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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

## WEEKLY SUMMARY

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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents. ٠.





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## PORTUGUESE GUINEA: AFTER CABRAL

The Guinea-based African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands has begun to collect itself, but it will be some time before the movement regains the momentum it had before the assassination of its leader1

17 Considerable confusion still exists within the movement as it tries to adjust to life without Amilcar Cabral, who was assassinated on 20 Jan-🖗 uary. No potential successor has Cabral's stature, and only the semblance of a new leadership has so far emerged. Authority appears to be exercised on a consensus basis, with President Toure-on whom the rebel movement is heavily dependent for bases and logistics-the single most influential voice. A new party secretary ggeneral probably will not be chosen until after the current investigation into Cabral's death and until, in Toure's words, a "fifth column" of conspirators is purged. The new leadership will probably have to contend with extremists who favor more aggressive military action.)

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 $^{+17}$  One tentative conclusion produced by the investigators is that the increase in dissension within the rebel movement during the past several months was linked to the infusion of a large number of new recruits, many of whom described themselves as deserters from the Portuguese African Army. Toure faults the rebel leadership for not screening such men more closely. He contends that many were Portuguese agents and that some of them figured prominently in Cabral's death.]]Last week, Toure claimed that confessions from the captured assassins established that black African elements conspired with Portugal to eliminate the movement's mulatto, Cape Verdian leadership. At a symposium honoring Cabral on 1 February, Toure asked for a greater effort to eliminate contradictions within the movement.

Malthough Lisbon clearly is the major beneficiary of the killing, Toure has not offered any solid evidence of Portugal's involvement.



73 In sharp contrast to the highly visible control Toure exercised over the rebel organization immediately after the killing, he is now trying to bolster its image as an independent force. Last week, he stressed the responsibility of the insurgents themselves to punish those guilty of killing Cabral and to make all critical decisions regarding the movement. Subsequently, Luiz Cabral, half brother of the slain leader, was accorded the role of rebel spokesman in a Guinean communique.

79 There is little evidence that Portugal has taken military advantage of the rebels' situation, although insurgent leaders and supporters fear such an eventuality.

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## TAN-ZAM RAILWAY: CHUGGING ALONG

5 Construction of the Chinese-financed Tan-Zam Railway may be completed in 1974, a year ahead of schedule. This \$400 million project has helped to improve Peking's image in Black Africa; the railroad is important to Zambia and Tanzania and its construction is being pressed at a speedy pace. The undertaking is the largest single Chinese aid project. The railroad will enable Zambia to ship its copper to Dar es Salaam for export

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