

Tuesday, February 20, 1968

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [

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SUBJECT: Viet Cong General Offensive Plans for Danang, Hue, Quang Tri and Other Centers in Viet Cong Military Region 5

[The following information was received from interrogation of a Viet Cong prisoner

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From briefings he received during November-December 1967, [

1.3(a)(4)

] learned that the Viet Cong planned to take the following steps in Danang City in connection with the projected general offensive:

- A. Besiege the city and prevent resources from entering it.
- B. Wage a war of nerves against the city.
- C. Attack the airfield by rockets to blockade Government of Vietnam and allied troops within the city.
- D. Increase shelling of the airfield should allied troops provide only artillery and air support for Government of Vietnam troops and try to protect their own bases.
- E. Should allied troops be deployed to reinforce Government of Vietnam troops, retreat from the city and try to besiege the surrounding area while awaiting the outcome of the Khe Sanh and western highlands (Pleiku-Kontum) battlefields. The Viet Cong would then launch a general offensive or ask for negotiations, depending on their position.

1.3(a)(4)

[] indications of a general offensive on Danang were to be: The shelling of Danang and Nhon Nuoc airfields for two consecutive nights; the shelling of fuel storage facilities, I Corps headquarters, and ordnance installations; and attacks by Sapper Battalion 2 on the Lien Chieu fuel storage area, the Nam O bridge, and ships moored in the Hoa Khanh area. Viet Cong forces reserved for the offensive against Danang would be one regiment of the North Vietnamese army 2nd division (the other two regiments would be held for possible use in a very decisive battle), one mobile battalion of the Quang Nam Province main forces, one Sapper element, and newly infiltrated Regiment 31 of North Vietnamese Army 341st division.

1.3(a)(4)

[] in Hue, Viet Cong forces were to overrun the city and to hold it by all means. If attacked by Government of Vietnam/allied forces, they were to move from one house to another but were not to be allowed to retreat from the city, even if this meant the sacrifice of the entire regiment. Thus, the Viet Cong forces would have to hold Hue until the battle broke out in the Khe Sanh area, the Pleiku-Kontum area or the Saigon area.

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Approved for Release
Date 18 April 1990

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In Quang Tri Province, the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army planned to eliminate the Lang Vei post as a means to lure the U.S. into concentrating all of its power-- artillery, marines, aircraft--in the Khe Sanh area. When the plan had worked out properly, the Viet Cong planned to launch a decisive battle in either the Pleiku-Kontum area or the Saigon area. Once this was begun, the Viet Cong would then shell the airfields. One regiment would attack Quang Tri City and try to hold it at all costs.

1.3(a)(4)

[] in other areas of Viet Cong military region 5, specifically in the provincial capitals where the allies are weak and have no large military bases' such as Hoi An, Tam Ky, Bong Son, Hue and Kontum, the Viet Cong planned to use military forces to liberate the people; in the strongly defended cities, the Viet Cong would employ political means as the main force, although they would also fight militarily if possible.

1.3(a)(4)

[] If Government of Vietnam/allied troops wish to fight successfully against the Viet Cong attack on Danang, they must helilift their troops behind Viet Cong lines and attack from the rear. They should outnumber the Viet Cong three to one and be prepared to fight not only the Viet Cong retreating from the city but also the Viet Cong reserve forces trying to penetrate the city. At the present time, Government of Vietnam regular forces should be used to conduct operations to observe and discover the movement of Viet Cong units and front line laborers. At the same time, the Government of Vietnam troops should be allowed to rest and recuperate so as to be prepared for the coming decisive battle.)