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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

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44

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
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The **WEEKLY SUMMARY**, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

W A R N I N G

The **WEEKLY SUMMARY** contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EST, 4 December 1969)

Far East

	<u>Page</u>
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	1
VIETNAM	2
Opposition politicians are making the most of the incident at My Lai to embarrass the South Vietnamese Government and to further their own goals, while Buddhists, taking advantage of the atmosphere of protest, are planning demonstrations in support of their religious, minority, or political aspirations. On the war scene, there are signs the Communists will step up activity early this month, probably featuring shellings and sapper probes.	
SINO-SOVIET TALKS YIELD ONLY WORDS, WORDS, WORDS	5
The Chinese and Soviets aim harsh words at each other as the border talks remain deadlocked.	
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE MALAYAN PENINSULA	7
The militant arm of the Malayan Communist Party is trying to re-establish its bases in northern Malaysia.	

Europe

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE	9
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMS CONTROL	10
A number of significant advances in the field of arms control has occurred in the past two weeks. They generally are arousing expectations for further meaningful disarmament measures.	

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- PARTY CALLS FOR SUPERVISION OF YUGOSLAV PRESS 12
 The Communist party has called for increased supervision of Yugoslavia's information media through adoption of new laws to put an end to the "negative by-products" of the press.
- SOVIET FARM CONGRESS ADOPTS NEW CHARTER 13
 This is the first in 35 years and remains a conservative model for the management and operation of the collective farms.
- CONDITIONS FOR AMERICAN DESERTERS IN SWEDEN IMPROVE 14
 The majority of American expatriates seem to be in the process of being successfully integrated into Swedish society with the help of a wide variety of government programs.
- Middle East - Africa
- THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 15
- BIG FOUR PEACE TALKS RESUME AS MIDEAST STRIFE CONTINUES 16
 The Four Power talks on a Middle East peace settlement reopened this week after a five-month recess, but the Israelis are maintaining their adamant military and diplomatic stance.
- SOMALIA'S POLITICAL SCENE REMAINS MURKY 17
 Six weeks after the coup, the Supreme Revolutionary Council is still sorting itself out, but there are signs that frictions and factions are developing among the council members.
- GROWING OPPOSITION TO LIBYAN JUNTA 18
 After three months in power, Libya's Revolutionary Command Council is plagued by several challenges to its position. President Qaddafi, in particular, is reported to be facing growing opposition.
- ELECTIONS SCHEDULED IN PAKISTAN 19
 President Yahya Khan last week outlined a timetable and laid down guidelines for a return to civilian rule, steps that should reduce the pressures that have been building up against the government.

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CRUCIAL ELECTIONS IN KENYA SCHEDULED FOR 6 DECEMBER 20
 The primary elections will determine the Kenya Africa National Union candidates for Parliament, but the way they are conducted, as well as the outcome, may in large measure set the course of future events in Kenya.

Western Hemisphere

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE 21

NEW GUERRILLA INCIDENTS OCCUR IN GUATEMALA 22
 The army has mounted a large counterinsurgent operation in the northwest, where guerrillas have occupied several small settlements over the past two weeks.



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ATTENTION SHIFTS FROM THE MILITARY TO POLITICS IN CHILE 24
 Repercussions from the military confrontation with the government are diminishing as the presidential campaign shifts into high gear.

CUBA SEEKS TRADE TIES WITH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 25
 Some countries may be receptive to Cuban initiatives for closer economic ties.

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FAR EAST

The seven-week-old Sino-Soviet border talks being held in Peking are not going well. Both sides, particularly the Chinese, have resumed the harsh war of words, and there is strong evidence that the Soviets have rejected several Chinese demands. The Chinese, meanwhile, are continuing their protracted "war preparations" campaign, [redacted]

[redacted] The campaign, however, is designed to promote national unity as much as it is to show the Soviets that China is ready for an attack.

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The war in South Vietnam shows signs of picking up, probably with a new round of enemy shellings and small-unit attacks later this month. On the political scene in the south, the government has left itself extremely vulnerable to criticism over its handling of the My Lai massacre case. Opposition figures and groups, who have been more vocal on a number of matters recently, are already castigating President Thieu. He, however, is not expected to move very soon against his more prominent opponents.

In Laos there are signs pointing toward a higher level of enemy activity in coming weeks. In recent days the Communists have overrun a number of government positions near the Plaine des Jarres, and enemy troop movements in the south indicate the Communists are preparing for another round of attacks against government outposts in the Muong Phalane area.

The Cambodian political scene is more disturbed than it has been in ten years. A number of government leaders are incensed at Prince Sihanouk's constant interference in the affairs of the cabinet he mandated to run the country. A public congress later this month could well be the setting for a showdown between Sihanouk and these government leaders. At this juncture, however, the outcome of this challenge to Sihanouk's authority is uncertain.

The New Zealand parliamentary elections on 29 November returned the ruling National Party to power with about the same small majority, despite a strong challenge by the opposition Labor Party. Prime Minister Holyoake has said he would continue to support US policies in Southeast Asia. [redacted]

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VIETNAM

The Critic's Choice: War,
Politics, Religion...

The South Vietnamese Government's handling of the affair of My Lai has left it extremely vulnerable to criticism by opposition elements who have recently begun to agitate more openly against the regime. Official statements have denied that a massacre took place and have shown no sense of concern that the truth be found out. According to the press, a spokesman for President Thieu stated that the government classified the incident at My Lai as "an act of war" and considers the case closed.

This seeming insensitivity has provided Senator Tran Van Don with a ready-made issue by which he could have embarrassed the government and furthered his political ambitions. After conducting an investigation on the spot, however, Don said it was impossible to arrive at a conclusion about the case now until further evidence is brought out by military tribunals in the US. Vice President Ky also took exception to the government's hasty termination of the case and asked the Ministry of Defense to conduct a thorough investigation.

Taking advantage of the continuing atmosphere of protest, Buddhist monks of Cambodian descent demonstrated in Vinh Binh Province in support of an earlier Saigon sit-in. The militant An Quang Buddhists, moreover,

now have dropped their extreme caution of recent months to advocate a variation of the third force alternative. One of the country's smallest and least known minorities, the Chams, have also been encouraged by other protests to plan a demonstration alleging government discrimination against them.

Although the Cambodian monks were easily dispersed by the police in Vinh Binh, and there is considerable doubt that the Chams can actually generate a demonstration, the militant An Quang Buddhists may again be a problem for the government. The militants have apparently chosen to risk the relationship of constrained good will they had developed with the government and have defied an official prohibition against political discussions at the An Quang Laymen's Conference held last weekend. According to press reports, the Buddhists restated an earlier position that dissociates them from both the Saigon government and the Communists, whom they classify as two warring forces that do not have the support of the people.

In an apparent effort to offset the An Quang meeting, the Catholic Greater Solidarity Force--a hard-line, progovernment political party--held a meeting to condemn both the third force idea and the enemy's proposals for a coalition government. The Catholics paraded past the US Embassy and for emphasis

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took their anti-Communist banners to the National Assembly building.

Meanwhile, President Thieu is minimizing criticism of his government.

There is evidence that Thieu may take legal action against some of the lesser opposition activists, but he probably will not try to take on any of his more prominent opponents for the present.

The Enemy's Choice: When and Where


The enemy maintained pressure with shellings and limited ground attacks during the week. The heaviest action again took place more than 100 miles north of Saigon where North and South Vietnamese forces are fighting for control of a remote border region. There were numerous signs pointing to another round of stepped-up enemy activity early this month, again probably featuring increased shellings and sapper probes.

In the Mekong Delta region, South Vietnamese Army commanders appear generally confident they can handle the current enemy threat, but some are apprehensive at the prospect of taking on even more North Vietnamese reinforcements.

The commanding general of IV Corps recently said that his forces should be able to defeat the Communists now in the delta in a year or two. He claimed that the two North Vietnamese regiments and other replacements sent into the delta during the summer have found the region strange and inhospitable and have been unable to carry out aggressive operations. He was uncertain what might happen, however, if still more enemy troops are sent into the IV Corps area.

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Officers commanding the major South Vietnamese field units in the delta also maintain that the current situation is well in hand. In northern IV Corps, the appearance of North Vietnamese replacements in Viet Cong units is being interpreted more as a reflection of Viet Cong weakness than of new Communist strength. To the south, ARVN commanders appear confident that recent sweep operations have effectively neutralized the 273rd Regiment holed up in the U Minh Forest. They worry about the situation along the Cambodian border, however, where the local South Vietnamese commander has few regular army units at his disposal. He says that he could not stop a strong Communist attack in that area without sizable reinforcements.

This caution is well warranted. The enemy's winter-spring campaign is just getting under way, and enemy forces in some sectors of the delta have only recently become more aggressive. Several ARVN units have taken heavy casualties in the past two weeks.

It remains to be seen whether field-grade officers and their troops will develop new esprit or will be shaken if heavy contacts continue and their losses rise.

The enemy's increasing concern over the situation in the delta has been evident ever since last spring when the Communists began sending large North Vietnamese troop units into the area for the first time in the war. North Vietnamese forces are being sent into the delta probably because of the enemy's desire to build up weakened Viet Cong units in the region and, as an important corollary, regain contact with the millions of people in the area who have been coming increasingly under the influence of the government. The Communists probably believe that these objectives are critical, either if the war is prolonged or if there is some break toward a cease-fire and political settlement.

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SINO-SOVIET TALKS YIELD ONLY WORDS, WORD, WORDS

Peking has made its most harsh and direct attacks against Moscow since the Kosygin - Chou En-lai meeting on 11 September. A congratulatory message to Tirana on Albania's 25th National Day directly condemned the "Soviet revisionist ruling clique" and Chinese public commentary has weighed in heavily against Moscow's "counterrevolutionary collusion" with the US. This attack and the subsequent Soviet response, is the most dramatic indication to date that the border talks are not going well.

The new round of Chinese polemics was capped by Chou En-lai at a reception the Albanians gave in their embassy on 29 November. Chou refrained from attacking the Soviets by name but, using the well-understood euphemism of "social-imperialism," condemned Moscow for its "aggressive ambitions" and called for full "psychological and material preparations" for war. His remarks were then eagerly amplified by the Albanian ambassador, who accused the "Brezhnev-Kosygin clique" of "bloody provocations" and military buildup along the Chinese frontier. The uninhibited attack caused the Soviet bloc diplomats in attendance to walk out in Chou's presence. The Albanian ambassador's blunt remarks obviously had Peking's approval and Moscow will rightfully interpret them as a deliberate Chinese effort to resume open propaganda exploitation of the border conflict.

Moscow is already edging close to resuming polemics. A stinging Radio Moscow commentary to China on 2 December avoided direct mention of the Chinese but was transparently aimed at recent Chinese propaganda attacks. Vividly conjuring up the horrors of nuclear war, it condemned "modern adventurists" who generate "war frenzies" in their own countries and criticize measures taken by others to ease international tensions.

The Chinese apparently hope to place the onus on Moscow by charging that the Soviets are using military pressure to force a new "unequal" settlement on them. Peking is genuinely nervous about the border situation, however, and seems to have little to gain by breaking off the talks.

Meanwhile, the Chinese are broadening the scope of their "war preparations" campaign.


Fundamentally, however, most of what is currently billed as "war preparations" continues to be used to promote nationwide unity and unpopular domestic programs.

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COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE MALAYAN PENINSULA

The Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO), the militant arm of the Malayan Communist Party, has stepped up activities since the May postelection riots in Kuala Lumpur and is trying to re-establish bases in northern Malaysia. Several clashes between the CTO and the authorities have taken place in recent months, but the Malaysian security forces appear capable of keeping the situation under control.

After the end of the ten-year-long emergency in 1960, the CTO was generally content to lie low in base camps in southern Thailand, free of harassment and able to recruit, train, and re-equip. In early 1968, it announced plans to move from "revolutionary" to "armed" struggle. They instigated attacks on Malaysian security groups but met with little success.

Since early 1969, the CTO has increased its strength by one third--roughly from 900 to 1300, gaining support mainly from the Chinese, but also from ethnic Malays in the border area. The appeal to the Malays marks a distinct change from previous CTO tactics in which recruiting efforts were limited almost exclusively to the Chinese. This appeal to both sides, in a country where hostility between Chinese and Malay is endemic and racial tensions flare quickly, seems unlikely to be successful at the present time.

In building their influence south of the Thai border the Communists are expanding propaganda and political action and, at the same time, are attacking Malaysian security forces to prove their renewed militancy. In the propaganda sphere, a statement from Peking last August, attributed to the Malayan Communist Party, urged peoples of all races to overthrow the Rahman government. The CTO is also supported by a new clandestine radio station located in China, which has been broadcasting similar appeals. In addition, CTO cadre are apparently using coercion against the local population to develop logistical and political support.

On the action side, sightings of small CTO groups have greatly increased during the past few months in West Malaysia near the Thai border, and several major incidents of violence against security forces have occurred. The CTO has had the worst of it in these encounters, but its increasing presence ties down much of Malaysia's internal security apparatus. Should further racial rioting break out elsewhere the police and military would be hard put to handle both problems.

To complicate matters the Thai authorities, convinced that the CTO will return eventually to Malaysia, are more concerned with their own insurgents than in joint efforts with Kuala Lumpur against the CTO. The Malaysians realize they will have to bear the brunt of the burden.

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EUROPE

The Soviets this week were engaged simultaneously in four highly important negotiating sessions. In the summit meeting in Moscow they and their East European allies were grappling with problems concerning Germany, undoubtedly with the East Germans arguing against too rapid an accommodation with the Brandt government. A renewal of the Warsaw Pact's call for a European Security Conference is also expected.

In the talks in Peking the Soviets are reported to be meeting stiffer resistance, as both sides gradually raised the level of public recriminations. In Helsinki, the Soviets' serious, nonpolemical approach maintained the impression that they mean business in the arms talks. The other US-Soviet bilateral discussions—on the Middle East—were suspended as the four powers took up the subject again through their ambassadors to the UN. The Soviets have not yet replied to the US settlement proposals of 28 October, but the nature of their response seems foreshadowed by the negative indications from Cairo.

In its contacts with West Germany, Pankow seems to be escalating its demands to test the limits of Bonn's propensity to make concessions. Talks on transportation and postal matters now are recessed, in part because the East Germans do not want to appear too forthcoming toward Bonn in view of the Moscow meeting with their allies.

The compromise reached at the summit meeting of the European Communities this week offers hope for progress on admitting new members. Agreement was reached to work for a settlement on agricultural financing by the end of this year and to move rapidly toward achieving a common position before opening negotiations with applicants. There was informal agreement that such negotiations could start in about six months.

Norway, Denmark, and Sweden plan to present a resolution at the Council of Europe meeting next week calling for the suspension of Greece from that organization. The outcome of a vote on this question is not yet clear.

The UN General Assembly's political and security committee this week approved several resolutions on peaceful uses of the seabeds. One, opposed by both the US and USSR, calls for a moratorium on claims and exploitation of those portions of the ocean floor lying beyond national jurisdiction. Another asks the Secretary General to poll the UN membership on the feasibility of holding a world conference to lay down the limits of national jurisdiction.

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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMS CONTROL

A number of significant advances in the field of arms control have occurred within the past two weeks, including US-USSR simultaneous ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), West German signature of that document, and the US statement of intent to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on chemical and biological warfare (CBW). These developments are arousing expectations about further meaningful disarmament measures, but some arms control resolutions which may be adopted by the UN General Assembly later this month may not necessarily advance this goal.

Twenty-four countries now have completed ratification of the NPT, which was opened for signature in July 1968. A total of 70 other nations have signed the treaty but have not yet ratified it. The treaty will enter into force when 19 of these states finish the ratification process. This could happen within a matter of weeks. A number of the former British dependencies, for example, have signed the document. They generally have ratification procedures similar to that of the UK--no constitutional requirement of parliamentary consent--and presumably could take final action on short notice. There are 13 states in this group alone.

Further action by at least some of the so-called nuclear threshold countries and the members of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) is also likely. Sweden and Japan, both threshold

nations, have indicated that they will be acting shortly--Sweden to ratify and Japan to sign. Bonn, and the other EURATOM countries, will not ratify the NPT until EURATOM has worked out an acceptable agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency on safeguards against the diversion of nuclear fuels to weapons use. Bonn's signature should facilitate the opening of negotiations toward such an agreement.

The most significant of the several CBW proposals being floated during the current disarmament debate in the UN General Assembly's political and security committee are those of the USSR, Sweden, and Canada. The Soviets are inclined to press to a vote their proposed resolution that praises their draft convention that would ban the production, development, and stockpiling of CBW agents and require the destruction of existing stocks.

Sweden has been notably successful in securing backing from a number of the other nonaligned nations for its proposal that would have the General Assembly condemn and declare contrary to international law the use in war of all CBW agents, including tear gas and herbicides. This position is not in accordance with US views on the nonuse provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Most Western nations support the Canadian proposal that would evenhandedly refer all CBW resolutions proposed at the UN to the Geneva disarmament talks for further consideration.

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Prospects for UN endorsement of the US-USSR draft seabeds treaty have been improved somewhat by the US decision to propose revisions of the treaty's verification arrangements and certain of its formulations on applicable boundaries. Treaty critics had focused on these sections, and a treaty so revised could sway a number of members to support it. The Soviets have stated privately, however, that Moscow's review of the proposed revisions would be long and complex and may not be completed before the General Assembly adjourns later this month.

A number of the smaller countries, led by Mexico, have pro-

posed Assembly resolutions intended to prod the superpowers on disarmament matters. One of the more troublesome resolutions would have the Assembly call upon the US and the USSR to stop further work on strategic weapons systems not yet operational. The Dutch are circulating an alternative draft that would call on all nuclear weapons states merely to refrain from actions prejudicial to the success of SALT.

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PARTY CALLS FOR SUPERVISION OF YUGOSLAV PRESS

The Communist party has taken a first step to increase government control of Yugoslavia's information media. On 26 November the Executive Bureau adopted a 10,000-word "special document" advocating new laws to regulate the media and creation of "democratic social machinery" to put an end to "sensationalism, vulgarity, ideological confusion, and catering to special interests" in the press. The document was the result of extensive debate in the Presidium, the party's policy formulating body, during a meeting last month. The meeting had been called to consider ways to counter the "negative by-products" of the unrestrained press.

The new machinery presumably would include some form of high-level news management board to exercise over-all supervision. Each publication would set up its own editorial council that would ensure compliance with the objectives set forth in the new law. Publishers, editors, and individual journalists would all be liable for the publication's content.

This action came after a series of publications violated, in the leadership's view, Yugoslavia's basic policy objectives. A Zagreb youth weekly, Pop Express, for example, was banned recently by the public prosecutor for carrying articles "seriously detrimental to public morals and especially to those of children and youth." Its features included "101 Ways to Make Love" and "101

Ways to Avoid the Draft." Although the Zagreb regional court subsequently rejected the ban and only one issue was actually suppressed, the government had registered its dissatisfaction.

In Bosnia, republic party officials took exception to the literary magazine Zivot for publishing attacks against party officials. Tito himself publicly condemned the production of a recent play critical of the party's methods of reshaping the country after World War II. In the most serious case, however, the government suppressed Literary News for criticizing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on the eve of a visit to Yugoslavia by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. The newspaper's editorial board was forced to resign and its editor was sentenced to six months in prison for "slandering" a foreign power.

The Yugoslav press, radio, television, and theater now is subjected only to loose post facto control. The fact that the Presidium debate over the new guidelines recognized the importance of freedom of speech to Yugoslavia's self-managing society suggests that even among party leaders there is a reluctance to consider formal censorship. Attempts to incorporate the Presidium's restrictive recommendations in new legislation are certain to raise controversy in the government's legislative bodies. Furthermore, the media can be expected to fight efforts to restrict its prerogatives.

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SOVIET FARM CONGRESS ADOPTS NEW CHARTER

Last week in Moscow, representatives of the USSR's collective farms "unanimously" adopted a new model charter, the first in 35 years. Although proposals to amend the draft were legion, the ratified document reflects few of these changes and remains a conservative model for the management and operation of the country's 36,000 collective farms.

Such recent agricultural reforms as a guaranteed annual wage, the creation of incentive funds and a unified system of social security benefits are incorporated in the new charter. The charter also permits private plots and livestock, inter-kolkhoz cooperative ventures and auxiliary enterprises on the farm. Elections may be either by secret or open ballot, thereby rejecting the suggestion to make the secret ballot mandatory.

Long-standing controversial issues that sparked lively debate after publication of the draft charter last April have been ignored or subject to compromise. The demand for a national collective farm union that would have usurped some of the decision-making powers of the Ministry of Agriculture has been shunted aside in favor of what appears to be a less contentious organization of collective farm councils. The new councils, to be formed on the na-

tional and local level, apparently will be only advisory and pose no threat to continued centralized control--the chairman of the national council, already formed, is also the minister of agriculture.

Another source of controversy, the form of farm labor organization, was completely ignored in the congress proceedings. The link, a small well-equipped unit of labor assigned to one plot or crop over a relatively long period of time, is touted by some as superior to the larger brigade, commonly the basic unit of farm labor. This issue has been bitterly contested over the past few years but the charter leaves the choice of the labor organization up to the farm.

A proposal to free production and marketing from state control was firmly rejected at the charter congress. The politburo's expert on agricultural affairs, Polyan-sky, stated that the government will continue to issue procurement targets for each farm.

The charter is only a model to be followed on each farm according to local conditions and is vague on many points. Thus, relatively open discussion inspired by the draft document is unlikely to end.

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CONDITIONS FOR AMERICAN DESERTERS IN SWEDEN IMPROVE

Efforts to integrate American expatriates into Swedish society are showing signs of success.

Of the 294 military absentees and war resisters currently registered with the Swedish Immigration Board, 104 have steady jobs, 156 are studying, 15 are unemployed, 12 are under medical or psychiatric care, and seven are in jail, mostly for narcotics offenses. Of those studying, most are enrolled in language classes.

The stream of deserters and draft dodgers began in December 1967 when four sailors left their ship in Tokyo and traveled to Stockholm. After some hesitation Sweden decided to grant them asylum, but on humanitarian, not political grounds, in line with a long Swedish tradition of providing a haven for refugees.

Of the 378 Americans who have applied for asylum in the last two years, 325 were granted permission to stay, 15 were refused, and another 15 are currently under consideration. An estimated 30 to 40 left the country either before or after their applications were processed, and an additional number have entered and left Sweden without coming to the attention of the police or immigration authorities. It is estimated that 148 men defected from units in West Germany, 142 arrived directly from the United States, while 20 came from Vietnam. The balance came via Canada,

Cuba, and several West European countries.

Because most arrive without skills or knowledge of the Swedish language, the deserters are initially employed in positions such as truckdriver assistants or dishwashers, and those who cannot find work are granted \$17 a week, as well as food, lodging, and clothes. Once the deserter gets past the initial trauma of life in exile, he is encouraged to sign up for any of a wide variety of programs designed to help him find a place in society. Implied in the official policy of swift integration is a desire to prevent formation of an expatriate fraternity, highly visible and capable of embarrassing the government.

A small number of war resisters grouped in the American Deserters Committee has, with the assistance of the radical left in Sweden, attracted considerable publicity by refusing to subscribe to the government's effort to integrate them. Instead they have taken part in, or promoted, demonstrations, films, lectures, and other agitational work in Sweden and the other Nordic countries.

This activity, coupled with the publicity given to some deserters' scrapes with the law and their generally alien appearance, has stiffened the general Swedish reserve toward foreigners. To overcome this the State Immigration Board has undertaken an extensive community relations program.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

As the Four Power talks on a Middle East peace settlement reopen this week after a five-month recess, both the Arabs and the Israelis are maintaining their adamant military and diplomatic stance. Action along the so-called "cease-fire" lines continues, with the Israelis launching daily strikes in response to a steady series of minor attacks by regular and guerrilla Arab forces.

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Sudan's five-month-old RCC moved to protect itself with a series of political arrests aimed at cracking down on antiregime activists. In Somalia, the locus of power in the six-week-old Supreme Revolutionary Command remained unclear.

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Southern Yemeni troops seized a remote Saudi border post on 26 November but were apparently repulsed several days later. What provoked the clash is not yet known, but it further complicates inter-Arab relations prior to the Arab summit meeting scheduled to begin in Rabat on 20 December and billed as an effort to achieve Arab unity.

In Nigeria, the Biafrans continue to hold back sustained federal attacks along the enclave's northern and southern fronts. Biafran units are probably suffering munitions shortages because of the high level of fighting since mid-November, but there are no signs that federal forces are about to achieve any major breakthrough.

Pakistan's President Yahya Khan last week laid down general guidelines for a return to civilian rule and announced that national assembly elections will be held next October. Although martial law will continue until a new government is inaugurated—possibly well into 1971—suspicions that Yahya intends to rule indefinitely have been laid to rest for the time being.

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BIG FOUR PEACE TALKS RESUME AS MIDEAST STRIFE CONTINUES

As the Four Power talks on a Middle East peace settlement reopen this week after a five-month recess, the Israelis are maintaining their adamant military and diplomatic stance. They have taken pains to reiterate their long-held stand on a settlement--there will be no withdrawal without direct negotiations with the Arabs. On the military front, they are launching daily strikes along the so-called "cease-fire" lines in response to the continuing attacks by regular and guerrilla Arab forces.

Israeli Foreign Ministry officials have been quite vocal in their opposition to the Big Power talks. Foreign Minister Eban rebuffed Soviet criticism of Israel as the main obstacle to peace by pointing out that Moscow was so obviously biased toward the Arabs that it was unfit to serve as a peacemaker. A Foreign Ministry official also took a swing at the US, noting that although Tel Aviv agreed with Washington in principle, there were still wide differences between them on the details of a settlement.

On the military fronts, Israel is striking Jordan and the Egyptian positions along the west bank of the Suez Canal on a regular--almost a "milk run"--basis. These blows are in response to steady attacks by fedayeen and regular Jordanian forces along Israel's eastern border, and to the continued Egyptian dispatch of commando teams--and occasional aircraft--across the canal.

During November, the Egyptians built up a favorable "score" that seems certain to provoke an eventual Israeli response, perhaps even a major retaliation. The two major unsettled accounts are the Egyptians' naval shelling of the north Sinai coast at Romani early last month and, in particular, their attack in mid-November against two ships in the port of Eilat. Although the Egyptian frogmen's strike at Eilat did no serious damage, it was a stinging and embarrassing blow to the Israelis and one that by itself would seem to warrant major retaliation.

Israel, however, has not embarked on any large-scale operation since it put an armored force on the west side of the Gulf of Suez on 9 September and followed this with a month-long aerial pounding of the area. The pause--and it seems certain to be this rather than any change of policy--may stem primarily from the fact that October and November were busy months for the Israelis. Mrs. Meir visited the US; they conducted parliamentary elections and are still in the process of forming a new government; they were concerned spectators of developments to the north during the Lebanese-fedayeen confrontation; and they have still not obtained the release of the two Israeli passengers hijacked to Damascus.

Between now and the Arab summit meeting set for Rabat on 20 December, however, the Israelis may again return to the "education" of Nasir that they began last July.

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Their views on the Egyptian leader have not changed: they still see him as the main block to a satisfactory settlement, and still believe that things would be better all around if he were not on the scene. Given the Israelis' belief that the military pressure they have

exerted up to now has already been responsible for some disarray in Cairo, such as the recent changes in military commands, they can be expected to apply additional pressure in the hope that in time they can remove Nasir himself from the scene. [REDACTED]

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SOMALIA'S POLITICAL SCENE REMAINS MURKY

Six weeks after the coup, the Supreme Revolutionary Council is still sorting itself out. The division of responsibility and authority between the civilian cabinet and the military remains poorly defined. The regime is intent on focusing its efforts primarily on domestic affairs, but few concrete steps have yet been taken to confront Somalia's age-old economic and social headaches.

There have been some insights into the inner workings of the council, but the over-all picture of the new power structure is one of uncertainty and fluidity. No single individual or group dominates the regime. General Siad, president of the council, continues to be the key figure, acting as both head of state and of government. He holds his position by virtue of being army commander, however, and it is questionable how much authority he actually has among the council members, at least some of whom dislike him personally. Outside the council, he has had some success in consolidating his position by neutralizing--at least temporarily--several influential and popular army and police officers who were potential opposition leaders.

In the absence of firm leadership, two factions have developed in the 25-member council and now appear to be vying for position.

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[REDACTED] Neither group is particularly cohesive, however, and differences based on tribal, regional, and individual loyalties are evident, especially among the younger members.

It is not clear to what extent either faction is able to influence decisions on matters before the council. Some friction has already arisen over particular issues, however, and this may indicate that infighting is sharpening. For the moment, neither group seems to have a distinct advantage over the other. In view of their maneuvering, and of the known opposition to the coup among some tribal groups, it appears increasingly likely that some kind of shake-up in the regime is inevitable. [REDACTED]

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GROWING OPPOSITION TO LIBYAN JUNTA

Some three months after its seizure of power, Libya's Revolutionary Command Council is plagued by several challenges to its position. President Qaddafi, in particular, is reported to be facing growing opposition. Two centers of this as yet unorganized dissent--the cabinet and the former ruling establishment--offer no serious threat because they lack the military means to stage a counter coup. The third disaffected group--elements in the army and in the junta itself--does wield some military muscle,

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Most of the discontent in the cabinet arises from the junta's unwillingness to share its direction of government affairs. Despite attempts by the prime minister and others to force the council's hand by submitting their resignations, the officers have remained firm in refusing to delegate power, claiming that the civilians cannot be trusted. The junta's patience with the prime minister may be just about exhausted.

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Members of the former royalist ruling establishment are also bitter about their exclusion from the top levels of government. Although some of them may have tribal support, especially in the Cyrenai-can area, they lack the military power needed to challenge the army. Those who have retained their po-

sitions in the bureaucracy do have some means to manifest their opposition, however. Their present plans call for strikes and other forms of "civil disobedience" during December, hoping to bring government administration to a standstill.

Unlike the other two groups, those within the army who oppose Qaddafi do not seek a share of power--they already have that--but rather are intent on altering the President's pro-Egyptian policies.

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Most recently, their wrath is said to have been raised by council discussion of a union between Libya, Egypt, and Sudan. Qaddafi and his supporters are apparently seeking the de facto legitimacy that unity would confer, but their opponents fear that such a scheme would only squander Libya's oil wealth to finance Egyptian military ventures.

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ELECTIONS SCHEDULED IN PAKISTAN

In a nationwide broadcast last week, President Yahya Khan scheduled national assembly elections for 5 October 1970 and laid down general guidelines for a return to civilian rule. His long-awaited announcement should reduce the pressures that have been building up against the government in recent weeks.

Yahya's speech followed many days of speculation that an official move to end the political stalemate was imminent. He announced that the national assembly elected in 1970 will initially have a constitution-making role. If it completes this task within 120 days, it will become the central legislature; if it fails, a new assembly will be elected to finish the job. Although martial law will continue until a constitution is authenticated and a new government inaugurated--possibly well into 1971--suspicions that Yahya intends to rule indefinitely have been laid to rest for the time being.

Yahya noted that a number of issues such as the parliamentary form of government, an independent judiciary, and the Islamic nature of the state were nationally agreed upon and could be considered settled. He also announced settlement of several other important questions--the basis for national voting and the form of administration for West Pakistan--along lines he believes to be most widely accepted, thereby simultaneously removing them as election issues and appeasing dissident elements.

In regard to West Pakistan, Yahya declared that the unified state would be dissolved and he implied that the pre-1956 ethnolinguistic provinces would be reinstated--a concession to minority demands for an end to Punjabi domination. In a gesture to more populous East Pakistan, Yahya announced acceptance of the one man - one vote formula for national elections. He further proposed maximum provincial autonomy consonant with national integrity, but left specific details of the center-province relationship to the new assembly.

Yahya also made other attempts to placate his critics. He announced, for example, that all martial law restrictions on political activity would be removed on 1 January 1970, but he coupled this with a warning that violence would not be tolerated. He acknowledged the gravity of the country's economic troubles and pledged to reduce prices and end food shortages. Calling upon all Pakistanis to pull together in a national effort, he promised to eliminate corruption among government officials and vowed to protect responsible members of both management and labor.

Yahya's speech initiates a new phase in Pakistan's political development. It remains to be seen, however, if the outlined plans can stem the tide of labor unrest, head off new political agitation, or produce the stable, democratic government Pakistan has lacked since its inception.

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CRUCIAL ELECTIONS IN KENYA SCHEDULED FOR 6 DECEMBER

The conduct and outcome of the primary elections to select the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) candidates for Parliament may in large measure set the course of future events in Kenya.

The elections have provoked much local interest and excitement; more than 600 people are seeking nomination for the 158 parliamentary seats. Because President Jomo Kenyatta banned the only opposition party in October, whoever wins a KANU nomination in the primary will automatically win a seat in the "election" to be held on 20 December.

Little violence has developed during the electoral campaign, but tribal tensions remain high. Luo and other smaller tribes are especially suspicious and distrustful of the dominant Kikuyu tribe because of the assassination in July of popular Luo politician Tom Mboya. A resurgence of oath-taking ceremonies among the Kikuyu, and the extremely heavy-handed manner in which the Kikuyu-dominated government reacted to tribal dissatisfaction, intensified this animosity.

In spite of their bitterness, and even though KANU is controlled by Kikuyu politicians, many Luo and members of other minority tribes are seeking party nominations in their areas. Tribal leaders seem to have decided that it is of overriding importance to try to elect capable individuals who can take tribal grievances to Parliament.

Important contests will also occur in the Kikuyu home districts. Several old-guard Kikuyu cabinet ministers--including those largely responsible for the effort of the past several months to maintain Kikuyu hegemony--face challenges from progressive young members of their own tribe. These younger politicians, who appear to be more sensitive to the aspirations of other tribes, have a good chance of winning--if the elections are conducted honestly--because some of the old-line Kikuyu politicians have neglected their constituencies since taking office in 1963.

The critical question is whether Kenyatta and the old-guard Kikuyu will allow a free selection of candidates. Although several facets of the electoral law--such as a virtual lack of a secret ballot--make rigging an easy affair, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The old-guard Kikuyu, however, may well seek to fix at least some contests to save their own seats or to disenfranchise other tribes. If the rigging does occur and is done too blatantly, particularly in the Luo areas, it will certainly disillusion those who look to the present primaries as a chance to vent their grievances through legal, democratic processes. Such a development would seriously hamper chances for any future tribal reconciliation. Moreover, if the younger Kikuyu are denied a real run for office, even the Kikuyu tribe may be split. [REDACTED]

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The Inter-American Economic and Social Committee (IA-ECOSOC) of the Organization of American States adjourned its Washington meeting last Saturday, agreeing to resume on 26 January in Caracas. The conference sessions were long and difficult, and differences between the US and Latin American delegations as well as disagreements among the Latins themselves were prevalent. President Nixon's newly stated policy to downplay US predominance in hemisphere affairs left the Latin Americans, who have long been followers or reactors to US initiatives, in an unaccustomed position. They were simply unprepared themselves to take the lead.

The Bolivian Government apparently hopes that its agreement with the USSR to exchange ambassadors will smooth the way for Soviet technical and financial assistance. A spokesman for the Soviet technical team currently in Bolivia to study the mining industry had earlier said that diplomatic relations were a necessary precondition for any type of Soviet assistance.

The Soviet Union's armed forces newspaper Red Star reported this week that the USSR is helping to equip Cuba with the "newest weapons and military equipment." The article, which coincided with the arrival in Havana of the first in a new series of military shipments, did not specify the types of weapons to be delivered. Relations between the two countries have warmed steadily during the past year.

In another development, approximately 150 Americans arrived in Havana to cut sugar cane in an effort to help Castro fulfill his promise of a 10- million-ton sugar harvest for 1970. The group, named the "We Shall Win Brigade," is the first of what organizers hope will be about 600 Americans to travel to Cuba.

In the Dominican Republic, most major opposition political parties for the first time jointly condemned any re-election effort by President Balaguer. Their public statement, which warns that the president's re-election would lead to further violence and chaos, is an attempt to demonstrate "widespread public" opposition to a second term. Despite opposition forebodings of violence and recent rumors of prospective coup attempts, however, Balaguer's recent actions indicate that he will run.

The possibility of terrorist activity in Brazil and Panama has increased. In Brazil, security officials are expecting trouble on the first-month anniversary of the death of dissident Communist leader Carlos Marighella. In Panama, the government fears that the death in prison of the former leader of the small pro-Castro Revolutionary Unity Movement, Floyd Britton, may spur some retaliatory acts by his followers.

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
NEW GUERRILLA INCIDENTS OCCUR IN GUATEMALA

An elaborate counter guerrilla operation has been under way for the past week following new incidents in Guatemala's mountainous rural northwest. A series of delays in Communist plans to begin disrupting the electoral campaign, however, has resulted in a moderate to low level of urban terrorism.

On 21 November, three farms near the Quiche - Alta Verapaz border were occupied by about 50 guerrillas of the Communist Rebel Armed Forces. On 26 November, approximately 24 men occupied a small village near the Huehuetenango-Quiche border. In both incidents the occupants were subjected to propaganda harangues and were invited to join the revolution, but no one was harmed. The raids appear to have been primarily foraging expeditions.

The band, whose style in two recent raids is similar to that of the guerrillas who struck at drilling sites in Alta Verapaz in early October, appears to have split into two groups, possibly as an evasion tactic. Various army units, including the rapid reaction paratroop force from San Jose, are tracking the guerrillas and apparently have wounded some who are fleeing eastward. Bad weather has hindered the counter-insurgent operation, which is one of the largest the army has made and to which the government has committed paratroop forces for

the first time. Army Chief of Staff General Cifuentes has made an urgent appeal to the US for the immediate delivery of a helicopter, which he considers crucial to the operation's success.



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In general, politicking for the presidency has failed to fire the public. Unless the Communists begin to put their subversive plans into operation this month, the political lull is likely to prevail until after the Christmas holidays.

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ATTENTION SHIFTS FROM MILITARY TO POLITICS IN CHILE

Further military defiance of the Chilean government seems less likely as political activity intensifies ten months before the presidential election.

Retired General Roberto Viaux is awaiting trial for leading an army uprising on 21 October. Unless he is made a martyr by a harsh sentence, Viaux' chances of becoming the leader he thinks Chile needs are waning. Pay raises and the appointment of respected new commandants have assuaged much of the military's restlessness for the present.

Meanwhile, all seven declared presidential candidates are campaigning in widely varying styles. Among them, former president Jorge Alessandri on the right, Radomiro Tomic of the governing Christian Democrats, and Socialist Senator Salvador Allende on the far left now are considered the real contenders for the six-year term. President Frei cannot succeed himself.

The 73-year-old Alessandri is an independent with a nationalistic and paternalistic image that carries his appeal far beyond the conservative National Party that nominated him.

The ambitious and combative Tomic is suffering from widespread public disenchantment with the government, and he rated very low in a recent opinion poll. Rebuffed in his pitch for Communist support, he now is court-

ing middle class voters and re-organizing the lower class groups that were a big factor in Frei's unusually high margin of victory in 1964.

Allende suffers from over-exposure and the lukewarm support of his own extremist Socialist party. Nevertheless, the Communist Party may drop its own candidate, poet Pablo Neruda and back Allende because of his proven vote-getting powers.

Chileans have a near obsession with politics. Their numerous, opinionated, and articulate newspapers foster interest and accentuate divisions in this 85 percent literate population. Acrimonious political jokes are a national avocation, and political judgments are harsh and changeable. The Christian Democrats' "revolution in liberty" has alienated so many that Chileans--the majority of whom belong to no political party--are seeking a new solution. At the moment, Alessandri appears to have the most appeal, but this may be undercut by a growing suspicion that he might turn back the clock.

The consistent and growing strength of Chilean leftist political forces is a major factor. If they can overcome the serious internal squabbles that divide them and settle on one candidate, their coalition under the disciplined leadership of the Communist Party could win.

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CUBA SEEKS TRADE TIES WITH CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES

Havana is showing greater interest in establishing commercial ties with its Caribbean neighbors.

According to a recent press report, Fidel Castro sent a personal message to Jamaican Prime Minister Shearer calling for closer trade ties among all Caribbean nations. The report has been denied by the official of the United Nation's Economic and Social Council who purportedly delivered the message, but press coverage of the matter is keeping it alive. Cuban officials have indicated that Cuba may attempt to join the Caribbean Free Trade Association.

Some governments may be receptive to Cuba's initiatives. For example, Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad-Tobago has called for cooperation with Cuba on several occasions, and at a recent West Indian Sugar Conference he again openly discussed the merits of closer trade ties between Cuban

and other Caribbean nations, especially in the area of sugar trade.

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A few Caribbean leaders are convinced that lasting regional agreements must eventually include Cuba. These governments may also be trying to demonstrate their independence of United States policy regarding Cuba.

Castro, for his part, would welcome a "chink in the armor" of the US-sponsored economic denial program and an undermining of present OAS policy. He would also use expanded economic ties to extend his political influence.

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