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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

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22 January 1971  
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
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THE LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLA TODAY

[Redacted]

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NOTES: IAEA; [Redacted] Zambia; Brazil; Peru

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## FAR EAST

### Vietnam: *A Quiet Tet This Year*

The Communists continue to prepare for increased military action soon, but [redacted] they will generally abide by their unilateral four-day Tet cease-fire set to begin early on 26 January. The three-day Lunar New Year holiday actually starts on the 27th.

soldiers, for instance, continues to undermine the morale and performance of the armed forces. A number of senior officers have recently expressed concern about the low pay, stating that it is at the root of ARVN's misbehavior in Cambodia and the high desertion rate.

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[redacted] Because of manpower and supply problems created in part by the Cambodian situation, the expected shellings, ground probes, and other harassments in South Vietnam are likely to be limited.

With few exceptions, ARVN soldiers are provided a food allowance in cash instead of rations or mess facilities. Because this allowance is insufficient, soldiers often steal food. Housing and family allowances also are inadequate, and military personnel steal goods for resale or "moonlight" to try to make ends meet. Senior officers in South Vietnam's Joint General Staff have estimated privately that roughly 80 percent of the 12,000 desertions per month last year were prompted by the economic squeeze.

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The areas most threatened include the northern provinces and the sector northwest of Saigon near the Cambodian border. North Vietnamese combat units have recently either moved into, or are positioned near, both of these areas and could be used to put some pressure on allied forces. Elsewhere, the Communists will continue to rely mainly on their local forces and on guerrillas to carry on the war.

From time to time in the past year or so, the government has reviewed the problem and made plans to establish commissaries, improve messing facilities both at installations and in the field, and grant regular home leave as well as transportation home, but little has actually been done to implement these plans. Increased American aid was provided on a crash basis last summer to help build adequate housing for dependents; a modest housing program has been under way for several months, but it is only a beginning toward meeting the need. Some Vietnamese military sources claim that last October's pay raise already has been overtaken by rising prices.

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[redacted] Ground actions are likely to be limited to allied military installations, mainly the more remote outposts and field positions.

A distribution system for a \$42.7-million food supplement program supported by the US for 1971 has just been approved and may begin soon. This could alleviate the immediate problem of hungry soldiers if implemented, but a much more widespread effort to upgrade general living

#### *Low Pay Hurts ARVN*

Despite the government's success in slowing inflation, economic woes still persist in South Vietnam. The less than subsistence pay for ARVN

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### TET CEASE-FIRE PERIODS

Tet Holiday 27-29 January

		<u>Saigon</u>	<u>Washington</u>
<b>Communist</b>	<b>Begins</b>	<b>Jan. 26-0100</b>	<b>Jan. 25-1200</b>
	<b>Ends</b>	<b>Jan. 30-0100</b>	<b>Jan. 29-1200</b>
<b>Allied</b>	<b>Begins</b>	<b>Jan. 26-1800</b>	<b>Jan. 26-0500</b>
	<b>Ends</b>	<b>Jan. 27-1800</b>	<b>Jan. 27-0500</b>

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conditions is needed before military service ceases to be a serious economic hardship for enlisted

personnel and junior officers.

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### Laos: *Talk-Fight, Talk-Fight*

The Communists are continuing to press for talks in the Plaine des Jarres, although it is not clear how far they are prepared to water down demands regarding security precautions. In recent remarks clearly intended to reach the US Government, Soth Phetrasy, the Pathet Lao representative in Vientiane, said that if there were to be further progress toward peace negotiations, the US would have to weigh in with Prime Minister Souvanna, who was taking an "intransigent stand." Soth evidently was referring to Souvanna's refusal to discuss Communist demands presented to him in December that the US and Laos observe a bombing halt in Xieng Khouang Province as part of the security precautions for talks in Khang Khay. The Communists then dropped their insistence that the halt also apply to Samneua Province, but the prime minister, who was uncharacteristically abusive, did not offer a counterproposal.

In an obvious effort to portray the Communist position as reasonable, Soth said the Pathet Lao recognize that Vientiane and Washington might fear that a bombing halt in Xieng Khouang would jeopardize the Long Tieng complex. He argued, however, that the bombing could be resumed at any time Souvanna felt that the talks were not getting anywhere.

Although Soth is a congenital optimist, his remarks appear to be part of a fresh Communist effort to revive the possibility of talks.

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On 14 January the Communists chimed in with another plea for talks. In a communique, the Pathet Lao called on the prime minister to overcome the opposition of the US and the rightists and enter into "sincere" negotiations. They again scaled down their requirements for the start of talks—referring to the need to "de-escalate" bombing and air activity in Xieng Khouang Province, but no longer calling for a complete cessation. Souvanna was urged to answer the proposals before Souk returned to Samneua.

Fighting has been relatively limited in all sectors of Laos. The government forces operating against the infiltration corridor in eastern Savannakhet Province have mined the road and have encountered only token enemy resistance.

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
### Cambodia: *Moving into the Pass*

The massive Cambodian - South Vietnamese military operation to clear Route 4 entered its second week with Communist elements still in command of the Pich Nil pass. In the meantime, two heavily protected fuel resupply convoys reached Phnom Penh from South Vietnam via the Mekong, helping to ease somewhat the pinch on the capital's petroleum stocks.

Cambodian Army (FANK) troops are now spearheading the task force attempting to push through the northern end of Pich Nil, but sporadic Communist harassing fire and rugged terrain have slowed their advance. The bulk of the South Vietnamese marines who were supporting them were airlifted to the south side of the pass in midweek in order to reinforce the other arm of the pincer movement on Pich Nil. The limited resistance offered by the Communists on the northern front indicates that the enemy intends to keep the losses there to a minimum.

Enemy resistance to the FANK - South Vietnamese drive south of the pass has been sharper, however. In one engagement with the Communists near the village of Stung Chral, which is the planned linkup point for the two task forces, South Vietnamese marines claim they killed over 30 enemy troops and captured a sizable quantity of ammunition.

South Vietnamese forces also played a prominent role in providing air and naval cover for two fuel convoys that reached Phnom Penh. The first escorted convoy arrived without incident, but the second received some ineffectual enemy attacks. This latest instance of Saigon's growing assistance to the Lon Nol government followed consultations between officials of the two countries to set up a joint Mekong River defense command. Under the new arrangement, Phnom Penh has deployed a number of FANK battalions to try to ensure the security of the river's banks between the capital and the South Vietnamese base at Neak Luong. For its part, Saigon is to use some of its air, ground, and riverine resources to defend



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shipping on the Mekong from Neak Luong southward to the border.

#### *Matak Under Fire*

[redacted] Deputy Prime Minister Matak is receiving much of the blame for the government's most glaring domestic deficiencies. Some of the regime's strongest supporters among the middle class, the bureaucracy, and the youth evidently hold him primarily responsible for the failure to reduce corruption and curb inflation.

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[Redacted]

Matak's official position, his royal blood, his sometimes abrasive style, and his identification with the old order combine to make him a natural target for such criticism. His detractors,

[Redacted], appear to be protesting—perhaps more

unconsciously than not—that Cambodia is still being governed in much the same way and by many of the same people as during Sihanouk's day. If corruption continues to flourish, if the National Assembly again becomes a rubber stamp for the leadership, and if the press is discouraged from publicizing abuses in and out of government, then some of these more politically aware elements may begin to wonder more vocally just exactly what was gained by the events of last March. [Redacted]

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**Communist China: *Progress and Problems in the Provinces***

Despite an evident desire to increase the tempo of its lagging party rebuilding campaign, Peking faces some major problems in the provinces. Nearly one third of the provincial government chiefs designated during the hectic 1967-68 period have been purged or transferred to new posts. Thus, there is no obvious candidate in these areas to fill the post of provincial first party secretary, in contrast with the situation in the six provinces where party committees have been formed since mid-December. If Peking hopes to have all 29 provincial level committees formed by the party's 50th anniversary this summer, it will have to move with unaccustomed speed toward making some key personnel assignments in the months ahead.

In each of the six new provincial-level party committees announced thus far, the committee head has been the chairman of the corresponding revolutionary committee—the administrative unit that emerged as the key governmental authority during the Cultural Revolution. By simply confirming incumbent government leaders as the new party chiefs, Peking avoids rekindling the bitter personal and factional rivalries that marked the formation of the revolutionary committees.

In nine province-level units, however, the chairman of the original revolutionary committee is no longer on the scene. These vacancies do not appear to follow any particular geographic or

regional pattern and vary in point of time from the Tsinghai post in the northwest, rendered vacant by the transfer of the province chief to Peking in March 1968, to the chairmanship of the Yunnan revolutionary committee in the far southwest, which has opened up as a result of the death of the province chief just last month.

Five and possibly six of the missing province chiefs appear to be purge victims. Foremost among these is Peking city boss Hsieh Fu-chih, who, as a politburo member and minister of public security, was a major figure on the national scene as well. The others are all members or alternate members of the party's prestigious central committee formed after these men acquired their provincial governing posts. They still appear to be in political difficulty, however, probably stemming from their actions during the Cultural Revolution.


The death of Tan Fu-chen in Yunnan must have come as particularly disquieting news for those in Peking most responsible for resolving the complex personal disputes that emerged earlier in the Cultural Revolution. Tan was sent to Yunnan in mid-1968 as a compromise candidate to smooth over the intense factional rivalry between the supporters of Chou Hsing, the former governor of Yunnan, and Chen Kang, a local military commander. Now the problem of putting

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### Communist China: The Missing Leaders



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together a leadership team in the province has come full circle, with no ready solution in sight.

Whatever the outcome behind the hard decisions confronting Peking, there does not appear to be any fundamental shift under way in the present mix of military and civilian leadership in the provinces. At the time of the formation of the revolutionary committees, army men outnumbered

their civilian counterparts about two to one. Of the six new provincial first secretaries, four are military and two are veteran party cadres. Military dominance in local political affairs is also evident in the over-all makeup of the six party committees. Of the 29 secretaries and deputy secretaries thus far identified, 16 are military officers, 9 are party veterans, and only 4 fall into the category of "revolutionary activists." [redacted]

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### Philippines: *Striking and Feuding*

The Marcos government has emerged from a week-long, violence-ridden crisis only to face the likelihood of new student demonstrations early next week. President Marcos is sufficiently concerned over the situation that he has taken steps to ensure the loyalty of the military and to improve security force capabilities in the Manila area should he feel compelled to impose a state of martial law.

Trouble began in early January when a hike in petroleum prices sparked a series of demonstrations by Manila's transport workers and the drivers of the city's jeepneys—converted jeeps that provide a large part of the capital's transportation. Attacks on buses, taxis, and private vehicles brought city life to a near standstill. Student activists joined the jeepney drivers and began criticizing the American oil companies involved in the gasoline price hike.

The fatal shooting of several youths by Manila police on 13 January has aggravated an already ugly mood on the part of the students, although a temporary respite was achieved when Marcos rescinded the gasoline price increase temporarily. Subsequently the oil companies were advised they could not raise prices on regular grades of gasoline despite a stiff increase in tariffs. The issue, nevertheless, probably is seen by many Filipinos as one involving US economic imperialism.

A key factor in the present situation is the feud between Marcos and the family of Vice President Lopez. The Lopez-owned Manila electric power company has been seriously affected by the oil price increase, and there are strong indications that the jeepney drivers' strike was abetted and financed by some of the Lopez family in an effort to embarrass the President. A power blackout on 12 January covering Manila and adjacent provinces quickly raised ill-founded rumors of a coup against Marcos and had the earmarks of a ploy to heighten tensions. Marcos obviously believes that the blackout was deliberately caused by the Lopez family. The resignation of the vice president from his concurrent post of Minister of Agriculture and Resources was accepted by the President last week with public recriminations against the Lopez clan.

Given this combination of potentially disruptive factors, further violence is a distinct possibility. The students, after a summer and fall of relative inactivity, now appear to have found a cause. The events in the immediate future most likely to provoke new disorders, primarily by the students, are Marcos' state-of-the-nation message on 25 January and the anniversary on the 26th of last year's serious student riots that developed sharp anti-American overtones. At the moment, Marcos seems to have backed himself into an uncomfortable corner. If he elects to invoke martial law to thwart the student demonstrations, he may stir up even greater unrest. [redacted]

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## EUROPE

## Polish Leadership Undergoes Test

Polish party chief Gierek's strength as a national leader is being tested by his ability to respond adequately to persistent labor unrest along the Baltic coast and, without either appeasement or repression, to prevent it from spreading throughout the country. His meetings in Warsaw this week with workers' delegations from the area indicate his willingness to try to satisfy workers' economic and political demands.

Gierek's dilemma is posed by conflicting party and popular imperatives, which are giving rise to political and social instability. He and the party leadership need popular support and calm before going into the next central committee plenum, which is slated to chart the country's future course. The workers, having felt the power of toppling and installing a new regime and spurred by Gierek's new style of encouraging popular participation in government, are unwilling to give him the needed support before the party answers basic questions and presents a clear outline of future plans. Publicity for the upcoming plenum, which had been expected in late January, has already ceased, suggesting that labor unrest may cause a postponement.

The workers' grievances continue to focus on economic issues, especially wages and working conditions, that have been aggravated as a result of mishandling by local authorities. Younger workers tend to articulate, in addition, more volatile political demands, such as those for the ouster of two politburo members who they believe share the blame for the December riots. The workers also are impatient with what they regard as the government's substitution of words for quick action. The willingness of the local press

and radio in the Baltic area to air workers' grievances has partially mollified them, but continued official silence on the details of the riots in December—including accurate numbers of persons killed and the fate of those arrested—is leading to tension, speculation, and a distortion of public opinion.

There is no evidence that the regime views the unrest as reflecting organized opposition, either from outside or from within the party. Instead, it has acknowledged that there is a lack of organization among the workers who present demands. This fact, together with the low profile being maintained by police and other internal security organs, suggests that Gierek has confidence that a combination of firmness and conciliation will ultimately cause the unrest to lose momentum. Although Gierek in effect was installed by the workers, he cannot be permanently beholden to them, and he must show all the Polish people, as well as the Soviets, that he is a national leader in charge of his own house.

The thrust of the next party plenum evidently will be determined by intervening events, especially whether labor peace is restored. The plenum is expected to approve high party personnel changes. The conclave will also have to deal with such recently surfaced, ill-defined ideas as that mentioned by two politburo members envisaging "a system whereby leaders would assume and leave their positions normally and not under crisis situations." The plenum's promised program for the future, however, will hinge on economic reforms, and these reportedly are still being debated.

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IAEA: The special committee on verification procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) this week entered what may be the final phase of its effort to draft an agency position on safeguards required by the Nonproliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of fissionable material from peaceful uses. With agreement already achieved on the frequency and intensity of inspections, the chief remaining issue is that of financing the safeguards. A number of

competing schemes may be advanced, and the developing countries lacking nuclear plants will again express their desire that they not be assessed for the safeguards, including those applied to US and UK facilities voluntarily opened for inspections. Meanwhile, the EURATOM countries have yet to resolve their differences over the sort of inspection agreement they wish to negotiate with the IAEA.



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### Preparations for Bulgaria's Tenth Party Congress

Todor Zhivkov, who heads both the party and the government in Bulgaria, has for months been putting great effort into orchestrating a party congress designed to perpetuate his power and to modernize the country's government and economy. He has worked hard to wipe out factionalism and today is surrounded by men whom he appointed. He also has paid more attention than formerly to nationalist elements, most graphically manifested in his policy of Macedonian irredentism. At the same time, however, he makes no pretense of masking his close ties to the Kremlin. The Bulgarian party meeting was purposely scheduled to begin after the long-delayed 24th Soviet party congress, now announced for 30 March, in order to have the benefit of any new winds blowing from Moscow.

which to hold the congress. His foreign policy preparations have included efforts to improve relations with Bulgaria's neighbors—with the glaring exception of Yugoslavia, where friction over Macedonia has prevented success.

As the congress approaches, there appears to be little opposition to Zhivkov's rule. He seems to be relatively secure, as illustrated by his appointment of a large number of real or potential political enemies as diplomatic envoys abroad. Nevertheless, there are some signs of disagreement among the leadership. The main issue apparently revolves about whether or not Zhivkov should drop his claims to Macedonia and reach a detente with Tito

[Redacted]

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The party assembly will convene on 12 April to endorse a new constitution—the first in 24 years—adopt the first long-range party program, and approve a series of economic plans, including further modification of economic reforms and a move away from even the limited decentralization programs of the late 1960s. New economic plans call for the formation of large industrial and agricultural complexes, all with limited autonomy and using cybernetics extensively for planning and operations.

Evidence of dissension can be seen in a recent attempt, presumably Zhivkov's, to suppress the Defense Ministry's daily paper, *Narodna Armiya*, which had been in the forefront of the Macedonian campaign. In late December, it was ordered curtailed from a daily to a weekly, but was subsequently continued as a daily without explanation.

Zhivkov has struggled for over a year to establish the best possible political atmosphere in

As a result, there is room for speculation that nationalism is still strong among the military despite the fact that many of its early practitioners were purged after an abortive military coup in 1965. [Redacted]

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## Spain: *Government Facing Military Criticism*

Events in connection with the Basque nationalist trial at Burgos are expected to force the government to do something about the critical attitude of army officers toward Opus Dei, a Catholic group favoring economic liberalization that has dominated the government since the last cabinet reshuffle in October 1969. Madrid's endemic speculation about a new cabinet is rising but Franco's dislike for acting under pressure may delay change.

In early 1970 Opus Dei's prospects seemed rosy. Besides cabinet strength, it could count among its assets its close association with Prince Juan Carlos and Vice President Carrero Blanco, heirs apparent to Franco as head of state and head of government, respectively. In addition, the group was given much of the credit for the country's continuing economic growth, although involvement of some members in a government credit scandal had tarnished its reputation.

An indication of military dissatisfaction with Opus Dei influence came at the graduation ceremony of the Army General Staff School last May when the commanding general spoke sharply before high government officials of inequities to the disadvantage of the military in the distribution of the country's growing wealth. Military salary increases in fact have been badly outpaced by increases in the average hourly wage for civilian labor. Many of the younger officers reportedly moonlight. The staff school commandant was dismissed from his job within the week, however, for airing an unpleasant truth in public.

In mid-December during the tense period preceding the sentencing of 16 Basque nationalists, a second high-ranking army officer—General Angosto of the Canary Islands command—referred to the military's constitutional mission to defend the nation's security at home as well as abroad. In an evident warning to Opus Dei, he

declared that "all should know that we are ready to take up these same arms...although we understand we should act only as a last resort." The officer's speech followed closely on mass pro-army, anti - Opus Dei demonstrations throughout Spain, and, perhaps because of the delicacy and unpredictability of the situation at that time or perhaps because he spoke without specifics, Angosto has kept his post.

After Franco on 30 December commuted the death sentences handed down by a military court at Burgos, a third general officer attacked Opus Dei as a group that "under the guise of noble aims, seeks to spread and create discord." Similar opinions are reportedly widespread among the military, who believe a firmer government hand would reduce the incidence of disorders. Nevertheless, Franco immediately removed the general from his command, possibly because of the directness and public character of the verbal attack.

Although the statements of only high officers have received publicity, murmurings of military dissatisfaction with Opus Dei's role in government are reported to be greatest among the younger officers. Military discontent has thus far been kept within bounds by the respect of older officers for Franco, but it is obviously a factor that the government must take into account.

How the desires of the military will be dealt with is not clear but some adjustment to accommodate them is likely. In the political sphere, cabinet changes giving greater representation to the military are a possibility. Another way of placating them would be to increase allocations to the armed forces including funds for higher pay.

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## MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

### Middle East: *Negotiations*

Secretary General Thant and UN mediator Jarring are reported to be "cautiously optimistic" following the exchange of peace proposals between Israel and Egypt through Ambassador Jarring.

According to the press, the Israeli proposals passed to Jarring during his visit to Jerusalem on 8 January listed what were termed "indispensable essentials" for a peace settlement between Israel and Egypt. Included among the several "essentials" were the establishment of secure, recognized, and agreed boundaries and the assumption by each country of responsibility for ensuring that "no warlike act, or violence, by any organization, group, or individual originates from or is committed in its territory against the population, citizens, or property of the other party." The Israeli proposal also referred to the withdrawal of military forces "from territories lying beyond positions agreed in the peace treaty," thus reaffirming Israel's position that a peace treaty should precede any withdrawal and still leaving Israel's future boundaries open for negotiation.

The Egyptian response to the Israeli proposal was submitted to Jarring on 15 January.

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Although the Egyptian response took issue with the Israeli document on these two key issues, informed observers did not regard it as a rejection of the Israeli suggestions. Israeli radio and television newscasts described the Egyptian paper as leaving the door open for the continuation of negotiations. Noting that the Israeli and Egyptian positions remain far apart, Israeli commentators found encouragement in what was described as the "moderate" tone of the

Egyptian paper. In part, however, this tone may have been introduced by Jarring who redrafted the Egyptian response to make it more palatable to the Israelis.

An Israeli Foreign Ministry official concerned with intelligence matters told US Embassy officials on 19 January that he now expects the Egyptians to postpone calling for a Security Council meeting for two or three weeks at least. He was also sure that the Egyptians would allow the cease-fire to continue, either de facto or even possibly through formal extension, for a limited period.

The question of the fedayeen attitude toward the Jarring negotiations was also raised this past week. In a report that was subsequently both disowned and reaffirmed by various fedayeen spokesmen, Cairo's semiofficial *al-Ahram* on 20 January claimed that the entire membership of the fedayeen central committee had reversed its previous opposition to Egyptian and Jordanian acceptance of Secretary Rogers' peace negotiations formula. Even if the *al-Ahram* report is factual, both it and a subsequent explanation by a guerrilla spokesman in Cairo clearly point out that any change in the commandos' attitude is contingent upon the recognition by Egypt and Jordan that the fedayeen have a legitimate right to continue their armed struggle against Israel. Thus, rather than signaling a possible end to the commando war against Israel, the *al-Ahram* episode constitutes merely a public admission by some fedayeen leaders that they are powerless at present to influence either Jordan's and Egypt's participation or negotiating positions in the Jarring talks.

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
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Jordan: *Fedayeen Differences Increasing*

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While Jordan enjoyed a week of unusual calm with the effective implementation of the latest agreement between the government and the fedayeen, long-simmering differences between the commando organizations rose to the surface.

Because the mauling the fedayeen movement suffered in the September 1970 confrontation with the Jordan Arab Army was precipitated largely by incidents instigated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Fatah-dominated fedayeen central committee has since attempted to keep the PFLP under control. When the PFLP was accused last week by Fatah of attempting to torpedo the latest cease-fire agreement by ambushing a Jordanian Army patrol, the PFLP reacted by stating it had reservations about the agreement and would not adhere to the provisions requiring its militia to surrender its arms. Both the PFLP's leader, George Habash, and its official spokesman added to the growing polemics by calling for the overthrow of King Husayn. Fatah then responded by charging that the PFLP was collaborating with the Jordanian Government inasmuch as its violations of the agreements gave the army pretexts for crushing the entire fedayeen movement. As proof of its allegation of collusion, Fatah claimed that each time it moved to force the PFLP to subordinate itself to the fedayeen leadership, these actions were pre-empted by the initiation of government military campaigns against all fedayeen organizations.




The PLA, a relatively unified and disciplined body, considers itself the only Palestinian organization able to recoup some of the losses suffered by the fedayeen movement since the September 1970 clash with the Jordanian Government. The PLA also seeks to change the composition of the Palestine National Council, the legislative arm of the PLO, so that non-fedayeen Palestinians have greater representation in that body.

Much of the ferment in the fedayeen movement accrues from the fact that in microcosm it is subject to the same ideological conflict—the struggle for ascendancy between local and Arab nationalism—that is being experienced in the rest of the Arab world. For the fedayeen, local nationalism is Palestinian nationalism. It is exemplified by Fatah and the PLO and is concerned with one goal—the destruction of Israel and the creation of a Palestinian state in those areas traditionally known as Palestine. In order to succeed, Palestinian nationalists realize that they must have the support of various Arab governments, each of which has its own parochial interest. To gain this support Palestinian nationalists have learned to make accommodations with governments whose domestic policies they frankly abhor.

Arab nationalism, as propounded by the PFLP and its even more extreme offshoot, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), is concerned with the creation of a unified Arab nation with radical economic and political policies. The liberation of Palestine, these Arab nationalists argue, can only be achieved when the Arab world is cleansed of all reactionary regimes and unified.

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In their turn, the Arab governments—the PFLP considers them all reactionary—believe it necessary to try to maintain severe restrictions on the fedayeen movement as a whole for fear that it may some day be the captive of the PFLP. Angered and confused by this basically hostile attitude of the Arab regimes and hesitant to solve the

dilemma by fully opting for either one or the other brand of nationalism, the fedayeen movement has turned upon itself. Its future role now depends on whatever accommodation it is able to make with itself.



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USSR-Egypt: *Podgorny Accentuates the Positive*

Soviet President Podgorny's visit to Egypt from 13 to 19 January for ceremonies marking completion of the Aswan High Dam afforded Moscow a unique opportunity to show off the "constructive" side of its close relationship with

Cairo. The ceremony at Aswan was, of course, the high point of the visit, but Podgorny's much-publicized side trips to Alexandria harbor and the Helwan iron and steel complex underlined the scope and variety of Moscow's assistance.

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Business alternated with ceremony throughout the visit as Podgorny and Egyptian President Sadat met behind closed doors on several occasions. They almost surely discussed diplomatic developments since the last high-level Soviet-Egyptian contacts in December, and they presumably also touched on military and economic assistance. The tone Podgorny probably set in his talks with Sadat came through in a speech on 18 January in which he cautioned that a "difficult, persistent, and many-sided struggle, including political and diplomatic struggles, is still to be waged..." and warned that it will call for a "realistic assessment of the situation, statesmanship,

self-control, and flexibility." These remarks, implicitly critical of Sadat's fiery oratory in recent days, lend weight to recent reports that Moscow disapproves of Sadat's tough talk.

The Soviets took advantage of Podgorny's presence in Cairo to offer their assistance in an Egyptian rural electrification program estimated to cost as much as \$276 million and requiring five years to complete. A visit by Podgorny and Sadat to the Soviet helicopter carrier "Leningrad" in Alexandria on 16 January served as a reminder of Moscow's military support for the Egyptians. [REDACTED]

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### Arab States: *Arab Summit Meeting?*

Discussions are under way that may lead to the holding of a full-scale Arab summit meeting in Kuwait in the near future.

With the approach of the end of the Middle East cease-fire, Libyan strong man Qadhafi has begun drumming up support for a convocation of Arab heads of state to discuss his plan for "pan-Arabizing" the battle with Israel. The Libyan strategy, which calls for the commitment of all Arab resources against Israel, has met with a cool reception outside of Libya since it was first advanced last May.

Qadhafi has proposed the summit be held on 25 January and has asserted that at least six

states—Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, and Syria—have already agreed to attend. Kuwait is to contact the remaining Arab countries to obtain their assent but is not eager to participate in or host such a gathering. Kuwaiti officials probably hope that the reluctance of other Arab leaders to attend will delay or indefinitely postpone the holding of the proposed summit.

Meanwhile, the leaders of the quadripartite alliance of Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Syria met in Cairo this week. Discussions covered not only cultural and economic ties, but, with foreign and defense ministers in attendance, probably included military problems and the advisability of convening a full Arab summit as well. [REDACTED]

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### International Oil Situation

In a series of parries and thrusts the oil-exporting countries and the oil companies have been testing each other's resolve on the issue of greater revenues demanded in December by the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). A hard-nosed position by the oil-exporting countries has been met with equal adamancy by the oil companies, and although interspersed

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with threats, including a shutdown of production, discussions are taking place that could lead to meaningful negotiations.

it appears that such a general meeting will not take place before 25 January.

The burden of discussion thus far has fallen on a two-man oil-company team and an Iranian, Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian Committee in Tehran representing only the Persian Gulf members of OPEC, which also includes Libya, Algeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela. The committee has indicated that proposals presented by the companies on 16 January could provide a basis for negotiations.

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Although Libya has threatened to take "appropriate measures," it may now be awaiting some indication of the outcome of the Tehran talks before making further moves. The companies involved, however, are not sanguine about their future in Libya.

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Thus far, OPEC has continued to postpone a general meeting to permit further exchanges of views at the Tehran talks. These postponements may have resulted from mounting evidence of unity by the oil companies and statements by most governments of consuming countries backing the oil-industry negotiating effort. Currently

Algeria, also a member of OPEC pushing for major concessions by the oil companies, is carrying on bilateral negotiations with France that cover, among other things, their oil-industry relations. Although the stormy negotiations with France were being conducted outside of OPEC, Paris, modifying its earlier go-it-alone stand, has announced that it supports the unified Western approach to OPEC. Algerian-French talks that had been suspended earlier this week have now resumed in lower key.

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ZAMBIA: Xenophobic government officials, fearful both of trouble from resident whites and of cross-border attacks by the Portuguese, have generated an atmosphere of nervousness in Lusaka. Army units are guarding several government installations in the capital, and armored patrol units are on alert. Other security precautions affecting local British residents have also been ordered by the Zambian defense minister.

He apparently believes that these actions are necessary to prevent the whites from sabotaging Zambian installations in retaliation for the government's bitter opposition to British sales of naval arms to South Africa. In addition, many government leaders are concerned that Lisbon may mount paramilitary raids into Zambia similar to those into Guinea last November.

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### Guinea: *Postinvasion Drama Enters Final Act*

President Toure's carefully orchestrated campaign of political harangues and sweeping denunciations of enemies of his regime has reached its denouement. This stage began last week when party militants, at nationwide meetings ordered by Toure, demanded harsh penalties for those Guineans and foreigners found guilty either of complicity in the Portuguese-directed attacks on Guinea last November or of broadly interpreted "subversion."

Guinea's National Assembly—constituted as a special "revolutionary tribunal"—has been meeting since 18 January to hear the evidence and to sentence those found guilty. At the session on 19 January, the government's Commission of Inquiry portrayed West Germany, whose ambassador and aid personnel were expelled last month, as playing, with Portugal, a leading role among the regime's foreign foes. The commission charged Bonn with operating a spy ring in Guinea and named as key members two West German nationals arrested in December—one of whom the commission said had committed suicide while imprisoned. Several French and Lebanese citizens long resident in Guinea, along with alleged local collaborators, are also being held either as participants or accomplices. Despite the allegations, the only known link among these people is the likelihood that some were involved in black-market dealings.

Also due for sentencing by the tribunal are a still-undetermined number of African commandos of the Portuguese Army and Guinean exiles who were captured during the November attacks. Al-

though a UN investigation team that visited Conakry in November reported that close to 60 such persons were being held, the names of only 13 have been listed by Guinea, prompting rumors that many have already been executed.

Guineans accused of subversion—but not explicitly tied to the November attacks—constitute a special category of "internal opposition." Toure is using the postinvasion security scare as a pretext for eliminating Guineans he long has suspected of disloyalty. Included among these are some leading members of Guinea's largest tribe, the Foulah, who have traditionally opposed Toure's rule. Foulahs predominate among the top leadership of the Guinean exile group that participated in the attacks on Guinea. Prominent Foulahs were included among a few cabinet officials and their protégés at various levels of the bureaucracy who were arrested after the attacks. Toure probably considers these vaguely defined subversives the most important of all the detainees.

The tribunal's final verdicts are expected to be severe. In opening the proceedings on Monday, President Toure again said he would not grant clemency and asked the tribunal to be equally exacting. Moreover, resolutions adopted last week by the party apparatus—a good clue to the final sentences—called for widespread application of the death penalty and for public executions. Apparently preparing the ground for an early break with West Germany, the resolutions also called for severance of relations with governments whose nationals are adjudged guilty of working to overthrow Toure.

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### Sudan: *Soviet Economic Assistance Lags but Military Aid Increases*

Despite President Numayri's prediction that Sudan's economic relations with the USSR would be "noteworthy," there has been little implementation of Soviet economic aid since the coup

of May 1969. Meanwhile, the pace of Soviet military deliveries has increased appreciably.

Last week the USSR and Sudan finally signed a three-year trade agreement, although

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earlier Soviet press reports had suggested that conclusion of a five-year pact was in the offing. Trade is to expand over the period of the agreement, with Sudan exporting cotton in exchange for machinery and equipment. Trade relations since the coup, however, have not gone smoothly. Early in 1970, a Soviet economic delegation failed to straighten out problems encountered with a \$43-million barter deal involving exchanges of Sudanese cotton for Soviet consumer goods, machinery, and equipment. The Soviets at that time refused to supply goods that the USSR could sell elsewhere for hard currency or to take Sudanese cotton that had been stored for some time.

During Numayri's visit to Moscow in late 1969, the Soviets discussed several economic development projects and, according to Sudanese press reports, extended some \$40 million in credits. The Rahad irrigation project, for which the

Soviets agreed to provide nearly \$29 million in credit, had been planned by the previous regime, which had been unable to find financing. Although other Communist countries also were slated to participate in the financing, there is no evidence that they have indeed extended any assistance or that work on the project has begun.

Moscow also considered participating in efforts to improve Sudan's transportation network, but no estimate of the cost was mentioned. Construction of a road between Khartoum and Port Sudan and expansion of the capacity of the railway running in the same vicinity were among the projects considered. The only action taken thus far was the arrival in March 1970 of twelve Soviet technicians to study the possibility of expanding the railroad. The USSR also has begun an offshore geological survey that will require about two years to complete. [REDACTED]

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## WESTERN HEMISPHERE

**BRAZIL:** The 70 Brazilian prisoners who were exchanged for the freedom of the Swiss ambassador have lost no time in launching verbal attacks on the Medici government following their arrival on 14 January in Santiago. On their second day in Chile, leaders of the group were permitted a three-hour press conference at which they delivered a manifesto denouncing oppression in their country and claiming that many of them had been tortured. The manifesto pledged that

kidnaping of diplomats would continue as long as repression and torture persisted. Newspapers controlled by President Allende's coalition have used the manifesto to accuse President Medici of being personally responsible for torture, characterizing him as a "sadistic, blood-thirsty gorilla." The Chilean Foreign Ministry reportedly will furnish passports and visas to the Brazilians; Cuba, Switzerland, and Italy have offered to take some of them. [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~**Chile: *Allende Continues His Subtle Maneuvering***

President Allende's genius for tactical maneuvering is becoming increasingly evident. In two recent cases the government undertook strong actions and then, perhaps because of the reaction, drew back to positions that would give the administration what it wanted without incurring unnecessary opprobrium.

On 13 January the government sent a large tax investigation team into the offices of *El Mercurio*, the most prestigious newspaper in Chile. Not content with financial investigation, the team seized and sealed other records. As a result, the newspaper, which had opposed Allende's election but since had taken a conciliatory line, came out in open opposition to the government, running editorials detailing a "systematic" attack on the publishing company and specifically mentioning Allende's animosity toward it. The paper also recalled foreign concern about press freedom in Chile. On 15 January the government restricted the investigating team to a standard income tax review that will not interfere with the paper's normal operations.

A similar development has occurred with respect to the nationalization of Bethlehem Steel's Chilean operations. On 14 January the government, falsely claiming publicly that Bethlehem had solicited the take-over, gave the company until 1 February to conclude a sales contract on Chile's terms. The announcement surprised Bethlehem officials, who had hoped to operate normally under the Allende administration. Shortly thereafter the minister of mines said that talks with Bethlehem were proceeding "satisfactorily" and that the government envisioned a settlement resembling that planned for the copper companies. On 18 January the head of the government steel industry, which would be taking over the Bethlehem operations, told the US ambassador that Allende was unhappy at the way the whole matter had been handled. The government now claims that no deadline is involved and

that it is ready to receive a counteroffer from Bethlehem.

The constitutional reform project for copper nationalization is expected to be presented to the full senate soon. The review committee has accepted an amendment proposed by the Christian Democratic Party and the Popular Unity parties that would safeguard the rights of copper workers, long the most favored group within Chilean labor. This assurance may be increasingly important in view of unemployment figures announced recently by the minister of economy. Between September and December 1970 the unemployment rate in Santiago rose from 6.4 percent to 8 percent. In the same period in 1968 the rate declined; in 1969 it remained constant at 5.4 percent.

Political maneuvering, never very far below the surface in Chile, is claiming increasing national attention. On 4 April there will be municipal elections as well as a by-election to fill the senate seat vacated by President Allende. The Christian Democratic Party has nominated Andres Zaldivar, a strong supporter of former president Frei. If Zaldivar wins, the PDC moderates will receive a strong boost. His chances for victory will be enhanced if the conservative National Party withdraws its candidate; the Popular Unity coalition has nominated an unattractive Socialist.

The Socialist Party holds its national congress the weekend of 29 January, and policy documents prepared for it could exacerbate differences within the party. The more radical members, many of whom believe that Allende is not revolutionary enough, will be doing their best to gain control of the party and to make their ideas official party doctrine. In addition, another leftist group has obtained a Socialist Youth document severely critical of the Socialist secretary general and is considering publishing it to increase tensions within the Socialist Party.

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### Bolivia: *President Postpones Problems*

President Torres' overreaction to last week's abortive coup has ended—at least temporarily—the threat from the military, but it has also helped exaggerate the left's importance and the extent to which the government is dependent on it. The President, therefore, will be forced to exercise all of his political ability to prevent a complete mortgaging of his government to the left.

The suspension from the armed forces, arrest, or promised exiling of the leading military plotters has effectively destroyed Torres' immediate moderate opposition within the military. By extending these measures to potential plotters, the government has warded off an immediate reaction from the military. But this action, coming so soon after the demonstrated lack of military unity in the October coup, is likely to result in a further demoralization of the military, which is the only group in Bolivia that can maintain stability over the long run.

The support of the left was not crucial in overcoming the military threat, but the left has been led to believe it was, both by the dramatic government call for workers and students to "defend the revolution" and by the official welcome given the leftist, "antifascist" demonstrations on 11 and 12 January. Significantly, neither the initial leftist response nor statements made during the public rallies reflected approval of the Torres government but rather support for the general principle of a leftist, "revolutionary," antirightist government. This distinction has been evident since the October coup and indicates continuing leftist unhappiness with the slow pace of government revolutionary actions. Now, however, the left believes its support is critical to the government's continued existence. The public statements of individual labor leaders and the shouted demands during the two rallies show that the left is determined to be repaid for the support it believes it provided the government; it plans to

increase pressure to obtain more and faster leftist changes in the government.

Some of the President's statements and actions, such as the abrogation of a contract with a US firm, the promise to study a "popular parliament," and the qualified promise to arm the people when weapons become available, are concessions to the left. Torres, however, did not accept demands for more radical actions, such as executing the military plotters, announcing plans to nationalize the US-owned Matilde Mine, formulating plans for the immediate socialization of the country, or expelling US agencies. Since taking power in October, Torres has generally given lip service to some of the left's less extreme demands, but then dragged his feet in implementing them, thereby postponing a complete break between his government and the left. His generally lukewarm response to public leftist pressure during the past week indicates he hopes to continue this policy. Now, however, it will be harder because the suppression of the most vocal military opposition has destroyed a balance to leftist pressure and also because the left now is more confident of its power and its ability to force demands on the government.

Two of the more interesting figures in last week's events were Jorge Gallardo, Minister of the Interior, and his brother, Colonel Samuel Gallardo, the Army Chief of Staff. The former was in the forefront of government spokesmen calling for public defense of the Torres regime against the "fascist hordes," while the latter was held briefly by the military plotters on the morning of the abortive coup. The interior minister normally exercises an important position in the government hierarchy, and Jorge Gallardo appears to be using this power to reinforce his position with the left and to encourage the destruction of nonleftist opposition to the government. [redacted]

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[redacted] he is becoming stronger and could play a crucial role in undermining Torres' efforts to brake a rapid government shift to the left. [redacted]

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### Political Assassinations Continue in Guatemala

A major peasant leader and a well-known leftist congressman have become the most recent victims in Guatemala's accelerating round of political assassinations. The strong public reaction to what appears to be the government's policy of eliminating leftist intellectuals seems sure to encourage a Communist response in kind and may in time lead to mass political protest.

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The congressman, Adolfo Mijangos, was killed by government security forces




the prominence he enjoyed as a clever, articulate intellectual as well as his confinement to a wheelchair made the attack on him particularly repugnant. The intellectual community and the democratic left have publicly accused the government and rightist political groups of the murder, and the Communist-oriented student association called for a public uprising. The press, which has been chafing under the state of siege, used the incident to flout censorship, and even the most staid daily printed extensive accounts of the murder and published antigovernment declarations from community leaders.

The attack on Mijangos probably negated the public relations advances that had been made by the government in previous weeks. Favorable comment on recent official successes against the terrorists and on the more courteous conduct of the security forces toward the general public had buoyed the administration.

The murder Sunday of the peasant leader Tereso Oliva y Oliva is bound to intensify criticism of the government and fear among the left wing. Oliva, Guatemala's foremost rural labor

organizer, was machine gunned in the presence of a family wedding party by two men who his fellow labor leaders believe are government agents. The murder is likely to provoke inter-national labor reaction because Oliva was being groomed as a candidate to lead an inter-American peasant organization.



The more activist Rebel Armed Forces does not seem to have suffered seriously in the counterterrorist campaign, but it is obvious that it is more difficult for both revolutionary groups to operate under the stringent security measures now in effect.



**Leftist congressman Adolfo Mijangos, killed by security forces**

A military police guard was killed inside the British Consulate, presumably by Communist terrorists. There probably will be more attempts on the lives of prominent rightists or foreign diplomats in retaliation for recent government operations. The continuing inclusion of prominent political figures on the government's clandestine assassination list will serve to keep the cycle of retributory violence in motion, and may eventually stimulate the political left to dramatize its concern through public demonstrations and a political encounter in the streets.

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## OAS General Assembly on Terrorism Still Poses Problems

Members of the Organization of American States (OAS) remain badly divided over the proposed convention on terrorism that will be considered at the OAS third special session of the OAS General Assembly beginning in Washington on 25 January. Although most countries will probably make a concerted effort to avoid open squabbling, prospects do not appear bright that they will be able to come up with a strong agreement that can be quickly ratified.

Both the Venezuelan and Colombian foreign ministers have expressed considerable pessimism over the lack of preparation and the failure so far to achieve a consensus. The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry terms the present draft "completely unacceptable," and proposes a narrow definition of terrorism. Brazilian officials, on the other hand, continue to press for a wide-ranging agreement. They believe a majority of states will vote with them and have indicated that they will be reluctant to modify their position even if a majority lines up in opposition.

It is likely that the meeting will decide that a convention can be adopted and opened for signature by a simple majority vote. The session will be judged a failure, however, unless near un-

animity can be achieved on a convention that goes considerably beyond last year's general resolution repudiating terrorism. In addition, failure to achieve a consensus will probably make many states slow to ratify whatever agreement emerges.

Should divisiveness and rancor surface at the meeting, it could portend problems beyond the immediate issue of terrorism. Any bad feeling or inability to reach agreement on a unified stand that might result from the current meeting would make it even more difficult to establish agreement on the more serious problem of hemispheric policy toward Cuba.

Given the spread of nationalistic sentiment and increasing Latin dissatisfaction with the US over issues such as trade, the OAS may be entering a critical period. The question of OAS member countries' relations with Cuba looms as a problem that could seriously weaken the organization. Venezuela, which lodged the original charges that led to diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba in 1964, has again hinted strongly that it is moving toward re-establishing relations with Castro. If it does, others are likely to follow suit soon, even if the OAS ban is not relaxed.

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PERU: A strike at a government-owned petroleum facility and a threatened strike against two US-owned mining firms may force the government to reconsider two of its current labor policies. For over a year, the government has made political gains by permitting workers in privately owned industries to receive dramatic wage increases and by acquiescing in the gains of Communist-led unions in order to weaken the power base of the rival American Popular Revolutionary Alliance. Workers at the Talara petroleum facility went on strike on 17 January to support the

demands of their Communist-infiltrated union for a 25-percent wage increase, double the amount offered by the government. This installation was expropriated in October 1968 from the US-owned International Petroleum Company. Communist-dominated unions at the Southern Peru Copper Company and the Marcona Company have issued strike notices for 21 January. Southern Peru has already rejected a government request that it "transfer" four company officials who are US citizens; the union is demanding that the four be dismissed.

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

## *Special Report*

*The Latin American Guerrilla Today*

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№ 44


22 January 1971  
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## THE LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLA TODAY

For more than ten years Fidel Castro has been encouraging and aiding Latin American revolutionaries to take to the backlands and mountains of their own countries to imitate his guerrilla campaign and victory. Today, however, there are fewer than 1,000 rural guerrillas holding out in only a few countries. They are weak, of declining importance, and do not pose serious threats to the governments. Guerrilla insurgency in the hinterlands became increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant in many Latin American countries in the decade of the 1960s as societies urbanized and modernized at accelerated rates.

As rural guerrilla fortunes have faded, however, a new breed of revolutionary has appeared in the cities. In Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala urban guerrillas have engaged in spectacular acts of terrorism and violence. Six foreign ambassadors have been kidnaped during the last three years, of whom two were murdered. About a dozen other diplomats and a large number of government officials also have been kidnaped. Robberies of banks and arms depots, airline hijackings, arson, sabotage, and killings of police and security officials have reached unprecedented proportions in several countries. Terrorism is likely to increase in at least a half-dozen Latin American countries this year and could challenge the governments of Uruguay and Guatemala.

### *The Rural Guerrilla After a Decade*

Prominent students of the Cuban revolution believe that Castro never intended to wage a rural guerrilla war when he landed in Cuba from Mexico in 1956, but that he hoped to join in a quick urban putsch. His experience during the preceding ten years as a student radical, adventurer, and violent revolutionary was acquired in the cities. Even after Castro was forced into the sierra after his expedition foundered, he continued to rely heavily on urban support groups. His radio appeals were beamed mainly to middle-class, nationalist audiences, and in April 1958 he helped organize an abortive national strike in the towns and cities.

Castro's small guerrilla band won some skirmishes with regular military forces, but ultimately the Batista regime collapsed because

Castro captured the imagination of an oppressed, disenchanting middle class through highly effective public relations. Once in power, however, Castro quickly alienated urban groups through his radical appeals to peasants and workers. The regime exaggerated and glorified the accomplishments of Castro and his guerrilla colleagues, and created a rural, agrarian mystique for the revolution.

In the months following Castro's victory, exiles and revolutionaries from a number of Latin American countries unsuccessfully attempted to initiate guerrilla struggles in their own countries. By 1960 Castro and Che Guevara were giving support to such revolutionaries on a large scale. Misinterpreting their own experiences, they recommended that rural guerrilla methods be employed and gave little consideration to urban tactics. Large numbers of Latin American youths

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traveled to Cuba for training in rural guerrilla techniques, and Guevara's guerrilla handbook was widely distributed and used throughout the hemisphere. In fact, the Cuban leaders and their revolutionary disciples were so confident of these methods that from 1959 through 1965 almost every country in Latin America skirmished with revolutionaries inspired or supported by Havana. A few of these efforts endured, but by mid-decade most of the remaining guerrilla bands were of declining importance.

These efforts failed principally because the Cuban leaders themselves refused to understand the true dynamics of how they came to power and because they imposed an unworkable strategy on their followers. As rapidly as new guerrilla efforts were conceived, however, security and counterinsurgent forces in many Latin American countries were expanded and became more effective. The rural guerrillas also failed because of ineptness and disputes over leadership, tactics, and ideology. Generally, they were poorly trained and equipped despite Cuban efforts, and, desiring quick results, were unprepared psychologically for protracted conflict. Rural guerrillas have been unable in virtually every instance to attract significant middle-class support, mainly because their programs and campaigns have been directed at rural groups.

In 1966 and 1967 Cuba attempted to revitalize waning guerrilla fortunes in the hemisphere through an intensified, reckless commitment to continental rural guerrilla war. The Latin American Solidarity Organization was founded as a hemispheric revolutionary front. It held its first conclave the summer of 1967. In the meantime, Che Guevara with 16 other Cubans was spearheading a new guerrilla effort in Bolivia. Cuban advisers were also operating with guerrillas in Guatemala and Venezuela, and possibly in Colombia. Castro insisted more stridently than ever that meaningful change could result only from violent struggle in the countryside. The French Marxist, Regis Debray, earlier had published a treatise expanding the point, asserting

that guerrilla action must be an exclusively rural phenomenon without significant aid from the cities. His *Revolution Within the Revolution* became the new Cuban manifesto on guerrilla war.

Cuba's efforts to "export" the revolution reached their zenith during this period. Guevara's summary defeat in Bolivia in October 1967 and the concurrent failures of guerrillas elsewhere demonstrated more clearly than before the bankruptcy of Havana's approach. Young revolutionaries throughout Latin America began to reappraise Cuba's strategy. Castro unintentionally contributed to an acceleration of this re-evaluation by publishing Guevara's field diary. Che's poignant memoir of ineptitude, hopeless meanderings in dense jungles, and flight from encircling Bolivian troops has undoubtedly convinced many young revolutionaries that other tactics can lead more quickly to dramatic results. It is ironic that Che's detailed account of his own defeat is likely to endure as a more permanent legacy than his guerrilla handbook or speeches.

Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian author of the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* has replaced both Guevara and Debray as the primary theoretician of violent revolution in the hemisphere. Debray, who was recently released from a Bolivian prison after serving more than three years of a 30-year term for his part in the Guevara fiasco, admitted on 30 December that he had underestimated the importance of urban terrorism. He now claims to be rethinking his entire treatise on guerrilla tactics, and has endorsed urban terrorism.

Guevara's precipitate failure also led to a reappraisal of tactics in Cuba. During 1968 and the first half of 1969, Havana appeared to be withdrawing from revolutionary liaisons in Latin America. Cuban support to revolutionaries in Venezuela and Colombia terminated, and guerrillas in other countries were told to acquire their own funds and arms. Castro, however, was reluctant to amend his rural guerrilla strategy and was loath to share the spotlight as foremost

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revolutionary in the hemisphere with Marighella. Nevertheless, during the second half of 1969 there were signs of a gradual—if grudging—Cuban acceptance of urban methods as urban terrorists accelerated their activities in a number of Latin American cities. In November 1969 Marighella was killed, and two months later Castro came out in support of his line by publishing the *Mini-manual*.

Since then, Havana has been more flexible and cautious about endorsing revolutionary groups. Both urban and rural tactics now are supported, and in view of events in Chile, the nonviolent path to power is also publicly accepted—at least there. Underlying the pragmatism of this approach, however, is the same enduring commitment to rural guerrilla methods that has characterized the Cuban revolution since the early 1960s. Cuban leaders continue to predict that in most countries rural insurgency will be decisive in the long run and that urban tactics should be employed to create favorable conditions for rural conflict. Marighella himself was making plans to initiate rural guerrilla warfare in Goias State prior to his death.

Today, Guatemala may be the only country receiving material support from Cuba for guerrilla operations. A few Cuban advisers are in the Guatemalan countryside, and Cuban funds have been provided. In other countries, Havana appears to be giving little more than training and propaganda support to revolutionaries.



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*The Dawn of the Urban Guerrilla*

The urban guerrilla groups that have sprung up since Che Guevara's fiasco in Bolivia are direct—albeit more sophisticated—descendants of the rural guerrillas of the 1960s. They have

learned from Havana's mistakes of the last decade, but because most of them operate in highly urbanized societies, they realize that rural methods are not applicable anyway. They are young—most of them are believed to be in their early twenties—from middle-class backgrounds, and are frequently either university or former university students. Except in Argentina the urban guerrillas generally profess to be Marxists. In the few instances where they have discussed or publicized their political programs these are vague but ultranationalistic. Today's urban revolutionary desires quick remedies for social and economic ills and has chosen the tactics of terrorism in the cities to achieve rapid results—or at least to make dramatic headlines.

In general, the urban guerrilla endorses Havana's theoretical line by ascribing long-term importance to the rural struggle and to the peasantry, but in practice he concentrates or confines his activities in urban zones. In an interview published in October 1970 in the Cuban Communist Party daily, for example, a Tupamaro admitted that plans called for extending the struggle into the countryside, but "not with the characteristics of typical rural-guerrilla warfare." He emphasized instead that, at least in Uruguay, future operations in the countryside would consist of brief, commando-type raids launched from the cities.


Thus, although urban revolutionaries look to Havana as the spiritual center of revolution in Latin America, they are zealously nationalistic and prefer to maintain tactical and financial independence. Cuba has provided training for some urban guerrillas, backs them with propaganda support, and grants haven to revolutionaries and political prisoners, but there is no evidence of more extensive contacts. There are indications that Havana would like a larger share of the action, but it is probably known among young revolutionaries that Cuba has been heavy-handed and arrogant in dispensing aid in the past.

While Cuba has persisted in emphasizing the rural nature of its revolution and has

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concentrated on rural tactics for revolutionaries, the rest of Latin America has been urbanizing at accelerating rates. In 1940 there were five Latin American cities with more than a million inhabitants; in 1960 there were nine. It is estimated that today there are 17, and that in ten years there will be 26. Mexico City, Sao Paulo (Brazil), and Buenos Aires already have more than five million residents, and four other cities have more than 2.5 million. By the end of this decade five more cities will surpass the five-million level, and another five will have more than 2.5 million people. The accelerating rate of urbanization is also reflected in the growth of cities of a quarter million inhabitants or more. In 1970, 19 Latin American cities had between 500,000 and one million inhabitants, and another 32 had between 250,000 and 500,000 residents.

The new revolutionary in Latin America comes from these cities. In his *Minimanual*, Marighella said that it is "ideal" when the urban guerrilla "operates in his own city." In Uruguay and Brazil, and possibly in other countries, guerrillas follow Marighella's advice, organizing themselves into four- or five-man "firing groups." Each group is a largely autonomous tactical squad that initiates its own operations and has little contact with other groups. Marighella also emphasizes individual action, suggesting, for example, that assassinations should be performed by one guerrilla "in absolute secrecy and in cold blood." Such rigid compartmentalization accounts in large part for the ability of urban terrorists to resist police raids.

Urban terrorists have been responsible for the kidnappings of six foreign ambassadors since August 1968—two were murdered. Three US military officers have been killed by terrorists during the last three years, and at least eight other foreign diplomats or officials were kidnaped for ransom in 1970. Local officials are also targets of terrorist action—particularly in Guatemala. Airplane hijackings have become common, and in October 1970 the first combined hijacking-kidnaping occurred when a Costa Rican airliner

was hijacked to Cuba. Five US citizens aboard were threatened with death unless several revolutionaries—including a top Nicaraguan terrorist leader—were released from Costa Rican jails. Urban revolutionaries also struck in the Dominican Republic last April when the US Air Attaché was kidnaped and later released in exchange for prisoners. Terrorists have stolen millions of dollars, ransacked arms depots, engaged in various kinds of sabotage, and murdered local and foreign officials. They contributed directly to the collapse of the Ongania government in Argentina, and have undermined stability in several other countries.

As urban terrorism has increased, contacts and collaboration among urban-based activists have also been on the rise. Bolivia is the principal focus of insurgent interest in South America, and a number of foreigners have participated in ELN activities since last summer. Individual Uruguayan and perhaps Chilean advisers in urban terrorist techniques were in Bolivia last September. Three Chilean revolutionaries, rumored to be members of the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) were killed in Bolivia last summer, and three others were allowed to return to Chile after being captured.

The Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR are the two groups most likely to engage in proselytizing. If the MIR or the Altamirano faction of the Chilean Socialist Party is permitted to aid terrorists in other countries, in fact, Santiago could become the primary revolutionary capital in Latin America. Although

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Havana has provided some training and backs urban guerrillas with propaganda, the Cubans apparently have few contacts with South American terrorists.

The new breed of urban revolutionary has been most active in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina. These countries had almost no difficulties with rural guerrillas during the 1960s and few manifestations of urban violence until the last few years. Guatemala, however, has had a long history of rural and urban violence, which intensified during much of the decade of the sixties. Urban terror recently has become more important there than has Castro-line guerrilla struggle, but revolutionaries maintain a significant capability for both kinds of action. In Bolivia there have been two abortive guerrilla episodes since 1967, and revolutionaries appear increasingly interested in adopting new urban methods. In Colombia and Venezuela rural guerrillas continue to operate in the countryside, but they are the weakened and disheartened remnants of large and important guerrilla groups that were threats in the mid 1960s. The current status of the revolutionaries in each of these countries is described in the following paragraphs.

#### *Uruguay*

The National Liberation Movement (MLN)—better known as the Tupamaros—is a revolutionary Marxist organization that has had a spectacular and rapid rise to prominence during the last few years. Since late 1969 it has been the most active and successful insurgent group in South America. It has kidnaped a total of seven Uruguayan and foreign officials during this period, and three of them—the British ambassador, a US agronomist, and the Brazilian consul—are still in captivity.

The Tupamaros are highly organized and disciplined, and through audacious and ingenious offensives have been a disruptive force far out of proportion to their numbers. They initially enjoyed considerable public sympathy, but lost

much of this support after they murdered a US AID official last August. Nevertheless, they are likely to remain a significant disruptive force for some time to come, especially in the tense political atmosphere that probably will precede the presidential election in November.

Named after Tupac Amaru, a Peruvian Indian who organized an important uprising against Spain in 1780, the movement was founded in northern Uruguay in 1962 by Raul Sendic. It was not active until 1966 when it began to conduct sporadic robberies for money, arms, and supplies such as police uniforms and identification papers. Until 1967, the movement concentrated its activities in areas outside of metropolitan Montevideo, but later turned more and more to urban violence.

From 1967 through 1969, the Tupamaros succeeded in portraying themselves as romantic, quixotic revolutionaries. They attempted to minimize personal violence and excesses, and gained considerable popularity and publicity as selfless Robin Hoods. In elaborate public relations efforts, the Tupamaros redistributed to the poor some of the money they had stolen, as well as food, milk, and other provisions. They also “exposed” alleged financial frauds through the dissemination of compromising stolen documents, which did cause considerable alarm in government and financial circles. By daring daylight robberies, they accumulated large sums of money, often robbing banks by recruiting employees or by disguising themselves as policemen or guards.

On 8 October 1969, about 40 Tupamaros raided the small town of Pando, robbing three banks, taking over the police and fire stations, and severing communications. There were casualties on both sides, and the Tupamaros claim that members captured by police were tortured and killed. The Pando raid marked a major turning point for the guerrillas, who thereafter turned increasingly to murder and other extreme forms of urban violence.

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Their activities—especially the murder of police and security officials—increased in late 1969 and early 1970. In late July 1970, an Uruguayan judge was kidnaped but later released unharmed. On 31 July, US AID official Daniel Mitrione and the Brazilian consul were kidnaped; on 7 August, US agronomist Claude Fly, was abducted. Mitrione was killed on 10 August after the Pacheco government refused to negotiate with the terrorists. Tupamaro demands for the release of all imprisoned guerrillas in exchange for Fly and the Brazilian gradually faded in the face of government intransigence. By mid-September the terrorists retreated further and agreed to release the captives if major news media publicized their political manifesto. Although two Montevideo papers and a magazine subsequently printed the treatise—in violation of government censorship laws—the hostages have not been released.

The government's determination not to negotiate with the guerrillas has been complemented by a considerable show of force. Aggressive counterinsurgency campaigns—especially an unprecedented crackdown following the August kidnappings—have resulted in significant guerrilla losses. In August, Congress authorized a 20-day, limited state-of-siege as thousands of soldiers and policemen scoured the Montevideo area in search of the terrorists. A number of important guerrilla leaders, including Raul Sendic, were apprehended. As a result, an estimated 250 to 300 Tupamaros are currently imprisoned. According to some estimates, only about 150 Tupamaros remain active.

A hard core of the Tupamaro organization weathered the government's counterterrorist campaign, however. During the last few months of 1970 terrorists remained very active. They took over cinemas to make political promulgations, assaulted important communications facilities, robbed banks, and in early November they carried out one of the largest robberies in the country's history. In conjunction with these spectacular operations, they have also conducted a persistent campaign of low-level harassment designed to

attract constant publicity and to keep security forces off balance. Finally, on 8 January 1971 they added another hostage to the list of foreigners being held, when UK ambassador Jackson was kidnaped. Uruguayan police estimate that about 50 Tupamaros participated in this elaborately coordinated kidnaping in the streets of Montevideo.

The Tupamaros have a fairly extensive base of support among students and youths, who form a potentially large reservoir of new recruits. Student and faculty federations at universities and secondary schools are dominated by extreme leftists and Communists who sympathize with or overtly support guerrilla demands. In late August, for example, secondary school students demonstrated violently in Montevideo in favor of the Tupamaros. This resulted in a government decree closing the schools until the beginning of the new academic year this March. Students have been relatively quiescent in recent months, during the Uruguayan spring and summer, but student Committees for the Support of the Tupamaros have appeared.

The Tupamaros also have been supported by fairly large numbers of middle-class professionals who increasingly are disenchanted with the quality of life and economic stagnation in Uruguay. Middle-class support probably has continued to diminish, however, since the Pando raid, mainly because of the terrorists' increased emphasis on murder and other extreme forms of violence. One Tupamaro leader has stated publicly that the chivalrous tactics employed before the end of 1969 have been replaced by greater revolutionary militance.

The Tupamaros have demonstrated remarkable resiliency, determination, and skill since last summer, and it is likely that, because they enjoy extensive support from students and youths, they will remain a formidable force in Uruguay for

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some time. The boldly executed Jackson kidnaping shows that the terrorists retain the capability to carry out complex and important assaults and that the government's refusal to negotiate and police dragnets have had only limited results. Immediate Tupamaro objectives and their full capabilities are not known, but it is likely that the terrorists will remain active in the coming months, perhaps building toward a concerted, large-scale campaign of urban terrorism to coincide with the period preceding the presidential elections.

### *Brazil*

Since September 1969, Brazilian security forces have moved aggressively and effectively against suspected leftist terrorists. A substantial number of terrorists have been rounded up, and



**Carlos Lamarca Engaging in Guerrilla Training**

two of the most important Brazilian guerrilla leaders and theoreticians have been killed and others exiled. In early November 1970 the government launched a massive counterterrorist operation in several major cities in an attempt to frustrate a terrorist campaign they had learned about from captured documents. Estimates of the number of persons arrested in the operation vary from 500 to more than 5,000, which has provoked widespread criticism of the police and the military.

Terrorists are still able to carry out major operations, however. This was demonstrated dramatically on 7 December when Swiss Ambassador Bucher was kidnaped in Rio de Janeiro and held nearly six weeks for ransom. After protracted negotiations the government on 14 January released 70 political prisoners, who were flown to Chile in exchange for the ambassador. For the first time, however, the government forced the terrorists to reduce their original demands significantly by adhering to a firm negotiating posture. The guerrillas dropped their demands for the publication of communiqués and for free railroad transportation and yielded when the government refused to release a total of 37 other prisoners. The terrorists, in fact, were the net losers in the Bucher affair, inasmuch as their credibility and their image of invincibility in kidnap cases were undermined seriously.

The National Liberating Action (ALN), one of the two most important terrorist groups in Brazil, has been active for about three years. Former officials of the Soviet-line Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) who split off in opposition to the party's nonviolent policies form the core of the ALN's leadership as well as that of most of the other major terrorist groups. Carlos Marighella, the author of the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and the foremost Brazilian revolutionary of recent years, was the ALN's leader until he was killed by police in November 1969. His deputy, Joaquim Camara Ferreira, took over, but died in October 1970 resisting arrest. In September 1969 ALN members, working jointly with a student group closely affiliated with the ALN, kidnaped US Ambassador Elbrick. He was released unharmed when 15 terrorists were flown to Mexico. Most of them went on to Cuba, where they were greeted by Fidel Castro.

The Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR), a second important terrorist group, is headed by Carlos Lamarca, a former army captain and counterinsurgency specialist who deserted in January 1969. The VPR was responsible for the first significant terrorist action against a foreign

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national in Brazil when, in October 1968, they killed US Army Captain Charles Chandler in Sao Paulo. In March 1970 VPR militants kidnaped the Japanese consul-general in Sao Paulo. He was later released in exchange for five imprisoned terrorists. In April 1970 the US consul in Rio Grande do Sul foiled an abduction attempt by the VPR when he ran down one of the terrorists in his car. In June 1970 VPR terrorists working with the ALN kidnaped the West German ambassador. Forty prisoners were flown to Algeria to secure his release. The Bucher kidnaping in December was the most recent example of VPR capabilities.

tries. Brazilian revolutionaries are probably largely self-sufficient as a result of robberies of financial institutions. It is possible that Havana also has provided some financial backing, but there is no firm evidence of this. Marighella was long one of Castro's favorite revolutionaries. He attended the conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization in August 1967, and he may have returned to Brazil with definite commitments of Cuban support at a time when Havana was still relatively generous in dispensing aid.

Urban terrorism appears to be becoming a less serious problem in Brazil, even though kidnappings, robberies, and sabotage are likely to continue. Terrorist capabilities appear to have declined during 1970 as police became more effective in apprehending and killing important guerrilla leaders as well as a significant number of militants. The government's performance in the recent Bucher kidnaping enhanced its prestige, just as the terrorists' capitulation on many important points during the negotiations probably strengthened the hand of those military and security officials who advocate a stronger line in dealing with terrorists. It is possible, therefore, that urban terrorism has already reached its peak in Brazil and may now be declining in importance and intensity. Terrorists retain the capability to carry out many types of assaults and acts of sabotage, nevertheless, and undoubtedly will remain a destabilizing factor in Brazil for some time.

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It is likely that as security dragnets have become more effective this year and several leaders have been lost, terrorists have begun to pool their diminished resources.

The number of militants taking part in terrorist operations is probably not more than 1,000. Most are former university students, but many are cashiered military and police personnel, extreme leftist labor figures, and professional criminals. There is a good deal of sympathy for some of the terrorists' goals among intellectuals and the radical clergy. Several priests have been accused of assisting the ALN's support sector, and military and security officials are convinced that terrorists have important contacts among the Brazilian clergy. Marighella devoted a paragraph in the *Minimanual* to the clergy, saying that "the priest who is an urban guerrilla is an active ingredient" in the struggle.

Some terrorists—particularly in the ALN—have received training in Cuba, and Uruguayan terrorists have assisted Brazilians in illegal border crossings and in obtaining passage to other coun-

#### *Argentina*

Although Argentina experienced a brief episode of Cuban-supported rural guerrilla action in late 1963 and early 1964, urban terrorism did not become a problem until 1969. Some Peronists and other extremists in the labor and student sectors have long engaged in occasional acts of urban violence and strikes, but the phenomena of bank robberies, kidnappings, and other spectacular acts of urban terrorism are relatively new. Unlike terrorists in neighboring countries, most of

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whom identify with Castroite or Maoist doctrines, the bulk of Argentine urban revolutionaries claim to be left-wing Peronists. Very little is known about their structure and membership. There may be as many as a dozen small groups, some of which reportedly are attempting to form coalitions or to merge forces. The Peronist Armed Forces group appears to be the most active.

During the early months of 1970, terrorists concentrated on raiding small police and military posts and on robbing banks. In March, members of the Argentine Liberation Front, a group formed in late 1969 or early 1970 from the union of three earlier revolutionary groups, seized a Paraguayan consul in Buenos Aires and demanded the release of two imprisoned leftists. The government rejected the demand. Paraguayan President Stroessner, who was vacationing in Argentina at the time, endorsed the Ongania government's decision and the terrorists later released their captive. This was the first case in Latin America in which a government successfully defied the demands of kidnapers of a foreign diplomat.

An almost immediate reaction to this escapade was the attempted abduction of a Soviet diplomat, apparently by right-wing extremists led by an official of the Argentine Federal Police. The effort was foiled by the police. One of the most spectacular events of the year was the kidnap and murder of former president Pedro Aramburu. He was abducted on 29 May, and the kidnapers, who later identified themselves as Montoneros, said on 2 June that he had been tried and executed for crimes allegedly committed when he headed a provisional government from 1955-58. The military government of President Ongania, seriously embarrassed, was ousted by the armed forces a week later.

Terrorism has continued during the administration of General Levingston. On 1 July 1970 a 15-man commando group, whose members identify themselves as Montoneros, terrorized a small town near Cordoba. They robbed a bank, occupied the police station, and severed communica-

tions. Four weeks later, a similar raid was made on a town near the capital. In October, the home of the US Defense Attaché was fire-bombed, and other explosive devices were found at the homes of two other US officials. Later in the month terrorists forcibly entered the homes of three US military officers and made off with arms, uniforms, and identity documents.

Terrorism in Argentina is less spectacular than in Uruguay or Brazil, but the Aramburu murder and its aftermath demonstrate what a small and fanatical group can achieve. It is likely that terrorist bands will increase their activities this year, aiming especially at US officials. Although they have not demonstrated many of the capabilities of the Tupamaros or of one or two Brazilian terrorist groups, Argentine urban bands are slowly increasing their potential both by experience and probably through their contacts with the Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR. Argentine security and police forces have not yet had much success in halting them, and relatively few guerrillas have been imprisoned.

Little is known about the extent of support and sympathy for the terrorists, but as in Brazil and Uruguay, youths and students probably account for a substantial portion. Elements of Argentine's highly politicized labor federations probably sympathize generally with terrorist objectives, and it is also known that some radical priests, members of a group known in Argentina as the Third World Movement, have contacts in terrorist circles. Last December a "Third World" priest was given a two-year suspended prison sentence for his alleged contacts with terrorists involved in the Aramburu murder. Measures announced by the government late last year were designed to move Argentina gradually toward constitutional government during the next four or five years, but they are not expected to have a major impact in reducing terrorists' activities. It is likely, in fact, that terrorist activity will continue to increase during the next few years and may pose a more serious problem to the government.

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*Bolivia*

Because of its geographic location in the center of South America and the weakness of its political institutions, Bolivia has long been a target of cross-border subversion. In 1970 revolutionaries from Bolivia and other South American countries, with Cuban support, attempted to avenge and vindicate Che Guevara by reviving his National Liberation Army (ELN). Even though ELN rural guerrilla efforts failed a second time, revolutionaries have continued their attempts to give the impression that a continental guerrilla movement is being forged in Bolivia. There were reports last November that a "South American Liberation Army" was trying to begin operations in Bolivia, and Cuban propaganda continues to place heavy emphasis on the international character and support of revolutionary activity in Bolivia. Despite this outside interest and rhetoric, efforts to revive rural guerrilla action have been completely frustrated. In recent months, moreover, the ELN appears to be taking an increased interest in urban guerrilla methods, and it is likely that rural efforts will be abandoned, at least temporarily.

ately, and counterinsurgency forces picked off the guerrillas systematically in skirmishes during the next few months. By early September, when eight guerrillas were killed in a fire-fight, the ELN probably had been reduced to half its original size. By the end of October, Chato Peredo had been captured and about 55 guerrillas killed. A few remained in the countryside and eight, including Peredo and three Chileans, were granted safe conducts to Chile. Rural guerrilla activity ceased.

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The present ELN is the offspring of the movement founded and led by Guevara until it was all but obliterated in 1967. Inti Peredo, one of the survivors of that effort, began to reorganize revolutionary cadres in 1968 and 1969.

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In September 1969, however, Inti was killed in a police raid, and leadership passed to his brother Chato.

In July 1970 the Uruguayan press published the text of a letter allegedly written by Chato Peredo and addressed to the Uruguayan Tupamaro terrorist group. It announced the establishment of "formal" relations between the Tupamaros and the ELN. Chato said that "in the near future we must give more and more proof of integration, not only in the sense of help, but also in the interchange of militants." In January 1970 a committee for the support of the ELN was formed in Chile. Socialist Senator Carlos Altamirano was named director and the then presidential candidate, Salvador Allende, was identified as a member.

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On 19 July 1970, the resuscitated ELN began another phase of guerrilla activity by overrunning a mining camp at Teoponte, north of La Paz. About 75 guerrillas, many of them students from La Paz, dynamited the installation and seized two German employees as hostages. The Bolivian Government later released ten political prisoners in order to free the hostages. The ELN was forced to take the defensive almost immedi-

Following the collapse of its rural guerrilla operation, the ELN appears to be shifting

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emphasis to urban tactics with the help of individual Uruguayan and perhaps Chilean advisers.

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Within the last few months ELN propaganda has been giving greater notice to the urban struggle. Published statements now warn that the ELN will "fight to the final victory in the mountains and the cities." Earlier statements did not refer to urban activities. So far, however, the ELN has demonstrated a limited capacity for urban activities. It robbed a payroll truck in La Paz in December 1969 but lost several trained guerrillas in the process. It has carried out well-publicized murders of several of its political opponents in the last 18 months, including two in the capital recently. It is probably also responsible for some of the bombings that occur sporadically in La Paz, and the dynamiting of the USIS office in Santa Cruz on 7 December 1970.

Like the FAR in Guatemala, the Cuban-oriented ELN is not the only violent revolutionary group in Bolivia. The pro-Chinese Communist Party began its own militant operations in October when party members seized a cattle ranch and handed it over to peasant groups. The action was designed to gain sympathy from the peasants and to create a base for future guerrilla operations. The government's subsequent seizure of the property practically annulled the party's gains, however.

One faction of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers Party is also committed to guerrilla activities, but some of its better trained members have joined the ELN. The pro-Soviet Communist Party is opposed to guerrilla activities and, as a result, many of its more activist members have joined the ELN.

Because of the continued interest of Bolivian and foreign revolutionaries in maintaining an active insurgency in Bolivia, the ELN probably will

continue to be active. Significant numbers of university students are ELN members or sympathizers, and the labor unions, which have a long tradition of radicalism, may also contribute members. The ELN has made it clear in repeated announcements that it intends to persevere in the struggle.

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#### *Guatemala*

During the last two or three years there has been more violence and terrorism in Guatemala—a country of only five million people—than in any other country in the hemisphere. It is estimated that terrorist activities since 1967 have resulted in an average of about 90 deaths a month—a third of whom have been policemen. It is also believed that about 50 prominent businessmen have been abducted for ransoms averaging about \$200,000.

The major perpetrator of the violence is the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), a pro-Cuban revolutionary group with both urban and rural wings. In January 1968, two high-ranking members of the US military group in Guatemala were murdered by the FAR, and in August US Ambassador Mein was killed resisting a kidnap attempt. The FAR was the first Latin American terrorist group to resort to kidnappings, assassinations, and other extreme forms of urban violence.

Since 1969 the FAR has escalated its activities. In the autumn, guerrillas overran an oil-drilling camp near the Mexican border, occupied a rural town, temporarily seized farms in outlying areas, and increased assassinations in rural areas. In December, the FAR launched a particularly violent but unsuccessful campaign to disrupt the March 1970 presidential election. FAR cadres killed more than a dozen security officials, the right-wing candidate for mayor of Guatemala

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City, and a highly regarded editor of the country's leading newspaper. Fire bombings in downtown Guatemala City caused damage estimated in the millions of dollars.

In 1970, urban terrorism largely supplanted rural offensives. On the eve of the election the FAR secured the release of a captured colleague by kidnaping the Guatemalan foreign minister, and a week later it obtained the release of two other guerrillas in exchange for the abducted US Labor Attaché. After the election in March, West German Ambassador Von Spreti was kidnaped. He was killed on 5 April when the government reversed its earlier policy and refused to negotiate with the terrorists.

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In the latter part of 1970 the FAR suffered a debilitating leadership crisis and splits over the choice of tactics:

[redacted] Rural guerrilla operations apparently have been minimized temporarily, but guerrilla safe zones have been established in the hinterlands, perhaps as havens for urban terrorists on the run. In mid-September 1970, a two-month lull in urban activities ended with dozens of bombings, assassinations, kidnapings, and various scattered acts of sabotage.

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In October 1970 the hijackers of a Costa Rican airliner identified themselves as members of the United Revolutionary Front of Central America. This was the first public mention of this sobriquet,

[redacted] It is not likely that a united or coordinated Central American revolutionary group exists at this time in more than a propaganda context.

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The FAR has engaged in some cross-border operations, mainly into neighboring Mexico and Honduras in search of safehavens. It was in such a Mexican hideout, however, where Marcos Antonio Yon Sosa, a veteran of Guatemalan guerrilla struggles since 1960 and leader of the now moribund 13th of November Revolutionary Movement, was killed by a Mexican Army patrol in May 1970.

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Terrorism is not the work of the FAR alone. The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) is also committed to armed revolution even though its long-term strategy calls for preparing the masses prior to violent operations. Since 1962 the party has tried to gain control over its own guerrilla factions, and it has had a history of rivalry with the FAR, interspersed with occasional abortive periods of unification.

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terrorists—in early December [Redacted]

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The upsurge of terrorist activity in November resulted in one of the harshest crackdowns in memory. On 13 November President Arana declared a 30-day state of siege that was extended in December for another month. Stringent counter-insurgency measures were adopted that resulted in the death of at least one guerrilla leader and the capture of another. The government's actions were so exaggerated that the Air Force mistakenly attacked a fleet of Salvadoran shrimp boats in the Pacific believing they were engaged in illicit activity. Four boats were sunk, two Salvadorans were killed, and 15 wounded.

Right-wing counterterrorists have also been active on a large scale. Their operations were responsible for many deaths during the recent state of siege. [Redacted]

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On 15 January congressman Adolfo Mijangos—a well-known intellectual who had been confined to a wheelchair—was killed. On 17 January one of Guatemala's leading labor officials was machine gunned. The continuing inclusion of prominent political figures on the government's clandestine assassination list will serve to keep the cycle of retributory violence in motion.

Neither the government nor the left-wing terrorists are likely to achieve a decisive victory in the near future. US citizens and other foreigners will continue to be major targets. A US businessman was beaten and killed—perhaps by right-wing

*Venezuela*

Since the peak of activity from 1962 through 1964, insurgency has fallen to such insignificance in Venezuela that there are now probably less than 100 guerrillas divided into several rival guerrilla factions, and only isolated acts of urban violence occur. Rural guerrillas continue to decline in importance and pose no direct threat to the government. They have conducted a few small raids and ambushes during the last few years, but are not capable of sustained operations and are expected gradually to abandon the struggle or resort to banditry. Low-level violence and crime could increase in the cities this year, but this will not be a serious problem.

The Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) was one of the primary recipients of Cuban support for many years, as well as one of the most active and formidable guerrilla groups in the hemisphere. From 1962 through 1964 it combined a high level of urban terrorism with rural operations. In 1963, the Betancourt administration probably was more beleaguered and threatened by terrorists and guerrillas than any Latin American government since Batista's in Cuba. From 1962 through 1964 urban terrorists burned factories, murdered police and security personnel, kidnaped a popular Spanish athlete, and engaged in various acts of sabotage. In early 1962 the US Embassy was bombed, US businesses were raided, and two US military advisers were kidnaped. Rural operations were carried on simultaneously, and spectacular acts such as the seizure of a Venezuelan merchant ship on the high seas were carried out.

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Guerrilla fortunes declined steadily under the Leoni administration (1964-1969), however, and in 1966 the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) formally abandoned violent tactics. Under the leadership of Douglas Bravo, some FALN cadres split with the PCV over this decision, endeavoring with Cuban aid to revive rural guerrilla insurgency. By 1967, however, the FALN had fallen into such lassitude and incompetence, that Castro publicly denounced Bravo as a "pseudo-revolutionary." Cuban guerrilla advisers, including at least two members of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party who had been attached to the FALN, were withdrawn by early 1969. Other forms of Cuban support also dried up. The Pro-Castro Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) has been active since 1960. In September 1969 it split into three rival factions, two of which compete with a total of about 40 guerrillas in the field.

Guerrilla fortunes were so dim by 1969, in fact, that President Caldera instituted a wide-ranging pacification program in March aimed at absorbing Communists and guerrillas into the legal political framework. He offered an amnesty to guerrillas who would lay down their arms, legalized the Communist Party, established relations with the USSR, reorganized the security forces and restrained aggressive armed forces operations against the guerrillas. The pacification plan has been successful in attracting some guerrillas away from their mountain redoubts and probably has undermined morale and added to the divisions among those who remain in the field.

Some Venezuelan officials appear to be apprehensive that small bands of revolutionaries may seek to emulate the successes of terrorists in other South American countries. The defense minister said publicly on 11 January that the government is concerned about a possible increase in terrorism. He cited as evidence the murder of a former guerrilla by FALN members, a bombing in

Caracas, and an attempted bombing. The US Embassy in Caracas has speculated that the recent split of the PCV into two factions could result in sharper competition among extremist groups and an increase in violence and crime. PCV dissidents, including about a third of the party's leaders, are forming a new party less subservient to Moscow. This faction could resort to robberies in order to fund its activities, even though the use of violent methods would be a departure from the peaceful approach that all factions of the PCV have endorsed since 1966. Thus, despite the current low level of violence and crime and the possibility that it will increase somewhat this year, there is virtually no chance that terrorism or guerrilla activity will be renewed on levels comparable to those of the mid-1960s.

#### Colombia

Rural violence has been an integral part of Colombian life since 1948 when rampant banditry and guerrilla strife that lasted a decade were

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An ELN Guerrilla Training Camp

unleashed. During the 1960s three rival guerrilla forces looking to Moscow, Havana, and Peking for support emerged from the remnants of earlier rural struggle. None prospered for long, however, and all have declined appreciably during the last

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


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few years. They no longer attract young recruits or receive much publicity in the cities or on the campuses. In all, there are probably only about 600 guerrillas in Colombia—a country of 21 million people.


The guerrillas have generally confined their activities to marginal mountain areas, and they now engage more in banditry than in guerrilla warfare. Because of these activities, they still cause trouble in the countryside

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


The Army of National Liberation (ELN) is the most active guerrilla group in Colombia. It has enjoyed considerable prominence there and in the rest of Latin America since 1966, when it began guerrilla operations and lost in battle its most famous son—the guerrilla priest Camilo Torres. In early September 1970 the ELN ambushed an army patrol, killing seven soldiers and wounding eight. It was the most serious guerrilla action of any kind in Colombia in more than a year.

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The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the action arm of the pro-Soviet Colombian Communist Party, is larger than the ELN but less active. Operating in four main groups, the FARC's policy since late 1968 has been to avoid provoking the government, because Moscow is reluctant to have the FAR jeopardize newly established Colombian-Soviet relations or the legal role of the Communist Party. Some small clashes with military forces take place from time to time, however,



The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) is the action arm of the pro-Peking Communist Party of Colombia/Marxist-Leninist.

The EPL avoids clashes with superior forces, but has attacked small, isolated towns, ranches, and police posts. Such raids apparently are the product of the EPL's weakness and its need to acquire provisions and publicity.

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These guerrilla groups have not engaged in significant urban violence and appear to have little capacity for such action. They do not pose serious challenges to the government, and are likely to continue to fade in importance.

*Outlook*

Rural guerrilla insurgency probably will be eschewed as a viable method by Latin American revolutionaries in most countries in the foreseeable future. Although the Cubans are likely to continue emphasizing this approach and some urban revolutionaries will express the belief that urban and rural tactics should be employed simultaneously, fewer and fewer volunteers are likely to be enlisted for rural action. Guatemala, where all forms of violence and terrorism remain at unprecedented levels, may be the only country where a resurgence of rural guerrilla activity is possible. The Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the Cubans will probably continue to encourage and perhaps materially support revolutionaries from other Central American countries. The potential for revolution in those countries is not very great, however, and it is unlikely that new rural guerrilla groups will emerge in the next year or so.

Urban revolutionaries in South America have been far more successful than their rural counterparts in embarrassing governments and in upsetting stability. They have won important concessions from the governments—especially in forcing the release of political prisoners. In Argentina, they were able to exploit the weaknesses of

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the Ongania regime and they contributed to a change of government after they kidnaped and murdered a former president. This year, terrorist activities may increase in Argentina and Bolivia, continue at relatively high levels in Brazil and Uruguay, and they could be initiated by small, fanatical bands at any time in several other countries. Prospects are, therefore, that terrorist activity will increase in as many as half a dozen South American countries.

the same policy despite important kidnapings. Kidnaped foreign officials were murdered in each country as a result, but guerrillas suffered significant losses of popularity for their brutality. Although the Brazilian Government in the past acceded quickly to terrorist demands, it adopted a tougher line in the recent Bucher kidnaping and undoubtedly will uphold this firm position in future dealings with guerrillas.

In the entire South American continent, however, there are probably no more than 3,000 active urban revolutionaries. Police and counter-terrorist techniques became more sophisticated and effective in 1970, and terrorists have been dealt hard blows in several countries. Important guerrilla leaders in Uruguay, Brazil, and Guatemala have been killed or captured, and large numbers of terrorists are in jail.

Small bands of violent urban revolutionaries may be able to harass and embarrass Latin American governments for some time to come, but they are not likely to pose serious challenges to any with the possible exceptions of the regimes of Guatemala and Uruguay. In Guatemala, FAR-initiated violence and right-wing counterterror already amount to a small-scale, bloody civil war that could increase in proportion depending on what actions the government takes. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros continue to demonstrate a remarkable ability to carry out spectacular operations.

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Terrorists succeeded at first largely because governments were surprised, confused, and unprepared to deal with them. During 1970, however, as terrorist methods became better known the Guatemalan Government adopted a firm policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists, and the Uruguayan Government persisted in

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