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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

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
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

W A R N I N G

The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EST, 3 December 1970)

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Cambodia: *The Battle of the Roads*

Communist harassing attacks and ambushes along almost all of the country's main lines of communication continue to keep sizable numbers of government troops isolated and on the defensive. Cambodian Army operations to reopen several key roads have quickly bogged down, with heavy casualties sustained. In Phnom Penh, the Communists detonated a bomb in the US Embassy, their first terrorist act against the American presence.

Steady enemy harassment in Kompong Cham Province has prevented ten Cambodian battalions from regaining control of Route 7, between Prey Totung and Kompong Cham city; one government paratroop battalion was badly mauled in an ambush. Elements of the Viet Cong 275A Regiment, which is operating just north of Prey Totung, evidently are directing these attacks.

To the west, the Communists cut Route 6 at Bateay just southwest of Skoun. Seven government battalions, including five diverted from the "Chenla" task force, are trying to retake Bateay, but progress has been slow. Farther south on Route 6, a Communist assault temporarily closed the river ferry crossing at Prek Kdam, just 20 miles from Phnom Penh.


Government efforts to ease Communist pressure on Route 4 in the Kirirom area, southwest of Phnom Penh, have been temporarily abandoned following a series of enemy ambushes. The continuing presence of North Vietnamese main force units near the Pich Nil pass overlooking Route 4 indicates the importance the enemy attaches to keeping the highway closed. In the meantime, government officials are concerned over possible oil shortages because it is now impossible to reach the coastal refinery at Kompong Som. Other sources of supply for Phnom Penh are being investigated.

In the northwest, Cambodian Army forces have been unable to regain control of the town of Puok and to clear Route 6 between Puok and Siem Reap city. They did succeed, however, in reopening the

road between Siem Reap and its airfield. Regional government commanders reportedly were to plan another push on Puok, using forces from Battambang and Siem Reap cities.

Elsewhere in this region, the Communists ambushed another rice convoy near Pursat city on Route 5 and reportedly burned all 11 of its vehicles. (b)(3)
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enemy interference with commercial traffic in Battambang Province is also becoming more common, and the Communists have been warning truck drivers they would be killed if they haul rice. In addition, enemy propagandists near Moung reportedly are telling rice farmers to hold their crops for Communist buyers, and




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implied that the Communists want to cut off the flow of foodstuffs to Phnom Penh.



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
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Laos: *Beating the Communists to the Punch*

A large government harassing operation in northern Laos near the Communist logistic center at Ban Ban has met only limited resistance. By 1 December, a force of almost 1,350 irregular troops had secured the San Tiau airstrip. In addition, 850 government troops from Bouam Long moved into positions about four miles north of

forces trying to retake Mok Haw, a Laotian Army outpost 25 miles north of Luang Prabang that fell into enemy hands on 20 November. The government committed several additional companies of irregular and army troops to this operation, but they have been unable to budge an unexpectedly large Communist force, estimated at three battalions.



Communist Troop Relocations in the South

No significant fighting has occurred since 29 November, but the Communists apparently are sending more troops to the Bolovens Plateau area.


the Ban Ban valley and were making slow progress in their effort to attack Communist logistic assets in the area. Present plans call for the withdrawal of both forces after they have harassed Route 7 and Communist logistic troops and stockpiles in the Ban Ban area.

On the eastern rim of the plateau itself, the government irregular base at Site 38 has again fallen into Communist hands. Other irregular troops, although suffering temporary setbacks from vigorous enemy attacks, were able to set up some defensive positions around Site 165 after receiving air support. A government operation has been mounted to divert enemy attention from the Bolovens Plateau.

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The presence of government troops in this sensitive area should help disrupt enemy supply efforts into the Plaine des Jarres. The Communists can be counted on to react sharply, however, and they apparently see the deployment of government forces required by the Ban Ban operation as a chance to make gains west of the Plaine.

In other action in the north, a sustained Communist effort is pushing back government



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Vietnam: *Fallout from Son Tay*

Hanoi appears to have taken a down-to-earth "war is hell" attitude toward the Son Tay raid and US air strikes a fortnight ago. A high-level and knowledgeable North Vietnamese official reportedly said last week that Hanoi did not consider Son Tay an escalation and will not make US air attacks a major issue. He explained that the Communists realistically expect the US to continue aerial reconnaissance over the North and to retaliate when these flights are challenged. The threat of reprisals, however, would not deter the North Vietnamese from trying to shoot down the planes, but, the official went on, Hanoi was not of a mind to allow such matters to seriously jeopardize the Paris talks.

This attitude has been reflected in the way the Communists have played the affair: their propaganda has been noisy, but it has not gone beyond the position Hanoi has taken on reconnaissance since the bombing halt two years ago—that reconnaissance is a violation of North Vietnamese sovereignty and that the Communists will make every effort to stop it. Air strikes, however, are termed in propaganda as a violation of the US agreement to stop the bombing. In more than two years Hanoi never has raised these as excuses to either stall or break off the talks.

Despite its apparent relaxed attitude about some aspects of the air and commando raids, Hanoi is plainly embarrassed and wary that they were brought off with such ease and it is trying hard to plug the holes in North Vietnam's internal defenses. A flood of domestic broadcasts has reflected new measures, under close party control and high level military supervision, designed to ensure faster and more effective reactions from both militia and regular army units in the countryside. There has been mention of 24-hour

watches, better coordination, harder training, and many more outposts, sentinels, and bunkers. Aside from shoring up the North's defenses, Hanoi probably is seeking to fire the collective energies of the North Vietnamese populace to the level prevalent earlier in the war, but which has flagged since the US bombing halt in 1968. Hanoi may also harbor some hope that by painting an impressive picture of fortress North Vietnam, the allies may be dissuaded from mounting new commando assaults.

With so much attention riveted on POWs, Hanoi also has taken some steps to dress up its image on the prisoner question. The Foreign Ministry last week broke with past practice and provided [redacted] information that first had been requested more than 18 months ago on the whereabouts of missing American pilots. Radio Hanoi also has started to broadcast brief taped holiday messages from US captives as in past years.

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[redacted] The overriding considerations for Hanoi are its image and its belief that eventually it will be able to squeeze some concessions from Washington in return for a general prisoner release. Although neither a tougher policy toward captives nor any wholesale releases are likely, some additional gestures such as providing more information on missing American airmen, may be made to lend weight to Hanoi's professions of leniency.

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Action Picks Up in the South

In South Vietnam, Communist military activity picked up this week, but still featured the small actions that the enemy has been emphasizing for over a year and a half. The enemy shelled

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several province capitals and numerous smaller towns and military bases throughout the country. Casualties and damages were generally light.

The sporadic timing of the attacks reflects the current Communist practice of letting local field commanders set their own timetable for action. This permits the enemy to take advantage of local conditions and strike when ready—in contrast to previous so-called “highpoints,” that were generally well coordinated and often captured headlines abroad.

Individually these attacks seldom inflict heavy casualties or damage, but they are cumulatively substantial. For example, the Communists have succeeded in overrunning some 65 government outposts in the Mekong Delta so far this year. Although scattered successes on this scale have not rolled back pacification gains, they do help create a significant amount of insecurity in rural areas where the government is trying to consolidate its control.

Despite Communist emphasis on guerrilla tactics and other economy-of-force methods to

keep their losses down, South Vietnamese forces have triggered clashes that were costly to the enemy, especially in the Mekong Delta. Late last week, for example, heavy ground battles developed in three delta provinces as the result of aggressive ARVN operations. Stepped-up US and South Vietnamese operations in the coastal lowlands of the northernmost provinces comprising MR 1 have also flushed out concentrations of enemy forces and accounted for over 400 Communists killed there each week.

Some South Vietnamese commanders are reorganizing their forces to improve their performance in the many localized actions. For example, Major General Dzu, who assumed command of MR 2 last August, has directed his two divisions to operate in small units rather than in the often cumbersome multibattalion operations of the past. He has given his territorial security forces—Regional Forces and Popular Forces—a new system of goals and quotas to encourage more aggressiveness against the enemy. Already, Dzu claims that the ratio of enemy-to-friendly casualties has risen markedly since last summer. [REDACTED]

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USSR-VIETNAM: In his speech in Armenia on 29 November, Soviet party leader Brezhnev gave Moscow's most authoritative condemnation of the recent US air attacks in North Vietnam and reassured Hanoi of its continuing support. Brezhnev, who devoted considerably more attention to Vietnam than in recent speeches, also used the occasion to reject implicitly US contentions

about an “understanding” regarding reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam and to chide the Chinese about the need for united action “to sober up the much too adventurist hotheads in the camp of imperialism.” Brezhnev, however, gave no indication that Moscow expects the raids to disrupt seriously the Paris talks. [REDACTED]

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Malaysia-Singapore: *Nettlesome Neighbors*

Kuala Lumpur and Singapore appear compelled to put their worst foot forward in their relations with one another despite a host of trade and family ties, a common diligence in containing domestic Communist movements, and mutual desire for security under the projected Five Power Defense Arrangement. The Malay-dominated government in Kuala Lumpur suspects that Chinese leaders in Singapore may covertly support opposition Chinese political parties and leaders in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur is also apprehensive that, in the event of communal violence invoked by the Malaysians, Singapore would send troops over the causeway into southern Malaysia to protect the local Chinese population and Singapore's water supply.

Malaysia's basic dislike and distrust of Singapore was enhanced this fall when Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the last minute canceled a state visit to Kuala Lumpur. He was apparently irked because the Malaysian prime minister had not cleared with him the script of a grandstand effort to improve relations between neighbors. The scenario called for the presence of Foreign Minister Malik of Indonesia at the same time as Lee.

On Singapore's side, the island state is well aware of its isolated position between two large Malay neighbors. Although its economy is now booming, the country's leaders fear possible collaborative moves between Malaysia and Indonesia designed to hamper Singapore's predominantly entrepot economy.

Aside from the basic antagonisms between the two countries, a number of issues have cropped up in recent months that have further aggravated the situation. Both capitals read the

possibility of offensive intent in the other's current moves to build up its defense establishment with the acquisition of late-model sophisticated military hardware. Singapore is scheduled to negotiate with the Soviets over the possible limited commercial use of Singapore facilities by Soviet naval craft. Malaysia, however, is bound to be fearful of even a minuscule Soviet naval presence in the area.

In another development creating friction between the two countries, Kuala Lumpur has so far failed to approve an Asian Development Bank project that would finance an expansion of Singapore's water supplies from the Malaysian mainland. The amount of increase is apparently well within the volume of water provided by existing agreements, but both governments have taken umbrage at the manner in which the other has handled the problem. Singapore's water needs are currently expanding at the rate of seven percent a year.

This prickly relationship is bound to influence, if not disrupt, plans for the projected Five Power Defense Arrangement, which is scheduled to include Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. Already Malaysia has announced its decision to restrict the use of its Jungle Warfare School facilities, an establishment that was slated to become a Five Power training center next March. The move was directed primarily at Singapore because its contingents were largely Chinese. Although individual problems between Singapore and Malaysia can probably be ironed out, the easily bruised sensibilities and constant suspicions of both sides will make it difficult for the Five Power arrangement to get off the ground.

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Thailand: *Praphat's Day Looms Nearer*

Recent cabinet changes strengthen the hand of Deputy Prime Minister Praphat's supporters in the government and lend further weight to the possibility of Praphat's early succession. In reshuffling his cabinet, Prime Minister Thanom retained all previous members, but made one important ministerial transfer and added a politically significant new face.

General Krit Siwara, who has been moving toward closer political ties with Praphat, shifted from the Education Ministry to a specially created post in the Ministry of Defense. The shift can be viewed as a personal triumph for Krit—he has been impatient to move out of Education—and should considerably enhance his standing both within the cabinet and the army, where he is

mentioned more frequently as a successor to Praphat as its commander in chief.

Of potentially greater significance for Praphat forces, however, was Thanom's award of a deputy slot in the Ministry of Economic Affairs to Liberal Party chieftain Senator Prasit, who is one of Praphat's closest supporters and who has long coveted a cabinet post. The timing of his appointment appears to be related to the considerable support he is expected to be able to muster on the government's behalf in Parliament when the controversial budget bill is voted on later this month.

The cabinet changes will strengthen the impression that momentum is building for Praphat's early replacement of Prime Minister Thanom.

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German Problem Comes Up Again

East German - West German negotiations, the four power talks on Berlin, and the ratification of the Soviet and Polish pacts with Bonn are all at a crucial stage. Available evidence indicates that this is attributable largely to East German opposition to its allies' tendency toward compromise and the rapid pace of events favorable to Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik.

Government and party leaders of the Warsaw Pact states met in East Berlin on 2 December for discussions with the East Germans. The Soviet delegation, headed by Brezhnev, included Kosygin and Konstantin Katushev, the secretary in charge of relations with ruling Communist parties.

In the face of their arrival, East German party boss Ulbricht appeared intransigent, and East Germany kept up harassment of West German autobahn traffic to and from West Berlin, even after the ostensible reason for it no longer existed. This harassment ceased shortly after the Warsaw Pact leaders ended their one-day meeting. The communiqué after the meeting avoided mention of specific problems, but heading the list of topics discussed was that of "strengthening security and development of peaceful cooperation in Europe." The document also stated that the meeting took place in an atmosphere of "complete unanimity."

The brevity of the meeting, the end of the harassment, and the use of the words "peaceful cooperation" in the communiqué indicate that the pact leaders convinced the East Germans to be less rigid toward the four power talks and in their negotiations with Bonn. The end of the harassment is particularly striking because on 2 December East German border guards had indicated to travelers that it would continue for at least four more days. The use of the words "complete unanimity" in the communiqué may be intended to convey the impression that Ulbricht is now bound to a new policy.

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Bonn is continuing its efforts to improve relations with the rest of Eastern Europe.

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Chancellor Brandt will be in Warsaw on 6-9 December to sign the treaty with Poland, and West German officials have indicated that talks with Prague may begin in January. Foreign Minister Scheel has stated publicly, however, that ratifica-

tion of a treaty with any East European country, as well as the ratification of the Soviet - West German treaty, will depend on achievement of a satisfactory solution to the Berlin problem. [REDACTED]

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Italy: *Coalition Clears Major Hurdle*

Prime Minister Colombo substantially advanced his government's program when he won Chamber of Deputies approval on 30 November for his key economic bill despite hazards posed by Communists, ultraleftists, and neo-fascists. In the same session, parliamentary action was completed on Italy's first divorce law, thus moving one of the most divisive issues for the center-left coalition off center stage. Chances for final parliamentary approval of the economic bill in Senate action before the Christmas deadline now seem much improved.

A crucial vote of confidence on 28 November on tax aspects of the bill was a setback for the Communists because it had the procedural effect of killing all opposition amendments. The Communists, whose legislative amendments the center-left had, as a matter of principle until this year, always refused, sought to avoid the confidence vote and even persuaded the ultraleftist Proletarian Socialists to abandon their obstructionism in order to protect the Communist contri-

bution to the final economic bill. The ultraright, however, continued to insist on individual Chamber consideration of the thousand-odd amendments which had been presented. At this point, Colombo estimated correctly that by a vote of confidence he could safely force into line even his left-leaning coalition colleagues who have favored a closer working relationship with the Communists.

Movement on the economic bill has been particularly important because it is a government prerequisite for certain social reforms that were demanded in protest strikes last spring. A recurrence of strike activity in late November raised the threat of a new wave of protest strikes if the social reforms seemed to be postponed indefinitely. Other factors contributing to unrest in recent weeks have included sporadic student outbreaks, the threat of a Mafia scandal in Sicily, and the problems of establishing regional governments, highlighted by recurring violence in the southern city of Reggio Calabria. [REDACTED]

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Developments in the European Communities

The momentum engendered last December by the summit meeting of the Six at The Hague continues to be evident in community activities a year later. The talks with Britain are getting down to the important issues, specific steps toward closer economic and monetary union will be considered later this month, and "political consultations," intended as a step toward political unity, have gotten off to a modest start.

With their third ministerial level meeting scheduled next week, both London and the Six are considering ways to deal with such tough questions as the length of the transitional period Britain should have and how much it will have to contribute to the community budget. The community is likely to insist that London accept a single period of transition for both industry and agriculture, but the UK may get in return at least a percentage ceiling on how much it will have to pay during that time. Although there will be significant differences of view on the terms of such a compromise, coming to grips with this problem will itself be progress.

London may in fact be persuaded that it is necessary to speed up the negotiations—as suggested in a recent *Economist* editorial—and most of the EC members share this feeling. During Chancellor Brandt's recent visit to Rome, both the Italians and the Germans reaffirmed their hope that the negotiations could be substantially concluded by mid-1971. When British negotiator Rippon was in Paris recently, however, French Foreign Minister Schumann indicated this was expecting too much. The Pompidou government will be tough in bargaining about agriculture, and it may also be sensitive that hard-core Gaullists

would be offended should Britain achieve an entry accord during France's tenure as Council chairman from January to July 1971.

Paris is clearly anxious, however, for early implementation of the first stage of monetary union. It desires to defer consideration of the economic and political arrangements that would accompany monetary measures. Germany and the Netherlands, on the other hand, have criticized the Commission's proposals for slighting these aspects. The French preference for exploring institutional issues only after the community is enlarged may rest on the hope that London will be an ally against "supranationalist" solutions. Despite these differences there is still moderate optimism in Brussels that a compromise can be worked out that would enable the first steps to be taken early in 1971.

When the foreign ministers of the Six met in Munich last month, explicitly to discuss political matters, the agenda was concerned with discussions on the Middle East and a conference on European security. Most of the participants seem to agree that the meeting marked the beginning of an evolution toward a single European "voice," even though there were obvious disagreements, especially between France and the others in approaches to the Middle East and Mediterranean. These topics will, nevertheless, continue to be examined at the working level, and the foreign ministers agreed on measures to strengthen consultation among ambassadors of the Six in third countries and in international organizations.

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Hungary: *Party Congress Advances Kadar Reform Goals*

The party congress that ended on 28 November succeeded in raising Kadar's political reform programs to regime policy without either incurring Soviet displeasure or causing visible signs of internal disagreement.

Soviet party boss Brezhnev warmly praised party chief Kadar and gave a general endorsement to his programs. During the deliberations, Hungarian party leaders, who will be responsible for implementing changes in government structure, secret police activities, and party work, presented an unprecedented picture of unity and solidarity. Their speeches conveyed a convincing degree of political realism, setting limits on domestic reform and acknowledging obligations to the USSR and the world Socialist movement. On the final day of the congress, Kadar and his closest advisers gave relaxed and confident summations, inasmuch as they had succeeded in papering over, at least, and perhaps even overcoming, domestic and foreign opposition to Kadar's reforms.

One of the more important practical developments at the congress was party secretary Biszku's scheme for widening collective leadership in order to eliminate potential disruptions caused by any physical incapacitation of the leaders. Although Biszku did not specifically mention Kadar, it is well known that the latter's health is not robust. Biszku did not detail his proposed plan but indicated that more delegation of authority to subordinates is in the cards. Another important substantive development was the central committee's decision to reject any loosening of cultural controls—already the least restrictive in the Soviet-oriented world.

Top personnel changes were limited as Kadar apparently decided that stability and continuity were more important than bringing younger people into the leadership. The most important demotions were brought about by abolishing the post of candidate politburo member; Defense Minister Czinege, Culture Minister Ilku and

Deputy Premier Ajtai consequently lost their high party posts through this stratagem. Key promotions included party secretary Aczel's election to the politburo, ex-candidate member Karoly Nemeth's move to full politburo status and the addition of Mrs. Valeria Benke, a capable ideologist, to the politburo. The election of 45-year-old Miklos Ovari to the party secretariat increased the influence of liberals in Kadar's inner circle. Three fourths of the central committee members retained their seats.

The handling of economic questions also reflected a realistic approach. Kadar himself emphasized satisfaction with economic progress achieved during the current five-year plan period (1966-70) and asserted that major plan targets will be reached or overfulfilled. New goals for 1971-75 appear realistic and will permit concentration on key tasks.

According to Kadar, the New Economic Mechanism brought numerous economic problems into sharp focus, but progress is being made in solving them and the system operates efficiently. He stated that attention now will be focused on key industries that need modernization in order to increase their efficiency and to improve Hungary's competitive position. The Hungarians expect this to be accomplished in part by procuring up-to-date technology from the West, to be financed by boosting exports and by greater reliance on medium-term credits.

Also, in January some less important industrial monopolies are to be reorganized into multifirm trusts, with the expectation that decentralization and more independent management of enterprises will lead to more efficient operation. In agriculture, the congress reiterated the need to stimulate agricultural production, especially in the livestock sector, in part through increased use of chemicals and machinery. (b)(3)

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USSR: *Solzhenitsyn—A Prize and a Dilemma*

The award of the Nobel Prize for Literature to novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has again confronted the Soviet leadership with one of its most thorny problems—how to handle Stalin's reputation.

Solzhenitsyn's identification with this issue dates from 1962, and his difficulties with the regime stem from the political—rather than the literary—significance of his works. In that year, over the opposition of some other members of the leadership, Khrushchev personally authorized publication of Solzhenitsyn's first novel to further his own de-Stalinization campaign. This campaign was intended to ease the passage of the First Secretary's various schemes for reorganizing the Soviet system. Since then Solzhenitsyn has become a symbol for those opposed to the neo-Stalinist tendencies of the present leadership.

The Politburo, which dismantled many of Khrushchev's innovations, is slowly rehabilitating Stalin and has barred any criticism of the major periods of Stalin's rule. This trend has encouraged those forces in Soviet society who are anxious to maintain the status quo while alienating those who advocate change and continuation of de-Stalinization. Solzhenitsyn, however, has continued to criticize Stalin and the arbitrary use of power that made his "achievements" possible, and has openly spoken out against the regime's repression of liberal intellectuals.

Primarily because of his significance as a symbol of anti-Stalinism, the author and his works have been a matter of special concern to the Kremlin. The last-minute decision not to publish his novel, *The Cancer Ward*, was reportedly made at "high political levels." Other reports suggest that Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko was

behind the novelist's expulsion from the Writers' Union in November 1969.

Since the announcement in early October of the Nobel Prize award, there has been no condemnation of Solzhenitsyn or of the Nobel Committee by any Soviet political leader. Nevertheless, the Politburo itself was undoubtedly forced to wrestle with the question of whether to permit the novelist to accept the prize and how the USSR's public image could best be protected. Solzhenitsyn initially announced that he wanted to accept the prize personally in Stockholm. His statement was ignored in the Soviet Union, but the press and spokesmen for the Writers' Union quickly branded the Nobel Committee's decision as purely "political" and "provocative." The rather mild tone of the criticism that has appeared to date and the relative silence of the press in the last few weeks are in sharp contrast to the furor that surrounded Pasternak, who was forced to refuse the award in 1958.

Citing his fear that he would not be allowed to return to the Soviet Union from Stockholm, Solzhenitsyn finally announced on 27 November that he would prefer to receive the award at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow. He also stated that he is "ready to deliver the Nobel Lecture or hand it over in written form" within six months. For the regime, this decision eliminates unfavorable publicity that would have been associated with overt action to prevent the novelist from receiving the prize. Moreover, inasmuch as the authorities cannot easily threaten Solzhenitsyn with foreign exile, they may find it difficult to influence the content of his lecture. The most important aspect of Solzhenitsyn's maneuvering, however, is that the authorities may be faced with an outstanding anti-Stalinist holding the Nobel Prize in the Soviet Union.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Guinea Repels Second Incursion

The abortive overland attack last week against a small upcountry border town was almost certainly an integral part of the Portuguese-directed operation that began with the earlier seaborne commando assault on Conakry. With African emotions further inflamed, Lisbon and its NATO allies face rough going when the UN Security Council considers the episode again, probably sometime next week.

An armed group, probably consisting mainly of exiled opponents of President Toure, crossed into Guinea, almost certainly from Portuguese Guinea, late last week and attacked Koundara, an inland town some 200 miles north of Conakry. The Guinean defenders repulsed the attackers, many of whom were apparently captured.

The Koundara attack may have been undertaken mainly to show increased activity by Guinean dissidents in order to help mask extensive direct participation by regular Portuguese troops in the raid on Conakry. Members of the UN fact-finding mission to Conakry, after interviewing captured participants in the raid there, have stated that the attack force numbered from 350 to 500 men and consisted of two companies of regular Portuguese African troops augmented by a commando group and about 80 Guinean dissidents.

Portuguese spokesmen, who continue publicly to deny Lisbon's involvement in either incident, have by implication portrayed the Koundara ruckus as a case of defecting Guinean soldiers fighting their way to asylum in Portuguese Guinea. At the same time, these spokesmen have reported the "escape" to Portuguese Guinea of 25 Portuguese soldiers and civilians previously held captive in Guinea. The emphasis in the Portuguese press on the return of these men, who probably were taken from Guinea by the commandos on 22 November, supports the conclusion that their liberation was Lisbon's primary objective in the entire operation.

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Meanwhile, in battered Conakry conditions have largely returned to normal, although army and militia patrols and some roadblocks are still maintained. Military and medical assistance from other countries has begun to arrive in response to Toure's appeals. Moscow evidently airlifted some type of aid last weekend, and Cairo apparently delivered the medical aid it had promised. Algeria and Libya have provided something characterized by Conakry as "military assistance" and two Nigerian coastal patrol craft are now reportedly operating off the Guinean capital. Throughout Africa, the anti-Portuguese furor and manifestations of support for Toure continue unabated as arrangements progress for a special meeting of the Organization of African Unity's ministerial council in Lagos beginning on 9 December.

When the Security Council returns to the Guinea question, the Western powers may well be confronted with difficult choices. The report of the Council's fact-finding mission, due early next week, will apparently stress the extent of Portuguese involvement. These findings will likely be cited by the Africans and their friends as sufficient reason to declare Portugal guilty of aggression and to impose mandatory sanctions.

Although the Council is not likely to adopt such extreme measures, Portugal's NATO allies are certain to be faced with renewed demands that all countries refrain from giving Lisbon any assistance that could be used against either independent African states or indigenous groups fighting for freedom from Portuguese control. A resolution along these lines would probably attract the requisite nine affirmative votes, necessitating the use of a veto to block it. [Redacted]

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~~SECRET~~**Jordan: *Husayn Mending Fences Abroad***

King Husayn's tour this week points up a shift in the nature of the problems facing Jordan now that a period of relative calm has passed since the application on 9 November of the truce terms with the fedayeen. The focus of the King's attention has moved temporarily beyond internal events to external problems—the raising of funds abroad, the purchase of new armaments, and the reorientation of the Arab states following Nasir's death.

Despite occasional skirmishes between the fedayeen and the army, the situation generally has remained quiet enough to allow the Arab truce commission to start reducing its presence in Jordan. The chairman, Tunisian Bahi Ladgham, has left for home, although he will return as necessary; the military observer team has been cut to 30 men; and remaining difficulties are to be ironed out at Permanent Military Subcommittee meetings. These problems primarily center on bringing undisciplined fedayeen and trigger-happy troops under the control of their commands, but also include getting the fedayeen out of the northern towns and the army out of Zarqa.

Husayn obviously feels secure enough to leave Jordan at this juncture, however, or at least

has decided that the immediate internal problems must be subordinated to more pressing fiscal and political demands. He left Amman on 1 December to talk with King Faysal about money problems, and planned to go on to Cairo to discuss his growing fear that the Arab states have been concerting a policy inimical to Jordan.

Nasir had been a moderating influence in Arab policy toward Jordan, but the Sadat regime has played an equivocal role in its relations with Husayn, especially since he appointed Wasfi Tal as premier. The King is now seeking to restore a solid base of bilateral understanding with Egypt to counter the recent affirmations by Syria and the fedayeen of their intention to associate themselves with the proposed tripartite federation of Egypt, Sudan, and Libya.

Adding to Husayn's growing sense of isolation is his suspicion that the other Arab countries would like to get rid of the Palestinian question by creating a "state" out of portions of not only the Israeli-occupied West Bank but even of the East Bank of his kingdom. The King's announced plan is to call for an Arab summit meeting and place the Palestinian burden on collective Arab shoulders.

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Israel-Egypt: *Differing Views on Further Talks*

As Israel this week appeared to be moving closer to a decision on whether to return to the Jarring talks, Egyptian President Sadat adopted a harder public line regarding any further extension of the cease-fire.

All major Israeli political groups, with the exception of the right-wing Gahal, now generally agree that rectification of the standstill violations

is no longer a precondition for a return to peace talks under the auspices of UN mediator Jarring. A public debate continues, however, over the specific requirements for Israel's return.

Speaking to a Labor Party meeting on 29 November, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan stated that Israel was prepared for talks without prior conditions, but added that it had "certain

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guidelines" for negotiations. These were: a continued Israeli presence in the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and along the Strait of Tiran, and an agreement that no Arab army would cross the Jordan River westward toward Israel. These guidelines were not preconditions, Dayan said, because the Arabs would not have to sign their agreement in advance. "We will sit together and discuss these matters," the defense minister said.

Deputy Prime Minister Allon pointed out, however, that although Israel had not left the talks for good, "a political and strategic solution" must be found for the problem of the forward missile deployment.

[Redacted]

For its part, Cairo has continued to stress the necessity of an early resumption of meaningful contacts with Jarring, and to profess to believe that a renewal of active hostilities will result if

such contacts fail to develop. Egyptians at various levels have stated that Cairo could not accept another renewal of the cease-fire unless substantial progress were made toward implementing the UN Security Council resolution. Moreover, on 30 November President Sadat defined the Egyptian interpretation of "progress" in stronger terms than previously. He told his front-line troops that the cease-fire would be extended only if a timetable were established for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory.

[Redacted]

any kind of demonstrable movement toward resolving the Middle East impasse would be sufficient to permit Egypt to extend the cease-fire beyond 5 February, at least on a de facto basis. The publicity given Sadat's definition of what would represent progress may make this more difficult, however. Israeli Foreign Minister Eban promptly responded to Sadat's statement with a public affirmation that Israel would not negotiate on the basis of prior conditions.

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TURKEY: The tense political situation has eased temporarily with the selection on the 36th ballot of Sabit Avci, the former minister of power and natural resources, as speaker of the National Assembly. The month-long balloting was marked by dissension and acrimony. Prime Minister Demirel now faces the problem of getting parliamentary approval of such major legislation as the annual budget, the opium licensing law, and a controversial labor measure, as well as defeating six censure motions that are pending against his

government.

[Redacted]

Meanwhile, student unrest, marked by increasing violence, has reached a new zenith. Many schools have been closed temporarily, but presumably will reopen later this month following the Islamic holiday.

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India: *New Efforts in Strategic Northeast*

Since the 1950s, the diverse regional, ethnic, and tribal groups inhabiting remote northeastern India have aspired to greater autonomy or, in some cases, complete independence. The geographic isolation of the area and the tendency of the inhabitants to back their demands with armed rebellion had caused New Delhi to try a dual approach—a strong military presence combined with large amounts of economic assistance. Recently, however, New Delhi appears increasingly willing to make concessions, provided the region's security remains relatively assured.


Last April, New Delhi acceded to a 16-year-old tribal demand for the creation of an autonomous, largely self-governing region, Meghalaya. On 10 November, Mrs. Gandhi announced that Meghalaya would be elevated to full statehood. This surprise move follows a decision in September to grant statehood to the two union territories of Manipur and Tripura, where prolonged agitation had been encouraged by New Delhi's agreement to create the state of Nagaland in 1962.

New Delhi has shown considerable adroitness in dealing with tribal dissidence. Its confidence has been bolstered by relative calm in the region throughout the past year, although it still gives due recognition to the area's basic instability. In response to demands from the Nagaland government, New Delhi has agreed to raise a Naga regiment in the Indian Army, but has refused to withdraw its armed forces from Nagaland or to transfer responsibility for law and order from the governor it appointed to the locally elected chief minister.

Nevertheless, it seems likely that New Delhi will continue to be harassed by separatist pressures because of the competing tribal groups, their resentment of New Delhi's pervasive role, and their dissatisfactions with existing bounda-

ries. In the long-troubled Mizo Hills insurgents have not abandoned their hope of establishing an independent state of Mizoram. Although the Mizo rebels have obtained some arms and training from adjacent East Pakistan, they do not now constitute a serious threat.

It has not yet been made clear, moreover, how the government will handle the demands of Naga tribesmen in northern Manipur who are agitating for their own sub-state or for annexation to Nagaland. In addition, the 4,000-man Naga underground, split into extremist and moderate factions, remains a viable threat although it has been somewhat demoralized by the hardship of continually evading security forces and by a continuing drain of manpower because of surrenders and captures. From his refuge in England, Naga extremist leader Angami Phizo continues to advocate the revolutionary path to independence.


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Over-all, Assam appears to have withstood the tremors of possible political instability. These had been heightened by the recent resignation, due to ill health, of Chief Minister Chaliha, who had provided governmental continuity for the past 13 years. A successor has been chosen with New Delhi's blessing, and the central government has further demonstrated its goodwill by deciding to build a second, and probably uneconomic, oil refinery in Assam.



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Zambia: Kaunda Seeks a New Order


The recent adoption of a new constitution by Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) and a reorganization of government at the local level have contributed significantly to strengthening President Kaunda's control over the country. Armed with this new authority, Kaunda has already moved ahead, announcing major economic and social reforms.

The new constitution gives Kaunda wide-ranging powers and is designed to combat party factionalism, especially along tribal lines. The local government reform increases the party's control by giving government-appointed district-level administrators powers to oversee lower level officials.

Kaunda has also announced that the government will acquire control of Zambia's five foreign-owned banks, eliminate private insurance companies, and take over building-and-loan societies. Moreover, retail and wholesale trading licenses will not be issued to foreigners after 1 January 1972, except in a few specifically exempt categories. The government, therefore, will eventually assume control of virtually all enterprises not nationalized in 1968 and 1969.

In addition, Kaunda has disclosed a new reform measure that vests control of all land in the hands of the President. Rural tribal lands will no longer be the sole responsibility of traditional chiefs and village headmen, while private land will come under government ownership but will then be leased back on a long-term basis. Kaunda also established a national service that eventually will conscript educated citizens for civic and paramilitary training and for a tour of duty in the countryside.

Although these initiatives suggest radical changes in the administration of the country, Kaunda is likely to move slowly and stop short of provoking widespread dissension. The land reform is basically designed to spur the consolidation of remote settlements into larger villages near government services and to prod small economic enterprises to join cooperative ventures. Harsh application of the reforms is likely to fall primarily on unpopular minorities—especially on foreign residents and members of small religious sects and the opposition political party—all of whom carry little influence in Zambian affairs.



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WESTERN HEMISPHERE


Chile: *One Month of Allende's Government**Economic Measures*

The government is moving to implement some of Allende's campaign promises, but it is realizing that financial constraints are causing a problem in reconciling reality and ideology. Several cabinet ministers, in particular those of agriculture and public works, already are complaining that lack of funds will prevent them from undertaking desired programs.

In a public statement on 27 November Finance Minister Zorrilla said that the government's priorities over the next year or so would be aimed at establishing a socialist state and ending the "dependent" nature of the economy. To this end the government plans to increase the state control of banking, nationalize the mining sector, and expand the state's participation in foreign trade. On 1 December it nationalized a large "monopolistic" textile company.

Zorrilla added that direct foreign investment would be encouraged only when it could make a real technological contribution. He said that housing, public works, agrarian reform, export promotion, and reduction of unemployment would be stressed.

The Allende government now is considering the most expeditious way to complete the nationalization of the US copper companies that was begun during the Frei administration. Legislation to this effect will be sent to Congress soon, and may be accompanied by a proposal that would change the constitutional guarantees now existing for private property. If Congress fails to act promptly and favorably Allende could carry through on his "threat" to take the issue to the public via a plebiscite.

*The Christian Democrats*

The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is still trying to decide whether to oppose or collaborate with the government. Reports that the proposed constitutional reform of private property rights would be taken to a plebiscite if balked by "anti-patriotic" elements in Congress drew sharp criticism from PDC legislators. They have been quick to state their approval of the principle of nationalization of the copper companies, however.

The UP, in particular the Communist Party, is trying to drive a wedge between the wings of the PDC supporting the position of defeated presidential candidate Radomiro Tomic and that of former president Eduardo Frei. The Communist-directed UP tabloid went so far as to imply that Frei was associated with the assassination of Army Commander in Chief Schneider in October and therefore with a plot to deny Allende the presidency.

PDC Senator Renan Fuentealba on 30 November tried in turn to aggravate the divisions within the UP, playing on the long-time rivalry between the Communists and Socialists.

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Fuentealba emphasized the PDC's support for changes in Chilean society but stressed that they must be made within the present constitutional system.

The Communists


At a plenum of the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) last week, Secretary General Luis Corvalan gave a speech attesting to the major role his party plays in the Allende government. He emphasized measures already taken by the administration that parallel PCCh policies and asserted that the ultimate goal of a "people's state" is impeded by Chile's present constitution, legal system, and entire institutional structure.

Corvalan's speech implies that PCCh leaders are confident that anti-Communist opposition in Chile now is weakened and that they no longer need to be cautious in their exercise of political power. *Pravda's* account of the speech portrays

the PCCh in a more militant and revolutionary light than previous Soviet press commentary, which had pictured the Chilean party as a reasonable partner in a coalition having wide appeal. This treatment suggests that the USSR is less worried than before about possible US and internal Chilean reactions to greater Soviet attention to the PCCh.

The Military

Schneider's murder solidified military support for Allende's government as little else could have.




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Mexico: Cabinet Appointments

The cabinet appointed by newly installed President Luis Echeverria reflects his own high standards and further enhances the outlook for good relations with the US. His choices for politically sensitive posts are strong, well-qualified men. Those who will deal with Mexico's most difficult problem—rural poverty—have intimate and extensive knowledge in the field.

The agriculture secretary, Bernardo Aguirre, has held office in his state of Chihuahua, one of the most important agricultural regions, and Aguirre himself is a rancher. The head of agrarian affairs, Augusto Gomez Villaneuva, is a vigorous lawyer in his late 30s who headed the powerful national peasants confederation, the rural arm of the official party. The new minister of education,

whose policies might affect the still explosive student situation, is a highly respected educator, Victor Bravo Ahuja. The labor and interior ministries, both stepping stones to the presidency, are headed by close friends of the president, Rafael Hernandez Ochoa and Mario Moya Palencia.



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Guatemala: *Some Success in Anti-Communist Campaign*

The terrorists are beginning to feel the squeeze of the tough security operations launched last month, and the chance of a retaliatory attack on US or Guatemalan officials remains high.

Several terrorist leaders have been captured, including the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) intelligence chief "Antonio" and long-time Communist Party (PGT) central committee member, Huberto Alvarado. Other active terrorists and collaborators are in custody, as well. [redacted] security is becoming a serious problem for the terrorist organizations because so many persons able to provide information have been arrested.

[redacted] the FAR leaders are convinced that "Antonio" and Alvarado will be killed by the police, and want to join with the PGT in an assassination attempt against two US officials.

Even though the security forces seem to be making some promising headway against the terrorists, the less sophisticated aspects of the state of siege operations continue to compound the

government's political problems. Two leftist intellectuals, both associated with the university and both frequently cited as "intellectual authors" of subversion, were shot this week, apparently by clandestine counterterrorist squads. In addition, five unidentified bodies were found in Guatemala City. These shootings and the government's unprecedented search of the university have raised the fury of the leftist opposition. The rector of the National University of San Carlos declared that a dialogue with the government is no longer possible and that "the battle lines are drawn." The leftist-oriented press association is similarly outraged by strict censorship requirements and by the "disappearance" of three of their colleagues—one being, in fact, "Antonio." The general public has been dismayed at the highly visible excesses of the security forces, such as the shearing of long-haired youths in public, the arrest of prominent members of the opposition parties, and the recent air force attack on a Salvadoran fishing fleet mistaken for an "invasion force." In response to widespread criticism, President Arana addressed the nation with a plea for tolerance of government errors in recognition that drastic methods are needed to rid the country of violence. [redacted]

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Nicaragua: *Political Negotiations Under Way*

Leaders of the two major parties have entered into negotiations on constitutional reform and presidential succession that may determine the country's political direction for the next decade.

According to an agreement reached last week between President Somoza and the leader of the opposition Conservative Party, Fernando Aguero, the scheduled 1972 general elections would not be held. Instead, at the end of Somo-

za's term, a transitional government elected by a constituent assembly would be installed for perhaps two or three years. Somoza would remain as head of the armed forces during this period and would be able to run for the presidency after the transitional government.

Both Somoza and Aguero would gain under such a plan. Somoza, who is constitutionally barred from seeking immediate re-election, would be able to protect his political flank from the

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sniping of opponents of continuismo and advance his political ambitions without blatantly ignoring the law. At the same time, however, he would be spared the necessity of relinquishing the presidency to a successor for a regular five-year term. Moreover, during the term of the transitional government, Somoza's party would no doubt control the congress, most of the cabinet posts, and, of course, the military.

Aguero, for his part, would attain his major short-term objective of ensuring that Somoza stepped down in 1972 and also gain for his party a more substantial role in the government. Aguero is, moreover, interested in the Colombian National Front system, which regularly alternated power between the Conservative and Liberal parties. He probably hopes that a transitional government could set the stage for such an arrangement in Nicaragua.

Subsequent meetings between the governing Liberal Party and the opposition Conservatives will seek agreement on the precise composition of a transitional government, specific changes in the



Aguero



Somoza

electoral and judicial systems, and a statement of broad policy objectives. If Somoza allows Aguero and his followers a significant degree of participation in the transitional government, chances for an agreement are quite good. Leaders of other political factions, realizing that a Somoza-Aguero accord could permanently condemn them to the political periphery, would undoubtedly attack any arrangement, but to little avail.

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Argentina: *Political Developments*

The military government of President Levingston will soon unveil a political plan and an economic development program, designed to move Argentina gradually toward a return to constitutional government. Levingston has made it clear, however, that before elections can be held the proper conditions must be created and that this process will take at least another four years.

[Redacted]

the President appears to have put to rest the growing sentiment for an accelerated return to constitutional civilian government. Speaking before a group of nearly 2,000 military officers on

16 November, Levingston played on their concern about a Marxist government in Chile by saying that the armed forces must provide the continuity of leadership that will enable Argentina to deal with its neighbors—Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay—that are in danger of succumbing to "socialist pressure." He stressed that Argentina must now demonstrate that "democracy" is the best system for meeting the problems common to the area.

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
Levingston also appears to have calmed the growing military frustration with the lack of progress on the domestic scene since the armed forces took over the government in 1966. The

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new economic team appointed last month has reoriented economic policy toward rapid industrialization and the President has announced that a comprehensive national development plan will be made public later this month. At the same time, a "political plan" is being devised that is intended to move the country toward civilian government in stages that will coincide with the development plan.

Two of the immediate political tasks the President has already set for the government are the elimination of contacts between former president Juan Peron in Spain and top Peronist leaders in Argentina, and the extremely difficult problem of limiting political activity by the labor unions.



President Levingston appears to be embarking on an ambitious course and he must retain the support of the military if he is to implement his wide-ranging political and economic plans. To do this he must show early progress in dealing with Argentina's economic problems and find some way to deal effectively with the growing problem of urban terrorism.

Terrorist groups, most claiming to be left-wing Peronists, have become increasingly bold in their ventures in recent weeks. US installations and official personnel have been the frequent targets of these groups, probably for publicity reasons as much as out of fundamental anti-Americanism. If it should become necessary to call in the military to help solve this growing problem, it would undoubtedly create a serious irritant in President Levingston's relations with the military.



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URUGUAY: Montevideo experienced an upswing in urban terrorism this week with a flurry of Tupamaro bombing attacks and the appearance of a right-wing anti-Tupamaro terrorist group. The targets of the Tupamaro raids included an International Telephone and Telegraph communication center and several progovernment political

clubs. On 26 and 27 November a new organization calling itself the "National Armed Defense" carried out minor attacks on the homes of relatives of known Tupamaros. The group pledged four Tupamaro deaths for every citizen killed by the left-wing terrorist group.



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