

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: ATR
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DISPATCH NO. MGK-W-1451

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CLASSIFICATION

Winton

TO: Chief, Karlsruhe Station

DATE: 21 February 1948

FROM: Chief, Foreign Branch M

Attn: Chief, BCS

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC: CAMISADE

Mattison - 9-1-48
201-12204

REFERENCE: HRLN 1254

1. We recognized the urgency of a decision on CAMISADE while was on the spot to start immediate W/T training, but the situation is now badly confused by several factors:

a. The crack about vagrancy goes without saying but misses the point. What we need, of course, is detailed information that CAMISADE will be fully self-supporting under PASTIME, and that his situation will be likely to preclude his being drafted into a kind of work where he could not put his radio training to use. Answers to these questions should be SOP for any PASTIME proposal, but especially for potential W/T operators, since their situation will govern the running of a number of other projects. I hope by this time you will have poached complete up-to-date agent control forms on CAMISADE, as requested in WASH 8885, since we still know far too little about what he is doing or would be likely to do under PASTIME. What about the statement in MGB-A-2496, that in the event of hostilities CAMISADE would probably be considered fit for military or labor service, for example? Does it still seem clear that he would be assigned to propaganda work? Incidentally, we'd also be glad to get the monthly PASTIME report promised in KAPOK B-258 of 16 September 1948; it would greatly facilitate our answers to cables like KARL 3587.

b. It was surprising news here that CAMISADE had been in contact with the Russians as recently as August 1948. The last previous mention of a Russian contact in the files here dates from October 1947 (BSG/Ops/173). There were no subsequent reports with details as to continued contact with Russian case officers, although the project forms of January and June 1948 continued to list Russian case officers among his targets. This absence of information and the statement in MGB-A-2496, that a completely new exploitation had become desirable, led us to assume that all such contacts had petered out, including the fantastic and unproductive business of the notional Mr. WEBB. Hence the conclusion in MGK-W-1219 of 22 December 1948 that so far as we knew CAMISADE had not been a double agent since October 1947; the arrival of MGK-W-1219 should have been a signal for immediately setting us straight.

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o. Now comes []'s MGB-A-5897 of 26 January 1949, which mentions in passing that in spite of the satisfactory CARRIAGE test on CAMISADE in September, "it was decided on other grounds not to give him the (radio) training." Of course your later cables supersede this information, and [] may have been misinformed, but it is one more suggestion that FEM has not been kept up to date on the case.

2. Where do we stand? The reintroduction of the DA angle now holds up decision on the radio training, until the whole thing is spelled out. As I wrote before, the organization has no blanket policy prohibiting the use of all double agents in W/T work; but you and we do need an unusually clear idea of what the DA-W/T combination could accomplish, and whether CAMISADE is the man for the job. The vanished PREGNANT, the Keystone comedy of the notional WEBB shadowboxing with the notional NIKOLAS @ the notional ALEXANDER, and then the long silence may not be to CAMISADE'S discredit, but they don't arouse confidence in CAMISADE as a long-range, high-level, productive DA. Whether the unknown ROSTOVIEV is the needed spark we don't know, but it seems to us that we are not justified in going on with both the DA handling and the W/T training together. Maybe later, but only if this becomes a DA case of really outstanding possibilities. When we thought the DA aspect was finished, we were interested in CAMISADE as one more reliable radio link for Berlin operations in general, but that would be impossible if the DA work were to continue, in which event his W/T would be of value to no other case than his own; and our training facilities are too limited to tie them up in a single one-man case unless it is an exceptionally good one.

3. These reservations about CAMISADE shouldn't be taken as lack of support for your renewed interest in DAs, which is welcomed here. I imagine what has soured [] and [] on Berlin's experience with DAs is that all our postwar DAs together haven't produced as much strategic and tactical information on the RIS as one interrogation session with a defector like [] or []. But the fact that we've had no outstanding DA cases in Berlin doesn't make that point conclusive, and besides we haven't concentrated on the other purposes for which DAs are useful--deception, for instance. I discussed the DA passage from your interesting MGB-A-3055 with the expert you mention, who promises a long essay on DA-handling for the field which I think will stimulate imaginations and kindle the old X-2 fervor rather generally; the other day he told me it was nearly ready to go out. Of course I'll discuss all the German cases with him as much as we can make time for, but if that is to do any good it will have to be backed up by brilliant but painfully thorough agent control work by every case officer involved. I'll take up CAMISADE with him in detail as soon as we're fully informed ourselves; at the moment it would accomplish little, for he would naturally ask a score of questions on the bare facts of the case which our present file can't answer.

4. Altogether, the confusion and misunderstanding which have grown up around CAMISADE are a prime argument in favor of a detailed monthly progress report.

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