(U) William J. Casey as Director of Central Intelligence: An Overview

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(U) We could be on the verge of an historic turning point in this century. . . . 300,000 freedom fighters are risking their lives in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Mozambique and Yemen.

—William J. Casey, 25 September 1986[1]

(U) William Joseph Casey served as President Ronald Reagan's director of central intelligence (DCI) during 28 January 1981–29 January 1987 in the midst of a period of great political flux in the world. In late 1986, he was diagnosed with a malignant brain tumor, and in mid-December he took medical leave. He formally resigned just over a month later. He died on 6 May 1987. To mark the passage of 30 years since the passage of a most extraordinary DCI, we are publishing the following, which is the concluding chapter of a forthcoming classified history of Casey's term as DCI.

—Editor

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(U) The Brezhnev Doctrine, proclaimed when Soviet and other Eastern Bloc forces invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, held that any country that adopted a communist form of government would remain, irreversibly, in the Soviet-led "socialist camp." The military movement into Czechoslovakia squelched the political opening of the Prague Spring and unambiguously demonstrated that any attempt by a socialist state to liberalize its political system would be stamped out with overwhelming force. The United States condemned the Brezhnev Doctrine but arguably acquiesced

in it by continuing a policy of détente with the Soviet Union through much of the Nixon and Carter presidencies, by the end of which the Soviets had considerably expanded their political and military influence in the Third World.

(U) Slightly more than a year after taking office, President Reagan effectively declared war on the Soviets in the Third World. In a speech on 9 May 1982 at Eureka College, his alma mater, Reagan pledged that the United States would support people fighting against the spread of communism anywhere in the world. In the years that followed, the Reagan administration more vigorously challenged the Soviets with a multiyear, worldwide program of supporting "freedom fighters" resisting Marxist regimes backed by the Soviets or

(U) The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government. (b)(3)

Soviet proxy governments, such as those of Cuba, Vietnam, and Libya.

(U) Casey and the Reagan Doctrine

(U) The practice of pushing back against the Soviets came, later, to be known as the Reagan Doctrine. National Security Advisor Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane traces the origins of the formal doctrine—albeit not by that name—to National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, an updated statement of US policy toward the Soviet Union signed by President Reagan in January 1983. NSDD 75 repudiated détente and—in a nine-page document—declared that the United States would "contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas."[2]

(U) Secretary of State George Shultz wrote that he enunciated the Reagan Doctrine in a speech on "America and the Struggle for Freedom" at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco in February 1985. Insisting that for many years "our adversaries acted without restraint" in spreading communism and in enforcing the "infamous" and "chilling" Brezhnev Doctrine, Shultz declared the United States would now "stand firmly in defense of our interests and principles and the rights of peoples to live in freedom." The moderate Shultz noted that he had carefully reviewed the draft of the hardline speech with the president and shown it to DCI William Casey and others at one of their monthly "Family Group" lunches at the White House. Casey, Shultz recalled, was very supportive. "Don't put this into the interagency clearance process," he extolled. "Don't let anyone change a word."[3]

(U) A National Security Council meeting in the Oval Office on 12 November 1985, just before President Reagan's summit meeting in Geneva with Soviet leader Gorbachev. Photo: Ronald Reagan Library, #C31939-20

(U) President Reagan, his two secretaries of defense, two secretaries of state, six national security advisors, and DCIs Casey and Webster all deserve credit for supporting and implementing the policy that by 1985 came to be called the Reagan Doctrine, and which ultimately thwarted Soviet ambitions in the Third World. They deserve credit as well for gradually implementing the succession of political, military, economic, and technological actions that squeezed the Soviet Union to the point that—when combined with the country's even more important domestic political, economic, and social problems—the USSR imploded. The collapse of the USSR, the end of centuries of Russian/Soviet imperialism, the end of nearly 50 years of communism in Eastern Europe, and the reunification of Germany were, undoubtedly, developments more far-reaching than anything Casey foresaw when he spoke of a possible "historic turning point in this century." Taken together, these developments constituted a profoundly important victory for the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, the Congress, the United States, and the West.

(U) More than any other single individual, William Casey was the originator and driver of US on-the-ground actions that slowed and finally arrested the expansion of Soviet presence and influence abroad. He was the de facto father of the Reagan Doctrine and created the reality to which the name became attached. Shultz recognized Casey's central role when he wrote about how the United States was supporting the opposition to Marxist regimes in many countries, referring specifically to Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. Shultz described how Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze finally informed him that

(U) William Casey commenting during a National Security Council meeting in the White House Situation Room on 14 August 1986. Photo: Ronald Reagan Library, #C36569-9

Soviet forces would be withdrawing from Afghanistan and about what he believed had forced the Soviets to take this step. "In March 1985, with Bill Casey pushing hard and with me in full agreement, the president had stepped up sharply our level of assistance to the Mujahidin [resistance fighters]." With the Soviet departure from Afghanistan, the Brezhnev Doctrine suffered its first serious breach. The Reagan Doctrine, Shultz emphasized, "brought results."[4]

(U) Afghanistan

(U) The most definitively successful of the worldwide programs opposing the Soviets was, indeed, the one that Shultz highlighted—US support to the Afghan mujahidin. Casey inherited this program from the Carter administration, but over the years—working within the administration, with Congress, and with liaison partners—he increased its size and lethality immensely as the goal of US policy transitioned from checking the Soviets to expelling them. With some charitable oversimplification, Reagan confidant Edwin Meese later observed, "Bill was a stalwart in advocating the use of Stinger missiles. That, more than anything else, brought about the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union."[5] In fact, there were many domestic and international considerations involved in the Soviets' decision to withdraw, but there was no doubt that the seemingly endless and growing insurgency was a key factor and that the role of the United States and the Agency in supporting Pakistani partners and the mujahidin resistance was critical to its ultimate success. In Afghanistan, Bill Casey led the most historically consequential covert action in the history of the CIA.

(U) Central America

(U) Casey was even more directly responsible for what became one of the most controversial covert actions—backing the Contra resistance to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Unlike Afghanistan, there was at the outset no established insurgency in Nicaragua; no reliable foreign provider of arms, training, and sanctuary; no funding sources beyond the United States; and no reservoir of support in the US Congress, press, and public. Casey had Reagan's support, but almost everyone else (with the important exception of Secretary of State Alexander Haig) was either apathetic or opposed to what was seen as Casey's war. To end Nicaragua's support to the insurgency in El Salvador and to counter the growth of Cuban and Soviet influence in Nicaragua—which Casey considered a communist threat to the entire Western Hemisphere—he began during his first year in office to mold rural campesinos, former Somoza-era national guardsmen, and assorted oppositionists into a militarily capable Contra force that operated with paramilitary support from the CIA until 1984.

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(U) CIA Legacy

~~(S//NF)~~ Covert Action. Rebuilding CIA's covert action infrastructure and its operational capabilities was one of Casey's major accomplishments. Over his six years in office, he secured vastly increased funding for covert action

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consistent with wider US policy goals.

(U) As a means of fighting back against the Soviets, covert action was Casey's highest priority, and it was probably the single category of Agency activities to which he devoted the most time. In the aggregate, the Agency's covert programs during the Casey years, 1981 to 1986, contributed significantly to US success in thwarting what had been a continual expansion of Soviet influence abroad. Soviet expert and former DCI Robert Gates has written that the first meaningful, authoritative change in the thrust of Soviet foreign policy can be traced to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the 27th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party on 6 March 1986—

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the date that "should be marked as the beginning of the end of the Cold War." From that time, Gates continued, there emerged "a radical turn in Soviet foreign policy away from the confrontations of the past and toward international cooperation . . . extending, finally, to the last redoubt of the Cold War—the Third World." On 4 December 1989—three years after Casey left office—Warsaw Pact leaders formally condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia and declared the Brezhnev Doctrine dead.[6]

(U) The Intelligence Community. For historians and the popular press, Casey's legacy will always be his leadership and involvement in covert operations. To his Intelligence Community and Agency colleagues and their successors, however, he also bequeathed a broader legacy. Above all, that entailed rebuilding the IC—expanding funding, increasing the number of personnel, and growing the capabilities of all agencies. It involved improving the collection of intelligence through human sources and new ground-based and overhead technical collection systems, as well as strengthening the quality of analysis. In these efforts, Casey received wide support from the heads of the other agencies. They recognized and appreciated his clout in the administration, his success in securing resources, his respect for their operational autonomy, and his invitation to involve themselves personally in his priority task of preparing national intelligence estimates. Casey was generally not territorial and had no taste for bureaucracy or interagency bickering. His era marked a significant elevation of cooperation among the senior leaders of the IC.[a]

(U) The Estimative Process. Casey followed through on his often-stated view that his most important responsibility was to oversee the preparation for policymakers of national estimates that were timely, relevant, and of high quality. Under Casey, the process of producing estimates was not for the meek. He held strong views on many key intelligence issues and his vigorous approach to debating analytical points intimidated the uninitiated. But he enjoyed the give and take and clearly respected those who knew their brief and were able to represent their case effectively. One seldom changed Casey's mind on basic substantive issues, especially regarding the Soviet Union, but those holding different views had an opportunity to make their positions known and to express them in print. Casey on several occasions forwarded estimates and other analytical papers to policymakers noting that they reached conclusions with which he disagreed. Policymakers praised some estimates and criticized others. Reviewing the record, it is perhaps not surprising that the latter category contained a significant number of estimates that effectively challenged US policy. At a minimum, even these were timely and relevant. Under Casey's tutelage, estimates—produced in greatly increased numbers—had an impact.

(U) CIA Organization—DI. Within CIA, Casey's legacy also included two significant organizational adjustments. Early in his tenure, the director set in motion a review that reorganized the Directorate of Intelligence so that its constituent offices were defined by their area of geographic responsibility rather than by academic discipline—politics, economics, military and weapons analysis, and the like. For managers, this was a traumatic adjustment at the time, but over the longer term promoted closer substantive cooperation among Agency experts from different disciplines working on a given country or region. Equally important, it facilitated interactions on the part of managers and analysts with counterparts in the Directorate of Operations and elsewhere in government, who for the most part were also organized on a geographic basis. For analysts, this organizational change was the most significant in the history of the Agency, and it endured for 35 years.

(U) CIA Organization—DO. Casey's most significant organizational move in the Directorate of Operations was to create an organization specifically to counter terrorism. From the beginning of his time at CIA, Casey had focused on Libyan sponsorship of regional subversion and international terrorism. By mid-1985, more numerous international terrorist outrages (backed by the Libyans and others) and the plight of US hostages held in Lebanon led him to expend even more effort working counterterrorism issues with Agency officers, liaison counterparts, and US government colleagues. Prompted by his own findings and a govern-

a. (U) The director of intelligence and research at the Department of State, Amb. Hugh Montgomery, recalled, "Casey never really engaged the Community as such, but he was very supportive of INR."—Interview with author, 27 February 2013 [U].

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(U) Casey's willingness to do the job himself, coupled with a sometimes short temper and impetuousness, led to some comical results.

ment-wide review of options for a more aggressive and comprehensive counterterrorism policy, Casey in early 1986 created the Counterterrorism Center (CTC). The new organization was truly an innovation—a center that was located organizationally within the DO but made up of experts from all directorates and (in only token numbers originally) the FBI and other agencies. CTC suffered serious growing pains, as area divisions (especially the Near East and South Asia Division) saw it as a competitor, but it prospered to the point that it eventually became the largest operational component in CIA. Other CIA centers would follow (counternarcotics, counterproliferation, and counterintelligence), and decades later, CTC and the others served as models for a comprehensive reorganization of the Agency into regionally based "mission centers" that combined operations, analysis, and technical and support personnel.

~~*(S//NF) Leadership/Management.*~~ Casey was a more effective leader than manager. He foresaw the benefits of the reorganizations and directed them implemented. He recognized the need for a second CIA headquarters building and built it. But he did not—and, with all the demands on the time of a CIA director, perhaps could not—devote the close and continuing management attention that would have been required to solve certain other problems that he continually lamented

(U) Leaving aside covert action, Casey's approach to management was more exhortation than execution. During one conference, he explained to senior managers that Churchill during World War II had a sticker that read "Action This Day." The prime minister attached this sticker to memorandums he sent to subordinates "to make things move." "That spirit," Casey charged, "should be the bottom line of what we call the Excellence Program." Casey launched his "Excellence Program" with a speech to employees in January 1984; within months it had produced a "credo" outlining Agency values, what Casey described as a "three foot high pile" of submissions of ideas for improvements submitted by hundreds of employees, and several dozen implemented actions that the director judged responsive to his call to maximize superior performance from a large organization. Many managers considered the effort a passing fad, but it reflected Casey's perennial desire to take action now.[a]

a. (U) Casey was frank to acknowledge that he had been inspired to initiate his program by reading Tom Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr.'s best-selling management book, *In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies* (Harper-Collins, 1982).

(U) Casey could be very direct.

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On other occasions he said that lagging recruitment "particularly annoys me" and that the DO needed to look outside its traditional career trainee program. The Agency, he argued, needed more lateral hiring of individuals "with Slavic, Oriental, Hispanic, Arabic language and culture. We must be prepared to settle for poorer English, less education . . . trade superficial qualities for experience and instincts." Casey told senior operations managers that the CIA would never be able to acquire all the information it needed "from people who will take or can pass polygraphs."

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(U) Casey's willingness to do the job himself, coupled with a sometimes short temper and impetuousness, led to some comical results. Late one afternoon, Casey was frustrated that it was taking so long for him to receive a copy of a paper he had dictated, only to be told that the Wang word processor in his outer office was malfunctioning. Hearing

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this, Casey commanded his executive assistant: "Get Wang on the line!" The director explained that he was acquainted with Dr. An Wang, the founder of the company that made the offending machine. Despite protestations from his staff that they could fix the problem, Casey's call was placed and the next day a team from Wang, sent by Wang, showed up in the director's office.[10]

(U) While Casey was demanding and sometimes abrupt, he granted subordinates great authority and leeway and was, himself, an extraordinarily hard worker, all of which inspired loyalty and respect. Senior CIA officers were impressed, and then amused, when Casey finally took a proper vacation after 18 months on the job. With Mrs. Casey and his daughter, Bernadette, the director traveled to the American Southwest for a two-week holiday. While in the area, Casey took side excursions to visit the Sandia Corporation and Airborne Laser Laboratories in New Mexico; the Satellite Test Center, Special Projects Office, Defense Language Institute, and Naval Postgraduate School in California; the North American Air Defense Command in Colorado; and the Area 51 testing ground in Nevada.[11] The expectation at Headquarters was that he would doubtless return rested and ready to attack in all directions at once.

(U) Relationship with the President. Casey was also respected within CIA, the Intelligence Community, and in wider government circles because President Reagan—in an unprecedented move—made him a member of the cabinet. The two men had not known one another prior to the campaign, but Reagan and his advisers credited Casey with getting the president elected. They were of the same generation, shared a common worldview, and thought alike on key issues. As a result, a bond was established, and Casey had regular and assured access to the president.

(U) Casey offering counsel to the president in the Oval Office on 11 March 1983. Photo: Ronald Reagan Library, #C13369-13

(U) Casey saw a lot of President Reagan. Over his six years in office, the director attended an average of 23 cabinet meetings annually. He was present at an average of 50 formal NSC or National Security Policy Group (NSPG) meetings per year. Reagan normally chaired both of these groups. Beyond that, Casey typically attended nine smaller, less formal meetings with the president and others related to intelligence and national security matters, and had seven "one-on-one" (often with an accompanying aide and with the national security advisor present) meetings with the president each year. Not unimportant in Washington, Director and Mrs. Casey also joined the Reagans for an average of eight social occasions each year.[12]

(U) Casey's senior executive assistant recalled that Casey did not telephone Reagan often, but when he did he always got through.[13] According to National Security Advisor John Poindexter, Casey spoke by telephone with Reagan more frequently than any other member of the NSC. A sample of Agency and White House records suggests the two typically spoke by telephone six to eight times per year.[a] Poindexter remembered that Casey, whether he met in person

a. (U) CIA historian upon reviewing CIA records, found that there were six telephone calls in 1981—Center for the Study of Intelligence, unpublished and undated manuscript [not classified]. White House records show that there were eight telephone calls in 1986—William B. Lytton III, "Summary of Contacts between the President and DCI Casey in 1986," memorandum for Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., 20 August 1987 [not

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with Reagan or telephoned, usually provided the president a paper summarizing his key points. Reagan read this material—as he did the innumerable memorandums and letters Casey sent Reagan that were not associated with a meeting or telephone call—unless the document was too long or detailed, in which case Reagan might request that others summarize the key points for him.[14] In all, Casey may have had more contact with the president he served than any other director of the CIA.

(U) Casey and Reagan did not have a particularly close personal relationship, despite the relative frequency of contact between them. Both were paradoxes. They were outgoing and loved other people's company, yet were also very private and virtually never shared any personal information about themselves, even with those whom they had known for decades. Beyond that, Casey revealed to a few close associates that he had reservations about Reagan's lack of intellectual interests and relaxed work habits. As Casey confidant Jeane Kirkpatrick charitably put it, "Casey liked and admired the president and thought he had good judgment about foreign policy, but wished that he was more involved—more deeply and personally."[15]

(U) The frequency of contact, the volume of information Casey provided Reagan, and the attention the president is known to have accorded that information demonstrate, at a minimum, Casey's great determination to support the president and the close professional and political, if not personal, relationship that existed between them. Throughout his time in office, Casey took advantage of the fact that he had advised Reagan on substantive matters during the campaign and of his status as a member of the cabinet to offer advice not only on intelligence and national security matters, but about domestic issues as well. During his [redacted] trip abroad as DCI, for example, Casey [redacted] followed up on a matter discussed at a recent cabinet meeting by sending the president a cable with recommendations on a draft presidential public statement on funding entitlement programs; years later, Casey was sending Reagan letters advising on economic and budget issues in light of the coming reelection campaign.[16]

(U) Vice President Bush, some key cabinet members, and several senior White House political advisers thought Casey should not be in the cabinet and had too much influence with Reagan, particularly through his influence on Reagan's speeches and his involvement with domestic issues.[17] One White House insider who was close to Casey, however, recalled that "Reagan cared about Casey and they [the White House advisers] knew it. They tried to minimize his influence, but he was too big to take on."[18]

(U) Senator Paul Laxalt (R-NV), who served as Reagan's campaign chairman while Casey was campaign manager, knew both Reagan and Casey well and maintained regular contact with each throughout the time Casey was DCI. Looking back on that period, Laxalt observed that Casey, above all, loved his country and hated its enemies. So did Reagan. On all matters, "Casey was a formidable force protecting the president. Casey's judgment was highly respected by the president."[19] National Security Advisor Richard Allen described the relationship between Casey and the president even more succinctly, if indelicately: "Bill Casey was a great American. He was so goddamned loyal—absolutely."[20] (b)(1) (b)(3)

(U) Iran-Contra. For better and worse, Casey's loyalty to Reagan was never better demonstrated than during the period of the Iran-Contra affair. Reagan was emotionally and politically preoccupied by the detention of American hostages in Lebanon, leading him to inquire regularly of his national security advisors and Casey about what more could be done to secure their release and to his bit-by-bit approval of the Israeli-inspired, NSC-controlled, largely fruitless effort to secure the hostages' release by selling arms to Iran. Better than any other senior member of the national security team, Casey understood Reagan's thinking and determination to explore every possible avenue. He lent CIA support to the program, unrealistically trying along the way to disavow Agency responsibility for, or control of, it even when a presidential finding was signed. With the notable exception of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who opposed the effort throughout, other members of the NSC offered muted support for the program or acquiesced. After it became public, some, notably Shultz, were publicly critical.

(U) Casey was the NSC member most concerned about Soviet and Cuban expansionism in Central America and was the architect of

classified] (White House Legal Task Force Records, box 92814).

(U) Casey—alone among cabinet-level officers—insisted on testifying before Congress in defense of the administration.

the covert program to support the Contra resistance to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. He was also the most determined that the administration should find a way to continue support for the Contras during the period Congress disallowed support from the CIA. Reagan backed him, and all NSC members were involved in deliberations on how, legally, to raise funds. Some funds were raised from foreign states. Separately, the NSC staff created a private "enterprise" to purchase arms and forward them to the Contras. When more funds were needed, the NSC staff conjoined the Iran and Contra resupply efforts, illegally diverting profits realized by the sale of weapons to Iran to support the Contras.

(U) Reagan and Casey denied having any direct knowledge of the financial diversion prior to the time it was publicly disclosed by Attorney General Meese, although Casey was informed of rumors that funds were being diverted a month before Meese's revelation and asked that this information be shared with White House counsel. Iran-Contra investigators found no credible evidence that contradicted the accounts the director and the president provided them. Nevertheless, the otherwise positive legacies of Reagan and Casey—they who had authorized and implemented the Reagan Doctrine that rolled back the Soviets—were forever melded to and tarnished by Iran-Contra. Outside the national security advisors and the NSC staff, Reagan and Casey were the most active supporters of the ill-advised operations to secure the release of hostages in a manner incompatible with longstanding US policy, and to support the Contras during the period when US government funding was not authorized. Their motives may have been noble, but their judgment failed them.

(U) When the scandal erupted, Casey—alone among cabinet-level officers—insisted on testifying before Congress in defense of the administration. During his fourth appearance in December 1986, his failing health left him impaired to the point that the sympathetic chairman of the committee adjourned the hearing.

(U) Last Days

(U) On 15 December 1986, Casey suffered a medical crisis in his office and took leave from his duties as DCI. He resigned on 29 January 1987 and died on 6 May. A funeral mass was held at Saint Mary's Parish in Roslyn Harbor, on Long Island, near Casey's home of almost 40 years. At the last moment, the bishop of the diocese, John McGann, decided to preside in place of the local parish priest. The bishop arrived late (delayed by several motorcades), making some mourners impatient, but not distressing in the slightest President Ronald Reagan, sitting serenely in the front row.

(U) The occasion was pure Casey. The bishop credited Casey for his lifetime of support to the church, but used his homily primarily to attack US policy in Central America. In particular, he criticized "the violence wrought . . . by support of the Contras." The bishop's condemnation irritated many and was received with stony silence.

(U) Former UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick followed with a eulogy praising Casey. She noted that

(U) President and Mrs. Reagan offering their condolences to Mrs. Casey's widow, Sophia, as daughter, Bernadette, and Father Phillip Dabney look on at the funeral. (Reverend Dabney had presided over the wedding of Bernadette and her husband Owen Smith, not shown.) Photo: Ronald Reagan Library, #C40599-7

he "could barely stand it when we missed an opportunity to protect the United States and promote freedom . . . and supporting Nicaraguan freedom fighters had special priority for him." Kirkpatrick continued, "Some mean spirited, ill-informed comments have been written and spoken in the last days. These unpleasant comments would not have overly disturbed our friend. . . . He told a university audience last fall, 'The CIA is not a place for tender egos and shriveling violets. The debates and clashes of ideas can get rough." Kirkpatrick's remarks prompted a burst of applause.

(U) Casey would have loved the service. In a way, he had the last word. His death notice in the *Washington Post* suggested that, "in lieu of flowers, donations may be made to the William J. Casey Fund for the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters."

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Endnotes

1. (U) William J. Casey, address to the advisory and editorial boards of the *Washington Times*, 25 September 1986, as quoted in Herbert E. Meyer, *Scouting the Future: The Public Speeches of William J. Casey* (Regnery Gateway, 1989), 157.
2. (U) Robert C. McFarlane, *Special Trust* (Cadell and Davies, 1994), 219–20; the complete text of NSDD 75 is at appendix B, 372–80.
3. (U) George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 525.
4. (U) Ibid., 1086–87.
5. (U) Edwin Meese, remarks at centennial celebration of Casey's birth, Institute of World Politics, 13 March 2013 [U].
6. (U) Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (Simon and Shuster, 1996), 380, 469.
7. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
8. [redacted]
9. [redacted]
10. (U) William J. Casey, "Computerization," memorandum for executive director, 6 September 1984 [S]—Job 88B00443R, box 16, folder 422.
11. (U) Office of the DCI, travel records, 17 May to 18 November 1982 [not classified]—Job 9300415R, box 1, folder 2.
12. (U) DCI's schedule cards maintained by his executive assistants [not classified]—Job 9300415R, box 1, files 1–6.
13. (U) Betty Murphy, interview with author Joseph Persico, 1 July 1988 [U].
14. (U) John Poindexter, interview with author, 24 September 2014 [U].
15. (U) UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, interview with author Joseph Persico, 19 September 1988 [U].
16. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
17. (U) George H.W. Bush, interview with author, 6 May 1993 [U].
18. (U) White House speech writer Anthony Dolan, interview with author Joseph Persico, 29 June 1988 [U].
19. (U) Paul Laxalt, interview with author Joseph Persico, 21 September 1988 [U].
20. (U) Richard Allen, interview with author Joseph Persico, 16 December 1988 [U].

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