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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

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46

26 April 1968
No. 0017/68

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EST, 25 April 1968)

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<p>Hanoi in the past week stood pat on its offers of Phnom Penh or Warsaw for preliminary contacts with the US, but the North Vietnamese have not ruled out other sites. Militarily, enemy main forces in the South continued to avoid major combat, apparently devoting their efforts to resupply and replacement in anticipation of further fighting.</p>	
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SWEDEN ORDERS 175 VIGGEN AIRCRAFT
 Stockholm's order for the Swedish-built multimission
 aircraft is valued at more than \$440 million.

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Middle East - Africa

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

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RISING PRESSURE ON LAGOS TO END NIGERIAN WAR

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Rising African pressures to halt the fighting are
 having little effect on federal leader Gowon, who is
 determined to force secessionist Biafra to accept
 Nigeria's new state structure. Federal troops in
 the field are having difficulties against well-organ-
 ized Biafran resistance.

SOMALI ARMY WANTS MORE SOVIET ARMS

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The Somali defense minister plans to visit Moscow for
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TRIBAL TENSIONS HIGH IN SIERRA LEONE AFTER ARMY MUTINY

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An intense struggle for political control has devel-
 oped between Sierra Leone's two dominant tribal groups
 in the aftermath of the overthrow on 18 April of the
 ruling junta by mutinous army rank and file. Although
 an uneasy peace now prevails, the potential for con-
 flict along tribal lines has increased.

Western Hemisphere

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

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CASTRO WIDENS ROLE OF CUBAN MILITARY

26

Castro has concentrated on the domestic situation
 in his recent speeches and has given the armed forces
 a greater part in organizing the economy.

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NEW ELEMENTS ENTER ECUADOREAN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN 27

Former president Jose Maria Velasco has charged that Interim President Otto Arosemena signed pacts which will favor rightist candidate Camilo Fonce in the 2 June presidential elections. Rising campaign violence, possibly organized by paid Communist organizers, may increase on 1 May.

KILLING OF GUATEMALAN RIGHTIST LEADER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS 28

The summary execution of a right-wing terrorist may bring on more troubles for President Mendez. If Mendez moves to disband the civilian counterinsurgents in the Department of Zacapa, they are likely to begin active coup plotting. If he does not move against them, the counterterrorists probably will continue their illegal activities.

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FAR EAST

Hanoi appears confident that the delay in opening preliminary contacts with the US is working to its advantage.

North Vietnamese propaganda claims that world opinion is growing increasingly critical of alleged US moves to delay the talks and charges that Washington has "completely changed its attitude" since President Johnson's address on 31 March. Hanoi continues to insist on US acceptance of either Phnom Penh or Warsaw as the site for talks, but it has left the door open for an eventual agreement on another site.

The level of military action rose this week with sharp clashes near Saigon, in the delta, and in the Khe Sanh area. [redacted] warned of a widespread Communist offensive at the end of April, including a major attack on Saigon. The general posture and deployment of Communist forces, however, suggest that enemy initiatives in the immediate future will be more limited in scope.

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
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Communist preparations for political maneuvering and negotiations in the months ahead are reflected in the emergence of the first national-level "Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces." Local alliances, formed in several areas during the Tet offensive, were portrayed as the first step toward the formation of a coalition with the National Liberation Front designed to replace the present Saigon government. The Liberation Front tried to emphasize the non-Communist and independent status of the alliance by addressing a congratulatory message to its founding congress which met near Saigon last weekend.

The Lao Government has taken precautionary measures in response to reports of Communist plans to launch attacks on several government-held cities and to conduct sabotage and assassination operations. Although there are no firm indications that a major offensive is imminent, the Communists may stage another show of strength before the rainy season begins next month. [redacted]

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VIETNAM

During the past week Hanoi stood pat on its earlier offers of Phnom Penh or Warsaw as sites for preliminary contacts with the United States. Hanoi propaganda has continued to charge the US with "perfidy" on this issue but has not ruled out other sites. North Vietnamese spokesmen tried to convey an impression that Hanoi's suggestions were made on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, but they, too, left room for an agreement on any other locations.


Military Activity in the South

Several sharp engagements occurred in widely scattered areas of South Vietnam during the week, although most enemy main forces continued a relative stand-down.

[redacted] there are numerous indications that enemy forces are gearing for renewed heavy combat.

The current pattern of enemy activity may be explained in part by extensive replacement and resupply needs following the heavy fighting last fall and in the Tet offensive. A period of resupply and regrouping is in keeping with enemy activity in previous years. Seasonal lulls between the Commu-

nist "winter-spring" campaign and their "summer-autumn" campaign are also characteristic of Communist military action. In view of the current US - North Vietnamese diplomatic dialogue on a site for preliminary talks, the Communists may have hoped that their relative inactivity for the past month would be viewed as restraint.

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During the current relative lull, the enemy is making his presence felt in strategic areas by mortar and rocket attacks, harassment and limited ground assaults against selected targets. Occasionally, these actions have resulted in heavy casualties. On 21 April 22 Marines were killed and nearly 80 wounded in a clash in the mountainous terrain east of Khe Sanh. Communist losses were 24 dead. A number of bloody engagements have also broken out in recent days in the provinces around Saigon and in the delta. However, a large allied sweep, Operation DELAWARE/LAMSON 216, under way since 19 April in the A Shau Valley and its eastern approaches, has

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so far met only moderate resistance.

Communist Scenario for a Coalition

While Hanoi spars over the site for initial contacts with the US, the Communists in the South are pushing ahead with a political scenario which they hope will eventually produce a Communist-dominated "coalition" to replace the present Thieu government. On 23 April, the Communists surfaced the first national-level "alliance," the Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces. It is portrayed as a political force independent not only of the Communists but of the Liberation Front as well and as representing significant widespread opposition to the Saigon government.

Local counterparts of the new national "alliance" first appeared during the Tet offensive when Communist broadcasts claimed that several had been established in urban areas. The propaganda described them clearly as independent of, but willing to work with, the Liberation Front to establish governmental "administrations" in these areas. Only one such alliance--that for Hue city and Thua Thien Province--was publicized to any extent, however, and even here most of the people openly associated with the alliance were minor figures. Propaganda on this theme died out for more than a month, until it was revived in April.

On 9 April a Liberation Radio broadcast claimed for the first time that many new "revolutionary administrations" had been established throughout rural areas of South Vietnam. A week later the Thua Thien - Hue "alliance" was publicized as a "revolutionary committee" with regular semigovernmental functions. The committee allegedly met to review its activities during March and to establish various programs of action such as agricultural production, budgeting, and the preparation of a "rural convention" to organize a "new life in the countryside."

In rural areas, the Viet Cong claimed that "revolutionary administrations" had been set up in all "liberated areas, new and old" and that, since Tet, their control has been extended over an additional 1.6 million people and 600 hamlets.

The next step was the announcement that the National Alliance had been formed at a congress of delegates on 20-21 April. Saigon lawyer Trinh Dinh Thao was identified as a leader of the alliance. Thao is a fairly prominent Saigon attorney, who has been long known as a leftist and has been arrested several times on suspicion of pro-Communist activities.

[redacted] Thao and at least six other Saigon intellectuals had defected to the Communists shortly after Tet. Most of the other six also had leftist connections, although one reportedly

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had been a staunch anti-Communist. The Communists could get considerable propaganda mileage out of the use of these six in the alliance.

Saigon's Mobilization

President Thieu's general mobilization bill is running into some trouble in the National Assembly, although most of the legislators favor full mobilization in principle. On 10 April Thieu submitted to the Lower House

a draft law which would give him decree powers for stipulating specific mobilization procedures, but the Assembly seems unwilling to give him such carte blanche. The defense committees of both houses are now working with Thieu and various cabinet members to draft a new bill which will spell out in detail the steps for mobilization and leave less to the discretion of the President. The new draft law, which will also take into account deferments for essential personnel, should soon be ready for debate in the Lower House.

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LAO GOVERNMENT BRACES FOR COMMUNIST TERRORIST ATTACKS

Although the military situation has remained quiet in recent weeks, there are some signs that the Communists may attempt a dramatic finale to an already successful dry season offensive.

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rumors of a widespread offensive to celebrate the Laotian New Year two weeks ago did not materialize.

Unusual Communist activity in recent days, however, has led government authorities to take precautions. On 23 April an enemy commando team destroyed the quarters of US and Lao officials at Muong Soui, although the Americans escaped unharmed. In the south, a Communist attack against the town of Ban Lahanam appeared to be targeted against the USAID facilities in the area.

The rainy season, when the Communists usually go on the defensive, is about a month away, and the enemy may want to add a few victories to this year's impressive list of successes before calling it quits. Although there is no evidence that a major new offensive is in the offing, the Communists do have the capability of mounting one, or of launching raids on government towns at a time and place of their own choosing.


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Status of Provincial Governments, 25 April 1968



(M) Committee with Military Chairman
 (C) Committee with Civilian Chairman

REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE	DATE OF FORMATION	REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE	DATE OF FORMATION
Heilungkiang (C)	31 Jan. 1967	Honan (C)	27 Jan. 1968
Shanghai (C)	5 Feb. 1967	Hopeh (C)	3 Feb. 1968
Kweichow (M)	14 Feb. 1967	Hupei (M)	5 Feb. 1968
Shantung (C)	23 Feb. 1967	Kwangtung (M)	21 Feb. 1968
Shansi (C)	18 March 1967	Kirin (M)	6 March 1968
Peking (C)	20 April 1967	Kiangsu (M)	23 March 1968
Tsinghai (M)	12 Aug. 1967	Chekiang (M)	24 March 1968
Inner Mongolia (M)	1 Nov. 1967	Hunan (M)	9 April 1968
Tientsin (C)	6 Dec. 1967	Ningsia (M)	10 April 1968
Kiangsi (M)	5 Jan. 1968	Anhwei (M)	18 April 1968
Kansu (M)	24 Jan. 1968		

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POLITICAL CONFLICTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

The political situation remains tense in Peking, with no clear trend in any direction. Propaganda media continue to warn against both a "rightist resurgence" and attempts to reinstate officials disgraced and dismissed earlier in the Cultural Revolution.

Despite this campaign, no attacks have developed on controversial provincial officials rehabilitated in the past several months, and in fact, once-disgraced officials are still being restored to positions of authority. A new revolution committee was formed in Anhwei Province on 18 April. Even though Anhwei has been in the forefront of the anti-rightist propaganda campaign, two of its new vice-chairmen are former party officials who had been publicly denounced and dismissed from office in January 1967.

Provincial appointments have not departed significantly from the pattern of military domination in recent months, despite the "revolutionary" turn in propaganda. The three provincial committees set up in the past month-- Anhwei, Hunan, and Ningsia--are all dominated by military figures, despite continued propaganda admonishments that Red Guard representatives and "revolutionary cadres" should play a

role equal to the military on such committees.

Efforts to establish revolutionary committees in provinces in southwest and northeast China appear to be making little progress.

The principal stumbling block to revolutionary committees in these areas appears to be the objections of "conservative" military figures who govern these areas to the inclusion of "radical" civilian cadres in the provincial governments. Despite a mid-March chastisement of top Szechwan leaders by Madame Mao and other Peking officials, conservative forces in Szechwan continue to exert heavy pressure on radical provincial leaders and Red Guards. Posters in Peking have reported that bitter fighting in Shenyang earlier this month was triggered by recent political decisions concerning the province considered unfavorable to the "conservative" leaders of the Shenyang Military Region.

Elsewhere in China political conflicts seem to be on the decline, but there are still trouble spots. Shantung just recently announced a purge of its revolutionary committee. Posters [redacted] have reported renewed fighting in Shensi, Shansi, and Fukien provinces in recent weeks. [redacted]

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PYONGYANG INCREASES PRESSURE AGAINST SOUTH KOREA

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The yearly spring wave of North Korean pressure against the south has apparently begun. Tension heightened along the Demilitarized Zone this week as the result of a series of small-scale Communist attacks against US and South Korean units, accompanied by belligerent propaganda.

Unlike earlier incidents this year, which generally arose from chance encounters between infiltrating agents and security patrols, the latest attacks apparently were deliberately planned and executed by the North Koreans. This suggests that Pyongyang now sees less need for the relative restraint it has shown since the Pueblo seizure, and that a more aggressive North Korean posture along the DMZ, including larger scale incidents, may be expected.

The rise in tension along the DMZ comes amid indications that Pyongyang may be planning a substantial increase in guerrilla activity in the South.

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The North Koreans probably hope their efforts will force Seoul to divert resources from economic development to defense, stimulate internal South Korean differences and strain US-ROK relations.

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EUROPE

Political unease was evident in Eastern Europe during the week as another meeting opened in Budapest to prepare for a "summit" conference of Communist parties in the fall.

Moscow intervened in Poland's factional struggle with a forceful reiteration of support for Gomulka by the Russian ambassador in Warsaw. The situation in Poland remains fluid and much tension is evident. It is likely to stay this way for some time.

The initial phase of the Czechoslovak democratization process—the replacement of conservative Novotny supporters by progressives—has been completed. The second, and more difficult phase—meeting the public's and party members' hopes and expectations—is beginning and the new regime must show results in a relatively short time or become a target of hostility.

Marshal Yakubovsky, Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact, visited Warsaw, East Berlin, Sofia, and Prague—apparently to discuss a proposal to reorganize the Pact's command structure.

Soviet leaders fanned out across the country during the last two weeks carrying the official word from the central committee meeting on 9-10 April to local party organizations. None of these follow-up statements has been published, but they reportedly repeat Brezhnev's call for "iron discipline" and, in explaining developments in Czechoslovakia, adhere closely to the heavily expurgated versions that have appeared in the Soviet press.

The May Day demonstrations in Western Europe this year will encompass a wider range of issues and popular protest movements than any in the recent past. In addition to the traditional marches to urge labor solidarity, various groups are planning demonstrations against such divergent targets as the war in Vietnam, the government, university and business "establishments," and the Greek junta. Sponsors include not only the traditional trade union, Socialist and Communist groups but also such disparate elements as anarchists and Catholic intellectuals in Spain, and the amorphous "new left."

The Belgian political crisis continues, almost one month after the inconclusive elections. Socialist Party leader Collard is trying to form a coalition with caretaker Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants' Social Christians, whose internal split on the linguistic issue has just been thinly papered over. The Liberals, at present, seem to prefer going into opposition rather than share responsibility for coping with the linguistic issue.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA PREPARES TO ADOPT NEW POLICIES

Though still beset by factional problems the Dubcek regime is preparing to implement domestic reforms and is putting a new face on Czechoslovak foreign policy.

Progressives and conservatives clashed during regional party conferences last weekend, with three conferences recommending that an extraordinary party congress be held before the end of the year so that conservatives can be removed from the central committee. Three other conferences advocated a more moderate course, recommending that the regular congress be convened sometime in 1969. The four remaining regional party organizations, when they meet in the next few days, will find themselves under severe pressure to take a stand on the controversial issue of convening the party congress.

If these four also recommend an extraordinary congress, Dubcek will probably abandon his middle-of-the-road position. He has thus far, somewhat equivocally, opposed such a congress and has emphasized that there can be no witch-hunts in the party. At one regional conference on 20 April, he repeated earlier admonitions that "one cannot improvise but must study the problems" before acting.

The National Assembly convened on 24-25 April to hear Premier Cernik present the government's legislative program, which is based on the just-approved party action program. Newly elected assembly chairman, Josef Smrkovsky has promised speedy enactment of a number of reforms.

Cernik also informed the assembly of plans to improve bilat-

eral relations with the Scandinavian and other Western European countries, thus giving some substance to earlier statements that Prague will play a more active role in European affairs. He again emphasized that the German question is the basic problem for Prague's foreign policy, but his position on improvement of relations with Bonn was imprecise and somewhat contradicted earlier statements.

Cernik was not as forthcoming as Foreign Minister Hajek, who on 22 April hinted that Prague's sole condition for "normalizing" relations is that Bonn declare the 1938 Munich agreement null and void from its inception. The Czechoslovaks' equivocation on the German question suggests that they accept the necessity to move slowly on an issue so sensitive in terms of Prague's relations with the USSR and some of the Eastern European states.

Nevertheless, the new regime has already made clear that it will stress self-interest in dealing with Communist nations. On 17 April, Foreign Trade Minister Vales publicly criticized CEMA and indicated that Prague will seek to loosen its economic ties with the Communist states and trade more with the West. The new attention to self-interest has already led to an apparent conflict with the USSR about the nature of the forthcoming international Communist conference. Rude Pravo on 21 April criticized previous world Communist conferences as restrictive and advocated "open" sessions for the current Budapest preparatory meeting as well as at the conference scheduled later for Moscow.

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POLISH PARTY FACTIONS LOCKED IN STRUGGLE

The struggle between contending Polish Party factions is beginning to break into the open.

The first public clash took place in a polemical exchange between the party daily Trybuna Ludu--controlled by Interior Minister Moczar's hard-line elements--and the moderate party weekly Polityka. Apparently aiming at provincial party boss Gierek's "technocrats," Trybuna Ludu on 10 April charged Polityka with consistently extolling the leading role of the managerial class to the detriment of the working masses. Polityka rebutted these charges on 19 April and implicitly portrayed Moczar as the false champion of the workers.

Hard-line Warsaw party chief Kepa in a speech on 17 April provided further evidence of the struggle. He praised the hard-line-controlled press and extolled the "fresh breeze" blowing through the party, presumably as a result of the current purges. Kepa also became the first party spokesman to condemn the Polish Catholic hierarchy for its support of dissident student elements. He said that some 80 officials--mostly Jews--have been purged so far, including 14 at the ministerial and deputy ministerial level. Kepa's figures clearly fall short of the total number of those

purged. If the lower party and state echelons are included the victims may number in the hundreds.


The purges already have shaken the entrenched party and government bureaucracy, a result which the ambitious, younger party elements apparently welcome seemingly without regard for its consequences. The extent of the purges is related to the different factions' efforts to gain control of the party apparatus before the congress scheduled for later this year. The first meeting of a party commission to prepare the draft guidelines for the congress met in Warsaw on 22 April under party boss Gomulka's chairmanship.

Most Poles are uneasy about the outcome of the political struggle but have no role to play and are at the same time apathetic. The students had threatened to resume protests on 22 April if their demands were not met, but did not do so. Most of them appear intimidated and confused, but there are rumors that they will attempt new demonstrations during the regime-sponsored May Day celebrations. Renewed unrest could give added impetus to the party turmoil, and would probably benefit the party's extremist factions.


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SWEDISH AIRCRAFT



J-37 VIGGEN



J-35 DRAKEN

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SWEDEN ORDERS 175 VIGGEN AIRCRAFT

The Swedish Government has ordered 175 Viggen aircraft for its defense forces. The total value of the order is more than 2.2 billion Swedish Kroner (over \$440 million).

The Viggen is designed to be a multimission combat aircraft with short takeoff and landing capabilities and a top speed of over Mach 2 (twice the speed of sound). It is still in the prototype stage of development. Design difficulties must be resolved if the plane is to meet Swedish expectations.

The takeoff and landing features will permit deployment of the Viggen in widely dispersed sites and should improve the survivability of the force in the event of a surprise attack.

When the Viggen project was first authorized, the Royal Swedish Air Force expected to purchase 800 planes. Budget cutbacks have, however, forced sharp reductions in procurement.

The manufacturer of the aircraft, SAAB, has been seeking markets for the Draken, a forerunner of the Viggen that is now deployed in the Swedish Air Force. Foreign sales would help maintain earnings until Viggen production begins.

The first foreign sale of the Draken was made last month, when Denmark ordered 23 of the Mach 2 fighters and obtained an option to buy more. Austria, which will be re-equipping its air force in a few years, is another leading prospect for sales.

With the Viggen purchase by the Swedish Government and the Draken sale to Denmark, SAAB officials believe they are in position to intensify their export efforts. Viggen sales to the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, and West Germany are being sought even though all of these countries have strong indigenous aircraft industries.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

The Arab-Israeli theater has been generally quiet this week, although sporadic exchanges of fire have occurred along the Israeli-Jordanian cease-fire lines.

Jordan's call for a UN Security Council meeting on Jerusalem may well result in a full-scale discussion of Israeli occupation policies. The Jordanians not only intend to emphasize the provocative nature of Israel's planned Independence Day celebrations in Jerusalem on 2 May but also will call attention to earlier Israeli moves to establish sovereignty over the Old City.

King Hassan of Morocco is concluding an 18-day visit to the Middle East—long-planned official visits to Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia with brief stops in Egypt and Tunisia. He apparently views the trip as a way to increase his stature at home and abroad, improve relations with the moderate Arabs, and contribute to Islamic unity. Hassan may renew his efforts of last fall to hold an Arab summit meeting in Rabat, if discussions with Faysal, Nasir, and Boumediene prove promising.

In Athens, Greek Orthodox Easter celebrations caused postponement until this weekend of some parts of the regime's celebration of its first year in power. The government did, however, take the opportunity to praise the accomplishments of the 21 April revolution, to announce some new "reforms," and to revile the statements of regime opponents and former premiers Papandreou and Kanellopoulos. Premier Papadopoulos again emphasized the "harmful" aspects of the continued suspension of major US military aid.

On 22 April the Indian cabinet ratified the decision not to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty in its present form. Claiming that the treaty lacks strong security assurances, the Indians remain determined to reject it despite demarches from the US and USSR and at the risk of forfeiting foreign aid for developing India's nuclear energy program.

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In Congo (Kinshasa) the imminent arrival of Soviet diplomats will mark the first time in almost five years that the two countries have had diplomatic relations. President Mobutu twice before had expelled the Soviets for meddling in Congolese affairs.

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RISING PRESSURE ON LAGOS TO END NIGERIAN WAR

Despite Tanzania's recognition of Biafra and rising African pressures to call a halt to the fighting, federal leader Gowon appears determined to press on militarily until the secessionist Ibo regime agrees to accept its place in Nigeria's new state structure. Federal forces in the field, however, are presently having trouble handling well-organized Biafran resistance.

Federal troops in the Onitsha area have made no progress for some time and have had to deal with Biafran infiltration into the Mid-West aimed at the supply lines to Asaba. Meanwhile, Colonel Muhammed, a free-wheeling hard-line Northerner who is the field commander in the area, has been in Lagos for consultations for the past month and reportedly is resisting pressures to return to Onitsha and renew the offensive. On 23 April, unknown to his superiors, Muhammed flew to London, possibly to buy the arms he feels are not being supplied him.

It now seems likely that Gowon will urge his field commanders to push for Port Harcourt. The federal army division in the southern area, however, is having considerable difficulty in moving against well-organized Biafran regulars. Federal troops attacking Arochuku were forced back across the Cross River to Ikot Okporo and suffered heavy losses. Federal troops, however, did succeed in seizing Afikpo, a provin-

cial center just north of the Cross River, and may be attempting to link up with troops moving south from Abakaliki.

Although no other country has followed Tanzania's recognition action, several African leaders are becoming increasingly impatient with what they regard as Gowon's intransigence on peace talks. The presidents of Ivory Coast, Senegal, Zambia, and Congo (Kinshasa) now are seeking ways to persuade Lagos to agree to a cease-fire--a development the Biafra regime insists is essential to meaningful peace talks. Lagos, for its part, has severed diplomatic relations with Tanzania and appears prepared to do the same with any other country which recognizes Biafra.


Nevertheless, Lagos' concern and nervousness is manifest in both its efforts to bring the war quickly to a successful conclusion and in the sending of the foreign minister to London to contact other potential intermediaries, notably British officials and the Commonwealth Secretariat.

Prospects for talks of any kind, however, remain dim. Biafran leader Ojukwu's latest public statement has raised additional potentially complicating conditions beyond the demand for an immediate cease-fire. Gowon, who has his own hard-liners to consider is unlikely to halt the fighting before certain key objectives are reached, if then.

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SCENE OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR



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SOMALI ARMY WANTS MORE SOVIET ARMS

Somali Defense Minister Guled plans a 25-day visit to Moscow beginning on 30 April to request military equipment in addition to what Somalia has already received under the 1963 Somali-Soviet arms agreement. Prime Minister Egal apparently bowed to army pressure for more arms although receiving them could undermine his carefully nurtured detente policy toward Ethiopia and Kenya.

The army has been unhappy with Egal, primarily because he wishes to de-emphasize the position of the army and divert the financial savings gained thereby into badly needed economic development. Egal has so far required the army to give up training and equipping Somali insurgents operating in Ethiopia and Kenya. The army has also suffered a cut of some 3,500 to 4,000 men, and under pressure from Egal, has reluctantly undertaken a civic action program to avoid a budget cut.

Moreover, army commandant General Siad has been agitating

in government circles, charging that Ethiopia, through arms purchases and other acts, has taken advantage of Egal's detente to gain military and political advantages. Siad's campaign seems to have had an effect. President Abdirascid, badgered by the defense minister, in early April said that when Egal returned from a month abroad a complete review of Somali military policy would take place. The decision to ask for more arms appears to be the result of this review, and for political reasons Egal apparently has acquiesced.

A new Soviet arms agreement, once it became generally known, would adversely affect the current detente between Somalia and its neighbors. Further Soviet arms aid would probably be viewed less alarmingly in Kenya, but would serve only to harden Ethiopia's long-standing skepticism of Egal's policy and make any further accommodation between the two countries even more difficult.

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TRIBAL TENSIONS HIGH IN SIERRA LEONE AFTER ARMY MUTINY

An intense struggle for political control has developed between Sierra Leone's two dominant tribal groups in the aftermath of the overthrow on 18 April of the ruling junta by mutinous army rank and file.

The mutineers, who were motivated chiefly by desire for personal gain, apparently rebelled because they believed the ruling officer clique was enriching itself while neglecting the ranks. They were probably encouraged to revolt by supporters of the banned All People's Congress (APC)--dominated by northern Temne tribesmen--and by members of the former ruling party of ex - prime minister Margai--mostly southern Mende tribesmen.

After arresting virtually all members of the junta and other top army and police officers, the mutineers established a 14-man "sergeants' junta" and promised an early return to civil government. Although heavy firing occurred in Freetown, casualties appear to have been minimal. A seven-man National Interim Council, composed of army and police personnel, was created to perform the functions of government. Colonel Bangura, a popular northerner who joined APC party leader Siaka Stevens in exile in Guinea last month, was recalled to head the council and to take command of the army.

Political maneuvering for advantage with the new junta by the Temne and Mende factions rapidly escalated into a major confrontation. Temne politicians, working with Bangura, attempted

to develop a climate favorable for Stevens' assumption of power. Mende politicians, asserting that they would meet with force any arbitrary transfer of power to Stevens, also endeavored to influence the new ruling group. They particularly encouraged Lieutenant Colonel Genda, a Mende and the deputy army commander, to oppose the moves of Bangura.

With tensions at a fever pitch, a compromise agreement was reached between the two factions on 22 April, under which both sides agreed to convene the parliament elected in March 1967 but not convened because of army intervention. The parliament would choose a new prime minister to form a national government. The Mendes probably agreed because they hope political independents and the paramount chiefs will support their candidate for the premiership. The Temnes probably believe they can elect Stevens by insisting that several of the Mendes guilty of election fraud be disqualified from parliament.

An uneasy peace now prevails, but the possibility of conflict along tribal lines still remains. Stevens holds the advantage but runs the risk of provoking intervention by Mende troops unless he is willing to form a coalition government which will include members of that tribe. The most immediate problem is to restore public order. A lack of an officer corps in the army and police, has allowed discipline to break down, and unruly troops and security forces pose serious problems.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The tranquility that has prevailed generally throughout Latin America during the last two weeks is being threatened by increasing political agitation and disquietude in a number of countries.

Minor incidents may materialize from demonstrations or meetings in connection with May Day, traditionally an occasion in Latin America for Communists and leftists to try to embarrass the authorities by staging workers' parades and rallies. May Day observances in the hemisphere have been fairly tame affairs in recent years, but electoral and other emotional political issues this year have somewhat increased the possibilities of disorders in several countries.

In Brazil, both the Costa e Silva government and leaders of the pro-Moscow Communist party are concerned that violence may occur if students follow through with their plans for antigovernment demonstrations on 1 May similar to those that swept the country about a month ago. Workers in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and several other countries also plan demonstrations. Latin American affiliates of the Communist-front World Federation of Trade Unions have been instructed to dedicate their May Day activities this year to "the defense of Vietnam," but so far only Mexican and Uruguayan groups are known to have developed specific plans for activities with this theme.

Other political issues are raising tensions in several countries. Violence could result from a mass rally being planned for 28 April in Santo Domingo by leftist Dominican political groups to mark the third anniversary of the US troop landings there. In Honduras last week, the country's major labor federation joined with leaders of the opposition Liberal party in angrily protesting President Lopez' failure to respond to their demands for nullification of the results of the blatantly fraudulent municipal elections on 31 March and punishment of those responsible.

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In Canada, Pierre Elliott Trudeau was installed as prime minister on 20 April, two days ahead of schedule, and proceeded three days later to dissolve Parliament and call for elections on 25 June.

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CASTRO WIDENS ROLE OF CUBAN MILITARY

In four major speeches during the past five weeks, Fidel Castro has been mainly preoccupied with the Cuban economy and with the lack of response to his calls for greater sacrifice and productivity. His speeches on 13 and 15 March were stern lectures to city dwellers for their "counterrevolutionary" tendencies. They also outlined Castro's idealized concept of a moneyless, arcadian utopia in Cuba. The tenor of these speeches is in great contrast to his theme a year ago, when he was aggressively proclaiming his advocacy of revolution in Latin America.

In his speech on 19 April Castro announced measures designed to expand considerably the role of the armed forces in organizing the Cuban economy. He revealed that agricultural brigades are being organized by the military and that civilian and military responsibilities will increasingly be merged.

Special "induction centers" have been opened with the immediate objective of detailing 50,000 youths to three-year semi-military stints in agricultural areas of Camaguey Province. Others who probably would not normally have been inducted into military service are likely to be sent to other provinces. Castro also announced that military instruction will be a part of the curriculum for all students in Cuba and said that "the bearing of arms will be

the most elementary duty of every citizen."

These martial decrees emphasize Castro's determination to go forward with his radical "revolutionary offensive" launched on 13 March when most small businesses were nationalized and all bars and night clubs on the island closed. In addition, the move reflects Castro's growing inclination to rely on his trusted companions from the 26th of July Movement and the struggle a decade ago against Batista. He announced on 19 April that all 91 of the top-level officers recently promoted were members of this group.

In a speech on 9 April Castro appeared to be trying to mollify his urban audience by praising the past role of the urban population in the Cuban revolution. This gesture may have resulted at least to some extent from growing discontent in urban areas following the austerity measures decreed in March.

Castro's dogmatic insistence on restoring momentum to the revolution through "moral incentives" and military discipline is certain to create further discontent. It is unlikely, however, that this unrest will be translated into any political threat so long as the military remains loyal to Castro.

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NEW ELEMENTS ENTER ECUADOREAN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

Former President Jose Maria Velasco charges that Interim President Otto Arosemena signed pacts which will favor rightist candidate Camilo Ponce in the 2 June presidential elections in which Velasco is considered front runner.

In an attempt to refute Velasco's claims, Arosemena revealed on 11 April that in November 1966, when he was parlaying leadership of a small but strategic bloc of constituent assembly deputies into his selection as interim president, he had agreed to name representatives of certain parties to his cabinet. His admission of the one pact may have increased the public's willingness to believe in the existence of others, purported copies of which Velasco gave to the press. In these alleged agreements, conservative and rightist independent deputies accepted Arosemena's timetable for remaining in office until 1 September 1968 in return for his administration's support for them in their own provinces. Charging that Arosemena also promised electoral aid to rival candidate, Camilo Ponce, Velasco says that if he is defeated by this "electoral fraud" he will call for revolution. US officials comment that the recently stepped-up and well-organized violence against Ponce rallies may be the work of hired Communist hoodlums.

Arosemena has thus far skillfully rebutted the charges contained in Velasco's spellbinding but frequently incoherent speeches. If the later pacts are proven genuine, however, the Arosemena government will be seriously weakened and the

"IN EVERY SITUATION, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THERE IS AN ESSENCE WHICH IS THE ONE THAT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD, WHICH MUST BE STUDIED AND THERE IS A SEA OF ACCIDENTAL THINGS WHICH CAN, AT TIMES, INFLUENCE THE ESSENCE OF THE MATTER, BUT MANY TIMES THESE CAN BE IDLE OR MEANINGLESS THINGS THAT MUST BE SEPARATED. AND THE SAME WAY WITH A MAN OR POLEMIST WHO IS RESPECTED--HE CANNOT ATTRIBUTE TO HIS ADVERSARY ALL SORTS OF FANTASIES IN ORDER TO STRIKE WITH ALL ELOQUENCE AGAINST THE PHANTOM, EVEN THOUGH THAT PHANTOM DOES NOT EXIST IN HIS ADVERSARY...."

--Jose Maria Velasco,
Ecuadorean presidential
candidate

validity of the 2 June elections will be compromised.

Ponce has been overshadowed in this controversy, which has revived Velasco's campaign. Meanwhile, third-running Andres Cordoba, the candidate of the center left, has recently gained surprising momentum in the important coastal area. His gains are due largely to efforts of Guayaquil Mayor Assad Bucaram, who has political ambitions of his own. This development could work against Velasco. The remaining three candidates--representing the extreme right, the Communist party, and the Unified Psychedelic Cybernetic movement--remain largely window dressing.

In the increasingly uneasy atmosphere, Arosemena has thus far ignored warnings from civilian and military officials and from democratic labor leaders that he should withdraw approval of the meeting

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of the Communist Latin American Permanent Congress of Labor Unity (CPUSTAL), scheduled to begin on 26 April in Quito. A Chilean Communist labor leader is already on the scene to organize the meeting and has told leaders of the Communist-dominated Ecuadorean Labor Confederation (CTE) that he

would like to establish CPUSTAL headquarters in Ecuador. The CTE hopes to use the meeting to stir up demonstrations during labor celebrations on 1 May. With political tensions rising, some violence could result.

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KILLING OF GUATEMALAN RIGHTIST LEADER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS

The assassination of a rightist terrorist leader by security forces in Guatemala City may cause new problems for the Mendez government.

ist counterterrorists and deter the rightists from some of their more blatant extralegal activities.

Raul Lorenzana, a ringleader in the kidnaping of Archbishop Casariego last month, was executed by government forces on 18 April. One of Lorenzana's aides was also killed. Oliverio Castaneda, a leader of the civilian counterinsurgency groups in Zacapa Department, was seized but later released.

The fact that Lorenzana and Castaneda were meeting points up the problem that President Mendez will have in dealing with the clandestine counterinsurgent groups. If the president takes no action against them, they are likely to continue their counterterrorist activity. If he moves too rapidly in disbanding them, however, the rightists and the military may begin more active coup plotting.

The Communist Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) apparently believe that the recent military changes and Lorenzana's death probably mean the end, or at least the moderation, of the government's repression against them.

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Lorenzana's death may stimulate renewed plotting against President Mendez by rightist terrorist groups. On the other hand, the summary execution may point up the security forces' determination to deal harshly with right-

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