Nations, which involved encounters between National Security Adviser Kissinger and China's then-Permanent Representative to the U.N., Ambassador Huang Hua. This channel was used until China established a liaison office in Washington in May 1973 (the United States established an equivalent liaison office in Beijing at about the same time).

Between the spring of 1973 and March 1979, when the two liaison offices were converted into embassies, the bulk of Sino-American political exchanges were conducted in Washington between Liaison Office Chief Huang Zhen and Kissinger, or during Kissinger's periodic trips to the Chinese capital. During the Carter administration, Huang Zhen and later his successor Ambassador Chai Zemin continued to be primary points of contact with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. The chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, Leonard Woodcock, played a key role in negotiating the full normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in the second half of 1978.

With the conversion of liaison offices to embassies in the spring of 1979, the Sino-American political dialogue became increasingly institutionalized ("normal"), with the Department of State playing the

³ This text uses the *pin-yin* form of Romanization of Chinese place and given names throughout. This spelling system was adopted by the PRC as its official form on January 1, 1979. The previously used Wade-Giles spelling of the names of the Chinese officials cited in the chronology is given in Appendix B.

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predominant role in communications between the two governments. While periodic leadership visits at the Presidential or Cabinet level have continued to be an important aspect of the Sino-American political dialogue, the negotiating process has tended to become increasingly routinized at the ambassadorial level. This was particularly the case with the 1981-1982 negotiation on American arms sales to Taiwan.

It is important to be aware of this evolving institutional pattern of U.S.-PRC communications because of the shifting bureaucratic locus of exchanges between the two governments.

USE OF THIS CHRONOLOGY

This annotated chronology has been designed to be as simple and straightforward as possible, but a few explanatory comments on the categories used (the date of an encounter, the senior officials involved, and a summary of and/or comments on the subjects discussed) will be helpful.

Date. The date of a particular meeting (and the time it was recorded in the source document) represent the actual encounter at the locale where it occurred. The recording or reporting date of a particular exchange, upon occasion, may be somewhat later than the meeting itself, but the documentary record almost always identifies the time and date of the meeting.

In certain negotiating situations, the time difference between Washington and Beijing⁴ is important to understanding the evolution of a negotiation. This is particularly so in the negotiations of December 1978, when the United States initiated a rapid, last-minute exchange of communications between the two leaderships to make certain that the Chinese government understood the American position on post-normalization arms sales to Taiwan.

The relative times of negotiating exchanges being conducted via cable between Washington and Beijing can be accurately identified by using the "Zulu" or Greenwich Mean Time notation in the date-time group record in a particular cable.

Senior Officials. For brevity, and to minimize repetition, only last names or surnames are used to identify the senior spokesmen involved in an encounter. Other officials are usually in the room during a negotiating session, but their names are not noted except where these individuals actively speak in a particular meeting. Full names and titles are noted only the first time an individual is identified in that particular role. Thus, Kissinger is identified on October 10, 1969, as Presidential National Security Adviser, and subsequently is referred to simply as Kissinger, except for the entry of September 26, 1973, which is his first negotiating encounter in the role of Secretary of State. Appendix B contains a listing of the full names of the primary Chinese and American officials cited in this chronology.

Although Chinese names are rendered throughout the chronology in *pin-yin* form, the original documentary record now held by the U.S. government uses the Wade-Giles system of Romanization for pre-1979 memoranda of conversation and cables. Thus, Zhou Enlai is rendered as Chou En-lai in pre-1979 source documents. The Wade-Giles equivalents of Chinese officials' names are given in parentheses in Appendix B.

Where there could be some confusion or lack of specificity in the use of a Chinese surname, the full name is given, e.g., Huang Hua and Huang Zhen are both used in full.

Locale. The locale of an exchange is usually identified *implicitly* as the "home office" of the first official mentioned under the "Senior Officials" heading. Thus, for example, in an entry for October 20,

⁴ Beijing is 13 hours "ahead" of Washington during the months of Standard Time in the United States, and 12 hours ahead when the United States is on Daylight Saving Time.

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1971 identified as "Zhou-Kissinger (4:40-7:10 p.m.)" the meeting was held in Beijing (Zhou Enlai's "locale") at the given hour and date in local time. When meetings occurred in a city other than Beijing or Washington, that city is explicitly identified.

Summary and/or Comments. The documentary record summarized in this chronology consists largely of verbatim transcripts of negotiating encounters, identified only by the date and time of encounter and the participants involved. As the process of Sino-American communication became institutionalized and politically less sensitive, particularly during and after the Carter administration, memoranda of conversation or instructions and reports on negotiating exchanges were communicated by official cables, with their elaborate system of time notations identifying the hour of transmission and receipt of the message and document control numbers. Such notations are not usually necessary for the retrieval of a document, however; the date, participants, and subject are sufficient in most cases.⁵

The documentary record summarized here is voluminous; these brief summaries are intended primarily to provide a sense of the topics discussed in a particular negotiating session and major positions (and changes in position) put forward by the Chinese side--especially as they relate to negotiating positions on political normalization with the United States, American arms sales to Taiwan, international political and security issues. These summaries should *not* be assumed to be comprehensive, however. Some sessions in which exceptional important *initial* presentations were made of Chinese positions, or changes in established positions, are summarized in detail. Subsequent sessions that re-established policies with little change are summarized in less detail.

Where the author has judged that a particular session is noteworthy for some reason of style or substance, comments are enclosed in brackets to indicate that they are interpretive judgments.

⁵ Cable numbers were recorded in notes taken for the preparation of this chronology; and sources other than memcons or cables similarly recorded in these notes and in the chronology where it would help the user retrieve a particular source document.

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II. U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984: AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY¹

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
1967		
October	Publication of Richard Nixon's <i>Foreign Affairs</i> article, "Asia After Vietnam"	"Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China."
1968		
November 26	PRC Foreign Ministry statement	Proposes [in backhanded manner] resumption of Warsaw talks on 2/20/69.
1969		
February 28, March 1	President Richard M. Nixon - French President Charles DeGaulle, in Paris and Versailles, France	RN: "It is vital that we have more communication with China." [Nixon, <i>RN</i> , pp. 457, 460-462.]
February 18	PRC cancels Warsaw talk scheduled for 2/20/69	Cancellation said to be in reaction to "anti-China" atmosphere created by defection in Amsterdam of PRC diplomatic official Liao Hoshu.
July 21	USG announces relaxation of passport restrictions on travel to PRC, allows purchases of Chinese goods up to \$100 in value	
July 24	Captured American yachtsmen released by the PRC	[See Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 180.]

¹Abbreviations and acronyms used in the chronology are defined in Appendix C.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
August 1	Pakistani President Yahya Khan - Nixon, in Lahore, Pakistan	RN expresses interest in normalizing relations with the PRC, asks Yahya to so inform Zhou Enlai. [Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , pp. 180-181.]
August 2	Rumanian President Nicholae Ceausescu - Nixon, in Bucharest	RN expresses interest in Rumania playing a media role between the U.S. and PRC. pg 181 (km)
August 8	Secretary of State William P. Rogers' speech in in Canberra, Australia	"We have been seeking to open up channels of communication" with the PRC.
September 5	Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson speech at American Political Science Association meeting in New York	"The United States could not fail to be concerned . . with an escalation of the Sino-Soviet quarrel."
October 10	National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger - Pakistani Minister of Information Sher Ali	HAK informs Sher Ali that as a gesture of the desire to improve U.S.-PRC relations, regular 7th Fleet destroyer patrols of the Taiwan Strait will end. [Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 186.]
November 5	Yahya tells PRC ambassador to Rawalpindi that U.S. is ending destroyer patrols of the Taiwan Strait as a gesture of its interest in normalizing U.S.- PRC relations	Source of this information: Hilaly conversation of 12/19/69 (see below). (kmI)
November 7	USG announces suspension of regular 7th Fleet patrols in the Taiwan Strait	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
November 19	Richardson asks U.S. Ambassador to Bucharest Leonard C. Meeker to ask the Rumanians to convey to the PRC a letter (dated November 17) from author Theodore White to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai requesting visa	White tells Zhou the ferment in the U.S. is causing a reexamination of old positions regarding the PRC; he says his reporting would be read "in the highest political quarters," and hints that a U.S. troop withdrawal from Taiwan could result from a change in policy.
December	NCNA Director Hong Kong - U.S. Consulate Deputy Chief Harold Jacobson	PRC official anticipates establishment of U.S.-PRC relations; asks for U.S. ideas on how it would resolve the Taiwan issue. Contact continues through 4/70. 6, 25
December 3	U.S. Ambassador to Warsaw Walter Stoessel-PRC charge Lei Yang, in Warsaw	U.S. proposes renewal of Warsaw talks. [Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 188].
December 5	Stoessel - Lei Yang, in Warsaw.	January 20, 1970, set for next Warsaw talk meeting.
December 7	Two American yachtsmen, held by PRC since February 16, are released	
December 11	Stoessel invited to PRC Embassy, Warsaw	[Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 188.]
December 19	USG announces further easing of trade restrictions with PRC	[Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 191.]
December 19	Kissinger - Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Agha Hilaly	Hilaly informs Kissinger that the Pakistani ambassador in Peking was told by Chinese officials that they appreciate Pakistan's "role and efforts" in facilitating U.S.-PRC communication, and as a result they recently released two captured American yachtsmen as a gesture. Kissinger tells Hilaly his government can now inform the Chinese that the U.S. desires serious communication with the PRC in a more secure channel than the Warsaw talks. py 191 (KMI)

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
December 23	Kissinger-Hilaly	Hilaly informs the U.S. the Chinese are willing to resume Warsaw talks without preconditions; they are worried about U.S.-Japan agreement and revival of Japanese militarism. <i>(KMI) pg 191</i>
1970		
January 8	Stoessel - Lei Yang	Arrangements set for resumption of ambassadorial talks on 1/20/70; USG will not participate in a U.S.-Soviet condominium in Asia. [Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 193.]
January 20	Stoessel - Lei Yang	U.S. proposes sending a "special envoy" to Beijing for "direct discussions" or receiving one from China in Washington. <i>pg 187 (KMI)</i>
February 18	Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress, Communist China section	[We are] "attempting to define a new relationship for the future"; "many of our basic interests are not in conflict."
February 20	Stoessel - Lei Yang	Lei: "If the U.S. government wishes to send a representative of ministerial rank or a special envoy to the U.S. President to Beijing for further explanation on questions of fundamental principle between China and the United States, the government will be willing to receive him." <i>pg 187 (KMI)</i>
February 22	Kissinger - Hilaly	Hilaly conveys indirect PRC message, via Yahya Khan, of interest in direct U.S.-PRC talks, yet concerned that the USG will see the interest as derived from weakness or fear of the Soviets. [Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 689.] (Date of this meeting may have been 2/26/70.)
May 3	General Vernon A. Walters - Chinese contact in Paris	VAW: The U.S. has no aggressive intentions in Indochina [despite the recent Cambodian operation]; Kissinger is prepared to discuss issues secretly with Chinese counterparts. <i>(KMI)</i>
May 18	PRC cancels 137th Warsaw Talk meeting scheduled for 5/20/70	The cancellation is said to be in reaction to invasion of Cambodia by U.S. and South Vietnamese troops.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
May 20	Statement by Mao Zedong, "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs," issued by PRC media	Mao attacks "Nixon's fascist atrocities" of invading Cambodia and instituting domestic oppression; revolution is the main world trend, and the U.S. is in a state of fearful panic; China supports the world's anti-U.S. revolutionary struggles.
June 20	Nixon - Rumanian Foreign Minister Manescu	Manescu briefs on Chinese views of the U.S. } 6, 95
July 3	Rumanian Vice President Emil Bodnaras briefs U.S. Ambassador Leonard Meeker on contacts with China and North Korea, and Bucharest's views on these countries	Bodnaras signals PRC position on U.S. troop withdrawal from Taiwan, Mao's interest in resuming the U.S.-PRC dialogue despite the U.S. invasion of Cambodia. } 6, 95
July 10	American Catholic Bishop James Walsh, held since 1958, released by PRC	[Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 697.]
September 7	Walters - Chinese contact, in Paris	On this date, and once earlier in mid-June, Walters approaches PRC defense attache and says he has a message for the PRC from the USG. The Chinese do <i>not</i> reply to the message. [Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 696.]
October 1	Mao - Edgar Snow review PRC National Day parade, in Beijing	[Snow's <i>Life</i> magazine interview published on April 30, 1971.]
October 5	Nixon interviewed in <i>Time</i> magazine	"If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I don't, I want my children to."
October 25	Nixon - Yahya	RN: "It is essential we open negotiations with China: we will send a high level emissary to Beijing; we will make no condominium against China." py 699 (KWI)

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
October 26	Nixon - Ceausescu (10:55 a.m.-12:55 p.m.)	Nixon signals that diplomatic relations cannot be established at the start of U.S.-PRC dialogue. Ceausescu expresses concern about a U.S.-Soviet condominium. At state banquet, Nixon toasts "the People's Republic of China." pg 699 (KMI)
November 5	Zhou - Snow, in Beijing	[Snow's <i>Life</i> magazine interview published on April 30, 1971.]
November 13	Mao, Zhou - Yahya	Yahya delivers Nixon's views, as expressed in their meeting of 10/25/70. pg 700 (KMI)
November 21	Zhou - Rumanian Deputy Premier Gheorghe Radulescu	
December 9	Kissinger - Hilaly (6:05 p.m.)	Hilaly: A Nixon envoy is welcome in Beijing "in order to discuss the subject of the vacation of the Chinese territories called Taiwan." HK 701 (KMI)
December 16	Kissinger - Hilaly (11:00 a.m.)	HAK: The USG is prepared to begin discussions with the PRC with a view to bringing about a higher-level meeting in Beijing. The meeting would not be limited to the Taiwan question; but the USG will reduce its military presence on Taiwan "as tensions diminish" in the East Asia and Pacific region. [HAK baits the offer with an oral statement that withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan is not a difficult problem.] HK 702 (KMI)
December 18	Mao - Snow	Interview published in <i>Life</i> magazine on April 30, 1971. [Interview not conveyed to the White House, (Hersh, p. 367)].
December 23	Jean Sainteny - PRC Ambassador to France Huang Zhen, in Paris	Sainteny: The USG is looking for a channel of communication with the PRC. HK 703 (KMI)

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
1971		
January 11	Kissinger - Rumanian Ambassador Bogdan	Bogdan: If the USG has a desire and proposal for settling the Taiwan issue, the PRC is prepared to receive a special envoy in Beijing. <i>AK 702</i>
February 4	PRC Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua - Norwegian Ambassador Algard	Qiao: Despite recent U.S. escalation of Indochina conflict (in Laos), China sooner or later must have talks with the U.S. Taiwan is the major problem, but China is aware of greater U.S. flexibility on this issue. Qiao expresses interest in meeting with Kissinger. <i>706 (KMI)</i>
April 10-17	"Ping-pong diplomacy"	
April 27	Kissinger - Hilaly	In a direct message from Zhou Enlai (dated 4/21/71) replying to the USG message of 12/16/70 (delivered on 1/5/71), Zhou reaffirms willingness to receive Kissinger, SecState, or President Nixon publicly in Beijing. <i>714 (KMI)</i>
April 28	Kissinger - Hilaly	HAK conveys RN reply to Zhou saying he will soon send full response; asks Yahya to convey his concern that no other U.S. politicians be brought into the official dialogue. [This message reaches Zhou via PRC ambassador to Pakistan about 5/1.] <i>718 (KMI)</i>
May 10	Kissinger - Hilaly	RN formally replies to Zhou message of 4/21/71 (delivered on 4/27/71); accepts Zhou's suggestion that he visit Beijing for direct negotiations in which "each side would be free to raise the issue of principal concern to it"; Kissinger would come secretly to China for a planning visit for a Presidential trip after 6/15/71; secrecy is essential, but the Presidential trip can be announced shortly after a Kissinger - Zhou meeting. [Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 724.] <i>722 (KMI)</i>
May 20	Kissinger - Hilaly	Message to the PRC regarding U.S.-Soviet ABM negotiation: The USG will "conclude no agreement [with the USSR] which would be directed against the PRC." [Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 725.]
May 29	Zhou reply to Nixon messages received 4/29, 5/17, and 5/22, via Pakistani channel.	Mao welcomes Nixon's visit, "in which each side would be free to raise the principal issue of concern to it." First crucial issue is concrete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan. Zhou welcomes Kissinger for preliminary, secret meeting. It may be hard to keep the visit secret. [Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , pp. 726-727.]

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
June 2	Kissinger - Hilaly	Hilaly gives Zhou reply to Nixon messages received 4/29/71, 5/17/71, and 5/21/71. 726 (KMI)
June 4	Nixon reply to Zhou message of 6/2/71 via Hilaly	RN proposes HAK visit Beijing 7/9-11/71 to arrange RN trip to PRC. Secrecy essential. 727 (KMI)
June 4	Kissinger - Hilaly	HAK replies to Zhou message received 5/29/71: President Nixon looks forward to personal meeting with PRC leaders. Kissinger is authorized to discuss all issues regarding Presidential visit and a communique. Strict secrecy of his trip is essential. 728 (KMI)
June 11	Kissinger - Hilaly	Zhou accepts HAK secret visit on 7/9-11/71. [Kissinger, <i>White House Years</i> , p. 728.] 728 (KMI)
June 28	Kissinger message to Ambassador Farland for transmission to PRC via Yahya	USG will not answer Soviet government regarding five-power nuclear disarmament conference proposal prior to HAK discussion with Zhou; USG will maintain strict secrecy of HAK visit whatever the press speculation. 61, 91
July 9-11	National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger in Beijing	First secret trip.
July 9	Zhou - Kissinger (4:35-11:20 p.m.)	HAK: The U.S. will not collude against China. Regarding Taiwan, we will reduce our forces as U.S.-PRC relations improve; no U.S. support for TIM. Recognition of the PRC can come in RN's second term. Indochina negotiations. U.S. troops might be withdrawn from Korea in RN's second term. How the U.S. bureaucracy works. Zhou: To normalize, U.S. must recognize PRC as legitimate government; Taiwan a Chinese province; withdraw all U.S. forces and installations from Taiwan and Taiwan Strait in limited period. History of Indochina conflict. Japanese militarism. All U.S. troops should be withdrawn from Korea. 61, 95

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
July 10	Zhou - Kissinger (12:10-6:00 p.m.)	<p>Zhou proposes he and HAK tape-record a summary of their discussions; systematically presses on all HAK's presentation; Indo-Pak tensions; China might be carved up by a USSR/U.S./Japan/India coalition; the U.S. is dragging its feet on solutions to Taiwan, Indochina; China opposes Moscow's five-power arms control conference as it wants to "lasso" the PRC. The U.S. and PRC can stay in touch through periodic U.S. visits to Beijing. HAK: Regarding normalization, don't press events too fast; RN will complete process in first 2 years of second term. The U.S. will seek PRC admission to U.N. by majority, expulsion of Taiwan by two-thirds vote. We need time between the military withdrawal in Indochina and the political evolution. Zhou: Don't leave a "tail" in Vietnam; we will not invite U.S. politicians to China at this time; RN should visit Moscow before Beijing.</p>
July 10	Zhou - Kissinger (11:20-11:50 p.m.)	<p>Zhou: No need to tape-record a statement. HAK: U.S. will not support Taiwan military action against the mainland. U.S.-Soviet summit. Berlin agreement. Zhen Bao island incident. Sino-Indian border war of 1962.</p>
July 11	Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman CCP Military Commission/ Huang Hua - Kissinger (12:00- 1:40 a.m., 9:50-10:35 a.m.)	<p>Visit communique drafting: Chinese try to make it appear that RN asked to visit China; attempt to limit scope of the Presidential visit to discussion of normalization.</p>
July 11	Zhou/Ye Jianying - Kissinger (10:35-11:55 p.m.)	<p>Press announcement. Presidential visit and previsit. Zhou: [Ambassador Bruce not welcome; RN can come earlier rather than later (i.e., before the Soviet summit)]. Communications via Paris secret channel: Ambassador Huang Zhen and General Walters [Zhou expresses thanks for gifts on behalf of himself and Mao (but not Lin Biao!)] HAK: [RN wants no political visitors before his trip; proposes mutual renunciation of force agreement and accidental-war agreement; requests release of U.S. prisoners held by PRC.]</p>

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
July 15	Joint U.S.-PRC announcement of Zhou - Kissinger secret talks	Zhou, "knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit" the PRC, has extended an invitation to RN for a visit "before May 1972." RN has accepted. The meeting will be "to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides." (KME)
July 19	Walters - PRC Ambassador in Paris	First of Walters' 45 meetings in secret "Paris 765-6 channel." Thanks from HAK for his visit hospitality; RN wants him to visit Beijing with Ambassador David Bruce in another presummit planning session. (GJ) Chinese say many U.S. political figures now want to visit PRC; refusing them is difficult in wake of HAK trip.
July 21	Walters - Huang Zhen	Walters informs HZ of Dobrynin call on HAK regarding his Beijing visit. Soviets ask if RN is prepared to visit Moscow first; HAK says no. Regarding U.S. politicians visiting China, there is need to keep first U.S.-PRC exchanges free of partisanship so as not to inhibit President's freedom of action. (GJ) a
July 26	Kissinger/Walters - Huang Zhen, in Paris	Chinese agree to October interim visit, but refuse inclusion of David Bruce "for understandable reasons" (i.e., Vietnam). HAK expresses concern over Taiwan and U.S. "right wing" attacks on his China visit; requests the Chinese keep their distance from American "left" groups. (GJ) a
August 5	Zhou gives interview to <i>New York Times</i> correspondent James Reston (published on August 10, 1971)	Zhou: U.S. China policy is changing. Negotiations with Nixon must lead to withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan and Taiwan Strait. Not all U.S.-PRC problems can be solved at one stroke. Japan covets Taiwan. China will not go into U.N. if status of Taiwan "undetermined." Danger of Japanese militarism. Settlement of Vietnam war most urgent. Soviet buildup a threat to China. U.S. forces should withdraw from Korea.
August 16	Kissinger/Walters - Huang Zhen	HAK: A Soviet proposal for agreement on preventing nuclear war is directed at China. U.S. rejects the proposal, but is prepared to sign similar agreement with PRC. RN will not meet with Soviet leaders before Chinese. Indo-Pakistani conflict. Planning for RN visit to China. (GJ) a

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
September 13	PRC Defense Minister Lin Biao dies in plane crash in Mongolia	
September 13	Kissinger/Walters - Huang Zhen	Chinese agree to HAK interim visit beginning on 10/20/71. [Note the timing of this message in relation to the Lin Biao coup attempt.]
September 23	Walters - Huang Zhen	Chinese delay announcement of HAK's October trip to 10/5 because of imminent U.S. publication of its "two China" position on Chirep in U.N. The RN visit is to seek normalization; his talks should concentrate on this matter and not be diverted to "side issues." Information will be given later on technical aspects of HAK's October visit. [Stalling because of Lin Biao affair?]
October 3	Walters - Huang Zhen	Chinese confirm HAK's October visit; traveling party is acceptable as proposed on 9/13. A later reply will give special plane requirements. [The Lin Biao affair continues to delay planning?]
October 20-26	Kissinger in Beijing	
October 20	Zhou - Kissinger (4:40-7:10 p.m.)	President's visit.
October 21	Zhou - Kissinger (10:30 a.m.-1:45 p.m.)	[Taiwan, Japan.]
October 21	Zhou - Kissinger (4:42-7:17 p.m.)	[U.N. Indochina.]
October 21	Ambassador Xiung Xianghui - NSC Staff Member John Holdridge/State Department China Country Director Alfred Jenkins	[USG proposes a "liaison office" or "interests section" in addition to the secret Paris channel; expanded cultural exchanges.]
October 22	Zhou - Kissinger (4:15-8:28 p.m.)	International issues: Korea; Japan; South Asia; USSR; arms control.
October 22	Xiung Xianghui - Holdridge/Jenkins	[PRC rejects "liaison office" as "unrealistic" and "two Chinas" in character. Exchanges will be limited and on private basis only. Trade is debunked as conditional on normalization.]

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
October 23	Zhou - Kissinger (9:05-10:05 a.m.)	Presidential visit.
October 24	Zhou - Kissinger (10:23 a.m.-1:55 p.m.)	Attack on the initial U.S. communique draft; Taiwan
October 24	Zhou - Kissinger (9:23 -11:00 p.m.)	PRC first draft communique; Taiwan. 721-724
October 25	Zhou - Kissinger (10:12-11:00 a.m.)	U.S. side presents second draft communique.
	Zhou - Kissinger (9:50-11:40 p.m.)	Discussion of second PRC draft.
October 26	Zhou - Kissinger (5:30-8:20 a.m.)	Communique drafting. Presidential trip issues.
November 20	Walters - Chinese contact, in Paris	Walters passes HAK message on date of announcement of Presidential visit, memo on state of U.S.-North Vietnamese negotiations. (KMI)
November 23	Kissinger - Huang Hua, PRC Permanent Representative to the U.N., in New York City (10:00-11:55 p.m.)	First use of the secret "New York" channel [Indo-Pakistan crisis. Taiwan Independence Movement. U.N. Secretary-General candidate. Middle East. PRC U.N. Mission-White House communications.] (KMI)
December 10	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City (6:05-7:55 p.m.)	HAK: [Offers China information on Soviet troop deployments against the PRC; says if China helps Pakistan and comes under Soviet pressure, the U.S. "will oppose efforts of others to interfere with the PRC."] (KMI)
December 12	Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alexander M. Haig - Huang Hua, in New York City	Chinese agree to immediate Indo-Pakistani ceasefire, troop pullback, and Security Council meeting. No recognition should be given to Bangladesh. 911 (KMI)

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
1972 January 3-4	Zhou - Haig (midnight)	<p>[U.S.-Soviet relations] South Asia. Indochina. Haig offers unilateral U.S. support for the PRC; tables draft communique language on Taiwan issue. Haig: [In view of opposition from the "left" and "right" in the U.S. to Nixon's China policy, "it is crucial that there be no public embarrassment to the President as a result of his visit to Beijing."]</p>
January 6	PRC Acting Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei - Haig (11 a.m.)	South Asia. Vietnam. Taiwan. Communique.
January 7	Zhou - Haig (11:45 p.m.)	Sino-Soviet relations. Indochina. South Asia. President's trip. Taiwan.
January 26	Kissinger message to Zhou on Vietnam, via Paris (Walters) channel	Details peace plan for ending the Vietnam war.
January 30	PRC reply to Kissinger message of 1/26, via Paris channel	Expresses support for North Vietnam and rejects efforts to "exert pressure on the Vietnamese side on behalf of the United States."
January 31	U.S. reply to PRC message of 1/30, via Paris channel	Affirms there is no "reciprocal obligation" between China and the U.S. on Indochina, only a unilateral U.S. "commitment" to keep the PRC informed of its plans for ending the Vietnam war.
February 6	U.S. message to the PRC, via Paris channel	<p>[Offers a secret meeting with Le Duc Tho, rumored to be visiting Beijing just before the Nixon visit, to discuss the Indochina situation "with generosity and justice." Statement on the President's approach to his opening banquet toast in Beijing: the need for a new beginning; no reference to "current disputes"; no claim of similarity of views where they do not exist.</p>
February 9	PRC message to U.S., via Paris channel	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>
February 11	U.S. message to the PRC, via Paris channel	<p>[Notification of USG announcement on 2/14/72 of easing of trade restrictions so PRC and USSR are in "comparable position." President will pursue policy regarding Indian Subcontinent in parallel with the PRC.</p>

(KMI)
1051
61, a5

(KMI)

1051

1103 (KMI)

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61, a5

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

61, a5

61, a5

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
February 11	PRC reply to U.S. message of February 6, via Paris channel	China supports Vietnam, will definitely not meddle in the U.S.-Vietnamese negotiations. 6/95
February 14	U.S. reply to PRC message of February 9, via Paris channel	Coordination of responsibilities for protection of Presidential aircraft on flight to PRC. 6/1, c
February 16	U.S. reply to PRC message of February 11, via Paris channel	Asserts USG does not intend to "enmesh" PRC in the Vietnam negotiations, but is attempting to bring about "trust and mutual confidence" through open exchanges and meticulous implementation of understandings. (
February 21-28	President Nixon in the PRC	
February 21	Zhou - Kissinger (2:30-2:40 p.m.)	Chairman Mao wants to meet President Nixon "soon." Inclusion of Lord, exclusion of SecState from the meeting. Tone of banquet toasts. HK 1057 (KMI)
February 21	Mao - Nixon (2:50-3:55 p.m.)	Symbolic exchange. 1057/66 (KMI)
February 21	Zhou - Nixon (4:15-5:30 p.m.)	Structuring the official discussions. RN describes his management of the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Zhou: Chairman Mao is suffering from bronchitis. 6-1, 1072 (KMI)
February 21	Zhou - Nixon (5:50-6:55 p.m.)	Opening plenary. 1072 (KMI)(b)(1)(b)(3) (KMI)
February 22	Qiao Guanhua - Kissinger (10:05-11:55 a.m.)	
February 22	Zhou - Nixon (2:10-6:00 p.m.)	Taiwan. Japan. Soviet Union. Indochina. 1072/73 (KMI) 5 mi 6-1 9!
February 23	Qiao - Kissinger (9:35 a.m.-12:34 p.m.)	HAK gives briefing on Soviet military deployments against PRC U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Communique drafting schedule. 6-1 a 1076 (KMI)
February 23	Zhou - Nixon (2:00-6:00 p.m.)	South Asia. Domestic politics. Japan. Soviet Union. 1072/73 (KMI)

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
February 24	Qiao - Kissinger (9:59 a.m.-12:42 p.m.)	Discussion of differences on the Taiwan paragraph; mention of possibility of no communique [Qiao says if no agreement on Taiwan wording, then PRC will not include statement on exchanges and trade.]
February 24	Qiao - Kissinger (3:30-3:45 p.m.)	HAK presents redraft of Taiwan paragraph.
February 24	Zhou - Nixon (5:15-8:05 p.m.)	Taiwan. Indochina. Japan.
February 25	Qiao - Kissinger (9:30-10:58 a.m.)	Communique drafting: U.S. link U.S. troop withdrawal from Taiwan to peaceful settlement. [Second Mao - Nixon meeting cancelled.]
February 25	Qiao - Kissinger (12:50-1:15 p.m.)	[Redacted]
February 25	Qiao - Kissinger (2:35-2:45 p.m.)	PRC counterproposal on Taiwan.
February 25	Qiao - Kissinger (3:35-4:00 p.m.)	Chinese accept linkage between ultimate goal of total U.S. force withdrawal from Taiwan and U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.
February 25	Zhou - Kissinger (4:50-5:25 p.m.)	Discussion of linkage between progressive U.S. troop withdrawals from Taiwan and reduction of tensions in "the area."
February 25	Zhou - Nixon (5:45-6:45 p.m.)	Sino-Soviet relations. Middle East. U.S. prisoners in China.
February 25-26	Qiao - Kissinger (10:30 p.m.-1:40 a.m.)	Chinese accept U.S. language on Taiwan. Wording worked out on trade and exchanges, maintaining official contact.
February 26	Zhou - Nixon (9:20-10:05 a.m.)	Plenary session before departing from Beijing.
February 26-27	Qiao - Kissinger, in Hangzhou (10:20 p.m.-1:40 a.m.)	HAK reclaims on several issues in the joint communique: requests changes in Taiwan paragraph (from "all Chinese" to "the Chinese").
		[Redacted] After facing prospect of collapse of the communique negotiation, HAK withdraws request for the Taiwan paragraph change.

(KME) 1077

(F1, a5)

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1077

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(b)(1) (b)(3)

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1077/78

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1077

(F1, a5)

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(b)(1) (b)(3)

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
February 27	Qiao - Kissinger, in Shanghai (11:30 a.m.-1:55 p.m.)	Final touches on the communique; briefing the press; channels of communication. 1084 (KMI)
February 27-28	Qiao - Kissinger, in Shanghai (11:05 p.m.-12:30 a.m.)	[Military briefing] Vietnam negotiations. 1086 (KMI) G, AS
February 28	Zhou - Nixon, in Shanghai (8:30-9:30 a.m.)	End-of-visit review of understandings on international issues and Taiwan. 1087 (KMI)
February 28	U.S.-PRC "Joint Communique" issued in Shanghai	
March 5	Huang Zhen - Walters, in Paris	[Forty-fifth, and last Walters - HZ meeting in the secret Paris channel. Informal discussion of Sino-U.S., U.S.-Soviet relations.] G, AS
March 14	Nixon letters to Chairman Mao and Zhou, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	Thanks for "gracious consideration" accorded Presidential party in PRC. Desire for continuation of candid discussions in meeting "the realities [which] will continue to shape our [mutual] future." G, AS
March 14	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	HAK reveals Soviet concerns about U.S.-PRC military intelligence sharing; discusses U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreements. HH protests U.S. bombings in Vietnam. G, AS
March 24	Haig - Huang Hua, in New York City	[HH reads protest on U.S. ship and aircraft intrusions into PRC territorial space; asks U.S. to investigate poisoning death of PRC U.N. Mission official.] G, AS
April 12	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	Discussion of state of Vietnam negotiations and military actions [HAK informs HH of U.S. reduction of nuclear weapons on Taiwan by 50 percent by end of 1972; state of U.S.-Soviet negotiations; says the U.S. is prepared to sign any agreement with the PRC it signs with the USSR.] G, AS
April 18	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	HAK informs HH [Indians, as a "bridge" for the Soviets, are proposing they sign friendship treaties with Japan and Indonesia; RN has directed him to make a secret trip to Moscow "in light of the complicated international situation." Arrangements made for HAK's June trip to China.] G, AS

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
April 26	Haig - Huang Hua, in New York City	Haig informs HH of state of U.S.-Soviet negotiations; raises threat of heightened U.S. military pressure in Vietnam in response to North's escalation of fighting "at whatever risk to other U.S. policies"; asks HH if he could come secretly to Washington if emergency situation arose. b7, a5
May 8	Nixon letter to Zhou, delivered via Huang Hua, in New York City	RN tells Zhou [his resort to military pressure on North Vietnam is designed to bring the war to a close; if all U.S. prisoners returned and an internationally supervised ceasefire reached in Indochina, all U.S. forces will withdraw in four months; Hanoi should not be able to jeopardize progress made in Sino-U.S. relations; HH rejects Haig suggestion of 4/26/72 that he secretly travel to Washington.] b1, a5 1129/90 (KMT)
May 16	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	[HAK informs HH of agreement to be signed at U.S.-Soviet summit; Soviets propose agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons by U.S. and USSR, but use against third countries; U.S. has rejected the idea and will not sign agreement directed against PRC interests; HH says RN speech of 5/8/72 is aimed at escalating, not ending the Vietnam War; PRC support for Vietnam is "unshakable."] b1, a5 (KMT) 1197
June 11	PRC note to USG, delivered via PRC UN Mission in New York City	[Protests U.S. military violations of PRC territorial airspace: if the U.S. side doesn't show restraint in its military operations, "efforts toward the normalization of relations will inevitably be affected."] b1, a5
June 19-22	Kissinger in Beijing	[KMT] 1304
June 19	Zhou - Kissinger (10:25-11:20 p.m.)	[Indochina. Japan.] b1, a5
June 20	Zhou - Kissinger (2:05-6:05 p.m.)	[Soviet Union. Indo-Pakistan War. Europe. Indochina.] b1, a5
June 21	Ye Jianying - Kissinger (morning)	[Soviet Union. Indochina.] b1, a5
June 21	Zhou - Kissinger (3:25-6:45 p.m.)	[Soviet Union. Indochina.] b1, a5
June 22	Zhou - Kissinger (3:38-6:35 p.m.)	[Indian Subcontinent. Korea. Germany. Taiwan.] b1, a5

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
	Zhou - Kissinger	Normalization.
	Zhou - Kissinger (11:00 p.m.-12:55 a.m.)	Indian Subcontinent. Sino-Soviet relations. Indochina. Domestic U.S. politics.
June 28	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	HAK delivers RN thank-you note for June trip; says U.S. will treat "sympathetically" any specific proposals Zhou has about accelerating the normalization process; if, as Hanoi broadcast hints, PRC forces enter Vietnam conflict, the U.S. would be put in a very difficult position in its relations with China. G1 95
July 26	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City (4:15-7:15 p.m.)	HAK reviews U.S.-Soviet negotiations; says he has instituted new military procedures to prevent U.S. violations of PRC airspace; hopes to avoid confrontation over Korea in UNGA and will work out a deal to dismantle UNCURK. U.S. will avoid having its freedom of action (in support of China) restricted by any U.S.-Soviet agreement against use of nuclear weapons. G1 95
August 4	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	HH reads note: U.S.-Soviet nuclear agreement is "impermissible." PRC hopes the U.S. will reconsider its opposition to UNGA debate on Korea. Germany's recognition of the PRC. HAK: Soviet peace moves in the West presage "aggressive intent" in the East, with the period 1974-1976 a time of maximum danger. U.S. needs enough of a relationship with China to convince Moscow there is a U.S. interest in PRC security. U.S. will try to deprive U.S.-Soviet nuclear treaty of operational meaning, or turn it against Soviets. G1 95
August 14	PRC message to USG on Sino-Japanese normalization, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	PRC says it "respects" U.S. relations with Japan. G1 95
August 14	NSC Staff Member Jonathan Howe - Huang Hua, in New York City (3:30-4:20 p.m.)	HH: PRC doesn't fear Soviet effort to isolate China: Soviet attacks on PRC are designed to create false sense of security in Europe; Japan wants to normalize relations with PRC; in this process China understands importance of U.S.-Japan tie and "will not embarrass the U.S." G1 95

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments	
August 21	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City (6:05-6:50 p.m.)	U.S. Soviet nuclear agreement negotiations. Sino-Japanese normalization. Vietnam peace negotiations.	t, 95
August 28	NSC staff member Richard Kennedy - Huang Hua, in New York City	In reaction to PRC protest at U.S. killing of 5 Chinese crewmen in Vietnam conflict, HAK sends "oral message" to Zhou saying he hopes China will view Indochina conflict in "a broader framework" of "modern imperialism" and help speed the end of the conflict [via pressure on Hanoi to negotiate].	61, 95
September 6	PRC note in response to USG oral message of 8/28/72, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	China hopes the U.S. will take the long view and withdraw from Indochina at an early date. "We have no alternative but to adhere to principles."	61, 95
September 8	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City (6:15-7:00 p.m.)	HAK reviews U.S.-Soviet nuclear agreement negotiation in advance of his Moscow trip. The U.S. will not sign an agreement that implies a Soviet-American condominium. SALT; CSCE; MBFR; Vietnam; U.S.-Japan contacts; and Sino-Japanese normalizations. Chinese wheat purchases from U.S.	61, 95
September 19	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City (6:17-7:45 p.m.)	HAK reviews his Moscow trip: U.S.-Soviet nuclear treaty (we will avoid any formulation that implies a U.S.-Soviet condominium); MBFR, CSCE, SALT strategy; Soviet wartime debt; ExIm Bank credits and MFN; Soviet concerns about China; U.S.-PRC relations; Vietnam negotiations (a period of intensive discussions is about to begin); the U.S. will vote against a Soviet U.N. proposal on nuclear weapons. HH: PRC note says China will seek delay of U.N. debate on Korea (until after U.S. election); normalization of Sino-Thai relations; grain purchases from the U.S.; scientific exchanges.	61, 95
September 26	PRC note to USG, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	Attack on Soviet proposal for nuclear agreement with the U.S. as "claptrap" and "utterly unacceptable."	61, 95

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
October 3	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City (8:30-9:20 p.m.)	Sino-Japanese normalization. HAK reviews U.S.-Soviet negotiations ("we now find it impossible" to turn down the offer of a nuclear treaty); Vietnam ("the decisive moment" for peace; if it's missed there will be "expanded conflict"); proposes January visit to discuss Soviet issues. a
October 12	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	PRC agrees to Kissinger 10/3/72 suggestion of a trip, but says it is "to discuss prospects of the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations." a
October 16	USG message to the PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	As U.S.-Vietnam agreement is near, USG needs to know PRC attitude on postwar military aid to Vietnam. After agreement reached, USG is prepared to discuss Cambodia with PRC. HAK asks PRC help in convincing North Vietnamese that last-minute adjustments in peace agreement aren't tricks. a
October 24	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	HAK asks directly for Zhou's intervention with the North Vietnamese to convince them that last-minute "adjustments" in the peace agreement needed to gain Saigon's support are not a U.S. "trick." Two substantive issues are (1) nature of the "administrative structure" to oversee the peace agreement in Vietnam, and (2) the withdrawal of some North Vietnamese troops above the DMZ. FINE 1391 6, 9
October 25	PRC note in response to the HAK/HH session of 10/24, delivered from the PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	The U.S. is capable of handling Saigon's "sabotage schemes." [If the U.S. cannot complete the peace negotiations there could be "unforeseen consequences." "As for the questions of the three countries of Indochina, only by solving them separately can progress be made according to order. We will not elaborate on this point as there is an identity of views here." FINE 1370 6, 9
October 27	USG note to the PRC, delivered to the PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	The note reiterates U.S. request for Chinese assistance in convincing the North Vietnamese to attend "one final negotiating session" in Paris. 6 9

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
October 31	PRC reply to U.S. communications of 10/24/72 and 10/27/72, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	Attack on the USG for allowing the Saigon government to obstruct the peace agreement and for trying to put pressure on the North Vietnamese. (FMI) 1403
November 1	USG reply to PRC communication of 10/31/72, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	A defense of the U.S. position in the negotiations and outline of plan for consummating the peace agreement 2 to 3 weeks after the North Vietnamese resume negotiations at Paris. If South Vietnamese authorities will not concur in the agreement, the U.S. will consider a bilateral agreement with the North Vietnamese. The USG is willing to obligate itself to the PRC regarding its limitation on bombing of North Vietnam (as a bona fide of its good intentions). (FMI) 1403. 61, 95
November 3	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	HAK reviews in detail the state of U.S.-North Vietnamese negotiations, "so that if there is a strain in our relationship . . . it is not caused by misunderstanding." 61, 95
November 11	Qiao Guanhua message to RN, via Huang Hua phone call to NSC Staff Member Winston Lord	Premier Zhou and Qiao congratulate RN on his reelection.
November 13	Kissinger - Qiao Guanhua, in New York City (7:30-10:00 p.m.)	Indochina negotiations. HAK: If North Vietnam is farsighted they will settle; otherwise, U.S. will bomb. Qiao expresses concern about strong U.S. support for Saigon's opposition to Hanoi's troops in South Vietnam. U.S.-PRC relations. HAK: "We have every intention of accelerating normalization in the new term." Sino-Soviet border negotiations: Qiao reviews their history; says the Soviets, in early November, shifted their position from discussion of territorial disputes to non-use of nuclear and conventional forces. HAK: The U.S. will reach no understandings with Moscow without informing China. Agenda for HAK's proposed January 1973 trip to China, making a schedule for normalizing relations; how to deal with a "period of maximum danger" from the Soviets after 1974. On postwar evolution of Indochina, Qiao asks if HAK will meet with Sihanouk. Warm review of Shanghai Communique negotiations. Europe. Relations with the Soviets. Japan. (FMI) 1413/4. 61, 95

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
December 7-8	Huang Zhen - Kissinger, in Paris (late night meeting)	<p>HAK: Negotiations with Hanoi are at "very critical stage"; if Le Duc Tho holds to his obdurate stance, U.S. will break off negotiations and resort to military action; if U.S. forced to do this it will affect development of U.S.-PRC relations.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">61 95</p>
December 16	Huang Hua - Lord, in New York City	<p>Lord briefs HH on North Vietnam's negotiating tactics of recent date to counter their "inaccurate accounts" given various governments.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">61 95</p>
December 18, 22, and 29	U.S. messages to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	<p>USG informs Chinese of status of the Vietnam negotiations.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">61 95</p>
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January 3	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	<p>South Asia. HAK: If the renewed Vietnam negotiations in Paris fail, the U.S. will scrap the October deal and seek a new basis of agreement "of a more bilateral nature"; a breakdown will weaken U.S. ability to respond to the Soviet strategic rocket buildup (which will further expose China, as well as the U.S., to Soviet pressures). HH: "Serious news" is that U.S. should not miss the new opportunity of the reconvened Paris talks to conclude the Vietnam War via "serious reciprocal negotiations."</p> <p>HAK delivers Nixon letter to Zhou reviewing progress in U.S.-PRC bilateral and international dealings and reaffirming "intention to move energetically" toward normalization in the second term.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">61 95</p>
January 6	Zhou reply to Nixon letter of 1/2/73, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	<p>Mao "takes satisfaction" in development of U.S.-PRC bilateral relations since 1973. If Vietnam War continues, progress in U.S.-PRC relations is bound to be affected. HAK will be welcome to visit China after Vietnam War is over.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">61 95</p>
January 14	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	<p>Informs China that U.S. and Vietnamese will sign peace agreement in Paris on 1/17/73. RN will suspend all military actions against North Vietnam on 1/15/73. HAK will visit Hanoi 2/8-11/73. Proposes combining Hanoi trip with visit to Beijing.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">61 95</p>

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
January 22	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	Proposes agenda for Beijing talks: "normalization of relations"; the current world situation; and future policies in South and Southeast Asia in the postwar period. } b1, a5
January 24	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	Additional Chinese views on the Paris conference in response to USG notes of 1/15/73 and 2/22/73. PRC opposes discussion of Laos and Cambodia at Paris, stresses the principle of decisions reached via unanimity through consultation. } b1, a5
January 27	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	Responding to Chinese agreement on dates for HAK's February visit to Beijing, note says time is propitious "to accelerate the movement toward the normalization of relations." } b1, a5
January 29	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	U.S. and North Vietnam explore PRC participation in the Paris peace conference. U.S. has agreement of Lon Nol to (temporarily) cease fire in Cambodia if other side does likewise. Requests PRC influence with Cambodian insurgents for "restraint" in offensive actions. } b1, a5
February 1	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	PRC gives its ground rules for participation in the Paris peace conference on Vietnam; wants no enduring "organ" of the conference established. } b1, a5
February 2	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	Message "primes" the PRC on the claims/assets issue, which HAK is prepared to discuss in Beijing in order to "ease the development of trade." } b1, a5
February 5	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	USG reply to PRC note of 2/1/73 on functioning of the Paris peace conference on Vietnam. "There must be some way to keep the members of the conference informed of the situation in Indochina after the conference adjourns, and some means must be established to reconvene the conference." RN wants SecState Rogers to meet with PRC Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei in Paris after the peace conference. } b1, a5
February 15-19	Kissinger in Beijing	YEAR-END SUMMARY (US-71) (KMF)

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
February 15	Zhou - Kissinger (5:57-9:30 p.m.)	Tour of the world--Soviet Union; Europe; South Asia. Reaffirmation of Taiwan understandings. "We are prepared to proceed as rapidly as the PRC toward normalization. [Zhou: You want to get at the Soviets by standing on China's shoulders.] 6-1,95
February 16	Zhou - Kissinger (2:15-6:00 p.m.)	[HAK discusses U.S. military withdrawals from Taiwan; outline of a normalization deal.] HAK (KMD) proposes a U.S.-PRC liaison office. U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the treaty preventing nuclear war; Soviet and U.S. foreign-policy strategies. MBFR negotiations in Europe and internal politics. Implementation of the Paris peace agreement on Vietnam [Zhou urges USG to negotiate with Sihanouk.] 6-1,95
February 17	Zhou - Kissinger (2:20-6:25 p.m.)	Soviet nuclear treaty. Liaison offices and communications. Indochina and Paris conference arrangements [U.S. prisoners in China. Soviet security system in Southeast Asia. Indonesia. U.S.-PRC claims/assets. Congressional visit.] 6-1,95
February 17	Zhou - Kissinger (10:22-11:10 p.m.)	[Zhou: "Europe wants to push the evil waters of the Soviet Union eastward." "It is very important to expose the true features of the Soviet Union as being engaged in false relaxation of tension and engaged in expansion." 6-1,95
February 17-18	Mao - Kissinger (11:30 p.m.-1:20 a.m.)	Mao: "Now we call the (U.S.-PRC) relationship a friendship." We shouldn't use intelligence operations against each other. [We can work together to commonly deal with a bastard.] The U.S. should strengthen its ties to Europe and Japan. China's women "create disasters"; we will export them to the U.S. [If Russia attacks China, the West will let them get bogged down for a long time (i.e., not help China) and then attack to defeat them.] 6-1,95

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
February 18	Zhou - Kissinger (2:43-7:15 p.m.)	<p>Global and European defense strategy. MFBR negotiating strategy. Middle East. Zhou: China must be prepared to resist a Soviet attack for several years, both for its own self-confidence and to hold out long enough to elicit support from the rest of the world.</p> <p>The danger of militarism in Japan; the U.S. should win Japan over. South Asia. Now is a bad time for progress in Cambodia; but we should keep each other informed. Abolition of UNCURK; U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea.</p>
February 19	Zhou - Kissinger (12:35-2:20 a.m.)	<p>Visit communique and press policy [MIAs] Paris peace conference on Vietnam.</p>
February 21	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	<p>Information on functioning of the Paris peace conference. The U.S. delegation has been instructed to avoid actions which would put the PRC in an isolated position. The SecState has been instructed to discuss private claims/assets with the Foreign Minister "in a global and political framework."</p>
February 23	PRC reply to USG message of 2/21/73, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	<p>PRC supports U.S./DRV co-chairmanship of Paris peace conference; opposes rotating chairmanship, or U.N. SecGen as chairman; opposes linking the conference to the U.N. in any way, or to the establishment of any "permanent organ."</p>
February 23	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	<p>Proposes David Bruce as head of the new U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing. Information on Soviet views regarding Paris peace conference on Vietnam.</p>
March 7	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	<p>Informs Zhou that John Downey's mother is in "critical condition."</p>
March 9	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	<p>Welcomes selection of Bruce as USLO chief. Informs of release of John Downey and U.S. pilots Flynn and Smith.</p>
March 12	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	<p>Informs of report that PRC will appoint Zhang Wenjin as PRCLO Chief.</p>

61, 95
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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
March 15	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	Informs USG of selection of Huang Zhen as PRCLC Chief and Han Xu as his deputy.
March 17	Lord - PRC Official at U.N. Mission in New York City	Lord informs on U.S.-Soviet summit agenda; India-Pakistan. Abolition of UNCURK if there is no UNGA debate. U.S. recognition of Mongolia. Vietnamese violations of Paris peace agreement—an offensive by Hanoi would have the "gravest consequences." Delivers RN letters to Mao and Zhou. 61 95
March 17	Nixon letter to Mao	RN: Comments on "joint determination" to normalize relations; common dangers and common views that have drawn the U.S. and PRC together "at a critical juncture in history." 61 95
March 17	Nixon letter to Zhou	RN: Normalization of U.S.-PRC relations remains our "basic policy"; with Vietnam War over, exchanges and trade will accelerate; we have parallel view important international issues. (b)(1) (b)(3)
April 4	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	[Redacted]
April 13	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRC U.N. Mission in New York City	Expresses "extreme disappointment" at Zhou's public statement on Cambodia. If North Vietnam continues to escalate military actions, an "extremely grave" situation will develop that is not in the interest of U.S.-PRC normalization. pg 349 (KMI)
April 16	Kissinger/Bruce - Huang Hua, in New York City	(Memcon missing.) pg 350 (KMI)
May 18	Zhou - Chief of U.S. Liaison Office David Bruce (6:30-7:50 p.m.)	Zhou: [Need to speedily implement Shanghai Communique. Would Bruce meet with Sihanouk?] Need for successful implementation of Paris accords on Indochina. 61, 95 pg 350/351 (KMI)

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
May 27	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	Final session in the secret New York channel. HAK outlines approach to having Sihanouk form a coalition government, seeks support from Hanoi and Beijing. HH: The Cambodia question cannot be solved in Paris. HAK lays out cross-recognition and U.N. membership plan for both Korean states; now USG will not object to debate on Korea in UNGA. U.S.-Soviet treaty on prevention of nuclear war: PRC message attacks the draft treaty as great power collusion, having a demoralizing effect on U.S. and European defense efforts.
May 29	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	Initiation of the PRC Liaison Office. HZ confirms Zhou invitation for HAK to visit Beijing in August. HAK: U.S. will not vote on any major U.N. question with the Soviets against the PRC; proposes joint U.S.-PRC public declaration saying neither country will sign agreements affecting the interests of the other without prior consultation. HAK discusses plan for Cambodian settlement; gives HZ copy of his talk with Pompidou on U.S. policy toward its relations with the Soviets and China.
May 30	Nixon - Huang Zhen	RN: As Brezhnev will try to use his forthcoming summit in Washington to affect "third parties," U.S. is prepared to make agreement with PRC "about consultations." Need to work out a "Laos-type" peace agreement for Cambodia. RN expresses interest in visiting PRC again.
June 4	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	Mao and Zhou invite RN to visit PRC again "at appropriate time." HAK invites Zhou to Washington. PRC message on Cambodia: China cannot negotiate with Sihanouk on behalf of USG. HZ repeats HAK's plan for a Cambodian settlement as stated on 5/29/73, says the plan will be communicated to Sihanouk. HAK invites HZ to San Clemente after the Brezhnev summit for debriefing.
June 5	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRCLCLO	Expresses "surprise and regret" at Zhou's public statement of 6/4/73 on U.S. actions in Cambodia.
June 13	Kissinger - PRC Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei, in Paris	Discussion of U.S.-North Vietnamese agreement on Laos, prospects for Cambodia [Soviet reactions to Huang Zhen reception in Washington. Visits to China by RN, to Washington by Zhou.]

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
June 14	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	U.S.-North Vietnamese agreement on Laos and Cambodia. RN's second visit to China. U.S. note says it will work for "suspension" of UNCURK, subsequently for end of U.N. Command in Korea. Brezhnev summit arrangements and agreements. HZ delivers PRC message attacking U.S. signing of draft agreement with Soviets on prevention of nuclear war. HAK reiterates interest in formal U.S.-PRC agreement on consultations.]
June 19	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	Meeting during Brezhnev summit, HAK tells HZ he asked Soviet leader to delete portions of his speech implicitly attacking China. HAK delivers RN letter to Zhou (see below). HZ informs HAK of 6/14/73 Soviet proposal to China for a nonaggression treaty. HAK gives HZ note on U.S. Korea policy: suspension of UNCURK; future of the U.N. Command; cross-recognition of the two Korean states. If there is a ceasefire in Cambodia, HAK will meet with Sihanouk in Beijing in August.]
June 19	Nixon letter to Zhou	U.S. will not engage in consultations with USSR without discussing with China. The U.S.-Soviet (draft) nuclear treaty will facilitate U.S. resistance to Soviet "hegemony."]
June 24	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HAK informs HZ that Brezhnev, during summit meeting, told RN of their proposal to China of a nonaggression treaty.]
June 25	Zhou - Bruce	Zhou expresses concern about U.S.-Soviet agreements; debunks Soviet offer to China of nonaggression treaty; the U.S. is trying to get at the Soviets by "standing on China's shoulders"; it is best to keep one's promise [on normalization]; the U.S. should strengthen its ties to Japan in light of Soviet pressures and economic enticements.]

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
July 2	Kissinger - Huang Zhen, at the Western White House in San Clemente, California	<p>HZ informs of his instruction to return to China; criticizes press leaks about HAK's August visit to Beijing; Zhou visit to Washington. HAK: RN needs visit to U.S. by PRC leader before his second trip to China in 1974. PRC message on Cambodia: press speculation about PRC mediation between Lon Nol and Sihanouk is causing trouble; Sihanouk is angry at HAK's past unwillingness to meet with him. HAK on the Brezhnev summit: extensive talks about China at Brezhnev's initiative, who discusses proposed Sino-Soviet nonaggression treaty, Lin Biao affair, proposes U.S.-Soviet exchanges on PRC nuclear program, inquires of any U.S.-PRC "military arrangements." Gromyko warns about U.S.-PRC political cooperation. HAK: Need to coordinate U.S.-PRC-European action to deter Soviet attack on China; secret U.S. support for Rolls-Royce aircraft engine sale to PRC.</p>
July 6	Nixon - Huang Zhen, in San Clemente, California	<p>RN defends U.S.-Soviet nuclear war agreement, "totally rejects notion of a superpower condominium." Regarding Cambodia, China holds the key to a solution, "urgent need" for peace to avoid heightening U.S.-PRC differences.</p>
July 6	Kissinger - Huang Zhen, in San Clemente, California	<p>HZ says Washington and Phnom Penh press leaks about negotiations between Sihanouk and Lon Nol are "extremely disadvantageous" and will "cause trouble."</p>
July 11	PRCLO informs USG of delay in scheduling Kissinger's August trip to China	<p>Chinese assert need to consult Huang Zhen upon his return to Beijing. [Real reason is desire not to appear in the middle of Cambodia negotiations.]</p>
July 11	Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft - PRCLO Deputy Chief Han Xu	<p>Conveys HAK's "surprise" at delay of August trip announcement. As HAK is "sole architect" of U.S.-PRC normalization, if he is embarrassed over the Cambodia issue it could jeopardize the U.S.-PRC reconciliation. What would HAK be able to bring back from Beijing regarding Cambodia?</p>
July 18	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRCLO	<p>Expresses support for the position of Sihanouk, the National United Front, and the RGNU in their demand for an end to the U.S. bombing; refuses to convey to Sihanouk the "tentative thinking" of the USG regarding a Cambodian settlement spelled out by HAK to HZ on 5/29/73.</p>

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967.

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
July 19	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRCLC	HAK welcome to visit Beijing beginning August 16 [first day of the Congressionally mandated bombing halt in Cambodia]. <i>py 365</i>
July 24	Scowcroft - Han Xu	Scowcroft conveys oral and written messages to the PRC on behalf of HAK regarding Cambodia: The written message expresses "astonishment" at PRC message of 7/18/73 and its refusal to convey the U.S. peace proposal to Sihanouk, rejects the PRC-supported solution to the conflict as arbitrarily weighted against the U.S. and its Cambodian ally. An "oral note" delivered by Scowcroft says this is the first time the PRC's word (to deliver USG plan to Sihanouk) has not counted; that the U.S. adheres to the principle of not betraying "those who have relied on it," a principle it believes the PRC will welcome "in other contexts." <i>py 366</i>
July 25	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRCLC	USG rejects August 16 date for HAK's arrival in Beijing, proposes visit in September or October. <i>py 36</i>
August 17	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRCLC	After lengthy delay, PRC proposes September 6-9 dates for HAK's visit. <i>py 67</i>
August 23	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRCLC	Informs PRC that September dates for HAK's visit are not convenient (due to his appointment as Secretary of State), proposes October dates as alternates. An "oral note" says HAK considers U.S.-PRC relations "a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy." "In view of the great danger which he foresees, it is increasingly important that the U.S. and PRC synchronize their policies." David Bruce will be recalled to assist HAK in reorganizing the State Department. <i>py 679</i>
August 27	USG message for PRC, delivered via PRCLC	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 80px; width: 100%;"></div>
August 29	Qiao Guanhua - Bruce	
September 22	Henry A. Kissinger sworn in as Secretary of State (while also retaining title of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs)	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
September 22	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRCLO	Agrees to HAK visit in October as being "relatively convenient."
September 25	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRCLO	USG accepts dates of October 26-29 for HAK's visit, proposes joint announcement on October 3.
September 26	Lin Ping - Bruce	PRC requests withdrawal of U.S. Marine guards assigned to USLO, saying their social functions have "aroused resentment," and Chinese sovereignty cannot tolerate such activities. } 61, 95
September 26	Kissinger - Huang Hua, in New York City	Dissolution of UNCURK and the U.N. Command in Korea. HAK proposes reciprocal U.S. and PRC contacts with the two Korean states; HH is noncommittal; notes Sihanouk's search for international support. HAK says U.S. policy remains as it was expressed in May and June (1973), U.S. doesn't want to see Cambodia part of a "big power system," notes Soviet approach to Thai authorities regarding their Asian Collective Security proposal. } 61, 95
September 29	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HAK expresses concern about PRC demand to have the Marine guard removed from USLO. } 61, 95
October 3	Kissinger - Qiao Guanhua, New York City	Evolution of the U.S.-PRC opening. Southwest Asia. Japan. Europe. HAK: "If the Soviets plan some sort of military action against [China], we will demand consultations [with Moscow]. But, of course, we will first talk to you. . . ." Korea: HAK: "If you give aid to Hanoi they will give it to the Cambodians." Qiao: "Your interpretation is not correct on that point." Middle East. Taiwan. Qiao: "We wish normalization could be accomplished faster." } 61, 95
October 6	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HAK briefs HZ on U.S. strategy for the Middle East. } 61, 95
October 11	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HAK gives a welcome luncheon for HZ and the PRCLO staff at State Department.
October 14	Scowcroft - Huang Zhen	Scowcroft briefs HZ on the Middle East situation, especially a massive Soviet supply effort to Egypt. } 61, 95
October 15	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	Zhou asks the U.S. to use its influence with Lon Nol to get Sihanouk's mother evacuated from Cambodia. Middle East. } 683

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
October 16	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HAK details arrangements for the evacuation of Sihanouk's mother from Pnom Penh. HZ says Sihanouk will not use her for "political struggle." 673
October 19	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HAK informs HZ of his imminent trip to Moscow because of Soviet concerns about the course of the Middle East conflict, drops Japan stop from his anticipated trip to China later in the month, or in November if negotiations regarding the Middle East drag on. 674
October 23	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRCLO	PRC proposes rescheduling of HAK visit in late November. 672
October 25	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HAK reviews recent Middle East developments and the U.S. strategic alert in response to Soviet threat to intervene militarily. He points out how he invoked Article II of the U.S.-Soviet Treaty on Prevention of Nuclear War to constrain Moscow's actions. HZ criticizes U.S. and Soviet actions as taken without consulting others and thus "intolerable." HAK proposes he go to China directly from the Middle East. 675
October 27	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRCLO	PRC agrees to HAK visit beginning 11/11/73, entry to China via Pakistan.
October 31	Lin Ping - Bruce	PRC asks USLO to cancel Marine Guard birthday party. 676
November 11-14	Kissinger in Beijing	
November 11	Zhou - Kissinger (3:15-7:00 p.m.)	HAK reaffirms U.S. positions regarding Taiwan; informs Zhou of U.S. troop withdrawals in 1974, and willingness to establish diplomatic relations if the Taiwan issue can be handled. Discussion of Soviet Union, the Middle East, Indochina, South and Southwest Asia, Korea, and coordination of U.N. tactics regarding abolition of UNCURK. 677
November 12	Zhou - Kissinger (3:00-5:30 p.m.)	USG arms sales to Taiwan. Zhou says F-5E coproduction until 1978 will stabilize CCK's view of the future. Inconclusive exploration of a way to achieve early diplomatic relations; private claims/assets issue. Middle East and energy issues. Korea. Soviet arms control and "expansionism." 678

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
November 12	Mao - Kissinger (5:40-8:25 p.m.) <i>696</i> <i>688</i>	Mao: Soviet ambitions exceed their strength. While they might like to attack China they lack the capacity. The U.S. has greater international initiative now that the Indochina conflict is over. What is Watergate all about; and will the Democrats promote an isolationist policy? Regarding Taiwan, if the U.S. breaks relations, then U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations can be established. We don't need Taiwan for 100 years, but I don't believe the island can be regained by peaceful means. Middle East. Japan. Europe.
November 13	Zhou - Kissinger (4:30-7:15 p.m.) <i>697/8</i>	Zhou: The Chinese draft of the visit communique has one sentence helpful to advancing U.S.-PRC normalization. "Oklahoma City." U.S.-Soviet nuclear treaty. Chile. Che Guevara. U.S. correspondents in Beijing and missing in Cambodia. MFN for China. MIAs in China. Elements of a solution to claims/assets. <i>688</i> <i>B1, a5</i>
November 13-14	Zhou - Kissinger (10:00 p.m.-12:30 a.m.)	Zhou on the USLO Marine Guards: no uniforms or weapons in public. Zhou assures HAK Hanoi has no interest in launching a major offensive "now"; we think it would be good if there were a political settlement in Vietnam; Cambodia should be an area of "peace and neutrality"; the Soviets and Indians are trying to move into Southeast Asia. <i>687</i> <i>B1, a5</i>
November 14	Zhou - Kissinger (1:00-2:20 a.m.)	Communique drafting.
November 14	Zhou - Kissinger (7:35-8:25 a.m.)	[Japan. Pakistan.] <i>61, a5</i>
November 16	PRC note to USG, delivered via PRCLC	[Redacted Box] <i>61, a5</i>

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
November 26	Scowcroft - Han Xu	Scowcroft delivers note detailing indications of a major North Vietnamese military buildup and preparations for offensive action in South Vietnam, which it regards with "utmost seriousness." It "cannot stand idly by" if North Vietnam continues these activities, and U.S. attention will again be diverted to Vietnam, "which could only be of value to hegemonial powers." 6-1 a5
December 4	Scowcroft - Han Xu	Direct White House-PRCLO communications. U.S. Indian Ocean and Taiwan Strait military deployments. Chile.
December 7	Kissinger - Han Xu	HAK briefs on his forthcoming trip to the Middle East.
1974 January 23	Kissinger - Han Xu	HAK disassociates the USG from South Vietnamese representations to the SEATO countries and the U.N. regarding PRC military actions in the Paracel Islands; inquires about a U.S. citizen captured during the Paracel operation; says Egypt is very dissatisfied with its relations with the USSR, seeks PRC help in building a MIG-21 factory.
January 25	PRC verbal message to USG, delivered via PRCLO	PRC message affirms a U.S. citizen was captured along with troops of the "Saigon authority" in its military operation in the Xi Sha (Paracel) Islands; he will be repatriated. 6 a
February 16	PRC note to USG, delivered via PRCLO	Protests a demonstration by South Vietnamese students in front of PRCLO as organized with USG "connivance"; says it is detrimental to U.S.-PRC relations. (HAK decides not to respond to the written protest.)
March 20	Kissinger - Han Xu	HAK notes infrequent contact with PRCLO officials, asks if Huang Zhen will ever return to Washington; briefs on his forthcoming trip to Moscow; expresses intent to "proceed along the implications of the last communique we signed" if he makes his annual trip to China; says F-4s will be withdrawn from Taiwan, with some technical delays, by late June; USG proceeding on Korean policy as discussed last year; India wants better relations with the U.S. to lower its dependence on the Soviets.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
March 25	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRCLC	Requests clearance for several PRC aircraft carrying special delegation on flights to the U.N. for UNGA special session.
March 29	USG message to PRC, delivered via PRCLC	USG approves special PRC flights, but notes risk of legal attachment of the aircraft because of unresolved private claims/assets issue.
March 30	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRCLC	Rejects USG raising of claims/assets issue as "blackmail" undertaken "without any reason whatsoever." If the aircraft are attached the PRC will assume USG planning and direction, with an "extremely unfavorable effect" on U.S.-PRC relations. The aircraft have already departed China.
March 30	Scowcroft - PRCLC official	USG oral response to PRC message of same day notes that the U.S. attaches "utmost significance" to relations with China, denies "blackmail" intent, says the matter legally is not under the full control of the U.S. government.
April 2	Qiao Guanhua - Bruce	At predeparture dinner for Qiao, Bruce probes about state of U.S.-PRC relations. Qiao cites "minor problems": new U.S. ambassador in Taipei; new ROC consulates; says the U.S. should "not go too far," although Taiwan is not as important as international issues.
April 14	Kissinger - Deng Xiaoping/Qiao Guanhua, in New York City (8:05-11:00 p.m.)	Middle East. Deng says there has been no change in the U.S.-PRC relationship (despite tensions), as it is personally supported by Mao; China is not happy with Watergate. HAK: My thinking is inconclusive on how to implement the 11/73 communique; what are PRC suggestions? Qiao: Normalization can only be on the Japan model. Deng: We hope to normalize relatively quickly, but we are not in a hurry. Deng downplays China's "anti-Confucius" campaign. Europe. South Asia. Soviet Union. Korea.
April 26	PRC message to the USG	Requests withdrawal of the USLO Marine guard, as they are still acting as a "recognizable military unit." (The USG accedes to the request on 5/17/74.)

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
June 9	PRC Foreign Ministry middle-level official to USLO officer, at a diplomatic reception in Beijing	PRC official expresses concern about HAK's apparent preoccupation with Soviet, Middle Eastern and other international issues to the exclusion of U.S.-PRC relations; does he plan a trip to Beijing in the fall?
✓ June 13	Lord - Han Xu	Lord presents note and oral statement of U.S. position on abolition of the U.N. Command in Korea: Korean states must directly negotiate a new arrangement, including a nonaggression treaty; present armistice agreement must remain in force as a transitional arrangement; (b)(1) (b)(3)
✓ June 14	PRC message to USG, delivered via PRCLCLO	Withdraws 11/12,13/73 offer of a package settlement of the private claims/assets issue.
✓ June 24	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HAK briefs HZ on his forthcoming trip to Moscow, SALT and ABM issues. HZ says Sino-Soviet border negotiator Illichiev is returning to Beijing "at his own initiative . . . for you to see" on the eve of Nixon's visit to Moscow; China has delayed Senator Mansfield's second trip to Beijing in order to avoid speculation about China's involvement in Cambodian peace negotiations. HAK proposes a fall trip to Beijing after the PRC has considered the USG's proposal on the U.N. Command in Korea; debunks "press speculation" about U.S. loss of interest in China. B/aks
✓ July 6	Kissinger letter to Zhou, delivered via PRCLCLO	HAK says he understands Zhou is in the hospital, wishes him a quick return to full health, says he will provide a briefing on the results of the Moscow summit.
✓ July 15	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HAK briefs on the results of the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting: the Soviets tried to involve the U.S. in a number of agreements that had an escape clause regarding China; these proposals were refused; gives information on the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance showing the American edge. HZ gives thanks from Zhou for HAK's letter of 7/6/74; says he has received no word from Beijing on the U.S. proposal of 6/13/74 regarding the U.N. Command in Korea.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
August 5	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	At HZ's dinner in honor of HAK and his new wife, HAK refers to the domestic political turmoil of Watergate, says the U.S. will emerge stronger from the ordeal and that the policy of friendship for China has bipartisan support.
August 9	Richard Nixon resigns from the Presidency	HAK: All previous discussions, understandings, and commitments by President Nixon are reconfirmed. HZ: China understands the present difficulties facing the USG; will not forget Nixon's contributions to U.S.-PRC relations; appreciates intent of the new administration to carry out the SC; and is very pleased HAK will remain as SecState.
August 9	Kissinger - Huang Zhen (4:50-5:20 p.m.)	HAK: All previous discussions, understandings, and commitments by President Nixon are reconfirmed. HZ: China understands the present difficulties facing the USG; will not forget Nixon's contributions to U.S.-PRC relations; appreciates intent of the new administration to carry out the SC; and is very pleased HAK will remain as SecState.
August 9	President Gerald R. Ford - Huang Zhen (5:25-5:40 p.m.)	Ford: I support the Nixon-Kissinger development of U.S.-PRC relations as it is in the cause of peace; we will strengthen the relationship and "not let our relations with anyone else disturb or destroy our new relationship." HZ: We will not forget RN's contributions in visiting China and issuing the SC; we will appreciate your carrying out the SC.
August 9	Ford letter to Mao, handed to Huang Zhen	Reconfirms continuity of U.S. foreign and China policies: a strong U.S. role in preserving world stability. U.S.-PRC relations are "cardinal element" of our policy. HAK will remain as SecState and he will keep your government informed of all issues affecting Chinese interests. Our policy regarding Taiwan remains unchanged; no policy has higher priority than "accelerating" the normalization process. HAK should visit China before the end of the year "to chart in specific terms the future course of our bilateral relations." (In receiving the same letter in Beijing, Qiao Guanhua tells Bruce that the PRC appreciates Ford's support of the SC and his intention to speed up the further development of U.S.-PRC relations.)
August 9	Kissinger letter to Zhou, handed to Huang Zhen	HAK says the U.S. will emerge from its current situation with more consensus to play a coherent and forceful world role, that the U.S. remains committed to normalization, and that he personally has no higher objective.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ August 10	Nixon letter to Zhou	RN says he looks back with pride on his China policy; he is confident Ford will build on the established foundations with bipartisan support.
✓ August 15	Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hummel - Huang Zhen	HAK proposes either a symbolic visit to China in September, or a more substantive trip in November after an October trip to Moscow. Ford will meet with Soviet leaders before year's end "on neutral territory." [The meeting is eventually held in Vladivostok!] HAK doesn't want so much high-level contact with the Russians without a trip to China, but the later trip would enable him to say something more definitive about Taiwan and normalization. What are Chinese preferences?
✓ August 19	Kissinger - Huang Zhen (10:30 a.m.)	HZ delivers replies to the Ford letter to Mao of 8/9/74 and the Nixon letter to Zhou of 8/10/74. The former, from Zhou, is aloof in tone, says China is glad Ford will adhere to the principles of the SC released jointly with Nixon, as will the PRC; the Zhou reply to Nixon warmly recalls "happy memories" of his 1971 visit to China, of the "beneficial talks," and assures him his efforts to normalize U.S.-PRC relations "will not be forgotten." H/C
✓ August 23	Hummel - Huang Zhen	PRC reply to HAK's trip proposal of 8/15/74 is noncommittal; the USG should schedule HAK's trip to China "in accordance with its own requirements."
✓ August 24	Hummel - PRCLC officials	HAK now cannot come in September, will shortly propose trip dates before the end of the year.
✓ September 5	Deng Xiaoping/Qiao Guanhua - Congressional delegation led by Senator Fulbright	Deng calls himself "country bumpkin" (<i>tu baozu</i>);

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
September 13	Hummel - PRCLC officials	HAK proposes visit to China in late November, after accompanying President Ford to Vladivostok summit (first mention of this site), South Korea, and Japan; these are his only free dates in 1974; if they are inconvenient to the PRC, his visit will have to be put off until 1975. (PRCLC officials convey acceptance of the November dates on 9/24/74.)
October 2	Kissinger - Qiao Guanhua, in New York City (8:15-11:35 p.m.)	HAK says Qiao's U.N. speech had many "cannons," equated the U.S. and Soviet Union. Qiao says he emphasized U.S. and Soviet differences. Cyprus coup. HAK asks for PRC views on U.S. recognition of Mongolia or his visiting Ulan Bator; Qiao waffles; HAK then says he'll just try to establish diplomatic relations. The Balkans. South Asia. Qiao says the Soviets are better than the U.S. in using covert means to play on contradictions between and within countries. CSCE. Qiao and HAK have long dialogue on whether the focal point of Soviet pressure is in the East or West. HAK notes lack of PRC reply to the U.S. proposal of 6/13/74 regarding Korea; says the North Koreans keep trying to contact him through third countries; Qiao says China "keeps up good relations" with North Korea and "we have to respect their views." HAK says the U.S. holds to the objective of completing the normalization process late in 1975 or early in 1976, but the U.S. will have to do it "so that our public opinion does not have bad feeling" about China; and given concerns about "hegemony" the U.S. must not be seen as throwing away friends; he raises need for a liaison office or consulate in Taipei. Qiao emphasizes the Japanese model, recalls Mao's disparagement of a peaceful transition for Taiwan, says the U.S. should separate U.S.-PRC from Taiwan-PRC relations. HAK asks for postponement of U.N. debate on Cambodia, inquires about PRC view of a U.S./PRC/USSR/ Japan/Cambodia conference to settle the issue. Qiao says China can't control the U.N. debate, and the U.S. should not block admission of the GRUNK into the U.N. as the Lon Nol government will soon fall.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
October 25	NSC staff member Richard Solomon - Ji Chaozhu, at PRCLO residence	(b)(1) (b)(3)
November 11	Kissinger - Huang Zhen (3:14-4:00 p.m.)	<p>HAK says he appreciates China extending his November visit one day for "sightseeing" (designed, unsuccessfully, to elicit an invitation to visit Mao in the provinces, where he has been receiving foreign visitors) and asks to meet with the hospitalized Zhou. expresses concern about Nancy Tang's inquiry to USLO Chief Bush whether HAK's strategy for "gaining time" in building the relationship has become an end in itself; regarding normalization, basic U.S. strategy is unchanged, we are prepared to discuss concrete steps and a timetable "within the term of this Administration," but if a deadline is established, concrete discussion of U.S. problems will have to take place; regarding HAK's recent trip to Moscow, the Soviets have moved close to the U.S. position on SALT, and it is 50/50 that there will be an agreement in principle at the Vladivostok summit; Brezhnev also proposed a U.S.-Soviet treaty in which each would assist the other if attacked by a third nuclear power. The Indian Subcontinent. HZ lauds HAK's trip to Rumania and Yugoslavia.</p>
✓ November 25-28	Kissinger in the PRC	
✓ November 25	Deng - Kissinger (7:35-7:50 p.m.)	<p>Introductory biplay regarding President Ford's trip to Vladivostok. Deng rejects view that U.S.-PRC relations are "chilling a bit"; stresses Soviet threat to both countries.</p>
✓ November 26	Deng - Kissinger (10:20-11:02 a.m.)	<p>Deng needles HAK on lack of progress toward normalization: "You owe us a debt" regarding Taiwan; we are prepared to accelerate the pace, but we are not in a hurry.</p>
✓ November 26	Deng - Kissinger (11:15 a.m.-12:20 p.m.)	<p>HAK discusses background of normalization, U.S.-Soviet SALT negotiations, Middle East, India, Cambodia.</p>

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
November 26	Deng - Kissinger (3:45-5:00 p.m.)	HAK discusses details of U.S. approach to normalization. Deng debunks this approach as not in accord with the Japanese model, says it seems the time is not ripe to complete the process. Deng invites SecDef James Schlesinger to visit the PRC.
November 27	Deng - Kissinger (9:45-11:32 a.m.)	HAK offers a presentation on location of Soviet forces; Deng accepts. HAK describes Soviet proposal at Vladivostok for a U.S.-Soviet treaty in which each would defend the other in the case of attack by a third nuclear power. Deng debunks the offer, describes Moscow's proposal to Beijing of a nonaggression treaty, and baits HAK on detente policy and U.S. military and alliance vulnerabilities.
November 27	Deng - Kissinger (11:40 a.m.-12:20 p.m.)	Deng reviews Sino-Soviet relations.
November 27	Deng - Kissinger (3:36-5:45 p.m.)	Europe. Japan. South Asia. Cambodia. Oil and OPEC. Deng expounds 3 principles for normalization: no form of 2 or 1-1/2 Chinas, 1 China - 1 Taiwan; must be the Japan model; after the U.S. ends the U.S.-ROC Defense Treaty the issue must be left for the Chinese to solve themselves; any form of foreign reviewing or guaranteeing of the future of Taiwan is unacceptable; the problem should be solved "at one gulp"; the two sides cannot resolve the issue on HAK'S present visit.
November 28	Deng - Kissinger (4:00-6:15 p.m.)	Middle East. MIAs. Indochina. Private claims/ assets. HAK says the U.S. "prefers the solution of [Taiwan's] integration [into the PRC] be peaceful"; in the interim the U.S. will unilaterally reduce its military forces on Taiwan, and over the coming 18 months will reduce the size and seniority of U.S. diplomatic representation on the island. Deng ridicules the significance of HAK's piecemeal approach; China can wait for a solution for a few years, but it must be done "briskly" on the basis of the 3 principles.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
November 28	Qiao - Kissinger (9:45-11:15 p.m.)	<p>HAK says the 3 principles are accepted. The issue is implementing them so that U.S.-PRC normalization is completed before Taiwan is reintegrated into the PRC. Deng says there can be no commitment to the U.S. about how it will accomplish the reintegration; HAK says, "theoretically you could make a general statement of your unilateral intentions" [to do it via peaceful means].</p>
December 10	Qiao - Senator Mike Mansfield	<p>Communique drafting. Qiao tries to make it appear that Ford asked to visit China.</p>
December 24	Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib - Han Xu	<p>At a small dinner, Qiao expresses doubt that HAK briefed Chinese leaders fully on the results of the U.S.-Soviet Vladivostok summit when he was in Beijing in November.</p>
1975	Habib - Han Xu	<p>On behalf of HAK, Habib complains about PRC officials briefing the U.S. press in Beijing on unhappiness with the relationship and raising questions about the value of Ford's forthcoming trip to China if normalization cannot be completed, and about Qiao's remark to Mansfield expressing doubt that HAK had been fully forthcoming in briefing PRC leaders on results of the Vladivostok summit meeting. HAK invites Qiao to visit the U.S. to discuss preparations for the Ford visit.</p>
January 30	Habib - Han Xu	<p>Han urgently protests violations of PRC airspace (related to joint U.S.-ROC naval maneuvers on 12/31/74 and 1/28/75); requests "serious attention to such incidents."</p>
February 8	Kissinger - Han Xu (10:30-10:45 a.m.)	<p>Regarding Cambodia, U.S. is prepared to accept a coalition government headed by Sihanouk; USLO officials are prepared to meet the Prince to explain U.S. policy. Han says the U.S. should not interfere in the conflict. Sihanouk and the GRUNK are determined to struggle on and will not negotiate; China supports their position.</p>

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
February 8	Habib - Han Xu	[Redacted]
February 21	Kissinger - Huang Zhen (6:45-7:05 p.m.)	
March 19	Habib - Han Xu	USG protests a song, "People of Taiwan, Our Brothers," to be included in the repertoire of a cultural exchange group scheduled to tour the U.S. in April. Han says Taiwan is an internal matter and the group should be able to sing the song [which calls for the "liberation" of Taiwan].
March 20	Habib - Han Xu	Habib reiterates USG opposition to the song, "People of Taiwan, Our Brothers," says it is desirable to keep political issues out of cultural exchanges, requests PRC reconsideration of the issue by 3/23/75, or the USG will have to postpone the singing group's tour. Han replies the song is a matter of principle; USG objections raise doubts about its commitment to the SC.
March 23	Habib - Han Xu	Han protests Habib's demarche of 3/20/75; says the USG position is an "ultimatum" and is pushing the PRC to a "point of no return"; this is a matter of principle and the PRC never yields to foreign pressure on principled issues. If the USG holds to its position, which violates the spirit of the SC, the PRC will have to agree to the postponement, but it hopes the USG will reconsider. Habib says unless the PRC reconsiders its position, the USG will ask for the postponement and tell the press that it is due to the "high political content" of the singing group's repertoire.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
March 25	Habib - Han Xu	Habib reiterates USG objection to the tour group's song about "liberating" Taiwan; says it would create controversy harmful to the interests of the U.S. and PRC. If the PRC does not reconsider its position, and so inform the USG by midday 3/26/75, the USG will ask for postponement of the tour. [The Chinese never respond to this final appeal and the group's tour is postponed indefinitely.]
May 9	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HAK criticizes a <i>People's Daily</i> editorial characterizing the U.S. as "strategically passive." Regarding Indochina: we will cooperate in preventing "regional hegemonies" (i.e., newly victorious Vietnam), but we won't do other people's work for them. Any military attack on South Korea will involve the certainty of an American response. A summit meeting with the Soviet Union is expected in the early fall. Inconclusive sparring regarding the President's China trip agenda. HAK says he wants to negotiate a communique "substantially in advance" of the visit; he invites Qiao Guanhua to the U.S. to negotiate the document. HZ lectures HAK on the need to "learn correct lessons" from the Vietnam experience; twists him on Schlesinger statements critical of detente. H, 95
May 12	Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll - Huang Hua	Ingersoll starts to read HZ a public statement on the Mayaguez affair; begins to ask him for PRC assistance in getting the Cambodian authorities to release the U.S. crew. HZ says it is "inconvenient" for the PRC to pass any messages to the Cambodians, says "this is your problem," and terminates the meeting without having listened to the U.S. message.
June 2	Deng Xiaoping interview with American Society of Newspaper Editors delegation	Deng: President Ford will be welcome in China whether or not he has anything substantive to discuss.
June 26	Zhou - Dr. Li Chien-pien	Li, a U.S. citizen and schooldays acquaintance of Mao, tells USLO officials that he believes China will make a public statement "for domestic consumption" about its peaceful intentions toward Taiwan, but that the U.S. must meet the conditions of the Japan model if it wants to normalize U.S.-PRC relations. Taiwan would be an autonomous province of the PRC. C, S

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
July 7	Kissinger - Huang Zhen (5:35-6:15 p.m.)	HAK reviews developments in Middle East, Soviet Union; probes HZ on PRC views of a "possible" Presidential visit to China in the fall. HZ comments on Deng's statements to the American Society of Newspaper Editors delegation of 6/2/75; says the visit up to Ford to decide; China will bring no difficulties to its guests. HAK rhetorically asks if there can be "intermediate points between a full meeting of the minds and no progress at all" on normalization.
August 6	Deng Xiaoping - Percy/Javits Congressional delegation	Percy presses Deng on possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.
August 12	Kissinger - Huang Zhen (3:45 p.m.)	HAK debriefs HZ on the Helsinki summit, President's subsequent visit to Rumania and Yugoslavia; says he told Brezhnev the U.S. will not participate in an Asian Collective Security system; says he told Miki the U.S. cannot object to an "anti-hegemony" clause in the Sino-Japanese peace treaty. HZ says the Indochina situation "is really very good," but China doesn't comment on or make suggestions about the situation; it does oppose "expansionism in Southeast Asia." HAK raises the "possibility" of a Presidential visit to China in late November or early December, with his advance trip in mid-October; need to agree to a communique during his advance trip; the President is thinking about also visiting Philippines, Indochina, and Australia.
September 4	Lord - Han Xu	Han presses for a more specific and definite USG proposal on the timing of HAK and Presidential visits to China. Lord briefs on HAK's Middle East negotiations.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
September 28	Kissinger - Qiao Guanhua, in New York City (8:10-11:55 p.m.)	<p>HAK and Qiao spar at length over the nature of the Soviet challenge and how to deal with it. Qiao notes comparisons of detente and Helsinki with "Munich," cites European and Japanese fears of Soviet pressures. HAK twits Qiao for China's failure to make the anti-Soviet resistance in Angola more effective. HAK says he is willing to talk to Sihanouk at the U.N., that Vietnam has hegemonial aspirations; Qiao says if the U.S. approaches the Cambodians privately, although there may be public criticism of the U.S., they will respond with courtesy privately, that Vietnamese ambitions, driven by the Soviets, are unlikely to succeed. Regarding normalization and the President's visit, Qiao says the visit will be a "major event," that the PRC hopes for some steps forward toward normalization on the basis of the SC, that China is prepared but the U.S. says it has problems; HAK says normalization cannot be completed on the Ford visit because of domestic politics, but perhaps some formula short of full normalization can be worked out. HAK asks for PRC views about a joint communique at end of the Ford visit; Qiao says his mind is "blank" on the subject. HAK says the U.S. is prepared to improve relations with North Korea, but not if the South is isolated; Qiao says the Korea problem is a small one.</p>
October 19-22	Secretary of State Kissinger in Beijing	
October 19	Deng - Kissinger (7:08-7:25 p.m.)	<p>Deng, in the presence of the press, needles HAK on his "Long March" to normalize U.S.-PRC relations, says he hopes HAK will have his own "October 19th" (the day the Long March ended).</p>
October 20	Deng - Kissinger (10:00-11:40 p.m.)	<p>HAK discusses need for progress in bilateral U.S.-PRC relations during the President's trip to build public support for China and "resistance to hegemonial aspirations"; says there should be agreement on outline of a communique during this visit, and tables a draft. Deng deflates HAK's global presentation with questions about U.S. diplomacy and economic dealings with the Soviets; he turns down as "unnecessary" an intelligence briefing offered by HAK.</p>

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
October 20	Deng - Kissinger (4:15-6:35 p.m.)	<p>Deng and HAK engage in fundamental critiques of, respectively, U.S. and PRC foreign-policy strategies. Deng: "The polar bear is out to fix the U.S.," but the U.S. and Europe are helping Moscow make up for its vulnerabilities of agricultural deficits and backward technology; there is so much "flexibility" in U.S. tactics that it adds up to no overall strategy; the West seems to want to divert the Soviet peril eastward; China has never asked for anything from others, is self-reliant, and "fears nothing under heaven." HAK replies "with some sadness": The U.S. and China apparently have very different perspectives on world events and how to deal with the Soviets; the U.S., since 1969, has had four strategic confrontations with the Soviets, is trying to modulate the European impulse for detente, and decided on its own in 1971 to assist China if the Soviets brought pressure on the PRC during the Indo-Pakistani war because of its sense of need to preserve a strategic balance; the USSR has not surpassed the U.S. in strategic power; and the U.S. objects to China criticizing it for betraying its allies and endangering world security when in fact it is actively trying to preserve the global equilibrium; the U.S. takes China seriously, and if that view is reciprocated the two countries can have a useful relationship.</p>
October 21	Deng - Kissinger (5:07-6:08 p.m.)	<p>Deng says the previous day's "frank" discussion was beneficial to the further development of possible U.S.-PRC cooperation. Europe's southern flank. Spain. Portugal. Yugoslavia.</p>

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
October 21	Mao - Kissinger (6:25-8:05 p.m.)	<p>Mao is in an aggressive, sarcastic mood: "I am going to heaven soon"; HAK's words that the U.S. and China ask nothing from each other are "unreliable"; the U.S. is trying to "leap at Moscow by way of China's shoulders, but these shoulders are now useless"; the U.S. is trying to get Taiwan from China, and while it is better in U.S. hands now, China sooner or later will fight for it; the world is not tranquil, and all of HAK's global maneuvering can only delay the storm; U.S. forces in Europe will have a "Dunkirk" when the Soviets attack, but this strategic withdrawal is like China's own defense strategy; "I like people to curse me," then I will pay attention to them; HAK should bring Schlesinger when Ford comes to China "for the Soviets to see"; but the two sides should not discuss military issues until war breaks out.</p>
October 22	Deng/Qiao - Kissinger (3:40-4:45 p.m.)	<p>On the Presidential visit, Deng says the fact of the visit (not substantive issues) is its significance; U.S. proposals for bilateral commercial, navigation, and air transport agreements are inappropriate while relations are not normalized; the U.S. draft communique indicates the U.S. is not prepared for any significant progress on Taiwan or normalization; the U.S. proposal on a private claims/assets solution is not acceptable; China doesn't need MFN as long as the Soviets don't get it. HAK: If the American people are to develop a stake in the U.S.-PRC relationship there should be visible signs of progress. Qiao says North Korea links ending the Armistice agreement and U.N. Command to a DPRK-U.S. peace treaty, but [to China] the time is not ripe for solving this issue. South Asia.</p>
October 23	Qiao - Kissinger (12:35-2:30 a.m.)	<p>Communique discussion: The Chinese, having delayed submission of a draft document for the Ford visit until the last minute of HAK's advance trip, table a hard-line draft that sharpens U.S.-PRC differences on global affairs, dealings with the Soviets, and Taiwan. HAK says the draft is "completely unacceptable," yet the President cannot come to the PRC without some communique.</p>

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
October 27	Qiao - USLO Chief George Bush	<p>Qiao says the U.S. draft is unacceptable as it conceals the real views of the two sides; he will not moderate the Chinese draft, and it is of no great matter if there is no communique. HAK says he will try to draft another communique, to be cabled to USLO, and that a good Presidential visit will give the American people more of a stake in the relationship and make them willing to defend China if the Soviets make a move against the PRC.</p>
October 31	Qiao - Bush	<p>Bush: HAK proposes a joint press statement rather than a communique at the end of the Ford visit, as proposed by Qiao to HAK in the car going to the airport on 10/23/75, in order to moderate expressions of disagreement; if such a statement can be negotiated by 11/1/75, the Ford trip can be announced by 11/3/75; the visit will concentrate on working sessions, will be shortened by one day with no travel outside of Beijing; the President may visit one or two "friendly" Asian countries on his way home. Bush tables a U.S. draft joint press statement.</p>
November 1	Qiao - Bush	<p>Qiao: As the U.S. and China "at present" have certain common points, the PRC will welcome a Ford visit, but the U.S. should have no illusions about differences of viewpoint; the U.S. draft press statement of 10/27/75 is unacceptable as it covers up differences of principle; the Chinese ask that their draft communique of 10/22-23/75 be reconsidered.</p>
November 3	<p>President Ford announces senior personnel changes: Secretary of Defense Schlesinger replaced by Donald Rumsfeld; USLO Chief George Bush recalled to replace William Colby as head of C.I.A.; Henry Kissinger replaced as National Security Adviser by Brent Scowcroft, but retains his position as Secretary of State</p>	<p>Bush: If the U.S. is to be able to take strong actions on international problems of concern to the two sides, and on normalization, any document issued at the end of the President's trip must strengthen the relationship; after review, the PRC draft communique of 10/22-23/75 is still unacceptable; the U.S. requests PRC views and suggestions regarding a joint press statement. Qiao replies he will "study the matter further."</p>

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
November 4	Qiao - Bush	Qiao delivers hard-line reply to Bush presentation of 11/1/75, says it is inconvenient for the advance team to come on 11/6/75; proposes public announcement of the Ford trip two weeks before the date; PRC policy is independence and self-reliance, and it seeks no protection from others; on normalization, the U.S. owes China a debt; any attempt to cover up U.S.-PRC differences will be harmful and China does not fear press speculation; it might be preferable if no document were issued at the conclusion of Ford's visit.
November 5	Qiao - Bush	In response to the PRC presentation of 11/4/75, the U.S. agrees that the two sides further exchange views on the press statement/communique issue; the last possible day to announce the Ford visit is 11/13/75; the advance party's arrival date is proposed for 11/19/75. Bush tables a draft announcement of the President's visit (which the Chinese later accept).
November 8	Qiao - Bush	Qiao agrees to announcement of the Presidential visit on 11/13/75 and to arrival of the advance team on 11/19/75.
December 1	PRC Charge in Tokyo - Kissinger, at the Tokyo Airport	The PRC official tells HAK there is a "line" (of policy concerns) linking Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing, and that HAK has many friends in China.
December 1-4	President Ford/Secretary of State Kissinger in the PRC	
December 1	Deng - Ford (4:15-4:30 p.m.)	Deng: "Your visit should reflect the relations between our two countries, and our friendship." Ford suggests discussion of Soviet "hegemony"; Deng notes their mutual concern about this issue.
December 2	Deng - Ford (10:10 a.m.-12:30 p.m.)	Deng replays the sharp criticism which he and Qiao leveled at HAK during the fall, but in milder tones, about U.S. international policies, especially those which seem to strengthen the Soviets. He cites Mao that small quarrels can produce great unity, that despite bilateral differences, shared international concerns are most important. Ford twits Deng on China's ineffectual support for the anti-Marxist resistance forces in Angola.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
December 2	Mao - Ford, Kissinger (4:10-6:00 p.m.)	Mao mocks U.S. inability to counter the Soviets in various parts of the world. "God has sent me an invitation." U.S.-PRC relations might improve in two or three years.
December 2	Qiao - Kissinger (11:00 p.m.-12:00 a.m.)	Decision made that no joint press statement or communique will be issued; HAK will brief the "nihilistic" U.S. press. Qiao says tell them "our relations are basically good and will be gradually improving." HAK: The U.S. is prepared to buy Chinese petroleum or sell equipment of a special nature.
December 3	Deng - Ford (9:25-11:55 a.m.)	Deng continues his critique of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, dealings with the Europeans, South Asia, Indochina, and Angola. Ford parries with question of what China is doing to counter the Soviets; Deng says China prepares its own defenses, fires "empty cannons," and urges others to oppose the Soviets, but has limited influence itself.
December 4	Deng - Ford (10:05-11:47 a.m.)	Deng, with press present, tells Ford they have "set a new style" by not being compelled to issue a communique. In private discussion, Deng says he understands it will not be possible for the U.S. to make any moves regarding Taiwan and normalization before the 1976 election. Ford reaffirms Nixon's political commitments on Taiwan: support for the unity of China; no support for Taiwan independence; the U.S. will discourage third countries from intervening in Taiwan; and U.S. forces will continue to be reduced. After the election we will "move more specifically toward normalization" according to the Japanese model. Deng says normalization must meet the 3 principles: withdrawal of U.S. forces, severing defense and political ties to the Chiang government, and settlement of Taiwan's future as an internal Chinese matter; but the U.S. can retain nongovernmental trade relations and people-to-people contacts. Ford says the Taiwan issue would have to be solved peacefully; Deng counters that they don't believe in a peaceful transition, even in 100 years [thus changing Mao's meaning of "100 years"!]. MIAs.

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
1976 January 30	Lord - Han Xu	HAK urges Deng to inform the USG about the PRC's needs for special technology; Deng waffles, raises issue of the U.S. allowing the Dali Lama to set up an office in the U.S. Ford drags out the discussion to avoid the appearance to the press of a premature ending to the meeting. G1, 91
February 21-29	Former President Richard M. Nixon in the PRC	Lord briefs on HAK's trip to Moscow and Europe; SALT issues; Angola; Europe, NATO; MFBR; Eurocommunism. Han: The situation in Angola only proves our position that appeasement will whet the Soviet appetite for expansionism. U
March 15	Senator Goldwater makes speech on U.S. China policy	Goldwater claims Nixon told him on two occasions he would never recognize the PRC. (The speech is attacked by NCNA on 3/21/76.) U
April 14	Kissinger - Han Xu	After a luncheon in honor of new USLO Chief Thomas Gates, HAK tells Han that Gates has a letter for the new Prime Minister Hua Guofeng, and he (Gates) hopes to meet with Hua; regarding normalization, not everything has been done as fast as some might have expected, but the SC is being implemented, and we will complete the process. G1, C
April 18	Qiao Guanhua - House Armed Services Committee delegation	In response to a question about possible U.S.-PRC military cooperation to block Soviet expansionism, Qiao say the two countries have many common points on international affairs, but at present "we will exert our own efforts."
April 19	NCNA criticism of the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine"	[An implicit attack on HAK's policy for dealing with the Soviet Union as "a further development of the appeasement policy the U.S. has followed since the Helsinki Summit."]

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
April 27	USLO Chief Thomas Gates - Han Xu	After a PRCLO farewell banquet for the departing Gates, Han says Gates' confirmation hearing testimony characterizing Taiwan as a "country" is not in conformity with the SC; the means which the PRC might use to resolve the Taiwan issue is an internal affair that brooks no foreign interference.
May 17	Habib - Han Xu	Han protests 5/3/76 and 5/5/76 surveillance flights by U.S. Seventh Fleet of PRC hydrological ships near the Fiji Islands as "typical great power logic" and "hegemonic acts" incompatible with the spirit of the SC; the U.S. will be responsible for any unfavorable impact on U.S.-PRC relations. b1, 95
May 29	Kissinger - Huang Zhen	HZ presses HAK on his statement to a Senator that the U.S. would not normalize after the elections; asks for information on NATO ministerial meeting, Latin American and African policies, the situation in Turkey and Greece. J
July 13	Zhang Chunqiao - Senator Hugh Scott	Zhang takes a very hard line on Taiwan, emphasizes the greater "reliability" of warfare as a way of resolving the island's future, reveals the PLA is actively preparing for a forceful "liberation."
August 18	Kissinger - Huang Zhen (5:00 p.m.)	HZ asks for information on HAK's trip to Southwest Asia; ridicules USG concern about Eurocommunist Parties; formally protests Senator Scott's remarks regarding Taiwan and normalization as a "flagrant threat" against the PRC. HAK reaffirms willingness to complete normalization after the U.S. elections: "I recognize there is not unlimited time"; warns North Korea regarding axe murders in the DMZ. HZ needles HAK on his sensitivity about upcoming Schlesinger visit to China. b1, 95
September 9	Mao Zedong dies	
October 6	The "Gang of Four" arrested	
October 8	Li Xiannian - Mansfield	Li takes a relaxed attitude regarding Taiwan [in contrast to that of the just-purged Zhang Chunqiao with Senator Scott on 7/13/76].

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
October 8	Kissinger - Qiao Guanhua, in New York City (8:30-11:30 p.m.)	HAK complains about PRC attacks on him and U.S. "appeasement" of the Soviets. Qiao baits HAK for showing weakness regarding the Soviets at Helsinki and in Angola. HAK warns that lack of political support for China in the U.S. because of the current chilly mood will limit the USG's ability to aid China if the Soviets attack. Qiao pressures HAK on Taiwan, noting pro-Taiwan statements by Republican political officials.
December 21	Kissinger - Huang Zhen (4:35-5:40 p.m.)	HZ asserts PRC internal situation "excellent" after smashing of the Gang of Four; assures HAK Mao's foreign policy will be sustained; presses HAK on continuity in U.S. policy with the new U.S. administration; asks for word on HAK's meeting with Jimmy Carter in Georgia, the NATO ministerial meeting, and press rumors that HAK will write his memoirs; seeks reassurance that PRC-related documents of the Nixon-Ford period will not be disclosed.
1977 January 8	Kissinger, Secretary of State-designate Cyrus Vance - Huang Zhen (1:15-2:40 p.m.)	HAK and HZ reiterate their respective positions on normalization. HZ complains about Carter statement calling Taiwan "China" as having a "2 Chinas" implication. Vance expresses support for the Shanghai Communique and the principle of "one China," but does not respond to HZ's remarks about the need to oppose the "Polar Bear."

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CARTER'S MEMOIRS

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
February 8	President Jimmy Carter - Huang Zhen (10:00 a.m.)	Carter reaffirms U.S. commitment to the SC as the "basis" of the U.S.-PRC relationship. HZ: The relationship will continue to improve so long as the SC is adhered to; any violations will raise adverse results; to normalize relations, the U.S. must withdraw its troops from Taiwan, abrogate the defense treaty, and sever diplomatic relations. Carter expresses hopes for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. HZ says as there is a bunch of counterrevolutionaries on the island, it seems there is no other way than use of force, but when it will happen is hard to say. notes the "fundamental dispute" between the PRC and the USSR, but says this should not inhibit development of state-to-state relations. Carter says he sent a message to the Vietnamese leaders expressing interest in normalizing U.S.-SRV relations. HZ: "We think this is good." He assures Carter that PRC internal situation is now "very good and stable"; Mao's policies will be fully implemented by Hua Guofeng.
April 11	Secretary of State Cyrus Vance - Huang Zhen	CV proposes he visit PRC in August; informs of Woodcock appointment as new USLO Chief; briefs on his recent trip to Moscow, SALT, CTB, Indian Ocean issues, Zaire. HZ: The Soviets engineered a mercenary invasion of Zaire; if the U.S. does nothing it will only boost Soviet expansionism and the U.S. will get hurt.
May 22	Carter gives Notre Dame commencement address	"It is important that we make progress toward normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China . . . and we hope to find a formula which can bridge some of the difficulties that still separate us."
August 22-25	Secretary of State Vance in Beijing	
August 22	Huang Hua - Vance	CV presents tour d'horizon of U.S. foreign policy.

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
August 23	Huang Hua - Vance (9:30-11:50 a.m.)	<p>[CV briefs on Soviets in Africa. HH says Soviet actions in Africa are not limited and accidental; asks if U.S. will compete with the USSR and maintain the world balance of power.] CV on normalization: The U.S. will meet the three conditions "if prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question are not lessened"; given U.S. legal requirements, some "informal" USG presence on Taiwan after normalization will be necessary; will the PRC not contradict a USG expression of "concern and interest" in a peaceful settlement of Taiwan issue, and will it refrain from statements stressing forceful liberation?</p>
August 24	Huang Hua - Vance (9:30-12:00 a.m.)	<p>HH rejects CV's approach to normalization; you owe China a debt regarding Taiwan; fighting is inevitable; reciprocal U.S. and PRC efforts are uncalled for, CV's approach to meeting China's three conditions is only lip service. [HH on U.S.-Soviet relations: We think the U.S. is afraid of the Soviets; the superpower rivalry is about to lead to a world war.]</p>
August 24	Deng - Vance (3:00-5:40 p.m.)	<p>Deng [in a milder tone than HH, urges U.S. "resoluteness and vigilance" regarding the Soviets, expresses doubt the U.S. will stand up to the USSR; regarding normalization, CV's presentation is a "retreat" from the position of Ford in 1975 [reciprocal measures are not called for, the request for a PRC statement on peaceful settlement with Taiwan is a violation of Chinese sovereignty]; CV's "informal" USG presence on Taiwan is just a "flagless embassy" or "liaison office. [Deng then holds off further discussion on normalization by saying China is patient, [mis]quotes Mao on waiting "10, 20, even 100 years," says "we are prepared to to seek peaceful means unilaterally but without excluding use of force," and the two sides can continue to discuss normalization "in a more patient and leisurely style."]</p>
August 25	Huang Hua - Vance (9:30-10:15 a.m.)	<p>[Cultural exchanges. HH debunks the need for a communique.]</p>

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
August 25	Hua Guofeng - Vance (4:00-5:15 p.m.)	Hua discusses PRC internal affairs, the Soviet Union; Huang Zhen will be recalled as PRCLC Chief. } 6/1,95
August 28	John Wallach article on PRC "flexibility" on Taiwan issue	John P. Wallach, "China Seen Softening on Taiwan," <i>Baltimore News American</i> .
September 6	Deng Xiaoping interview with AP editors	Deng: Normalization was "set back" by Vance visit. He lays out PRC position on normalization. [See <i>The New York Times</i> , 9/7/77.]
September 28	Vance - Huang Hua, in New York City	Discussion of international situation. CV says Carter still reviewing normalization issues; when review completed, USLO Chief Woodcock will make presentation of USG views. HH: Premier Hua Guofeng hopes President Carter will view U.S.-PRC relations from long-term strategic and political perspective, not as diplomatic issue; no immediate expression of USG views is necessary; China will not press for a solution. } 6/1,95
November 14	Huang Hua - U.S. Liaison Office Chief Leonard Woodcock	LW: <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div> } 6/1,95
November 15	Vance - Huang Zhen (4:30 p.m.)	HZ's farewell call. CV briefs on Horn of Africa, Middle East, and SALT. } 6/1,95
November 17	PRC Foreign Ministry official invites Brzezinski to China	Reinforces prior invitation via Huang Zhen. } Bm pg 203

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
1978		
January 16	Brzezinski - Han Xu	ZB briefs Han on Carter's trip to India, the Middle East, and Western Europe. 6/95
May 20-23	National Security Advisor Brzezinski in Beijing	
May 20	Huang Hua - Brzezinski (9:52 a.m.-1:20 p.m.)	HH: The rivalry between the two hegemonic superpowers is the major source of world instability; the U.S. is on the defensive and fears the Soviet Union, its responses to Soviet expansionism, as in Angola, are weak; China does not fear encirclement; the U.S. is not qualified to raise the human rights issue regarding Cambodia; while international issues are of primary concern and Taiwan is a secondary issue in U.S.-PRC relations, if normalization is not solved it will affect our ability to coordinate actions against the Soviets; China will show no flexibility on terms for normalization. 6/95
May 20	Huang Hua - Brzezinski (3:30-6:40 p.m.)	ZB: "I can say on behalf of President Carter that the U.S. has made up its mind to normalize U.S.-PRC relations." 6/95
May 21	Deng - Brzezinski (4:05-6:30 p.m.)	Deng: [How can we not be concerned and impatient about an issue as important as normalization? In 1975, President Ford made an oral commitment to normalize according to our three conditions without reservation; we will respect Taiwan's concrete conditions, and U.S. can (unilaterally) express its hopes for a peaceful solution;] we look forward to President Carter's making up his mind to normalize; [commercial and scientific exchanges will be limited prior to establishment of diplomatic relations; whenever the U.S. reaches agreements with the Soviet Union it makes concessions.] 6/95
May 21	Lin Ping - Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke (4:05 p.m.)	[Holbrooke reviews U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia.] 6/95

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
May 21	Director MOD Foreign Affairs Bureau Chai Chengwen - Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Morton Abramowitz (4:30-5:40 p.m.)	Chai resists an "exchange" of views on Soviet forces in Asia; rebuts the view that these forces are targeted largely on China. 61, 95
May 21	Jiang Nanxiang - NSC Staff Member Benjamin Huberman (4:30-5:40 p.m.)	Discussion of scientific and technological exchanges. 61, 95
May 22	Hua Guofeng - Brzezinski (5:25-7:25 p.m.)	Hua: If Taiwan did not get U.S. arms, there might be a quicker and better settlement of the issue [a hint of a "deal?"]; solving the Taiwan issue in U.S.-PRC relations is a political, not a diplomatic matter. North Korea wants the U.S. to know it will not attack; the North is prepared to negotiate with the U.S. ZB: The President has made up his mind to normalize; on Taiwan, there will be a period of historical transition in which the U.S. will maintain a full range of economic relations with the island [i.e., commercial arms sales]. 61, 95
May 22	Hao Deqing - NSC Staff Member Samuel Huntington	Discussion of PRM-10 and PD-18. 61, 95
June 2	Vance - Huang Hua (10:55-11:55 a.m.)	CV: Woodcock will soon initiate discussions on normalization in Beijing. HH: If you want Deng to visit the U.S., we must work harder to normalize as Deng is getting older; if the U.S. continues to appease the Soviet Union, it will harm our relationship. 61, 95
June 19	Brzezinski - Han Xu (11:30-12:00 a.m.)	Han protests press report of impending TAS, says this is not in conformity with SC and is of great concern to PRC [but does <i>not</i> say that TAS will preclude normalization]; SecEnergy Schlesinger and Presidential Science Adviser Press can visit China, but the time is not ripe for military exchanges. ZB: Our acceptance of the principle of one China and the three principles for normalization does not preclude "full economic relations" with Taiwan during a historical transitional phase. 61, 95

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1982

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
June 30	Brzezinski - Han Xu (10:00-10:30 a.m.)	Discussion of Europe, Middle East, Africa, and Afghanistan. 6, 95
July 5- December 15	U.S. Liaison Office Chief Leonard Woodcock holds nine discussions with Huang Hua, Han Nianlong, and Deng Xiaoping leading to completion of the normalization negotiations.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
July 5	Huang Hua - Woodcock	[Redacted]
July 9	Deng - Congressional delegation headed by Lester Wolff	Deng: The U.S. can maintain unofficial contacts with Taiwan after normalization; we will respect realities on Taiwan and be flexible as to means, but the PRC cannot make a commitment to use only peaceful means to liberate Taiwan; if peaceful means are impossible, then armed force will be used. (b)(1) (b)(3)
July 14	Huang Hua - Woodcock (3:30-4:15 p.m.)	[Redacted] 11 5

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
July 25	Lin Ping - USLO Deputy Chief Stapleton Roy	USG protests PRC indiscretion to the French on the existence of normalization negotiation. } b1, 95
July 25	Presidential Science Adviser Frank Press in Beijing	
July 25	Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger in Beijing	
August 2	Brzezinski - Han Xu	Discussion of world issue; Han stresses Vietnam as Soviet "Cuba" in Southeast Asia. } b1, 95
August 11	Vance - PRC Liaison Office Chief Chai Zemin (luncheon)	Welcome luncheon, Sec Treasury Blumenthal participates. Africa. PRC agriculture. Loans and oil exploration.
August 11	Huang Hua - Woodcock (10:25- 11:30 a.m.)	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div> (b)(1) (b)(3) b1, 95
August 16	Holbrooke - Chai Zemin	
August 17	Brzezinski - Chai Zemin	First meeting. BM 226
August 21	Holbrooke - Han Xu	Han protests press reports of USG arms sales to Taiwan. } b1, 95

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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September 7 Holbrooke - Han Xu


September 11 Holbrooke - Han Xu

September 15 Huang Hua - Woodcock (10:30-11:30 a.m.)

September 19 Carter - Chai Zemin (11:35 a.m.-12:22 p.m.)

BM 229

BM 229



[Chai: We seek normalization "at an early date."
 Carter: This can be a very important year for U.S.-PRC relations; if the Woodcock-Huang Hua talks are successful, I'm prepared to normalize without further delay; we will honor China's three points; we will continue to trade including "the restrained sale of some very carefully selected defensive arms"; good U.S.-Taiwan relations are important to preventing nuclear proliferation; don't contradict our statement of interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue; Hua Guofeng and Deng are welcome to visit the U.S. Chai says the PRC will not make any promises on peaceful liberation. (PRCLO later changes his wording to say the means for liberating Taiwan are an internal Chinese affair, as Deng told the Wolff Congressional delegation on 7/9/78.)]

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
September 27	Brzezinski - Chai Zemin (12:00-1:00 p.m.)	Discussion of SALT and the Middle East. Chai: The pace of normalization negotiations is too slow.
October 3	Vance - Huang Hua, in New York City (6:55-11:55 p.m.)	HH harangues for four hours, creating a tense mood: the U.S. should view normalization of relations with Vietnam in the context of Soviet efforts to establish military bases there and Vietnam's aggression against Cambodia and Laos; U.S. insistence on TAS shows it has not yet made up its mind to normalize.
November 2	Huang Hua - Woodcock (9:00-10:00 a.m.)	LW completes presentation of U.S. position on normalization in this 5th session:
		[Redacted]
		LW then tables draft joint normalization statement.
		HH ignores draft communique; asks for clarification of five issues: (1) nature and length of the "interim period" for U.S.-Taiwan relations; (2) nature of the trade "and other" U.S. dealings with the island after normalization; (3) the composition and duties of the USG's "non-governmental" relations with Taiwan; (4) implications of U.S. "legislative adjustments" regarding Taiwan; and (5) the meaning of U.S. giving Taiwan access to its markets for island's products "at present levels." HH adjourns session without further discussion.
November 15	Holbrooke - Han Xu	[Redacted]
November 18	Deng meets with Japanese Komeito Party delegation	Deng: "Sino-American relations can be normalized in two seconds"; expresses desire to visit the U.S.

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
November 19	NSC Staff Member Michel Oksenberg - Lian Zhengbao	Lian implies USG asked about possibility of leadership meetings at the end of the year; says they can be arranged. (G) (S)
November 28	Deng gives interview to columnists Evans and Novak published in the <i>Washington Post</i> on this date.	"Taiwan can maintain its own non-communist economic and social system under unification with the mainland"; "normalization [of U.S.-PRC relations] will do more for U.S. security than any number of SALT treaties with Moscow."
December 4	Acting Foreign Minister Han Nianlong - Woodcock (3:30 p.m.)	LW responds to HH's five questions of 11/2/78: the

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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Han [replies to the six LW presentations on normalization. As USG accepts principle of one China and Taiwan as part of the PRC [sic, but no use of term "province"] China is prepared for "early normalization of relations": (1) the U.S. owes China a debt on Taiwan; (2) a normalization statement should include explicit U.S. acceptance of China's three principles; (3) China cannot agree to an "interim period," a time limit should be set for resolving transitional matters; (4) all U.S.-Taiwan semiofficial and official links should be severed and declared null and void; (5) PRC "emphatically objects" to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, "why must it continue to arm the Chiang clique?"; and (6) the PRC will refrain from objecting to USG hopes for peaceful solution to Taiwan issue, but "the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country is wholly a Chinese internal affair" [redacted]

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[redacted] U.S.-PRC normalization should be approached from a long-term and strategic perspective; Han tables PRC draft communique, tells LW Deng wants to meet him at an early date.

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December 6	Vice Premier Geng Biao - Williams Congressional delegation
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Geng: "We hope we can do something good (for U.S.-PRC relations) in 1979"; Woodcock is doing a good job [in the normalization negotiations].

December 11	Brzezinski - Chai Zemin (3:57-4:47 p.m.)
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BM 230

ZB [reviews SALT, Middle East, Iran developments; USG wants to meet normalization target date of 1/1/79 and have Deng or Hua visit the U.S. in January; there could be a SALT agreement and Brezhnev summit in January; and the Soviets would give a visit "worldwide significance." Chai asks if a Deng visit is linked to SALT agreement.]

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
December 12	Deng - Woodcock (10:00-11:25 a.m.)	<p>LW reviews areas of understanding and unresolved issues in the normalization negotiations.</p> <p>Understandings: U.S. "acknowledges" one China and Taiwan a part of it [note: <i>not</i> a "province"!]. U.S.-ROC diplomatic relations will terminate when normalization announced, U.S. military personnel will be withdrawn in less than four months, and the defense treaty will be terminated by its own provisions [i.e., in one year]; as President Carter told Chai on 9/19/78, American people will maintain unofficial cultural, trade, and "other" relations with people of Taiwan [indirect reference to TAS]; U.S. will express its "expectation and confidence" that Taiwan issue will be solved peacefully, and China has agreed not to raise objections to such a USG statement. Issues to resolve: wording of a joint normalization communique, which U.S. proposes to issue on 1/1/79, including announcement of a senior PRC leader's visit; date for establishment of embassies, which USG proposes be no later than 3/1/79; terminal date for USG transition period in relations with Taiwan proposed for 12/31/79; date for visit to U.S. of senior Chinese leader. LW says USG cannot declare null and void all legal arrangements with Taiwan, but will say such post-normalization arrangements are non-governmental and do not imply recognition.</p>
		<p>Deng reviews draft joint communique tabled by LW; presses for inclusion of an "anti-hegemony" clause to give it greater impact and "world significance"; says he will agree to USG "termination" of defense treaty with ROC "by its own terms" if no explicit mention is made of Article 10 (one year's notice to terminate) and no new TAS made during 1979, "as it would imply the treaty still in force"; agrees to four-month period of military withdrawals from Taiwan; personally accepts Carter's invitation to visit the U.S. in 1/79.</p>

CM 198

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1984

1978

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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December 14	Deng - Woodcock (4:00 p.m.)	<p>[Deng <i>implicitly</i> accepts USG position that it cannot declare all legal arrangements with Taiwan null and void; agrees to establish diplomatic relations while U.S.-ROC defense treaty is still in force and U.S. troops are on the island; accepts U.S. communique language on the status of Taiwan; leaves vague his position on TAS after 1979 but agrees to normalize despite USG assertions they will continue.]</p>
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G1,95

December 14	Deng - Woodcock (9:00 p.m.)	<p>On instruction from ZB, LW proposes U.S. and PRC announce normalization agreement on 12/15/78 to prevent premature leaks and enable President Carter to personally make the announcement. Deng agrees, proposes 1/29/79 as a good date to begin his visit to U.S. [Note: no agreement yet reached on a joint normalization communique].</p>
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December 14	Holbrooke/Oksenberg - Cao Guisheng (10:35-10:50 p.m.)	<p>LW: The USG agrees not to conclude new TAS agreements in 1979, but will deliver arms already contracted for, and President Carter will so state on "if asked" basis. Deng: Can't the reference to arms deliveries in 1979 in the statement be deleted? Agreement reached on most other aspects of the joint communique and the two unilateral statements.</p>
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G1,95

December 15	Zhang Wenjin - Roy (11:00 a.m.)	<p>Cao inquires about possible Brezhnev visit in January and SALT signing; is told Brezhnev may come in mid-January; Vance is returning from Middle East and Carter attaches great importance to a state visit by PRC leader.</p>
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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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December 15	Deng - Woodcock (4:00-5:00 p.m.)	<p data-bbox="950 472 1015 588">61 95</p>
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December 15	Brzezinski - Chai Zemin (8:45-9:10 a.m.)	<p data-bbox="852 924 998 976">B M 231</p> <p data-bbox="1015 819 1591 1081">ZB says public discussion of TAS after normalization cannot be avoided; USG will state on an "if asked" basis that TAS will continue after normalization, that the PRC does not endorse the U.S. actions, but both sides have nevertheless agreed to normalize, Deng should be quickly informed of this position to avoid public U.S.-PRC controversy just after normalization is announced.</p>
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December 15	U.S. and PRC leaders issue joint and unilateral statements announcing establishment of diplomatic relations as of 1/1/79	(b)(1) (b)(3)
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December 18	Brzezinski - Chai Zemin (9:00-9:20 a.m.)	<p data-bbox="998 1386 1583 1554">Chai: The USG has the responsibility to protect "Chiang clique" property in the U.S. which now belongs to the PRC. ZB: This is a legal, not a political matter and should be raised with the State Department.</p>
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1979

1979

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
1979		
January 9	Deng - Senator Sam Nunn	Deng: While Taiwan will have to fly the PRC flag, it doesn't have to disarm to achieve reunification; China will use force against the island (1) if it indefinitely refuses to enter into negotiations, and (2) if the Soviet Union tries to interfere in Taiwan's affairs. In view of the growing Soviet military presence in Asia, the U.S. should strengthen its naval presence, and Japan should strengthen its self-defense forces. (<i>The New York Times</i> , 1/10/79.)
January 24	Deng interviewed by <i>Time</i> magazine (published 2/5/79)	Deng: "If we really want to be able to place curbs on the polar bear, the only realistic thing for us is to unite [with the U.S. and Japan]"; "we believe the normalization of [U.S.-PRC] relations will enable us to obtain much scientific and technological know-how"; "the continued sale of [U.S.] arms [Taiwan] is of no benefit to negotiations between us and the Taiwan authorities for peaceful reunification because then Chiang Ching-kuo will think he has nothing to fear."
January 28- February 5	Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in the U.S.	
January 28	Brzezinski - Deng	Dinner at Brzezinski's home.
January 29	Carter - Deng (10:40 a.m.-12:30 p.m.)	Deng: We are disappointed that the U.S., the main force of opposition to the Soviets, has not done enough against the Soviet danger. CM 204
January 29	Vance - Deng (12:45-2:00 p.m.)	Luncheon.
January 29	Carter - Deng (3:45-4:49 p.m.)	Deng: [If the U.S. really gave security assistance to Pakistan, then they would not have to develop a nuclear plant;] North Korea will not attack the South even if all U.S. troops are withdrawn; the North wants to talk to the U.S., to the Park government, and to all parties and organizations in the South; the Soviet Union is not increasing its influence in the North, the North trusts China, and we cannot have contact with the South (or it will weaken that trust). [Note: A small group meeting was held at the end of this session to discuss Vietnam. No memcon was taken.] G-1, a5 CM 206

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
January 30	Carter - Deng (9:40 a.m.)	Deng: Japan and the U.S. can make a real contribution by urging the Taiwan authorities to negotiate with us; don't make the Chiang clique feel it has nothing to fear (via U.S. arms sales) and thus prevent negotiations; we will be forced to consider non-peaceful means to deal with Taiwan if (1) over a long period of time the authorities refuse to talk with us, or (2) the Soviets get involved with Taiwan.
		CM 209
January 30	Blumenthal - Huang Hua (3:00 p.m.)	Discussion of specific solutions for resolving the private claims/assets issue.] G, 95
January 31	Cabinet - Deng (8:00-9:00 a.m.)	Deng: If we get MFN status, China's trade with the U.S. should surpass our trade with Japan, U.S.-PRC trade should be ten times greater than U.S. trade with Taiwan; we want your most up-to-date technology; not even that of early 1970s, do you understand?!] G, 9
January 31	Blumenthal - Huang Hua (1:30 p.m.)	Further discussion of the claims/assets issue.] G, 9
February 15	PRC message to USG on "teaching Vietnam a lesson."	BM 411/12
February 24-March 4	Secretary of Treasury Michael Blumenthal in the PRC	
February 26-March 2	Minister of Metallurgical Industries Tang Ke in the U.S.	
May 3	Carter - Chai Zemin	
May 4-15	Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps in the PRC	
May 29	Huang Hua - Ambassador Robert Strauss (a.m.)	Middle East, Southeast Asia] G, 95
May 30	Deng - Strauss (a.m.)	
May 28-June 10	Vice Premier in charge of State Economic Commission Kang Shein in the U.S.	
June	Brzezinski - Chai Zemin	ZB proposes U.S. warship calls at PRC ports. BM 421

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1979

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
June 22-30	Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph Califano in the PRC	
July 10-14	Minister of Finance Zhang Jingfu in the U.S.	
August 25- September 1	Vice President Walter Mondale in the PRC	
August 27	Deng - Mondale (9:30 a.m.-12:10 p.m.)	<p>Trade agreement; MFN; credits. Deng: Don't link Ex-Im Bank loans to PRC repayment of a KMT-era debt. If you overstep certain bounds in your dealings with the island [Taiwan] it will arouse public opinion here. We will support Pol Pot as he has the only forces capable of resisting the Vietnamese in Cambodia until Vietnam's difficulties become unbearable, then a political solution must include a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and Hanoi giving up its dream of an Indochina Federation.</p>
August 27	Fang Yi - Mondale (luncheon)	
August 28	Deng - Mondale (9:30-12:00 noon)	<p>Deng: The Soviet presence in Vietnam is a regional and global problem more than a threat to China; Moscow's strategy is like a "barbell" with the Malacca Straits linking Indochina and the Middle East; the U.S. and China should coordinate support for the Cambodian resistance forces to form a coalition headed by Sihanouk based on patriotism, democracy, and nonalignment; regarding Korea, the U.S. should deal directly with the North and leave aside, for now, tripartite talks (including the South); regarding Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, they feel justified in pursuing this because of India's atomic explosion; they are not yet near to exploding a nuclear device; China is not helping them.</p>
August 28	Hua Guofeng - Mondale (3:30-5:30 p.m.)	
September 15-October 5	Minister of Agriculture Machinery Yang Ligong in the U.S.	
October 22- November 1	Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang in the U.S.	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
1980	Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in the PRC	
January 6	Vice Premier Geng Biao - Brown	[Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
January 6	Liu Huaqing - Assistant Secretary of Defense for Development, Research and Engineering Gerald Dinneen/ Director of U.S. Arms Control Agency George M. Seignious (5:00-6:30 p.m.)	Dinneen: The U.S. will consider sales of advanced technology it would <i>not</i> sell the Soviets, but we need "end use" information to deal with COCOM controls; start with proven technology (not the most advanced). Seignious proposes a "hot line" communication link for crisis communications. Liu complains that to date not one export license for advanced technology has been issued; isn't the U.S. treating China like the Soviet Union? 7
January 7	Geng Biao - Brown (9:00-11:45 a.m.)	Geng: Factors for war are increasing; the PRC, U.S., Japan, and Western Europe should coordinate their policies; the U.S., by putting pressures on OPEC, will give the Soviets opportunities for influence in the Third World; the Soviets want to improve relations with China on the basis of an "empty document" (non-aggression treaty); China insists the Soviets (1) lower troop levels on the Sino-Soviet frontier to the 1964 level; (2) withdraw troops from Mongolia; (3) stop support for the Vietnamese in Cambodia; and (4) negotiate the Sino-Soviet border dispute on the basis of the status quo; U.S. overflights of China to supply aid to Pakistan can easily occur if the aid the U.S. gives Pakistan is substantial; U.S. arms sales to Taiwan should be restrained to bring about an early return of the island to the motherland; if the U.S. sustains TAS, China will have to fight a war for reunification. BM 424 7 98
January 7	Huang Hua - Brown (12:30-3:00 p.m.)	HH: Soviet "barbell" strategy links their actions in Afghanistan and the Middle East with Indochina; China will support a united front resistance in Cambodia headed by Sihanouk <i>only</i> if the Pol Pot forces are included; the time is not yet ripe for a political solution. 7 6-1, 95
January 7	Geng Biao - Brown (4:00 p.m.)	Geng presses for early action on MFN for China, wants China treated differently than the Soviets on export controls. 7 6-1, 95

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1980

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
January 8	Zhang Aiping - Brown (8:00 a.m.)	
January 8	Chai Chengwen - Assistant Secretary of Defense David McGiffert (8:00 a.m.)	[Future U.S.-PRC military exchanges.] 6,1,95
January 8	Deng - Brown (10:00 a.m.)	[Deng: We all should unite to oppose the Soviets, whose strategic focus is still on Europe; the lack of an effective U.S. response to the Soviets has enabled Moscow to link its actions in the Far East and South Asia to its Europe-oriented efforts in the Middle East; we should turn Afghanistan into a quagmire for the Soviets; the U.S. should be more forthcoming on technology transfers to China, but I won't ask again for F-15s or F-16s. Brown: We want China's support of U.N. sanctions against Iran. Deng: This will only increase Soviet influence among the Islamic states.] 6,1,95
January 8	Liu Huaqing - Dinneen (3:00 p.m.)	[Liu: China needs advanced technology from abroad, cannot afford to equip itself with foreign goods. Dinneen: It is easier to sell equipment than to transfer technology.] 6,1,95
January 8	Wu Xiuquan - Komer (3:00 p.m.)	[Discussion of global and regional U.S.-Soviet military balances.] 6,1,95
January 8	Zhang Wenjin - Seignious	[Discussion of arms control issues.] 6,1,95
January 9	Hua Guofeng - Brown (5:00-6:50 p.m.)	[Global situation, leadership exchanges, Iran sanctions, technology transfers, U.S. aid to Pakistan.] 6,1,95
January 9	Liu Huaqing - Dinneen (3:30 p.m.)	[Dinneen: The U.S. will sell technology, not weapons to China. Liu gives a list of desired technologies and scientific exchanges.] 6,1,95
February 20- 24	Presidential Science Adviser Frank Press in the PRC	
March 17-23	Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin in Washington	
March 17	Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher - Zhang Wenjin	[Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Indochina.] 6,1,95

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
March 19	Holbrooke - Zhang Wenjin (10:00 a.m.)	European INF, Japan, Yugoslavia, Korea] 6/95
March 19	Mondale - Zhang Wenjin (11:00 a.m.)	Mondale expresses frustration with slowness in concluding agreements on civil aviation, maritime relations, textiles, etc. (1) 95
March 19	Holbrooke - Zhang Wenjin (2:25 p.m.)	Discussion of civil aviation, maritime agreements. Zhang accepts U.S. position of multiple carriers as basis for negotiation, says PRC itself is responsible for bureaucratic delays. 6/95
March 19	Vance - Zhang Wenjin (3:30 p.m.)	Middle East, Indochina.] 6/95
April 24-May 18	Minister of Forestry Luo Yuchu in the U.S.	
May 25-June 6	Vice Premier (and Defense Minister) Geng Biao in the U.S.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
May 25	Brown - Geng Biao	[Redacted] 6/95
May 26	Brown - Geng Biao	Geng: We want to further military exchanges with the U.S.; we must take coordinated and parallel actions together; China can play a role in containing a large Soviet force (in the Far East); Sino-Soviet relations will never improve. Brown reviews U.S. defense programs, technology transfer actions where the U.S. is prepared to help the PRC strengthen its defenses. Geng says China is prepared to "help" the U.S. with the sale of rare earth metals. 6/95
May 27	Brown - Geng Biao (9:00 a.m.)	Geng gives a comprehensive PRC assessment of Soviet strategy which is based on a "blind faith in military power"; urges the U.S. and China to cooperate in countering Moscow's "southward thrusting strategy"; the first line of defense should be Afghanistan and the anti-Vietnamese resistance in Cambodia; as China's power is limited, the U.S. will play the predominant role in countering the USSR. 6/95

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1980

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ May 27	DIA Director Eugene Tighe - Chai Chengwen	Chai gives maps on Soviet troop dispositions Far East and Vietnam.] 61,95
✓ May 27	Dinneen - Liu Huaqing (4:30-6:30 p.m.)	Discussion of the U.S. military R&D process Pentagon controls over R&D and procurement.] 61,95
May 28	Congressional leaders - Geng Biao (breakfast)	
May 28	Secretary of State Muskie - Geng Biao (luncheon)	Geng gives a detailed review of the history of Soviet relations, why the alliance broke down depth of the split.] 61,95
✓ May 28	Carter - Geng Biao (1:45-2:15 p.m.)	Geng: Premier Hua won't be able to visit the U.S. the fall due to a "tight schedule"; the U.S. and should work in parallel to counter the Soviets.] 61,95
✓ May 28	Muskie - Geng Biao (2:30-3:45 p.m.)	Geng: expresses concern for the stability of South Korea; regarding Indochina, the time is not ripe for a political solution, the U.S. should not recognize the SRV, and in time should support the Pol Pot resistance forces as the only effective fighting force.] 61,95
✓ May 29	McGiffert - Chai Chengwen (8:00-9:30 a.m.)	Chai facilitates U.S.-PRC military exchanges.] 61,95
✓ May 29	Brzezinski - Geng Biao (10:05-11:15 a.m.)	ZB urges U.S.-PRC exchanges on Afghanistan and with the Europeans, on the Soviet military threat. Geng presses for U.S. assistance to the Pol Pot resistance in Cambodia.] 61,95
✓ May 29	Brown - Geng Biao (2:00-4:00 p.m.)	Review of Geng's visit, especially technology transfer issues, military equipment sales, and exchange visits. Geng presses for U.S. assistance in remodeling its high-speed fighter aircraft; notes Under Secretary of Defense William Perry/Dinneen, Chairman JCS, CINCPAC, visits to China; PRC is prepared to sell the U.S. rare earth metals. Brown reviews technology and military transfer policies and actions on the PRC: the USG will sell dual-use technology to China that it will not sell to the USSR but not weapons; China is now in a new export control category.] 61,95

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
May 29	Dinneen - Liu Huaqing, in San Diego (3:30 p.m.)	Farewell discussion; early planning for Perry-Dinneen visit to the PRC; sale of PRC rare earth metals to the U.S. 61,45 -
June 5	CINCPAC Admiral Robert Long - Geng Biao, in Honolulu	Geng assesses the U.S.-Soviet naval balance. 61,45
June 4-20	Minister of Education Jiang Nanxiang in the U.S.	
June 5-26	Minister of Agriculture Huo Shilian in the U.S.	
July 10	Carter - Hua Guofeng, in Tokyo	Meeting occurs while both are in Japan for the funeral of Prime Minister Ohira.
August 21	Huang Hua - Vice Presidential candidate George Bush (11:00 a.m.)	HH, before the press, says any contentious remark that retrogress U.S.-PRC relations harm the interests of the Chinese and American people. Bush defends Presidential candidate Reagan's foreign policy platform, says Reagan supports the TRA but not reestablishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan or two-China policy. HH presses for clarification of Reagan's statement on "official relations with Taiwan"; attacks the TRA as an inappropriate basis for U.S.-PRC relations, which would lead to "retrogression"; urges PRC cooperation in opposition to Soviet "hegemony" around the world; the U.S. needs China and not vice versa. 61,45
August 22	Deng - Bush (10:00 a.m.)	

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1980-81

1981

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ August 25	Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan's China policy statement released to the press	"I would not pretend . . . that the relationship we now have with Taiwan . . . is not official." "U.S. relations with Taiwan will develop in accordance with the law of our land, the Taiwan Relations Act."
August 31- September 28	Vice Premier Bo Yibo in the U.S.	MFN/trade agreement
September 6- 19	Defense Department delegation led by Under Secretary William Perry in the PRC	
October 2-18	Minister of Posts and Telecommunication Wang Zigang in the U.S.	
October 17-22	U.S. Trade Representative Ruben Askew in the PRC	
November 21- December 16	Minister of Fifth Ministry of Machine Building Zhang Zhen in the U.S.	
November 22	Zhang Wenjin interview in the <i>Washington Post</i>	"Zhang said that any arms deliveries at all [to Taiwan] violated the normalization agreement." "He said that the United States had told Peking that the problem of arms deliveries to Taiwan would disappear with the passage of time."
November 15- 19	Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall in the PRC	
1981 January 20	Zhao Ziyang sends letters to newly inaugurated President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush	[Redacted]
February 20	Secretary of State Alexander Haig - Ambassador Chai Zemin	
✓ March 11	NSC Staff James Lilley - Ji Chaozhu	[Redacted]

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
March 14	National Security Adviser Richard Allen - Chai Zemin/ Ji Chaozhu	The Chinese say the PRC press has been instructed not to criticize President Reagan personally; the U.S. and China should unite to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan; [redacted]
March 14	Bush - Chai Zemin/Ji Chaozhu	[redacted]
March 19	Reagan - Chai Zemin/Ji Chaozhu	Chai urges U.S.-PRC consultations regarding the Soviet Union; asks that Haig visit China soon and Reagan too; [redacted]
March 26	Deng - Former President Gerald R. Ford	[redacted]
May 28	National Security Advisor Richard Allen/Michael Deaver dinner with Chai Zemin	(b)(1) (b)(3)
June 3	Haig - Chai Zemin	Haig briefs on agenda for his forthcoming trip to Beijing: the need for improved U.S.-PRC policy coordination based on a strategic dialogue; he expects Reagan to be more forthcoming than his predecessors on technology and arms sales; Taiwan must not become an insurmountable problem in the relationship.

HM 144-21

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1981

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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June 14-16	SecState Alexander Haig in China	
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June 14	Huang Hua - Haig (4:30-6:30 p.m.)	<p>Haig briefs on the "four pillars" of U.S. foreign policy. HH asks for "clarification" of U.S. policy for dealing with its allies; says the U.S. sends confusing signals on its approach to dealing with the Soviets, lacks a strategy of consistent counterpressures for constraining Moscow; discusses prospects for Soviet intervention in Poland and the need for firm countermeasures by the U.S.</p>
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June 15	Huang Hua - Haig (morning)	<p>Haig: USG will treat PRC as a friendly nonaligned country in terms of technology transfers, will put it in a different export control category than Soviets, suspend the prohibition on arms sales; PLA Vice Chief of Staff Liu Huaqing is invited to the U.S.</p>
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HM 207/P

[redacted]

[redacted] U.S. is interested in China's nuclear power program but needs assurances against proliferation. HH: U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation cannot proceed without an understanding on TAS, which infringe on PRC sovereignty and are a "grave threat" to development of U.S.-PRC relations: [redacted]

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[redacted]

61, 95 (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted] the U.S. and China should bog down the Soviets in Afghanistan and Cambodia; a coalition government and non-communist military forces should be created in Cambodia.

June 15	Geng Biao - Haig (4:45-6:30 p.m.)	<p>Haig describes U.S. defense modernization plans and military assistance programs; SecDef Weinberger hopes to visit the PRC; the USG will consider sales of military equipment and weaponry to China on a case-by-case basis. Geng complains that of a list of technology items given to SecDef Brown in 1980 only two were licensed; the PRC leadership has agreed that General Liu Huaqing will visit the U.S.; China is anxious to engage in co-production of military equipment with the U.S.; the U.S. should strengthen China so it poses a greater threat to the Soviets.</p>
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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ June 15	Deng - Haig (10:15 a.m.-12:10 p.m.)	<p>Haig invites Prime Minister Zhao to the U.S. Deng focuses discussion on "the cloud" over U.S.-PRC relations and the possibility of retrogression; problems in the relationship are USG blocking of technology sales, no action on the Mondale \$2 billion economic credit, Taiwan arms sales, Reagan's daughter's visit to Taiwan, and increases in the island's representation in the U.S. This is a particularly sensitive moment on the Taiwan issue, if we don't handle it well we will not be able to face the Chinese people.</p> <p>HM 20617</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 100px; width: 100%;"></div>
✓ June 16	Zhao Ziyang - Haig (3:30-5:00 p.m.)	<p>Haig delivers Reagan's letter inviting Zhao to the U.S. Zhao discusses PRC domestic policies in order to emphasize stability of the leadership and continuity of openness to the West; says Pakistan hopes the U.S. will supply weapons from its own arsenal if anything "unexpected" happens.</p> <p>6/14/81</p>
✓ Early July	Defense Attache General William Webb	<p>Webb is asked about USG willingness to supply China with TOW, HAWK, torpedos as basis for planning Liu Huaqing's visit.</p> <p>6/19/81</p>
✓ July 4	PRC Foreign Ministry oral demarche to U.S. Embassy	<p>PRC warns of "strong reaction" and "grave consequences" in response to any TAS.</p> <p>HM 20617</p>
✓ July 15	Zhang Wenjin - Roy	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 70px; width: 100%;"></div> <p>(b)(1) (b)(3) 6/19/81</p>
July 30	Zhao Ziyang letter to Reagan	<p>Letter, transmitted by HH to Haig on 8/2/81, replies to Reagan letter of 7/4/81: expresses satisfaction with Haig June 1981 visit; urges U.S.-PRC coordination of actions regarding the Soviets, with "each proceeding from its own position"; says development of bilateral relations is of "prime importance," but must be based on "strict abiding" by principles of the relationship and cautious handling of differences; accepts invitation to visit the U.S. at an unspecified time.</p> <p>6/19/81</p>

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ August 2	Haig - Huang Hua, in Cancun, Mexico	HH urges USG "prudence" in handling bilateral U.S.- PRC issues; proposes exchanges by NPC delegation, S&T Commission, Joint Economic Committee; requests information on "practical steps" the USG will take during projected Liu Huaqing visit.
✓ August 13	Zhang Wenjin - Charles Freeman	
✓ September 3	Scott Halford - Cao Guisheng	
✓ September 9	Zhang Wenjin - Freeman	
✓ September 20	Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge - Zhang Wenjin, in New York City	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ September 22	Haig - Zhang Wenjin, in New York City (5:00 p.m.)	(b)(1) (b)(3)
	HM 205	
September 30	Marshal Ye Jianying issues nine-point public program for Taiwan reunification	
October 2	Allen - Chai Zemin	
✓ October 3	Deputy SecState William Clark - Zhang Wenjin (8:35-9:25 a.m.)	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ October 21	Reagan - Zhao Ziyang, in Cancun, Mexico (12:48-1:58 p.m.)	Zhao: The PRC wants a long-term strategic relationship with the U.S. to counter the "Polar Bear" but U.S. TAS cast a shadow over development of the relationship; we have made a generous proposal to Taiwan in Ye Jianguing's nine points; they can retain their social system, economic and cultural relations with foreign countries, their property system and troops, leaders on the island can take up national posts, and we propose CCP-KMT negotiations on an equal basis; U.S. TAS interferes in China's internal affairs and discourages Chiang Ching-kuo from negotiating; the Soviets have designs on Taiwan, and reunification is important to the struggle against hegemony; Huang Hua will raise two important points with you via Haig.
✓ October 23	Haig - Huang Hua, in Cancun (8:00 p.m.)	HH, on behalf of Zhao, raises two specific points on TAS: the USG should (1) "give clear assurances that within a specified period of time the level of arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed that of the Carter Administration in both quality and quantity," and (2) in the same time period "arms sales will be reduced year-by-year and completely stop in the end"; he hopes to have a USG response when he comes to Washington in a few days. Haig: The U.S. has never wavered in its obligation to provide defensive arms to Taiwan; the PRC is now complicating the relationship by changing long-standing mutual understandings and putting pressures on the USG. HH: The PRC position is consistent with its past statements on TAS, especially Deng's remark to Woodcock on 12/15/78 that this issue had to be discussed and settled after the establishment of diplomatic relations.
✓ October 29	Haig - Huang Hua (10:00 a.m.)	Amid mutual warnings about the seriousness of how each side handles the TAS issue, Haig says the President (1) cannot accept a certain or fixed time frame for ending TAS, but (2)

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ October 29	Reagan - Huang Hua	<p>HH observes U.S.-PRC relations are "at a critical juncture" and can either advance or retrogress; Ye Jiangying's nine-point reunification proposal can be used to solve the Taiwan and TAS issues in a way favorable to the strategic U.S.-PRC relationship; he increases PRC conditions for dealing with TAS by saying (1) the issue needs "in depth discussions" to be resolved [i.e., negotiations], and (2) if the USG unilaterally sells arms to Taiwan while talks are in progress, China is "bound to act strongly and relations will stagnate or retrogress."</p>
✓ October 29	Weinberger - Huang Hua	<p>HH presses the SecDef to remove the "big obstacle" in U.S.-PRC relations.</p>
✓ October 29	Stoessel - Huang Hua (4:15-5:30 p.m.)	<p>Discussion of Europe, Soviet, INF issues.</p>
P October 30	Casey - Huang Hua (breakfast)	<p>(b)(1) (b)(3)</p>
✓ October 30	Haig - Huang Hua (2:00-5:00 p.m.)	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 390px; width: 100%;"></div>

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
November (early)	Ji Chaozhu - Holbrooke	[Redacted] b1, a5 (b)(1) (b)(3)
November 4	Ji Chaozhu - Freeman	[Redacted] b1, a5 (b)(1) (b)(3)
November 16-19	Secretary of Treasury Donald Regan in the PRC	
November 19	Deng - Regan	[Redacted] b1, a5 (b)(1) (b)(3)
November 20	Zhang Wenjin - Former Vice President Walter Mondale	[Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)-
		[Redacted] the PRC has gotten little advanced technology from the U.S. because of its export controls, and few Chinese see any benefits for China's modernization in a relationship with the U.S. b1, a5
November 22	Deng - Mondale	Deng: [Redacted] [Redacted] the U.S. has never sold China any advanced technology and seems to look at the PRC as a hostile force, not a partner. b1, a5 (b)(1) (b)(3)
December 4	Zhang Wenjin - Hummel	Hummel initiates negotiation of TAS issue at Vice Foreign Minister level [thus accepting HH's proposal of 10/30/81]; [Redacted] b1, a5 (b)(1) (b)(3)

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ December 11	Han Xu - Hummel	Hummel notifies the PRC of USG sale of military spare parts to Taiwan. <i>HM 2/11</i>
✓ December 14	Zhang Wenjin - Hummel	Zhang, in "urgent" notification to USG, asserts that if the U.S. proceeds to sell Taiwan spare parts, as notified on 12/11/81, "the Chinese side will have no alternative but to react strongly." <i>HM 2/11</i>
✓ December 15	Clark/Holdridge - Chai Zemin (10:00 a.m.)	Chai: The military spare parts sale to Taiwan shows the USG doesn't hesitate to let the U.S.-PRC relationship "suffer damage"; if the sale goes forward the PRC will "react strongly"; <i>HM 2/11</i>
	(b)(1) (b)(3)	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 50px; width: 100%;"></div>
		<i>HM 2/11</i> Clark/Holdridge: The spare parts sale has been in the pipeline for some time; the President never accepted HH's ultimatum for cessation of all TAS while talks are in progress; the sale is spare parts, not weapons;
		<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 270px; width: 100%;"></div>
December 22	Zhang Wenjin - Hummel (b)(1) (b)(3)	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments	
✓ December 25	Zhang Wenjin - Hummel		(b)(1) (b)(3) b1, a5
✓ 1982 January 8	Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shoesmith - PRC Embassy Officer Lin Zhaonan		(b)(1) (b)(3) b1, a5
✓ January 11	Zhang Wenjin - Holdridge (morning)	Holdridge: Reagan administration is first to negotiate with the PRC on TAS issues; the President has decided not to sell the F-X (F-5G or F-16/79) or an upgraded F-5E to Taiwan, but only to extend coproduction of F-5Es to replace worn out models and to sell used F-104s.	(b)(1) (b)(3) b1, a5
			b1, a5

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
January 11	Zhang Wenjin - Holdridge (afternoon)	
✓ January 12	Zhang Wenjin - Holdridge (p.m.)	
January 13	Han Xu - Robert Blackwill, Deputy Director, Politico- Military Affairs, State Department	Discussion of Polish crisis. 61,95 ✓
✓ January 13	Vice Premier Ji Pengfei/ Zhang Wenjin - Holdridge	
✓ January 22	PRC Foreign Ministry gives U.S. Embassy in Beijing a draft communique on TAS issue	(b)(1) (b)(3)

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ January 25	Zhang Wenjin - Hummel	
✓ February 1	Han Xu - Hummel	
✓ February 3	Zhang Wenjin - Hummel	
February 5	MFA Officials - U.S. Embassy Officers' luncheon	
February 6	Ji Chaozhu - U.S. Embassy Officer (luncheon)	
February 15	Zhang Wenjin - Hummel	

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ February 25	Deng - Moroccan Prime Minister Bonabid	
February 28	President Reagan and PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang exchange public letters marking 10th anniversary of SC	(b)(1) (b)(3)
✓ March 2	<i>Xin Hua</i> "Commentary" on TAS issue	Hint of flexibility on time duration of TAS. (b)(1) (b)(3)
✓ March 2	Ji Chaozhu - U.S. Embassy Office	
✓ March 18	Pu Shouchang - Hummel	
✓ March 22	Zhang Zai - Freeman	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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April (early)	Politburo member and Overseas Chinese Commission Director Liao Chengzhi - U.S. citizen	
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✓ April 5	Haig/Holdridge - Chai Zemin
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Haig delivers Reagan letters to Zhao and Deng offering to send Bush to China to discuss TAS; Holdridge informs Chai of impending notification of Congress of spare parts sale to Taiwan. Chai presses for public commitment to no further sales while negotiations are in progress.

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✓ April 5	PRC Ministry of Defense informs U.S. Embassy that visit to China by Secretary of Defense Weinberger is postponed indefinitely because of TAS issue
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✓ April 6	Deng - Former British Prime Minister Edward Heath
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

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April 6	<i>People's Daily</i> publishes "Commentary" on U.S.-PRC relations
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"The U.S. must not raise any conditions for ceasing its arms sales to Taiwan"; "China can never tolerate the condition whereby the U.S. continues its arms sales to Taiwan without a time limit."

April 13	USG formally notifies Congress of sale of military-related spare parts to Taiwan
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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
April 14	PRC Foreign Ministry statement to the press on the USG sale of military spare parts to Taiwan	"... the U.S. [gave the PRC assurances it] would not consider military transfers to Taiwan while the two sides were continuing their bilateral discussions" regarding settling the TAS question. (b)(1) (b)(3)
✓ April 14	Zhang Wenjin - Hummel	
✓ April 17	Zhang Wenjin - Freeman	Zhang: PRC welcomes Bush visit "in the near future" to discuss "serious threat" to U.S.-PRC relations
✓ April 20	Zhu Qizhen - Freeman	
✓ April 24	Zhang Zai - Freeman (luncheon)	
✓ April 26	Zhang Wenjin - Hummel	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ April 28	Zhang Zai - Freeman (luncheon)	[Redacted]
✓ April 29	Zhao Ziyang letter to Ronald Reagan	In reply to Reagan letter of 4/6/82, Zhao accepts USG suggestion of Bush visit
✓ May 2	<i>People's Daily</i> Commentary, "He Who Ties the Knot Should Untie It"	"There still exists a crisis of (U.S.-PRC) relations." "Washington's arms sales to Taiwan constitute an encroachment upon China's sovereignty and interference in its internal affairs. China will in no case tolerate a long continuation of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan."
May 5-9	Vice President Bush in the PRC	
✓ May 6	Zhu Qizhen - Freeman	[Redacted]
✓ May 6	Shoesmith - Lin Zhaonan	[Redacted]
✓ May 7	Huang Hua - Bush	[Redacted]

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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✓ May 8

Deng - Bush

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Bush defends the President's commitment to U.S.-PRC relationship and to the principles of the SC and normalization agreement. Deng notes the 1980 meeting with Bush may have been offensive, but China had to express its position candidly; U.S. has two erroneous views of China—that it is an insignificant power and that as it needs the U.S. for protection against the Soviets it will "swallow" any U.S. actions regarding Taiwan; the TRA "deeply hurt" China's sense of sovereignty, and the President has discretion in how it is carried out; U.S.-PRC relations are at a crisis point as the USG seems to want to split Taiwan from China; many actions of the U.S. have embarrassed China, such as the President's daughter visiting Taiwan; he concedes the USG did not agree to end all TAS while negotiations are in progress

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May 8

Zhao Ziyang - Bush

Zhao, in the presence of the press, says he hopes the USG will respond soon to PRC views on TAS as expressed by Deng earlier in the day.

✓ May 8

Han Xu - Hummel/Holdridge

Han tables the first concrete PRC drafting suggestions on a communique since January 22;

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
June 1	Secretary of State Haig announces his resignation; George P. Shultz named as new Secretary of State .	
✓ June 1	Deng - Senator Howard Baker	[Redacted]
		invites Senator Goldwater to visit the PRC.
✓ June 8	Han Xu/Wang Li - Freeman	[Redacted]
✓ June 15	USIA Director Charles Wick - Chai Zemin	[Redacted]
✓ June 17	Zhang Zai - Freeman	[Redacted]
July 13	Deng - Hummel (10:00-11:00 a.m.)	[Redacted]

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ July 14	(b)(1) (b)(3)	
	L Liao Chengzhi - U.S. citizen (a.m.)	
	(b)(1) (b)(3)	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ July 17	Huang Hua - Hummel (11:00 a.m.)	
✓ July 17	Han Xu - Hummel (3:30 p.m.)	
✓ July 20	Zhang Wenpu - U.S. Embassy Officer	
✓ July 23	Han Xu - Hummel (3:00 p.m.)	
✓ July 31	Han Xu - Hummel (2:15 p.m.)	
P August 6	Deng - Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Frazier	

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(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ August 7	Han Xu - Hummel (2:00-3:00 p.m.)	
✓ August 9	Han Xu - Hummel	
✓ August 10	Han Xu - Hummel (8:45 a.m.)	
✓ August 11	Han Xu - Hummel	
✓ August 12	Han Xu - Hummel	
✓ August 13	Han Xu - Hummel	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ August 14	Han Xu - Hummel	<p>Negotiations over a joint communique on TAS deadlock over three issues: linkage between U.S. TAS and PRC sovereignty; U.S.-PRC periodic consultations over TAS; and linkage between U.S. TAS and PRC policy of peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Han urges Hummel to come up with new proposals; Hummel counters that it is necessary to conclude the negotiation so that the USG can begin Congressional consultations on the agreement (and on notification of the F-5E coproduction extension). Han reads a statement that if USG proceeds to notify Congress on F-5E coproduction before agreement is reached, the PRC will be compelled to react strongly. Hummel notes 8/19/82 is the "final date" for notification and the issue cannot be further postponed.</p>
✓ August 14	Vice Premier Wan Li - HUD Secretary Samuel Pierce (afternoon)	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100%; height: 100%;"></div>
✓ August 15	Han Xu - Hummel (afternoon)	
✓ August 16	Han Xu - Hummel (10:00 a.m.)	

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ August 17	Deng - Hummel (11:00 a.m.)	<div style="text-align: right;">(b)(1) (b)(3)</div>
August 17	U.S.-PRC joint communique on TAS issued in Washington and Beijing	
1983 February 2-5	Secretary of State George Shultz in the PRC	Agreement to have SecState Shultz and Premier Zhao exchange visits.
✓ February 2	Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian - Shultz (3:30-6:00 p.m.)	Shultz: Four problems inhibit U.S. goals of peaceful and stable world: (1) global recession, (2) underdevelopment, (3) regional conflicts which Soviets exacerbate, and (4) Moscow's military expansionism. Wu: PRC pursues independent foreign policy, will not be a "card," yet does not seek "equidistance." Three major aggravating events in 1982 were (1) Israel's invasion of Lebanon, (2) delay in Namibia's independence, and (3) Malvinas war. U.S. policy encourages Israeli aggression. China seeks negotiated resolution of Iran-Iraq war, is neutral. Wu presents Nyerere proposal for withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from Namibia.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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February 3	Wu - Shultz (9:00 a.m.)	<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 380px; width: 100%;"></div>
February 3	Wu - Shultz (afternoon)	

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b1, a5

Wu: In wake of August 17, 1982 joint communique there is great potential for development of U.S.-PRC relations; yet obstacles remain

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

b1, a5

February 3	Fang Yi - Shultz (afternoon)	Discussion of technology transfer issues, U.S.-PRC space cooperation, lack of access for U.S. scholars in the PRC.
February 4	Defense Minister Zhang Aiping - Shultz (9:15 a.m.)	Agreement to establish a working-level meeting to discuss U.S.-PRC defense cooperation; expression of interest by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in visiting China.

b1, a5

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ February 4	Zhao Ziyang - Shultz	[Redacted]
✓ February 4	Finance Minister Wang Bingquan - Shultz	[Discussion of China's economic reforms, impediments to U.S.-PRC trade.] b1, a5
February 4	Prince Sihanouk - Shultz	[Sihanouk describes situation in Cambodia, asks for U.S. support.] b1, a5
✓ February 5	Deng Xiaoping - Shultz (b)(1) (b)(3)	[Deng: The U.S. can expect continuity in the PRC's policy toward America, but trust must be developed in the relationship; [Redacted] Discussion of exchange of leadership visits [Redacted]]
May 9-12	Presidential Science Adviser George A. Keyworth in the PRC	[Redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
✓ May 9-12	Fang Yi, Chairman of the State Commission on Science and Technology (with Keyworth)	[Discussion of technology transfer and science cooperation issues. Fang Yi: [Redacted] the shift in export control category for China from Y to P has not produced any significant change.] b1, a5
May 21-26	Secretary of Commerce Malcom Baldrige in the PRC	[Baldrige conveys shift in China's export control categorization from P to V; says dual-use items will still require COCOM review.] b1, a5
September 25-29	Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in the PRC	[Redacted]

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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September 26	Defense Minister Zhang Aiping - Weinberger (morning)	<p data-bbox="771 357 1339 430">Weinberger gives overview of Soviet military threat U.S. response. Zhang: [redacted]</p> <p data-bbox="738 420 1372 577">[redacted]</p>
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Weinberger gives overview of Soviet military threat U.S. response. Zhang: [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] proposes a "framework for military and technical cooperation." Weinberger outlines new technology transfer guidelines, points out negative impact of Chinese equation of U.S. with Soviets, PRC abstention in U.N. Security Council of censure of USSR for shooting down Korean airlines

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[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

✓ September 27	Zhao - Weinberger	<p data-bbox="771 850 1339 1018">Discussion of exchange of Zhao, Reagan visits. Zhao urges setting of date and early announcement of his visit to U.S. in early 1984; says U.S. policy on technology transfers is a barometer of trust in the relationship [redacted]</p> <p data-bbox="738 1018 1372 1512">[redacted]</p>
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Discussion of exchange of Zhao, Reagan visits. Zhao urges setting of date and early announcement of his visit to U.S. in early 1984; says U.S. policy on technology transfers is a barometer of trust in the relationship [redacted]

[redacted]

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✓ September 28	Deng Xiaoping - Weinberger (morning)	<p data-bbox="771 1522 1339 1690">Deng expresses pleasure at forthcoming exchange of Zhao/Reagan visits; asks Weinberger to help resolve outstanding problems in the relationship so as to enable both countries to deal better with the common threat [redacted]</p> <p data-bbox="738 1690 1372 1942">[redacted]</p>
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Deng expresses pleasure at forthcoming exchange of Zhao/Reagan visits; asks Weinberger to help resolve outstanding problems in the relationship so as to enable both countries to deal better with the common threat [redacted]

[redacted]

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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Deng says PRC can't agree to site visit provision of letter of understanding on retransfers of U.S. technology sold to China; Weinberger says this requirement is outmoded and will not apply to China; Weinberger says PRC should establish an office in Washington to deal with this issue, the U.S. is prepared to help China with antitank and air-defense munitions.

Deng expresses support for North Korean reunification proposal, asserts North has neither the intention nor the capability to attack South; South has 100 percent advantage over North in men and equipment and if it attacks North, China will not be able to stay out. U.S. and China should help promote peaceful reunification and get both Koreas to accept confederation. [Note: Deng's comments about Korea occur a few days before the North Korean bombing of South Korean leaders in Rangoon!]

6-1, 95

1984

January 10-16

PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang in the U.S.

✓ January 10

Reagan - Zhao (10:00 a.m.)



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(b)(3)

6-1, 95

✓ January 10

Shultz - Zhao



(b)(1)
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ADB membership. COCOM controls over exports to PRC should be eliminated, as well as U.S. discriminatory legislation barring low-interest loans. China wants to buy a "centrifuge isotope separator."

6-1, 95

✓ January 11

Shultz - Wu Xueqian

Wu: Korea. On Sino-Soviet talks, PRC doesn't believe Moscow wants to remove the "three obstacles"; there will be some trade and exchange growth of Sino-Soviet relations, but no "full normalization." Hong Kong. Nuclear cooperation.

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Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
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April 26-May 1	President Reagan in the PRC	
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
April 26	PRC President Li Xiannian - Reagan (3:20-3:50 p.m.)	
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Li: Warm welcome; U.S.-PRC problems "can be solved"; our two countries are friends; PRC-Japan friendship will last for centuries.

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April 27	Zhao - Reagan (9:30 a.m.)	
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Zhao:



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April 27	Zhao - Reagan (2:00-3:25 p.m.)	
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April 27	CCP General-Secretary Hu Yaobang - Reagan (3:40 p.m.)	
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Hu stresses "frank" talks with Reagan: PRC-Japan relations will be friendly into the next century; Americans have five misimpressions of China. They should understand that the PRC is opposed to power politics; wants an independent foreign policy; is part of the Third World; wants defensive weapons from the U.S.; wants U.S.-Soviet tensions to relax; and wants to normalize Sino-Soviet relations. Regarding domestic affairs, there is no serious opposition to Party reforms; no need to fear political chaos after Deng, as a second echelon of leaders is now being trained; China wants stability in Korea, but U.S. troops should eventually withdraw; they could return in a day if hostilities started again.

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Date	Senior Officials	Summary/Comments
✓ April 28	Advisory Commission Chairman Deng Xiaoping - Reagan (10:45-11:15 a.m.)	(b)(1) (b)(3)
June 9-27	PRC Minister of Defense Zhang Aiping in the U.S.	
August 15-23	Secretary of Navy John Lehman in the PRC	

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Appendix A

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Appendix B

**AMERICAN AND CHINESE OFFICIALS CITED IN THE
CHRONOLOGY**

AMERICAN OFFICIALS¹

Abramowitz, Morton
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.)

Allen, Richard V.
National Security Adviser, 1981-January 1982

Blumenthal, Michael W.
Secretary of Treasury, 1977-1979

Brown, Harold
Secretary of Defense, 1977-1981

Bruce, David
Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Beijing, 1973-1974

Brzezinski, Zbigniew
National Security Adviser, 1977-1981

Bush, George
Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Beijing, 1974-1975
Vice President of the United States, 1981-present

Carter, Jimmy
President of the United States, 1977-1980

Casey, William
Director of the CIA, 1981-Present

Clark, William P.
Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State, 1981-1983
National Security Adviser, January 1982-October 1982

Christopher, Warren
Deputy Secretary of State, 1977-1981

¹ The official positions identified for each individual are those held during years in which the individual conducted dealings with PRC counterparts.

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Deaver, Michael
Assistant to the President, 1981-1985

Dinneen, Gerald
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Development, Research and Engineering

Ford, Gerald
President of the United States, August 1974-1976

Freeman, Charles
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Beijing

Gates, Thomas
Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Beijing, 1976-1977

Habib, Philip C.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 1974-1977

Haig, Alexander
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1970-1973
Secretary of State, 1981-June 1982

Holbrooke, Richard L.
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 1977-1980

Holdridge, John
Senior Staff Member, National Security Council, 1969-1973
Deputy Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Beijing, 1973-1976
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 1981-1982

Howe, Jonathan
Military Assistant to the National Security Adviser, 1972

Huberman, Benjamin
Staff Member, National Security Council, 1977-1981

Hummel, Arthur W., Jr.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 1971-1975
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 1976-1977
Ambassador to the PRC, 1981-1985

Huntington, Samuel
Staff Member, National Security Council, 1977-1981

Ingersoll, Robert
Deputy Secretary of State, 1974-1976

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1984

OFFICIALS CITED IN THE CHRONOLOGY

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Jenkins, Alfred

China Country Director, Department of State, 1971

Kennedy, Richard T.

Staff, National Security Council, 1969-1971

Director, Staff Planning and Coordination, National Security Council, 1971-1972

Kissinger, Henry A.

National Security Adviser, 1969-1975

Secretary of State, September 22, 1973-1974

Komer, Robert

Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense, 1979-1981

Lord, Winston

Staff, National Security Council, 1969-1970

Special Assistant to the National Security Adviser, 1970-1973

Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1973-1977

McGiffert, David

Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.), 1977-1981

Muskie, Edmund

Secretary of State, 1980-1981

Nixon, Richard M.

President of the United States, January 20, 1969-August 9, 1974

Perry, William

Under Secretary of Defense, 1977-1981

Reagan, Ronald

President of the United States, 1981-present

Richardson, Elliott

Under Secretary of State, 1969-1970

Rogers, William P.

Secretary of State, January 20, 1969-August 1973

Roy, Stapleton

Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Liaison Office, Beijing, 1979

Schlesinger, James R.

Director, CIA, February 1973-July 1973

Secretary of Defense, 1973-1975

Secretary of Energy, 1977-1981

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1984

Scowcroft, Brent

National Security Advisor, 1975-1976

Seignious, George M., II

Director, U.S. Arms Control Agency, 1979-1981

Shoesmith, Thomas

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 1981-1983

Solomon, Richard H.

Senior Staff Member, National Security Council, 1971-1976

Stoessel, Walter

U.S. Ambassador to Poland, 1968-1972

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1972-1974

Vance, Cyrus

Secretary of State, January 1977-1980

Walters, Vernon A.

Special Presidential Envoy, 1970-July 1971

Weinberger, Caspar W.

Secretary of Defense, 1981-present

Woodcock, Leonard

Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Beijing, June 1977-1978

U.S. Ambassador to PRC, March 1, 1979-1981

CHINESE OFFICIALS²

Bo Yibo (Po Yi-po)

Vice Premier

Gao Guisheng (Tsao Kuei-sheng)

Chai Chengwen (Ch'ai Ch'eng-wen)

Director, Foreign Affairs Bureau, Ministry of National Defense (to 1983)

Chai Zemin (Ch'ai Tse-min)

Head, PRC Liaison Office, Washington, D.C., May-December 1978

Ambassador to the United States, January 1979-1983

² The official positions identified for each individual are those held during years in which the individual conducted dealings with U.S. counterparts.

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OFFICIALS CITED IN THE CHRONOLOGY

121

Chen Dong (Ch'en Tung)

Charge d'affaires, PRC Embassy, Warsaw, Poland

Chiang Ching-kuo

President of the Republic of China in Taiwan, Chairman of the Kuomintang

Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing)

Vice Premier, State Council, April 1973

Vice Chairman of the CCP, First Vice Premier, January 1975-February 1976

Chairman, Central Advisory Commission, CCP, September 1982

Chairman, Military Commission, CCPCC, June 1981

Chairman, Central Military Commission, National People's Congress, 1983

Geng Biao (Keng Piao)

Vice Premier, 1978

Minister of National Defense, March 1981-1982

Secretary-General, Military Commission, CCPCC, 1979-July 1981

Han Nianlong (Han Nien-lung)

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Han Xu (Han Hsu)

Deputy Chief, PRC Liaison Office, Washington, D.C., 1973-1978

Hao Deqing (Hao Te-ch'ing)

President, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs

Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng)

Chairman, CCP, October 1976-1980

Premier, State Council, April 1976-1980

Huang Hua (Huang Hua)

Permanent Representative to the United Nations, November 1971-present

Foreign Minister, December 1976-November 1982

Huang Zhen (Huang Chen)

Ambassador to France, April 1964-1973

Head, PRC Liaison Office, Washington, D.C., May 1973-November 1977

Ji Chaozhu (Chi Ch'ao-chu)

Councilor (Minister), PRC Embassy, Washington, D.C.

Ji Pengfei (Chi P'eng-fei)

Acting Foreign Minister, March 1971

Foreign Minister, January 1972-November 1974

Head, International Liaison Department, CCP, March 1979

State Councilor, June 1983-present

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U.S.-PRC POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS, 1967-1982

Jiang Nanxiang (Chiang Nan-hsiang)
Minister of Education, 1979-1985

Lei Yang (Lei Yang)
Charge d'affaires, PRC Embassy, Warsaw, Poland

Li Xiannien (Li Hsien-nien)
Vice Premier, State Council, 1954-September 1980
President, June 1983-present

Lian Zhengbao (Lien Chang-pao)

Liao Chengzhi (Liao Ch'eng-chih)
Director, Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, State Council
Deputy Chairman, National People's Congress

Lin Ping (Lin P'ing)
Director, American and Oceania Affairs Department, Foreign Ministry, July 1973-November 1978

Liu Huaqing (Liu Hua-ch'ing)
Deputy Chief-of-Staff, People's Liberation Army
Commander of PLA Navy, October 1982-present

Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung)
Chairman, CCP, June 1945-1976

Qiao Guanhua (Ch'iao Kuan-hua)
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Minister, 1974-1976

Wu Xueqian (Wu Hsheh-ch'ien)
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Minister, November 1982

Xiung Xianghui
Ambassador to Mexico, 1971
Charge d'affaires in London

Zhang Aiping (Chang Ai-p'ing)
Defense Minister, June 1983

Zhang Chunqiao (Chang Ch'un-ch'iao)
Member, Politburo

Zhang Wenjin (Chang Wen-chin)
Ambassador to Canada, September 1973-December 1976
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 1978
Ambassador to the United States, 1983-1985

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OFFICIALS CITED IN THE CHRONOLOGY

123

Zhang Zai (Chang Tsai)

Deputy Director, American and Oceania Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Zhang Zhen (Chang Chen)

Minister of Fifth Machine-Building Industry (Ordnance)

Zhao Ziyang (Chao Tze-yang)

Premier, September 1980

Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai)

Premier, State Council, 1949-1976

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SECRET**Appendix C****ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE CHRONOLOGY**

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missiles
ADB	Asian Development Bank
CCK	Chiang Ching-kuo
CCNAA	Coordination Council for North American Affairs (of Taiwan)
COCOM	Coordinating Committee on Export Control
CPIFA	Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB	Comprehensive Test Ban
CV	Cyrus Vance
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
Emboff	Embassy Officer
GRUNK	Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea
HAK	Henry A. Kissinger
HH	Huang Hua
HZ	Huang Zhen
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
LW	Leonard Woodcock
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (negotiations)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC)
MFN	Most Favored Nation (status)
MIA	Missing-In-Action
MOD	Ministry of Defense (PRC)
NCNA	New China News Agency
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRCLO	People's Republic of China Liaison Office (Washington, D.C.)
RGNU	Royal Government of National Union (Kampuchea)

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RH	Richard Holbrooke
RN	Richard Nixon
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SC	Shanghai Communique
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
TAS	Taiwan Arms Sales
TIM	Taiwan Independence Movement
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act
UNCURK	United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USG	United States Government
USLO	United States Liaison Office (Beijing)
<i>Xinhua</i>	New China News Agency
ZB	Zbigniew Brzezinski

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