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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

TO:

The Commissioner

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Attention: Mr. W. W. Wiggins

FROM:

W. G. Wyman

Assistant Director

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SUBJECT:

Vasyl GOGOSHA and the OUN/Bandera

REFERENCE: Telephone Conversation with Mr. Suddath

1. The Subject, who usually spells his name in a Polish transliteration Wasyl GOGOSZA, was thrice interrogated by members of this organization. The results of these three interrogations were in brief as follows:

- of OUN/Bandera, although he at first denied any connection with that organization and even went so far as to perjure himself in writing.
- b. There is persuasive documentary evidence in GCGOSHA's own possession suggesting that he is also a member of the Security Service (SB) of OUN/Bandera, although at no time would he admit membership in that Service.
- c. There is no evidence that GOGOSHA ever belonged to the Liquidation Squad of the SB of OUN/Bandera. (Careful investigation through other sources would lead the interrogators to believe that the original allegation of membership in this outfit is false.)
- d. It was impossible to prove or disprove the allegation made by a Ukrainian in Germany that GOGOSHA is anti-American.
- e. GOGOSHA willfully withheld information on the OUN/Bandera with the explanation that he was under an oath of secrecy which he could not break.
- 2. There are at least twenty former or active members of the SB of OUN/Bandera in the United States at the present time. Although the SB is known to have used extra-legal methods while investigating or interrogating suspected Soviet agents, there have been few cases to

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date where it was possible to pin a specific criminal activity on any individual belonging to the SB and take court action. Since the SB kept elaborate files and conducted investigations on Ukrainians and suspected Soviet agents of other nationalities, no serious attempt has ever been made by American officials in Germany to disband the SB. In the past five years the SB has been chronically unable to cooperate wholeheartedly with American intelligence representatives in Germany, primarily because the price set by Stefan BANDERA for complete cooperation involved types of political recognition and commitments to his group which no American in Germany was in a position to make. Operating independently, the SB has upon occasion been more of a headache to American intelligence than a boon. Nevertheless in war-time a highly nationalistic Ukrainian political group with its own security service could conceivably be a great asset to the United States. Alienating such a group could, on the other hand, have no particular advantage to the United States either now or in war-time.

3. A brief discussion of the OUN/Bandera seems pertinent here. The OUN/Bandera is an emigre organization of anti-communist, anti-Russian, Ukrainian nationalists who strongly favor the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. Most of the members of the group are Galician Ukrainians who were Polish subjects from 1920 to 1939. Under Poland, Ukrainian nationalism became particularly strong primarily because the Poles treated the Ukrainians as an inferior race: the Poles brutally denied them cultural autonomy; their chances for professional advantages were severely curtailed, particularly in the Polish army and civil service; all manner of Ukrainians were arrested and beaten for opposing in any way the complete Polonization of this ethnically Ukrainian territory. The Poles erroneously believed that the Galician Ukrainians represented a disloyal Soviet fifth column in their midst. In actual fact, all of the Galician Ukrainians were in violent opposition to communism and wanted above all else to be part of a liberated, non-Russian Ukrainian state.

After 1928, persecution of the 40 million Ukrainians within the Soviet Union also began, much along the same lines as in Poland but more in earnest. Since the rebirth of Ukrainian nationalism in the early part of this century, the Russians have treated the Ukrainians as a disloyal group ready to use every opportunity to free itself from Russian domination. Polish and Russian anti-Ukrainian policies only served to strengthen the national consciousness of the Ukraine. Realizing that the aspiration for national independence was uppermost in the minds of a majority of Ukrainians, the Third Reich promised at the beginning of World War II that the Ukrainians would be freed from

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Soviet domination and would have their own state. This promise accounts for the welcome the Germans received initially when they arrived on Ukrainian territory. The German promise also accounts in part for the tremendous number of Ukrainian deserters from the Red Army during the early stages of the war.

The OUN, which had resembled a secret fraternity of revolutionaries from its birth in 1929 until June 1941, now came out in the open. seized the radio station in Lvov and announced the creation of a free Ukrainian state. The Germans who had promised independence for tactical reasons immediately arrested the perpetrators of the Lvov broadcast, namely Stefan BANDERA, Eugene STETSKO, Stefan LENKAVSKY, and several other OUN leaders who spent the next three years in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. In simple terms, the Germans wanted from the Ukrainians only food and supplies for their armies and forced labor for their factories. The Germans used all means necessary to force the cooperation which the Ukrainians were unwilling to give. Thus by summer 1941 a battle raged on Ukrainian soil between two ruthless exploiters and persecutors of the Ukrainian people, the Third Reich and Soviet Russia. The OUN and the partisan army it created in late 1942, UPA, fought bitterly against both the Germans and the Soviet Russians. The OUN extended its activity even into the populous areas of the far eastern Ukraine where nationalism had been partially lulled to sleep by the First and Second World Wars.

At the end of the last war many members of the OUN came to Western Europe in order to avoid capture by the advancing Soviets. The OUN reformed in Western Europe with its headquarters in Munich. It first came to the attention of American authorities when the Russians demanded extradiction of BANDERA and many other anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists as war criminals. Luckily the attempt to locate these anti-Soviet Ukrainians was sabotaged by a few far-sighted Americans who warned the persons concerned to go into hiding. From 1945 to 1948 members of OUN and of UPA arrived from the Soviet Ukraine to Western Germany on foot. The messages they and returning German prisoners of war brought conclusively confirmed that the OUN and the UPA were continuing the fight against the Soviets, with the weapons and ammunition which the retreating German armies had left behind. Over 35,000 members of the Russian secret police (MVD-MGB) have been killed by OUN-UPA since the end of the last war. In other words the main activities of the OUN in the Ukraine cannot be considered detrimental to the United States.

The relationship of the OUN/Bandera in the emigration to the OUN in the homeland is debatable. The three principle leaders of OUN/Bandera have not been in the Ukraine since 1941. A decade of evolution in the Ukraine has rendered the ideology and principles of organization of these emigres ten years out of date. It is therefore quite understandable that

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most of the members of the OUN/Bandera in the emigration have been characterised as ultra-nationalists because they think as the Galician Ukrainians thought prior to 1939. Since the beginning of the Korean war the OUN/Bandera has published articles in its press which criticize the United States rather violently for what OUN/Bandera members deem to be a blind or non-existent policy toward the Ukrainian resistance movement. The OUN/Bandera reasons that the United States government should show some interest in an anti-Soviet nation of 40 million people within the Soviet Union which has carried out military opposition to the Soviet regime for the last ten years. If members of the OUN/Bandera feel any bitterness towards the United States it is usually only for the above reason.

4. Both Vasyl GOGOSHA and Eugen LOZINSKI have been described as martyrs by the Ukrainian emigre press. To the best of our knowledge Mr. LOZINSKI is a ranking member of the OUN/Bandera. At the present time, however, there are no accusations against Mr. LOZINSKI of which this office is aware. Nevertheless it is suggested that Mr. LOZINSKI's baggage be inspected for printed and mimeographed material in Ukrainian. If he is carrying such material, we would appreciate being informed. It is possible that Mr. LOZINSKI too may be carrying intelligence information on Soviet Russia of interest to this organization. The material found in Mr. GOGOSHA's luggage was of interest and has been returned to him in toto with the exception of one map which will be mailed to him at Ellis Island during the week 28 May - 1 June 1951. Attached please find two statements in Mr. GOGOSHA's handwriting, one of which denies membership in the OUN/Bandera while the other admits such membership. It would be appreciated if these attachments could be returned as soon as they are no longer of interest to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Attachments: 2

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