(Ref: Brief Int Div/At/a)/PT 4162 dated 18 Jul 46
enclosing: MARSEC Brief PP 562/16a, MARSEC/RCH dated 15 Apr 46
and comments by Special Service dated 18 Apr 46.

This report should be read in conjunction with:
dated 12 Jan 46.
Draft Report from KNTU No 1, V/42/F dated 30 Jul 46.
Report from 3rd US Army Int Centre Interrogation Section, ref
X2126, dated 25 Jul 45).

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I. PREAMBLE

1. Prisoner's role and importance in Nazi Germany are hard to assess.
   There is no convenient category into which he falls easily; his SS rank was of no
   significance, and even during his most influential period he was a mere Lt in the
   German army. Yet Prisoner's political influence has been of
   significance and has stretched further than the authority normally
   accorded to a well-known political writer.

2. Prisoner's reputation was built primarily on his shrewd analysis of
   foreign affairs. His constant interest in high policy, and personal
   knowledge of the politicians and officials who shaped it, showed him how
   tenuous and potent the manipulation of power can be. There is no doubt
   that his own political ambitions aimed very high, and that he considered
   himself a future Secretary or Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
   In his view titles and rank were unimportant and real influence, especially
   in totalitarian Germany, could equally well be wielded by shadowy men
   concealed behind the figures exposed to the public gaze. To Prisoner's
   mind along this way lay the road to high office: it was but one step to
   emerge from the shadows, and assume the mantle of public power. Such
   tactics required infinite finesse and a close knowledge of the in-fighting
   methods among the Nazi hierarchy. After three false starts (ROTH, THES
   and RIBENTROP), and partial obscurity in 1942-3, Prisoner, but for the
   accident of German defeat and total occupation, might well have achieved
   his ambition.

3. Prisoner did not regard himself as an unscrupulous opportunist. As
   a journalist he had observed the wrangles of politicians for many years
   and prided himself on having few illusions; to him Fascism, Democracy and
   Communism were but symptoms of the pre-old clash of cultures, part of

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the dynamic struggle between decay and growth, the pattern of history blindly and often brutally groping for fulfillment. Nazism was injecting new vigour into a people forgetful of its destiny. In his youth, he had sat at the feet of Oswald SPENDLER: his was SPENDLER's philosophy brought up to date.

When Prisoner first came into prominence in the early 1930s, he advocated pseudo-Socialism and State nationalism, in the Gregor STRASSER kind of Nazism. Through his writings he persuaded the Conservative element to endorse: Nazism, arguing that the more repugnant aspects were mere teething troubles of a young revolutionary party. This was his first betrayal of the moral integrity on which he so loftily insists.

4. Prisoner is a man of exceptional intellectual faculties and literary flair. From then onwards he interpreted Nazi expansion in terms of recurrence of German "Kultur": his theme was German hegemony in Europe, cloaked in the deceptive verbiage of a "Federal Europe". The mission of German Kultur, the degrading nihilism of "Americanism", the mechanistic barbarism threatening from the East, the decadence and hypocrisy of British Imperialism, all these were recurrent topics in his writings, served up with a seemingly rational erudition in which shrewd historical and social analysis, insidious half-truths and astonishing illacies constantly intermingled.

5. Prisoner's claim that he was not a Nazi is not well founded. He was not, it is true, a believer in the Nordic blood myth. He can point to his frequent clashes with the Propaganda Ministry, with BORJOW, DIETRICH, GEBEHL, and LIMBROFF, to his cautious public and open private criticism during the final stages of the Third Reich ("The war is lost - let us save GERMANY"), and finally to his timid intrigues to have the, as he believed, more malleable HIMMLER replace HITLER. But in 1940 when German domination over Europe was almost complete, Prisoner could still talk of moral values, reasoning post facto, as he had done before, that external force was an unimportant trumpery of a transitional stage which would lead EUROPE into the political and cultural unity of a Pan-Imperial Commonwealth, thus proving once more to the intellectual and doubting minority that Nazi methods were historically inevitable, and, therefore, excusable and in the long run unimportant.

The record of the Nazi regime is a grim historical fact, for which Prisoner must accept some responsibility. His share in the war guilt was that he shored up a vicious and cowardly dictatorship by giving it moral values and a historical perspective which he knew to be false. This is his second, irreparable betrayal.

History of the Case

6. Prisoner came to DR from FESTзеCHEN on 12 Jul 46, but reports produced by other agencies on this case were not available at the time. Interrogation was, therefore, hampered by lack of background material. When earlier reports on Prisoner came to hand these proved to contain a more detailed account of the facts than Prisoner can recall now after a considerable lapse of time.

7. Many questions in the Brief have already been fully covered by previous reports, and Prisoner has nothing new to add. In fact, such info as he has given falls short of previous statements. Further, on the basis of the "Dustbin" Report, apparently unwarranted assumptions have been made linking Prisoner with political and economic espionage.
For instance, a whole paragraph (par. 6) of the "Dustbin" Report is devoted to "MINING: Probable Activities" and contains hints and predictions not substantiated by data but, based, it would seem, wholly on the previous interrogators' hunches. Each of these red herrings has greatly delayed investigation.

8. Prisoner was at first sullen and unhelpful, since he had been given to understand by his German 10 that he was about to be released. He has since changed his attitude and co-operated to the best of his ability. "The association with H.KREUM (Prisoner 36) has confirmed that Prisoner has not been hedging on any of the questions put to him.

II. PERSONAL HISTORY

9. Career

15 Apr 37 Born in SCHENFURT/GER.
1925 Studied sociology and political science.
1929 Became assistant to Prof. BRUNOW at Institute of Social and Political Science at HEIDELBERG University. During the next few years visited Eastern European and Balkan countries.
1930 Took Doctor's degree at HEIDELBERG University. Assistant editor "Die Tat".
1932 Published his first book: "Zwischen Europa und deutschem Zukunft". Went to KULINK as free-lance journalist, and became an active contributor to "Die Tat".
Sep - Dec 32 Worked in the Isthmian Sect of League of Nations in GENEVA.
1933 Continued free-lance journalism. Published his second book: "Deutschland in der Weltpolitik". Went to ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA.
Oct 33 Assistant Editor of MUNICHER NACHRICHTEN.
1934 Published his third book: "Köpfe der Weltpolitik".
End 34 Became political editor of "MUNICHER NACHRICHTEN" and editor of "Die Tat". Traveled widely in EUROPE for his papers, during the next few years. Editor-in-chief of "Die Tat".
Summer 36 First journey to the MIDDLE EAST.
Jan - Mar 1938 Publication of fourth book: "Engländer, Juden & Araben in Palästina".
Apr - Aug 38 Visit to USA.
Jan - Mar 39 Second journey to MIDDLE EAST.
Sep 39 Accepted new position in Info Sect of AuswAmt, in addition to his duties as editor of IBN and "Die Tat", now renamed "Das XX Jahrhundert".
1940 Publication of fifth book: "Der Kesselost Kontinent".
Feb 42 Voluntarily joined the Army. His position as editor of the IBN had become untenable as a result of several editorial articles favoring a lenient policy towards FRANCE. ("There is no such thing as a "soft" or "hard" policy, only a "wise one").
Promoted BaSr (2) in Kriegsberichter Kaup.
Apr 42  War Correspondent in RUSSIA, attached 56 Pz Corps. There wrote memorandum criticising German treatment of Russians. This memo he managed to give personally to Gen WAGNER, Deputy Chief of OS, OKH. WAGNER apparently passed it on to HITLER, for some months later Prisoner was ordered by FORMANN not to write again on Russian affairs during the war.

Dec 42  Ill; returned to GERMANY.

Jun 43  Attached to OKW/N/Pr (Wehrmacht Propaganda), working on Wehrmacht publication "Signal". Brief visits to FRANCE, SPAIN, ITALY and DENMARK.

Spring 44  Promoted Lt. Publication of sixth book: "Das Zeitalter des Horaces".

Summer 44  "Das XX Jahrhundert" was suppressed by Propaganda Ministry as a result of an article on Hieronymus BOSCH (Allegorical Invecti").

Oct 44 - Mar 45  Wrote EGMONT Reports for RSHA VI, and became SCHELLEMBERG's political adviser.

Mar 45  Evacuated with Ant VI staff to BAVARIA.

1 Jun 45  Arrested by American CIO in BAD TOELZ, BAVARIA.

10. Political

1933  Member of Reichspressekammer.

Nov 38  Hptsfu in Allg SS.

Summer 40  Joined NSDAP (no rank or office).

Autumn 40  Stu/sf in Allg SS.

11. Decorations

Summer 42  KVK 2nd Class.

Summer 42  SK 2nd Class.

III. CONTACTS WITH GIs

12. Investigation has not substantiated any of the suggestions made in the brief, but there is no doubt that had Prisoner been approached to undertake special missions for Abw or Ant VI, he would have gladly done so (this on his own admission). In fact, by some oversight, no use was made of Prisoner's wide European experience and contacts. Prisoner is, therefore, almost exclusively a "political" case: as already stated, he played a significant role in the ideological and political field. The only exception to this is Prisoner's work as EGMONT, when he was given access to Ant VI material. Rare again, the motives which prompted Prisoner to engage in high-level evaluation of int reports was entirely political. An account of this aspect of Prisoner's activities will be found at Appendix A.
13. League of Nations

Prisoner denies that his appointment in 1932 as Public Relations assistant in the Section d'Information of the League of Nations in Geneva was engineered in any way through Max ILCNER. At that time prisoner was known for his anti-big business politics, and IG FARBE was one of his favourite vindictives. It is, therefore, unlikely that IG FARBE would have gone out of their way to help a young journalist who delighted in slinging mud at their org. Prisoner obtained his position through TERHAR, a friend, who was then an official in the League of Nations office (?) in Berlin. Prisoner believes that TERHAR at the same time worked in the Info Sect of the IG FARBE: this is, however, the only possible link he can trace.

14. IG FARBE Int Service

Prisoner denies any contact with this org. Max ILCNER he claims to have met for the first time after his arrest in December. He further denies that he was ever approached by this or any other org to carry out industrial, technical, economic or political espionage abroad. Lastly, he was not aware that SCHLEMMER had in mind a reorganisation of the IG FARBE Int Info service, which would have made a wide use of the IG FARBE Int Service.

15. Foreign Correspondents of MNN

Prisoner at first denied that any of the MNN correspondents abroad were also working for the GIS. He later admitted that he had heard that his Portuguese and Hungarian representatives were "somehow" connected with it. In view of the Propaganda Ministry ban on GIS activities, he took pains not to investigate the truth of these rumours; in any case, he took the view that as long as his correspondents fulfilled their duties to the paper, it was no concern of his what they did in their spare time. Furthermore, he realised that they were likely to acquire sources of info which would incidentally benefit his paper.

The following is a list of MNN correspondents during the war:

- Sweden: Graf von TOGENBURG (formerly UK)
- Switzerland: BRAUTIGAM (formerly France)
- Turkey: SCHRITZ, Walter
- Hungary: KORNHEUSER (Note: Worked for SD)
- Spain: HAGER
- Portugal (Note: Worked for IG PORTUGAL)
- Netherlands: BRACQARD (Later arrested as German agent; see Appendix D para 15)
- USA: VIERECK (Also arrested as agent; see Appendix D, para 15)
- USSR: Dr. Klaus MEINSERT, later Frau Dr. PORZGEN
- Italy: Egon HEYMANN
- Bulgaria: Otmar MERTH
- Romania: Name forgotten
- Japan: Arvid BALK

All his correspondents were instructed to send prisoner weekly or fortnightly confidential reports on the political situation, including gossip on personalities, stories from enemy
countries, and other matters which he could not print. He maintains that these reports were for his own use only and, except for material on SE EUROPE, were not shown to anyone else. Prisoner states that in this way he was able to build up an excellent info service, which was often better informed than official sources.

16. Contacts with Abw

a) Obstlt von LOSSOW

Von LOSSOW had formerly been the editor of "Illustrierter Rundfunk" in BERLIN and a personal acquaintance of Prisoner's. During the war this man worked in Ast MUNICH (Note: I Wi, Ast MUNICH, later Leiter I, Ast MUNICH) and came to see him about once a month. Von LOSSOW was interested in receiving news about commercial and economic conditions in SE EUROPE, and discussed with Prisoner at length the current situation. Prisoner allowed him to read the confidential reports from KORNHUBER and SCHMITZ, which he judged to be reliable. Prisoner cannot say to what use LOSSOW put the very general info he obtained from him. He denies that LOSSOW ever asked him to pass on certain briefs to his correspondents abroad.

b) Maj SOLM

Prisoner had flatly denied that SOLM was an Abw offr. He states that SOLM was his immediate chief in Wehrmacht Propaganda, and the offr responsible for the publication of "Signal". To the best of Prisoner's knowledge, SOLM was not connected with the Abw work (this is borne out by our own info, which gives SOLM as Head of Gruppe IV b, OKW/Ab). SOLM.

c) Dr LEVERKUHN

Prisoner states that LEVERKUHN was a friend of SOLM's. In Aug 43 SOLM asked Prisoner to meet this man, who, SOLM said, would be arriving from TURKEY and was exceptionally well informed on Turkish affairs, and on relations between the Western Allies and the USSR as seen from that part of the world. Prisoner met LEVERKUHN in SOLM's office, and questioned him on these subjects. Prisoner claims that this is the only contact he had with LEVERKUHN. Prisoner was not aware that he was head of KOS TURKEY.

d) KLEYENSTUBER

Prisoner has met this man twice but their relations were of no int interest. An account of the meetings is given in Appendix D, para 29.

e) Knowledge of KOs

Prisoner states that he can give no info on KOS SWEDEN, SPAIN or PORTUGAL. Except in the case of KLEYENSTUBER, he does not know the names of offrs atti to these orgs.

DIC
CCG(HE)
25 Oct 46

[Signature]

for Colonel GS

Commandant DIC, CCG(HE)
NOTE: This Report should be read in conjunction with the following reports:

Draft Report from MHIU No 3 dated 30 Jul 45.
Counter-Intelligence War Room: Liquidation Report No 6 SF 524/22(5) - R.R.O. 3a, dated 9 Oct 45.

This report does not set down the results of the detailed investigation, since the subject has already been fully covered in the above reports; it merely elaborates points on which Prisoner has given additional info. In view of the nature of the Brief, some repetition is inevitable.

1. Introduction

From Oct 44 until Mar 45, RSHA VI published its own analyses of world affairs which were circulated only at highest levels. These reports, which appeared at irregular intervals - about every two or three weeks - were called "EGMONT" Reports and classified "Top Secret". For some time SHELLENBERG, the ambitious head of Amt VI, had been an opponent of HITLER's and RIBBENTROP's foreign policy, and considered that HITLER was badly advised by the Jews. Through the "EGMONT" Reports, which reached HITLER through HIMMLER, SHELLENBERG, by giving what Prisoner calls "unbiased reports" of political trends, aimed to counteract RIBBENTROP's influence and, if possible, to oust RIBBENTROP from his position.

At the time, SHELLENBERG's main preoccupation was the necessity of concluding an immediate peace with the Western Allies, in order to salvage as much as he could from a GERMANY which, he considered, had plainly lost the war; he based his hopes for a German renaissance on the pattern of events which followed the 1914-18 war. To have said so openly in a report which was read by HITLER, would have been considered high treason, but SHELLENBERG, by presenting "objective" reports - GERMANY's position in world affairs being, on any showing, depressing enough - counted on persuading HITLER to listen to the "moderates", and failing this, to convince HIMMLER of the urgent need of betraying his "god" and removing the man who stood in the way of the long-term salvation of GERMANY. Although HIMMLER seems to have accepted the general argument behind the "EGMONT" Reports, he could not bring himself, until it was too late, to take the drastic step of overthrowing HITLER; HIMMLER's final peace talks with Count BERENSTADT are historical facts too well known to need recapitulation here. SHELLENBERG saw in HIMMLER the only man in GERMANY capable of taking over control from HITLER, and possessing sufficient authority to conclude an immediate peace. Prisoner now claims that he himself never saw in HIMMLER
more than the head of an interim government for a strictly limited period and mentioned BRUNING as a possible successor but these were only nebulous formulations doubtfully accepted by SCHULLENBERG; the main point of agreement between SCHULLENBERG and Prisoner was that HITLER must be removed. HIMMLER hesitated until it was too late, and the real aim of the "EGMONT" Reports came to nothing.

2.
WIRSING was the man chosen by SCHULLENBERG to produce the "EGMONT" Reports. His relations with SCHULLENBERG in this connection have been admirably summed up in Liquidation Report No 6, Counter-Intelligence War Room, dated 9 Oct 45:

"The essential conception of SCHULLENBERG's int service was the preparation by Amt VI of a properly coordinated summary of political int from all available sources; and SCHULLENBERG to achieve that and did not hesitate to go beyond the recognised organisation of Amt VI. A striking example is his use of Dr WIRSING in the preparation of the "EGMONT" Reports. Dr WIRSING was a journalist and author of note whose grasp of political affairs SCHULLENBERG much admired. He was, however, in no sense an Amt VI officer or agent. But SCHULLENBERG, recognising his ability (Note: and also a kindred mentality and political ambition) decided that WIRSING, with his wide knowledge of political affairs and his training as a political writer, was better fitted for the task he had in mind than any Amt VI officer, and did not hesitate to invite WIRSING to prepare reports on political matters for Amt VI. The remarkable feature is that WIRSING was given access to all Amt VI material likely to be of assistance to him. With this material at his disposal WIRSING prepared reports on various aspects of political importance which were in turn passed to the Zentral Büro (of Amt VI) for further distribution as the "Egmont Berichte". SCHULLENBERG had calculated in this way to have these reports, which attempted to be a true assessment of a deteriorating situation, passed through HIMMLER to HITLER with the hope that the foreign policy of the Reich would be framed to meet realities which HITLER would not face."

3. Origin of Name:

In 1942, Prisoner, while a war-correspondent in RUSSIA, produced a memorandum for AOK IV severely criticising the German adm in occupied RUSSIA. This memo reached HITLER, or, at any rate, his immediate entourage, and Prisoner was considered a biting critic for his remarks. Prisoner, furthermore, had a long-standing disagreement with GOEBBELS and the Propaganda Ministry and had also personally offended RIBBENTROP by refusing to take over the Infn Sec of the Ausw Amt in 1941 (see Appendix B). In order, therefore, not to prejudice the value of the Amt VI reports, it was agreed by SCHULLENBERG that they should appear anonymously as "EGMONT" Reports. "EGMONT" refers to a quotation from GOETHE'S EGMONT: "It is not meet to oppose the king, yet one must stand in the way of the king who takes the first unfortunate steps along the wrong path." "King" obviously is not a very
subtle allusion to HITLER, while it speaks against Prisoner's
acumen that he should consider that HITLER made the first
mistakes in autumn 44.

It was a condition of Prisoner's verbal agreement
with SCHELLENBERG that HITLER, GOEBBELS, RUDENRUF and BERGH
should in no circumstances be informed of his activities as
"EGMONT". In case of inquiry, SCHELLENBERG would claim
authorship himself, but no query of this nature ever arose.
The following persons were aware that Prisoner was the author
of "EGMONT": HITLER, KALTEHUNGER, the Gruppenchef of Ant VI,
the staff of the Zentralburo of Ant VI, KAMER(by special
permission of SCHELLENBERG), TROTT zu SOLZ and Dr Alexander
NEWM (both of the Kal Pol Abt of Ausw Ant).

5. Prisoner's Relations with SCHELLENBERG

In early 44, Prisoner's friend, TROTT zu SOLZ, mentioned
in the course of political discussions, that SCHELLENBERG was,
for an SS Gen, a "reasonable" man, and might be a useful contact.
He, TROTT, would arrange a meeting between Prisoner and
SCHELLENBERG. TROTT was executed for his part in the 20 July
plot, but he had already arranged for a meeting and through
SCHELLENBERG's adjutant, SCHUTZ Prisoner met SCHELLENBERG for
a drink at the Hotel Adlon in Sep 44. SCHELLENBERG told
Prisoner that he had read, and agreed with, Prisoner's most
recent book 'Das Zeitalter des Ikaros', which contained some
veiled criticisms of HITLER. Prisoner then plunged into
a long talk on the political situation, the gist of which hinted
that the war was lost, and that in order to get the best terms,
GERMANY must make peace now, while she still had some tangible
assets with which she could bargain, or a partially effective
Wehrmacht and occupied territories. Furthermore, prolongation
of the war would cause further needless destruction in GERMANY
and possibly dangerous internal political repercussions. SCHELL-
ENBERG asked Prisoner whether he was aware that his
views were opposed to HITLER's. Prisoner replied that he had no info as to
what HITLER's views might be, but asked whether HITLER had access
to reports which might enable him to form a dispassionate, objective
judgement. SCHELLENBERG did not answer directly, but asked
Prisoner whether he would be prepared to undertake the evaluation
of all international material from Ant VI special sources, for use
at highest level. From this discussion the "EGMONT" Reports were
initiated.

In the following months, Prisoner remained in closest
contact with SCHELLENBERG, and became, in fact, his political
adviser. Prisoner made it clear to SCHELLENBERG that he would
not consent to become an official of Ant VI, or even agree to work
in the Ant VI offices. SCHELLENBERG therefore instructed his
Zentralburo that every day the relevant Ant VI files should be
sent to Prisoner's flat; these were collected again next day and
a new batch delivered. This somewhat peculiar arrangement seems
to have functioned satisfactorily, and saved Prisoner the trouble
of wrestling with anu routine.

About once a week, or once a fortnight - according to the
general situation - Prisoner visited SCHELLENBERG at his Office,
and they spent an afternoon going through the draft "EGMONT" Report
which Prisoner had brought with him. SCHELLENBERG rarely made any
major alterations, and Prisoner took this opportunity to rais"
specific points which could only be briefly touched on in the
reports, on which he considered SCHELLENBERG should take action
(see para 11).

8. Prisoner's knowledge of GIS

Prisoner claims that his knowledge of GIS org and
personalities was slight, and that although he had access to
GIS material, he considered himself an outsider and abstained from
closer inquiry. Prisoner denies having any knowledge of GIS
methods of obtaining int from abroad. He claims to have been
aware of the existence of the Ns, but denies knowledge of details.
There is no reason to disbelieve Prisoner on this point, since
extensive knowledge of the GIS org was not necessary for the
production of EGMONT Reports.

At the beginning of Prisoner's collaboration with Amt VI,
SCHELLENBERG gave Prisoner a general outline of the GIS, and
specifically of the Amt VI org, without disclosing int methods.
Prisoner states that as a journalist, he had hitherto held a low
opinion of the efficiency of the GIS, and was surprised by the
quality of int available. SCHELLENBERG introduced Prisoner
to the heads of his Gruppen, and Prisoner recalls meeting Standf
SANDERSON, Standf STEINE, Ostubaf MÜLLER, Ostubaf KLAASEN, Maj
OMLETT and Oberfeldrichter SCHOR. SANDERSON later explained
to Prisoner the internal aim of Amt VI. When Amt VI evacuated
to BAVARIA in spring 45, Prisoner met Stubaf OELBRUCK, Obst BUNTROCK
and Ostubaf DÖPFELD.

9. Contents of Reports

Prisoner claims that after a year's imprisonment, his
memory is beginning to fail, and he is therefore unable to
reconstruct the contents of his reports. He states, on the other
hand, that he wrote a fairly complete summary of his
reports while he was in American captivity, and could certainly
not improve on it. It is not believed that Prisoner is evading
the issue on this point; to reconstruct the twelve or thirteen
reports after this lapse of time would certainly be a feat of
memory. For the sake of completeness, Prisoner's previous
reconstruction of the 'EGMONT' Reports, taken from the DUSTBIN
Report, in DOT EP 324-82 (WIRSING) dated 18 Jan 46, is reproduced
below:-

(Note: The reports are summarised month by month, as Prisoner claims
that he could not remember which events were treated in each
separate report)

"October 1944

ROOSEVELT's and CHURCHILL's QUEBEC Conference results in
the renewed determination for victory in Europe before the Far
Eastern victory. Considerable disagreements with RUSSIA as
evinced by the decreased lease-land deliveries. No co-ordi-
nation of Anglo-American and Russian conduct of war. This
however, may not be interpreted to indicate that an open con-

-iv-

BEGION
(In one of the first reports, Prschner mentioned Christmas as the last date by which contract would have to be made with EISENHOWER, any later date would lessen GERMANY's chances).

"November

STALIN's first turning against JAPAN demonstrates that RUSSIA is sensitive to American pressure in the matter of deliveries (STALIN's speech at the beginning of Nov shortly before the ROOSEVELT elections). Everything indicates that the Far East problem is in the foreground of American politics (regardless of the QUEBEC agreement). ROOSEVELT uses negotiations for deliveries as a means to obtain Russian participation in the Far East war, urgently demanded by public opinion in the United States. STALIN's speech is the first concession in this respect. By virtue of her sphinx-like behaviour in the Far East, RUSSIA holds the key to the general situation. GERMANY may fear that the Americans will trade Russian concessions in the Far East problem for concessions made to the Russian viewpoint on Europe and particularly on GERMANY. Therefore, the need for early negotiations with EISENHOWER becomes still more urgent. These negotiations make sense only before complete American-Russian agreement is reached, in which, of necessity, the European and Far Eastern problems are being balanced.

In ENGLAND no vital interest in this horse-trading of the two others. Great internal tension over foreign policy, by which EDEN himself is affected. The inner circle of the Tories is vitally interested not to have the Russian influence in Europe become too preponderant, since this would be in contradiction to 'the policy of balance of power. The first contact of this influential Tory circle with the Conservative Roman Catholic forces everywhere in Europe. In this connection especially important the role of BIDAUET, who maintains very close contact not only with the Vatican but also in ENGLAND with personalities like VOIGT and others. Important in this connection CHURCHILL'S visit to PARIS on 11 Nov (Plans for Western Block).

Importance of this also recognised in MOSCOW, hence invitation to DE GAULLE and BIDAUET to come to MOSCOW; this came as a decided surprise during CHURCHILL'S presence in PARIS.

There remains a slight chance for GERMANY to make contact with these circles, especially as Amt VI has, contacts with BRUNING through SWITZERLAND.

( NOTE: Prisoner had met BRUNING in 1932, but claims that he had not kept contact with him. When TROTT and Prisoner were looking for a suitable figurehead for a new Government, BRUNING'S name was mentioned. TROTT then said that he was in contact with BRUNING through, Prisoner believes, an American who was working at the International Bank in BASEL, and Anton BOHM, of the Ausw Amt, was also in correspondence through another source. SCHLESINGER himself had another personal contact to BRUNING through SWITZERLAND, but nothing further is known to Prisoner. Prisoner cannot say how far BRUNING was aware of developments inside GERMANY, but thinks..."
"that, up to 20 July, he was kept informed by Trott.

"In the following is given the pivotal point (Note 1 below) of the entire series of EGMONT reports: The Catholic and Conservative King cannot possibly negotiate with Germany without first establishing preliminary conditions in internal politics. The attempt to capitulate only in the West presupposes the establishment of corresponding preliminary conditions:

a) in the Roman Catholic problems,
b) in the Jewish problem (Note 2, below),
c) in the policy in the territories still occupied, especially in Denmark and Norway.

Unless this is done, Denmark is unable to negotiate even with those circles in England and America which view with disfavour so great a Soviet preponderance in Europe. Reference to utterances in this sense by the American Dulles in Switzerland, and by Americans in Lisbon."

"(Note 1: The main point, is Hitler's resignation or removal could naturally not be included by Schellenberg expressis verbis in the report. It was made evident to the above-mentioned preliminary conditions, which Hitler would never have been able to fulfil, and Hindler naturally only as a transitional solution for quite different forces. Therefore, in the last EGMONT report, the proposal was made to ask Bruning to form the new government)"

"(Note 2: Neither Hitler nor Hindler understood the above-mentioned reasoning. The only result was that Schellenberg began negotiations with a member of the Swiss Council (Ex-President Musy) - for the purpose of freeing Jews who were still in German hands; this was later stopped by Hitler. The second consequence was the granting of a few small concessions to Denmark and Norway and to some of the French who had been arrested; these concessions were, however, nullified by the Gestapo.)"

"December 1944"

In Moscow, anti-Japanese propaganda continues to be moderate. The main problem of American-Russian relations still remains open. So long as this is the case there remains the infinitesimal chance of saving the unity of Germany under Anglo-American occupation. On the other hand the result of de Gaulle's and Bidal's visit in Moscow is a renewed defeat for the Tories. Russia demonstrates by this that she too insists on speaking decisively in Western European matters. Info indicates that no final agreement has yet been reached on the problem of the German zones beyond the decisions reached in Teheran. Germany must take advantage of this before it happens. In Japan first inklings of a move to form a cabinet for peace negotiations under Kiyozoe."
"Battle of the Bulge Interrupts Reports

With the beginning of the LUXEMBURG offensive the reports are interrupted for a while in order to await the results. When Prisoner heard of this plan a short while before, he told SCHELLENBERG that all chances which still existed could be ruined if the offensive was not a huge success, something which could hardly be expected. SCHELLENBERG said that no-one could dissuade HITLER from this plan. He gave Prisoner to understand that HITLER was too undecided to act openly against HITLER — although SCHELLENBERG, too, clearly saw that that moment offered irrevocably the last chance.

"Beginning January 1945

The LUXEMBURG offensive, though not absolutely decisive, has been relatively successful in that the American deployment has been considerably disturbed for some time and in that GERMANY has proved that it still exists. It is all the more important now to draw the political consequence from this, especially since everything indicates an early conference of the Big Three. This is repeated urgently at the end of January. In the meantime, the great Russian offensive has, as could be foreseen, ruined the preliminary conditions which were the basis of the EGMONT reports of October, November and December (Renewed interruptions of the reports)."

"End of February 1945

Detailed analysis of the YALTA conference (this report is in American hands). Prisoner compared all the items which had come to his knowledge and on which an agreement had been reached with those which had remained unsettled. The result of the report: A final accord, for GERMANY had feared for some time, has been reached between the Allies. Presumably it also covers, in principle, the Far East problem. GERMANY's last chance is gone for the realisation of the plan submitted in autumn 1944. (In fact the preliminary conditions in internal politics, which were indispensable, had not been fulfilled.) There can no longer be any hope of a separate Anglo-American policy, not even with regard to capitulation."

'March 1945

The last reports dealt with the opposition in ENGLAND to parts of the YALTA decisions (the Polish question). They gave, however, only a condensed picture of the general situation. The last report recommended the voluntary dissolution of the NSDAP and the appeal to BRUNING to form a new Reich Government."

10. Sources of "EGMONT" Reports

Since the "EGMONT" Reports were essentially political reports, much of Art VI's specialised info was of no interest to Prisoner, or served merely as confirmation, in detail, of the general trend already known to him. Under this heading falls all military and most industrial int. Furthermore, since Prisoner
was an outsider in Act VI he made it a point of etiquette not to inquire into the sources of the info. Lastly as an experienced foreign commentator, Prisoner had acquired, over the years, a thorough knowledge of foreign affairs which continued to serve him for his interpretation of broad policy.

a) Basic Material

Material drawn from sources not connected with the GIS:

(i) International News Agencies (Reuter, UP, AP, INS, TASS, etc.).

The BNB provided a German translation of all messages sent by the International News Agencies, which came to about 200 pages a day. Security grading was "Secret". Similarly, they also provided a monitoring service of foreign broadcasting stations. Prisoner received these foreign news summaries as political commentator for "Signal". Prisoner's secretaries undertook the preliminary sifting of this bulky material.

(ii) American and British Papers and Magazines, eg the airmail edition of "The Times". Previously most of this material had come via LISBON, but now Prisoner had to rely on the somewhat limited supply from STOCKHOLM.

(iii) Reports from German Embassies in Neutral Countries.

As a political writer of repute, Prisoner, over the years, had formed a number of personal contacts with high-ranking Ausw Ant officials, from whom he received occasionally info. and guidance regarding the trend of foreign affairs, and who showed him, privately, reports sent in by the Embassies in SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, SPAIN and PORTUGAL. During the period of the "EIGHT" reports his most important contacts were no longer available (eg TROTT zu SOLZ had been executed in summer 44 for his part in the 20 July plot), but Prisoner consulted the following:

Dr SIX

Head of Info Sec, Ausw Amt. SIX did NOT show Prisoner confidential reports.

Dr Alexander KERTH

Infm Sec, Ausw Ant. Prisoner's main contact at the time. Provided Ausw Ant reports regarding the Western Allies.

Leg Rat BRAUN

Par East Sec, Ausw Ant. Provided info on the Par East.

Dr Anton BÖHM

Vatican Referat. Provided info on Roman Catholic affairs.

(Sad KRIMM)

Embassy, STOCKHOLM. In parentheses, KRIMM should be added to this list. KRIMM was aware that Prisoner had difficulty in obtaining access to Ausw Ant reports, many of which were circulating at the Embassy in STOCKHOLM. KRIMM made a practice of abstracting...
Diplomats: ECKHOFF Ambassador in SPAIN; on leave in GERMANY in Nov 44. A close personal friend of Prisoner, and well-informed on Anglo-American matters.

RAHN -Ambassador in ITALY. Also a personal friend of Prisoner. Prisoner visited him three times during this period:

- Aug 44: Prisoner visited RAHN in FASANO to ask him to intervene on behalf of TROTT zu SOLTZ.
- Nov 44: Prisoner introduced RAHN to SCHELLENSBERG. Prisoner hoped that RAHN might be induced to put out false statements for SCHELLENSBERG through DULLES in SWITZERLAND, and also act as Amt VI informant. Prisoner denies that RAHN agreed to collaborate with SCHELLENSBERG.

Prisoner states that Embassy reports were in general interesting only for what they failed to report.

(iv) German Personalities from Abroad

Prisoner had a very wide circle of acquaintances, many of whom were abroad as foreign correspondents for German papers. Whenever these returned to GERMANY they made a habit of calling on him and exchanging news. Prisoner recalls having spoken to the following during the "EGMONT" period:

Journalists: SELIG Correspondent for DINA Tag in LISBON. Saw Prisoner in winter 44 in BERLIN.

von TOGGENBURG Former MNN correspondent in STOCKHOLM and personal friend of Prisoner's. TOGGENBURG was fairly frequently in GERMANY and excellently informed.

SCHELTZ MNN correspondent in TURKEY.

PORZGEN Correspondent of "Frankfurter Zeitung" in SOFIA, formerly in MOSCOW and TANGIER.

Diplomats: DISCHENF Ambassador in SPAIN; on leave in GERMANY in Nov 44. A close personal friend of Prisoner, and well-informed on Anglo-American matters.

RAHN Ambassador in ITALY. Also a personal friend of Prisoner. Prisoner visited him three times during this period:

- Aug 44: Prisoner visited RAHN in FASANO to ask him to intervene on behalf of TROTT zu SOLTZ.
- Nov 44: Prisoner introduced RAHN to SCHELLENSBERG. Prisoner hoped that RAHN might be induced to put out false statements for SCHELLENSBERG through DULLES in SWITZERLAND, and also act as Amt VI informant. Prisoner denies that RAHN agreed to collaborate with SCHELLENSBERG.
Prisoner met RABIN in WURZBURG to discuss RABIN’s Vatican contacts, and the Nazi attitude towards Roman Catholics, which Prisoner hoped to modify. He wished peace feelers to be sent out through RABIN’s Vatican contacts.

Von PAPEN
Ambassador in TURKEY. Prisoner not von PAPEN in BERLIN after the latter’s return from TURKEY in autumn 44.

Travellers:

Prof SCHMITZ
Interned, repatriated from USA; until the war head of the Deutsche Akademie in NEW YORK.

Frau BOVERI
Another repatriate from USA; member of the BROWN-BOVERI family.

Foreign Personalities

Prisoner denies that during this time he met any foreigners of note. He recalls, however, having some discussions with two members of the Japanese Embassy in BERLIN, regarding the political situation in the Far East:

USHIDA
First (?) Secretary at Japanese Embassy.

KISHIMA
Naval Attaché at Japanese Embassy.

b) Amt VI Material

Amt VI material, taken by itself, was much too limited in scope to allow Prisoner to draw from it the extensive summaries required for his reports, but it was valuable in that it supplied concrete proofs and substantiated, in many details, his conclusions.

(1) Monitoring Reports (Sechausdienst)

Valuable as supplementary material to the International News Agencies reports (see above). Owing to the paucity of material about the USSR, the Russian sec of this report was specially useful.

(ii) Amt VI Daily Reports (Tagesbericht)

(NOTE: Prisoner has been questioned on SCHLEICHENBERG’s statement that the Daily Reports also went under the cover-name of “ENIGMA” Reports. Prisoner states this must be a misunderstanding; he claims that only his reports were known by this name.)
The Daily Reports recorded, in brief excepts or summaries, all the important messages which had come in during the preceding day, but coordination and evaluation of these messages were not attempted, e.g. from EISBERG (good connections in Roman Catholic circles; military info must be accepted with reserve). Origin of source was not indicated. The Daily Reports ran to six to twelve pages, and contained military routine material, e.g. shipping reports from GIBRALTAR, tactical reports from PAKA, troop movements, chains of command of enemy armies. Prisoner was not interested in this type of int, but looked for items of political int which sometimes were found among these messages.

Prisoner states that he does not remember the cover-names of these sources, except the following, which provided him with the only valuable political int material:-

JOSEPHINE: Provided excellent political sitreps, especially on the Western Allies.

EISBERG: Info about Roman Catholic matters.

HECTOR: Mainly a military and industrial source.

LEANDER: SCHELLENBERG's private source in LISBON. Through this source SCHELLENBERG obtained an American contact (through DULLES ?) and received info about internal American political personalities.

OSTRO: Another excellent source for political int on Western Powers.

East Sources: Nil C ran three agents in the Far East (SHANGHAI ?), who also seemed well-informed politically; one of these was known as DRODIN. They reported on peace feelers by JAPAN to reach a settlement with CHIANG KAI SHEK, the political situation in CHINA and often good material about Soviet industry and the equipment of Soviet armies in SIBERIA. Once there was also a report on a secret meeting of Japanese and Russian delegates in SIBERIA.

Prisoner admits that he was aware that JOSEPHINE and HECTOR were KRABER sources, but claims that he deliberately abstained from trying to find out further details. Some JOSEPHINE political int messages carried the prefix "EGMONT" and were passed to Prisoner directly they reached Amt VI. Prisoner knows nothing about the OSTRO source, except that the info came through SPAIN.

Under this heading fall also the memos of SCHELLENBERG on conversations he had with personalities of int interest.
Prisoner recalls two such mems, one on a conversation with Mr. NOSUDA of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, the other on conversations with JUSY.

(iii) Agents' Original Messages

For Prisoner's purposes, the most important and reliable political info was contained in the JOSEPHINE and OSTRO messages. He also remembers the following:

Von JAKOB: Apparently in close contact with the Swiss IS, and also some contact with BULES in Berlin. Prisoner believes that JAKOB may have been an agent run directly by SCHELLENBERG.

Contact with Spanish Foreign Office

A certain amount of material from the Spanish Foreign Office was available. Prisoner remembers several official Spanish reports regarding the political situation in Turkey. He can give no info as to how this material was obtained, eg. whether it was passed on by the Spaniards, or stolen from Spanish Foreign Office files.

Roman Catholic Sources

Again, Prisoner can give nothing but the vaguest info. Some of this material was reliable, some of it pure invention. The only source Prisoner can recall is a V-man, designated by a number, whose, no doubt unwitting, informants included the Prior of the SCHEYERN Monastery in Davari and the Bishop of LJUBLJANA in Slovenia.

French Source from Switzerland

A private source of SCHELLENBERG's reporting about the internal political difficulties of De GAULLE and his relations with BIDAULT. This source reported at great length on the significance of De GAULLE's visit to Moscow, winter 45. Prisoner believes this info may have come from someone close to BONNET, then living in Switzerland.

Chinese Source in Switzerland

A private source of SCHELLENBERG's, from which he obtained at the time the sensational disclosure about the YALTA Conference, that the Russians had acted as intermediaries in introducing Japanese representatives to STETTINIUS. Prisoner still thinks this info is of doubtful reliability.
USA
There were NO agents' reports.

GREAT BRITAIN
There were NO agents' reports. In the Daily Report there was, however, occasional mention of the effects of V-weapons, movements of troops, etc.

(iv) Decoding Dept of OKW (Chi-Berichte)

Abs VI received translations of diplomatic telegrams in cipher which had been broken. These were especially useful to Prisoner, since they contained facts which he could test against his own conjectures. There was no continuity of coverage, nor did they reveal any startling news. The Infm was necessarily scrappy, but Prisoner recollects messages from the following Embassies:

- Turkish Ambassador in MOSCOW to his Government.
  This was the only complete coverage available. Messages indicated the extreme pressure which the USSR continually brought to bear on TURKEY.

- Bulgarian Ambassador in MOSCOW to his Government.
  Reported mainly on events in the Balkans, especially developments in GREECE.

- Japanese Ambassador in MOSCOW to his Government.
  Occasional telegrams were deciphered which indicated clearly that the Japanese were having increasing difficulties in maintaining friendly relations with the USSR. Through this source came confirmation from an Abs VI Far East V-man regarding a secret meeting of Japanese and Russian emissaries somewhere in SIBERIA.

(Note: Prisoner has been pressed on the accuracy of his statement, in view of CLASSEN's claim that OKW/Chi III was unable to break the Japanese code, although in possession of the Basic Japanese code-book (CSDIC/NEA) Final Report 65 on CLASSEN, appendix G, para 1, dated 27 Jul 45. Prisoner nevertheless maintains his contention.)

- Ambassador HARDMAN in MOSCOW to the State Dept on Russo-Polish relations.

- Polish mission in JERUSALEM to Polish Govt in LONDON. Continuous coverage of reports on developments in BALKANS and NEAR EAST, especially ELAS.

- Bulgarian Envoy in SWITZERLAND to his Government.
  Reported on BALKAN affairs and attitude of Western Powers towards BALKANS.

- American missions in BALKANS. Reported on difficulties with Russians.

- CORDELL HULL to US Embassy PARIS. Announced the arrival of Ambassador CAPPSY.
(v) Evaluated material from Amt VI Gruppen

This consisted mostly of the reports by the various Gruppen concerning either their geographical sphere as a whole, or detailed analysis of a specific point.

Summary of activities in SOUTH AMERICA - monthly reports on the FAR EAST. For example, the Far East Referat prepared a monthly report on events in the FAR EAST. Other reports concerned the effect of W-weapons in the UK, British political pressure on TURKEY, character-sketches of new political foreign personalities and an analysis of the American elections.

Summing up all the sources of info available to him, Prisoner concludes that on the whole, only the JOSEPHINE and OSTRO reports were genuine and reliable politcal inf. It was, therefore, Prisoner's practice, before committing to paper his own analysis of important political developments, to await the JOSEPHINE and OSTRO telegrams on this point, which, however, agreed generally with his own views. Thus, in the matter of the YALTA Conference, apart from the international news releases and radio comments, Prisoner received info from three sources:

SCHENKENBERG's private Chinese source, reporting American-Japanese peace negotiations. This news was treated with reserve, and Prisoner omitted confirmation.

OSTRO gave a full and reliable report on the YALTA Conference about ten days later; there was no mention of the Japanese envoys.

JOSEPHINE (KRÜGER through ONOIE in STOCKHOLM) reported about a week after OSTRO; this was the most reliable of all three. There was no mention of the Japanese envoys.

There were no WT intercepts on YALTA.

11. Distribution

Draft reports handed in by Prisoner to SCHENKENBERG after final discussions were headed "EGMONT Berichte", and were passed out on the authority of KALTENBRUNNER. Prisoner is unable to say whether KALTENBRUNNER made any corrections before they left the RSHA. The reports were then retyped in special "Führer-type" (an especially large typewriter) on RSHA VI paper and headed "Ausserpolitisiche Lageberichte". (Prisoner claims he only glanced at one such final copy and is not certain of the exact phraseology.) With each copy went a note from KALTENBRUNNER, saying: "Herr with the latest report from Amt VI".

External distribution was as follows:

One copy to PEASSEL for HITLER.
One copy to HERZEL, new Amt 10 at PRÄQ. HERZEL had given a written undertaking that he would not show these reports to KALTENBRUNNER.
One copy to HERZEL.
One copy to GEISEN (a personal friend of KALTENBRUNNER).
Internal ESHA Distribution of "EGMONT" Reports was:-

One copy to KALTENDRUNNER.
Several copies kept by SCHELLENBERG, who may have given them
to various persons at his discretion. For instance Ogruf
LORENZ read many of the reports and Prisoner believes that
SCHELLENBERG circulated them among his Gruppenleiters.
One copy kept by Prisoner.

12. Addenda to "EGMONT" Reports

As a rule, each "EGMONT" Report contained a short addendum,
in the form of a private aide-memoire for SCHELLENBERG. In it
Prisoner raised specific points at greater length than was possible
in a political survey; these points were the result of the several
hours' discussion Prisoner had with SCHELLENBERG before the publication
of each "EGMONT" Report. During these discussions, especially in the
later stages, SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner openly discussed what could
be done to end the war in the light of the existing situation, and any
concrete measure which might contribute to that end was touched on
during the discussions, eg the M.intentions to release the Jews
from the concentration camps (aim: favourably influencing world
opinion towards GERMANY); negotiations for the release of Danish
police and Danish Jews from concentration camps; release of five
Swedes sentenced to death in the WARSAW trials (aim: to win the
goodwill of SWEDEN as a prerequisite for SWEDEN's services as
intermediary in peace negotiations); reversal of Gauleiter's NUPPER'S
radical anti-Catholic policy in AUSTRIA (aim: to maintain what
Prisoner considered the vital goodwill of Vatican circles, through
whose peace feelers were also attempted); These were all relatively
small points which SCHELLENBERG could bring up in the course of his
interviews with HIMMLER, who in turn might either give the desired
instructions on his own responsibility or try and obtain HITLER'S
sanction at a convenient opportunity. The aide-memoires were
essentially briefs for SHELLENBERG, stating the problem and
recommending action to be taken. Through these SCHELLENBERG, in
fact, became the mouth-piece of Prisoner, and Prisoner was gratified
by the influence he could exercise without assuming public responsibility.

13. Destruction of "EGMONT" Reports

Prisoner has been interrogated at some length on this point.
He professes ignorance as to the whereabouts of any of the reports
distributed through Amt VI. His own personal copies, he claims, were
destroyed in the last days of Apr 45. Pressed for details on the
alleged destruction, Prisoner slightly modified the version he gave
previously, and now states the following:-

When Amt VI evacuated to BAVARIA in Spring 45, Prisoner, with
four or five other Amt VI officials, was living in BAD HEILBRUNN. There
Prisoner met Ostubaf DAUFELD of Amt VI, who had recently been expelled
from SWITZERLAND for int activities for Amt VI. DAUFELD introduced
Prisoner to his father-in-law, GUT, the owner of the Hotel Kaiserhof in
BAD TOLZ. GUT agreed to let Prisoner use the safe in his hotel, and
the "EGMONT" Reports were deposited there, since Prisoner did not wish
to have them in his carpet. Prisoner states that GUT and Frau DAUFELD
know only that "the yellow folder" contained secret state documents;
Ostubaf DAUFELD was aware that it contained the "EGMONT" Reports.
From 29 Apr to 2 May 45 Prisoner was in FLENSBURG (see Appendix C). During this time, BAD TOLE was overrun by American troops. Getubuf DAUFELD was in hiding at the time, but before he left he gave instructions to his wife and father-in-law not to let the "yellow folder" fall into enemy hands. Shortly before the Americans arrived, GUT and Frau DAUFELD burned these reports. Prisoner learned these facts from DAUFELD himself, who was later arrested by the Americans, and together with Prisoner was at FREISING, 3rd US Army Interrogation Centre.

A few days after Prisoner's return from FLENSBURG, in the first week of May 45, Prisoner's secretary, Frau Hannelore RAM, went to BAD TOLZ and learned that the documents had been destroyed. She related this to Prisoner, and it was from her that he first knew of their destruction. Prisoner insists that when he left for FLENSBURG, he gave NO instructions to anyone what to do with the reports in the case of American occupation.

14. Two Reports believed captured

Prisoner believes that two reports have been captured. At beg Jun 45, Prisoner was interrogated at FREISING by Capt FLEX, US army, who told him that the "EGMONT" Report about YALTA had been found among documents seized at SEYSS-INQUART's HQ. Later, in Dec 45, Lt MITTELBERGER told Prisoner in OBERURSEL that another copy had recently been found.

15. Prisoner's Relations with KRAEGER

KRAEGER, through his JOSEPHINE Reports, was Prisoner's most important source for the "EGMONT" Reports. Furthermore, KRAEGER was the only int agent personally known to Prisoner. His relations with KRAEGER may therefore be of interest.

Prisoner made KRAEGER's acquaintance in Mar or Apr 43, when KRAEGER called on Prisoner in BERLIN with a letter of introduction from TOGENBURG. As a political journalist Prisoner always welcomed an exchange of info with well-informed persons from abroad, although this had become more difficult since the war. Even during KRAEGER's first visit it was evident that he was extremely well informed, especially about political trends in the UK and USA. KRAEGER introduced himself as a member of the German Embassy in STOCKHOLM, and Prisoner asked him to call again on his next visit to BERLIN. KRAEGER afterwards called regularly on Prisoner whenever he happened to be in BERLIN, which was usually about once a month or every six weeks. The two men became personal friends, since they found their political outlook to be very similar, and they had systematic discussions covering all aspects of the international situation, eg the military situation, political trends among Axis and Allied powers, the role of the chief political personalities, Allied intentions, strategy, etc. Prisoner states that before the war, he was accustomed to have many such discussions with other, similarly well-informed persons, mostly journalists or members of the Ausw Amt. Now, however, there remained only TROT zu SOLZ and Albrecht HAUSHOFER (both executed after the 20 July plot). KRAEGER's info, for him, was therefore specially valuable, since this info, especially his knowledge of the UK, was apparently based on facts and not on surmise and conjecture.

At first, KRAEGER did not mention his duties in STOCKHOLM. After some time, he hinted that they were in connection with the GAP
FOhrungsstab, and about a year after their first meeting, he told Prisoner he was a member of the Abw. Prisoner claims that he studiously avoided inquiring into details or questioning KRäMER about the sources of his infm.

Prisoner claims that until autumn 44 he made no use of the political infm he heard from KRäMER. He stoutly maintains that as a journalist and political writer, it was his job and ambition to be well-informed; the fact that he was then working in a minor capacity on the propaganda journal "Signal", for which this info was unnecessary, was irrelevant. KRäMER's conversations corroborated Prisoner's growing conviction that GERMANY was losing the war, and that an early negotiated peace with the Western Powers was the only way out, a conviction shared by, among others, KRäMER himself and TROTT zu SOLZ, who was also working towards that end.

When Prisoner began his career as "EGMONT" he told SCHELLENBERG that he knew KRäMER, and asked permission to make use of KRäMER directly. KRäMER told Prisoner that the JOSEPHINE reports came via a Swedish source, and their conversations now included operational and all questions, on which subject KRäMER had hitherto shown a certain reserve. But Prisoner still did NOT question KRäMER about his sources of infm. From time to time, Prisoner asked KRäMER for confirmation or elaboration of certain political news he had received from other Abt VI sources; these briefs were sent to KRäMER via Abt VI, and his replies were prefixed "for EGMONT". Prisoner states that KRäMER was the only int offr with whom he was in contact - otherwise he knew only cover-names of reports. For instance, the identity of OSTRO, the only other source of high political int value, was not known to Prisoner.

KRäMER was aware of Prisoner's political significance as "EGMONT". Although, for his own sake, Prisoner had not taken KRäMER into his full confidence regarding his political intentions, KRäMER knew of, and supported Prisoner's and SCHELLENBERG's attempt to negotiate a peace with the Western Allies. By 1945, KRäMER was able to discuss German peace overtures openly with SCHELLENBERG when he went to report to Abt VI, and KRäMER kept SCHELLENBERG informed directly of the political situation.

During Prisoner's visits to BEST in COPENHAGEN (see Appendix D para 30 and 31) he met KRäMER for discussions. These, however, differed in no way from the talks they had in BERLIN.

16. Prisoner's Relations with PFLEIDERER

PFLEIDERER fits into the framework of SCHELLENBERG's and Prisoner's overriding interest in SCANDINAVIA as the only remaining German asset. Prisoner and SCHELLENBERG were both agreed that the VERBOVEN-HITLER policy of resistance and scorched earth in NORWAY and DENMARK was mistaken. Meanwhile, KRäMER had become friendly with PFLEIDERER, head of the Consular Dept in the German Legation at STOCKHOLM, who also desired to see better relations between SWEDEN and GERMANY, the more so, since the Swedish Govt would be unlikely to act on GERMANY's behalf in any peace negotiations unless their most pressing demands were sympathetically considered.

At beg Mar 45, KRäMER reported to Prisoner that PFLEIDERER, an expert on Scandinavian affairs, had had some unofficial talks with Danish and Swedish personalities on the subject and regarded with deepest dismay the present German policy.
Towards end of 45, whilst PFLEIDERER happened to be in
BERLIN, he went to see Prisoner at KRAMER's suggestion and
discussed the whole Scandinavian question very openly. The
substance of this conversation has been fully reported in CSDICW(WLA)
Final Report 21 on PFLEIDERER, Appendix E, paras 6-10 and has
been confirmed by Prisoner. Prisoner asked PFLEIDERER to let him
have a memorandum on SCANDINAVIA; PFLEIDERER wrote this on his
return to STOCKHOLM, and sent it to Prisoner through KRAMER. This
memorandum was incorporated in another "addendum" to an "EGMONT"
Report, stressing that unless SCHELLENBERG could bring HIMMLER to
take immediate action to reverse or at least soften HITLER's
Scandinavian policy, peace negotiations through SWEDEN would
inevitably fail.

- xviii -
The Information Section of the Ausw Amt

1. Scope of Knowledge

From Sep 39 to Autumn 40 Prisoner, at the invitation of Ribbentrop, acted as hon advisor to the newly formed section. The info he gives may be regarded as reliable, although Prisoner is exceedingly vague about Civil Service org and adm routine.

2. Prisoner’s Contacts with Ausw Amt (till Autumn 39)

As a well known publicist on foreign affairs, Prisoner had formed connections with higher Ausw Amt officials, dating back to 1926, when he met Kreller, von Schleicher, von Dernburg and others at the house of Koch-Reser, the then minister of Justice and Leader of the Social Democratic Party. In 1922 Prisoner published in the "Tägliche Rundschau" a series of articles purporting to show that the foreign policy of the government was crippled by the obstructive attitude of key Ausw Amt personnel, and calling for urgent reforms: these articles caused something like a "succes de scandale" and were, Prisoner claims, partly responsible for initiating the abortive re-organisation of the Ausw Amt attempted by von Neurath.

From 1933 to 1935 Prisoner remained in fairly close touch with the Ausw Amt. He was at the time editor-in-chief of the "Münchner Neueste Nachrichten" and for his own info, Prisoner cultivated his many contacts in the Ausw Amt. Prisoner was the first German editor to organise airmail deliveries of his paper to foreign countries: from 1935 onwards the MNN was distributed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Balkans, Italy, France, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal before any other German paper, and had a foreign circulation three times as high as that of the "Frankfurter Zeitung", its nearest competitor. This gave the MNN a valuable asset, and the Ausw Amt was anxious that it should be well informed. Prisoner emphasizes that the MNN did not become the mouthpiece of the Ausw Amt although he was on good terms with most of the leading Ausw Amt officials. During his frequent travels abroad he visited the German Embassies, and came to know a large number of German diplomats. In the course of time Prisoner formed special close ties with Ambassadors Dieckhoff, Altenburg and Baun, with Prinzen von Bismarck, Unterstadter: Hess,Ambassadors von Hessen and von Renter-Fink, with Trotz zu Solz and Dr Alexander Werth. Prisoner also met other officials socially at receptions given in Berlin and elsewhere.

Prisoner denies that he had any contact with the Büro Ribbentrop. He was granted only one short interview with Ribbentrop in London in early 1939, while Ribbentrop was Ambassador at the Court of St James.
3. Conference at FUSCHL

At dusk Jan 39 Prisoner received a telephonic summons to FUSCHL, RIBBENTROP's residence, where he met a number of other journalists known for their comparative independence: KIRCHER and SIEDURG, of the "Frankfurter Zeitung", von PICKLER, of the "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", von STUDNITZ of the SCHERL publishing house, and Ernst JUNGER, the well-known author. The Ausw Amt officials present were Gesandter ALTENBURG, Leg Rat RAHN and Prof BREADER.

RIBBENTROP opened the two-day conference by a review of the present international crisis. His theme was that even if the "war party" in BRITAIN should gain the upper hand, the French Govt could be trusted to exert a restraining influence. Nevertheless, in RIBBENTROP's opinion, the crisis was likely to last for some months, until the "Polish question" was settled. A period of intense German propaganda abroad was desirable, firstly as a justification and secondly as an instrument of German policy. RIBBENTROP therefore requested the journalists present to put their services, either on a part-time or a permanent basis, at the disposal of the propaganda section of the Ausw Amt. SIEDURG accepted and became Botschaftsrat, von PICKLER and STUDNITZ agreed to serve as advisers in an honorary capacity. KIRCHER and JUNGER refused. Prisoner offered his part-time honorary services to the Ministry, spending two-thirds of his time in BERLIN and the rest in FUSCHL with his paper.

4. Reorganisation of the Infm Section of Ausw Amt

After this conference the Infm Section was reorganised. ALTENBURG was put in charge of the section, the personnel of which was as follows:-

Ausw Amt personnel: ✓See ALTENBURG: Head of the Section, personal liaison with other dept.s.
✓Leg Rat RAHN: Deputy Head. In charge of actual work of section.
Leg Rat Baron von RANTZAU: LO to OKW.
Leg Rat KRUG zu NIDDA: (successor to RANTZAU).
Konsul TUCHER
Gen-Konsul Baron von SCHELL.
TTUFT zu SOLT (Left for USA in autumn 39, retd summer 40).
Wiss Hilfsarb Alexander WEICH (joined early 40).
Leg Sek WOLFF
Leg Sek SIMON
Wiss Hilfsarb RICHTER.
(Five or six other officials, names forgotten).

Journalists:

Von PICKLER
Von STUDNITZ (Left shortly afterwards for Presse Abt).
Prisoner
Albrecht KAUSCHER Jr (demographer).
The Infm Section was on the same level as the Presse Abt (under SCHUETZ) and the Kultur Abt (under HULLIK), but cooperation with them was somewhat loose (see para 6 (c)). In addition to the Infm Section there existed the Deutsche Informationstelle, under Prof. FERBER, a public company sponsored by the Ausw Amt, whose functions were, theoretically, tech supervision of layout and printing of literature produced by the Infm Soc, and dissemination to foreign journalists in Berlin. In practice, it tended to duplicate the work of the Infm Soc. This led to intense rivalry between the two depts. Prisoner states that the series of hysterical propaganda pamphlets: "England Unmasked" (England Ohne Maske) were produced by this dept. In addition there were also two inter-departmental committees, the Englandausschuss and the Frankreichausschuss, on which the Infm Section was represented. These will be referred to in para 7.

Prisoner states that the Infm Soc, in the early days, was a small body of a few specialists, who worked on a flexible and non-bureaucratic basis. KUHN and Prisoner appear to have been the driving force behind the Sec. Auffassung was fully occupied in straightening out difficulties with other depts.

In spring 43 Dr SIX (formerly head of RSU VII) took over control of the sec, and the Infm Soc was greatly enlarged, merged with the Kultur Abt and renamed the Kul-Pol Abt. Prisoner can give no info about its activities, but he states that it became an unwieldy apparatus with many subsections and Referats which failed to function efficiently.

5. Functions

To disseminate German propaganda in neutral countries Prisoner stresses: a) that the sec was not responsible for distribution; this was the function of the German Embassies abroad, and was the particular job of the Kulturattaches; b) that the sec did not deal with propaganda in enemy countries.

6. Projects Carried Out

Prisoner claims to be unable to remember all the work done by the Sec during the months he served in it. It was flooded with propaganda ideas from well-meaning outsiders and a large amount of time was taken up in sifting this material. Prisoner's duties were to advise KUHN on practicable propaganda projects. He remembers the following as having been carried out.

a) German War Photographs

A great asset at the time was GERMANY'S monopoly of war photographs. Prisoner realised the value of this, and KUHN, later KLEINENBERG, was appointed to the OFW to ensure that a steady and speedy supply of photographs was made available to the foreign Press via the Deutsche Informationstelle. Censorship was relaxed in some respects for this purpose, eg the rule that no photograph of a dead German soldier should appear, was waived. The Press releases were directed mainly towards the US, and the Ausw Amt was able to send out pictures which, to some extent, counteracted the notion that SS thugs and Junker types predominated in the German army.
b) Pamphlets on HITLER'S PEACE OFFER

These were prepared after the Polish campaign and summarised HITLER'S speeches on the subject. They were slanted differently according to the country for which the pamphlets were intended.

c) "Rien que la Vérité"

A fortnightly 32-page magazine in French, Roumanian and Turkish. It was satirical and sexy in treatment, containing biting comments on extracts from the enemy Press, reporting on the allegedly "severe" conditions in ENGLAND. The most fruitful source was the "Daily Mail", which often carried detailed "eye-witness stories" about alleged shortages or other hardships suffered by the German people. The Info Sec had no difficulty in ridiculing these sensational products of a sub-editor's brain.

d) Leaflets

A number of leaflets were distributed relating to ENGLAND's war aims and/or peaceful intentions. After each HITLER speech leaflets were prepared giving the gist of HITLER's remarks concerning the country towards which the propaganda was directed. For instance, POLAND was the subject of much ingenious propaganda, since the Info Sec was aware that the Poles were none too popular abroad, even with the Allies. They stressed the undemocratic, reactionary, feudal nature of POLAND, and one leaflet, issued on the instructions of EISENHOWER, contained atrocity stories about the use of poison gas by the Polish Army during the Polish campaign. There was little truth in this; the facts were that a number of poison-gas shells had been captured by the German Army during the Polish campaign.

e) "Tory MP"

One of the scoops of the Sec concerned the book "Tory MP", by an anonymous author, published by Victor GOLLANCZ during the war. Prisoner saw a review of the book in the "Spectator". Export of the book was banned by British Censorship, but eventually a copy was procured via the German Consul-General in AMSTERDAM. The book was reprinted in ENGLAND in its entirety, and distributed privately to influential personages abroad. Thus, a Swedish MP would meet another Swede, who for this purpose was acting for the Kulturattaché of the Embassy in STOCKHOLM, at a social gathering. In the course of conversation the MP would be "lent" a copy of the book "which had recently been published in ENGLAND", and which the other "happened to have with him".

The position in the US was different. "Tory MP" had been published in AMERICA. The German Info Library in NEW YORK was instructed to buy up copies and send them to influential people on their mailing list, such as Isolationist senators. In fact, "Tory MP", according to Prisoner, did the British cause much harm, and was quoted gleefully by isolationists in Congress and Senate.
For wider use, a German version of "Tory MP" was prepared. It ran to about a hundred pages, and omitted the disparaging remarks about GERMANY, Fascists, etc. The Germans added more "dirt" on Parliamentary personalities, which, by some oversight, had been left out by the author, and tastefully illustrated it with unflattering drawings and photographs of the MPs concerned. Distribution was in the normal way through the Embassies in neutral countries.

f) Reply to British White Paper on Outbreak of Hostilities

This pamphlet was written by Prisoner himself in collaboration with Botschafter von MOLTKE, head of the Documentation Section of the Ausw Art. In it Prisoner did his best to discredit the British White Paper, seizing on the fact that Lord HALIFAX, during the last decisive days, had not exerted pressure on the Polish Govt to restrain their "aggressiveness". The German reply was given out through the MED and German radio, and also issued in pamphlet form through Embassies abroad.

b) German reply to French Orange Book

The Quai d'Orsay issued their own version of the circumstances leading to the commencement of hostilities, which, however, was less factual than the British version. Prisoner had less difficulty in demolishing the French case. The German reply was distributed in the same way as the reply to the British White Paper.

7. Propaganda in Enemy Countries

Prisoner states that this was not the function of the Informations Section. During the period under review the Sec made one exception to the rule: It suggested to the OKW the production of a leaflet, in the shape of an autumn leaf, to be dropped over enemy lines. On the reverse was printed a free pass to the German lines, promising preferential treatment as POW. The idea was accepted by the OKW and later copied by the Allies. Propaganda in enemy countries was the province of two special committees, viz:–

a) Englandausschuss

An inter-departmental committee responsible for overall directives for political warfare against the UK. Prisoner claims he gave no info about this committee, since the Informations Section, at least during the "phony war" period, was hoping for an early peace and was careful not to antagonise GREAT BRITAIN by historical or dangerous propaganda. They therefore thought political warfare against the UK a mistake and took no interest in this committee, although they were instructed to send a representative (RINTZAU).
The committee consisted of representatives from the following depts:-

Chairman of Committee: GohRet HESSE
Presse
RundFunk
Pol Abt
Wirtschaft
Information

Propaganda Ministry
OKW
Luftwaffe/Dr.Haus, Abt b
Abw (?)

b) Frankreichausschuss

A similar inter-departmental committee existed for propaganda in FRANCE, headed, Prisoner believes, by Otto ALETT. It ceased work after the occupation of FRANCE in Aug 40. The only example of its work Prisoner remembers is a series of pamphlets on French politicians, which gave the impression of emanating from a French Radical Socialist critic. After about ten pages the pamphlets switched over to virulent personal attacks on the character of the politician in question. The pamphlets were somehow smuggled into FRANCE via BELGIUM and achieved a wide distribution.

8. Liaison with Other Departments

a) Propaganda Ministry

Liaison was maintained with the Auslands Dept of the Propaganda Ministry (BOHME and DRAUWEILER). Prisoner is vague about the division of functions between the two depts, but states that co-operation was negligible. It appears that a bone of contention was control of the Kulturattaches at the Embassies, which was vested in the Propaganda Ministry. In spring 40 inter-departmental jealousy grew to such an extent that a special Führer Edict was issued to settle the matter: in fact, non-co-operation continued as before.

b) OKW

The Infra Sec had its own LO (RAMZI-U) at the OKW, whose duties were to pass on all suitable material as quickly as possible (eg: war photographs for foreign release). The Infra Sec also asked for directives through this channel, and were given some strategic info, since their propaganda to neutral countries was dependent on the military situation. For instance, if GERMANY had planned to attack GIBRALTAR in the near future, this would have necessitated a revision of German propaganda towards SPAIN. Prisoner states that the Infra Sec never received advance news of impending military operations in time. The Sec was informed of the Western Campaign and the invasion of NORWAY a few days before those operations started, but this was much too late for use in propaganda. Therefore the Infra Sec could not help the Wehrmacht to "soften the ground" politically before the Army struck.
Maj SOUL began production of "Signal" in summer 40. He was in touch with the Infn Sec regarding material, but except for that there was no co-operation.

do) Press and Rundfunk Abts, Ausw Abt

Liaison was affected through ALTENBURG. Prisoner states that there was no close co-operation, although frequently common directives were received by all three departments following RIBENTROP's morning conferences relating to common presentation of important news.

d) Wirtschaftsministerium

Co-operation was good. The Infn Sec maintained a special sub-sec, Wirtschafts-Propaganda, which kept in close touch with the Ministry. Wirtschafts-Propaganda published a fortnightly magazine "Globus", in all European languages, which in layout copied the "Reader's Digest" and contained reprints of articles on economic subjects which had appeared in the Axis-controlled Press.

e) Arbeitefront

There was similar collaboration in social questions, and the Infn Sec had a special sub-sec, Sozial-Propaganda. It featured all matters concerning social legislation and workers' welfare in Axis-occupied countries, and also organised congresses of foreign workers in GERMANY. Its aim was to suggest abroad that the worker was better off under Fascism than Democracy.

9. RIBENTROP's Conferences

Prisoner states that during the time he worked in the Sec he attended six or seven informal conferences called by RIBENTROP. One conference dealt with the confection of an atrocity pamphlet on poison gas allegedly used by the Polish Army, two others with the framing of the German reply to the French and British Foreign Office publications on the commencement of hostilities, at another the Sec was instructed to prepare a propaganda campaign to show up British imperialism at its worst (oppression of INDIA, exploitation of Colonies, subjugation of workers at home, etc.) this eventually appeared in the "England Unmasked" series of pamphlets prepared by the Deutsche Informationsstelle; the Infn Sec was apparently lukewarm in its attitude towards such a scheme). Another conference dealt with the German propaganda line after the invasion of NORWAY. The last three conferences were in connection with the USA Presidential elections. RIBENTROP wished to launch a tremendous propaganda campaign in the USA against ROOSEVELT, using "Yellow Press" methods to revile the President. After the occupation of PARIS a document was found in a French Freemason's Lodge, the Grand Lodge of the Grande Orient, containing formal addresses to and from ROOSEVELT, with photographs of the ceremonial presentation. RIBENTROP saw in this a proof of the sinister influence of International Jewry, Freemasonry, etc. Prisoner had some difficulty in persuading RIBENTROP that the document was innocuous and useless for mud-slinging purposes. RIBENTROP then ordered Prisoner to "find" (ie forge) another more damaging document, but Prisoner claims that he managed to stall RIBENTROP until the elections were over. DIECKHOFF, who was also present at those meetings, lacked Prisoner in his general argument that German intervention on the side of WILKIE in what was an internal US matter would merely serve to strengthen ROOSEVELT.
In the course of these conferences Prisoner had opportunities of raising matters of high policy with RIBBENTROP. At one time, Prisoner, in association with DIECKHOFF, OLUNDURO, AHEM and RAJ, was strongly in favour of a "collective" policy towards FRANCE; even now, Prisoner believes that had the Gurkhas admitted FRANCE as a junior partner in the "Pan-German Commonwealth", the political constellation in EUROPE would have been hard to unsettle. RIBBENTROP, however, was not in favour of such a course, and HITLER, warned by his intuition that CERMAKO was not popular in FRANCE, was in no mood to make concessions. At the last conference in Oct 40 RIBBENTROP offered Prisoner the post of head of the Inf Sec, with the rank of General 1st Class. The position had become vacant through ALTENBURG's appointment as Chairman of the Haußmeister-Hungarian Frontier Settlement Commission and RAJ's transfer as envoy to PZIS. Prisoner asked for 24 hours to think it over. He decided, however, that by becoming a state official he stood to lose his political reputation, without being able to influence German foreign policy. Prisoner's avowed ambition for some time had been that of king-maker, in his self-chosen role of the man-behind-the-scenes; he was prepared to bide his time until he could serve under another more malleable man whose political star was on the rise. He therefore declined RIBBENTROP's offer, a refusal which led to a period of almost complete political impotence until in Prisoner's "Egmont" period he once more became a power among the Nazi satellites, and but for CERMAKO's defeat, might have become the guiding brain behind the Foreign Minister-to-be, SCHELLENBERG.

After Prisoner's refusal to serve under RIBBENTROP, relations were strained between the two men. Prisoner broke off his connection with the Inf Sec and returned to MUNCHEN. He continued to act as honorary adviser to the Sec, and visited it whenever he was in BERLIN. He states that during the following years he was rarely consulted on the work of the Sec, and is not familiar with its productions, but as a journalist he was more than ever interested in keeping up his news contacts. He was cordially received in the Inf Sec and given access to its files which normally would not have been available to an outsider.

Prisoner has been questioned at length on his contacts with Prof F. A. SIX, who in 143 succeeded WINTER and STAHLER as head of the Inf Sec. SIX invited Prisoner to co-operate more closely with the new Kul-Pol Abt, on the lines of Prisoner's previous work with the Inf Sec. Prisoner was then one of the editors of the OKW paper "Signal", and had occasionally taken part in conferences between the two departments concerning common problems of foreign propaganda. Prisoner formed the impression that SIX had little idea of propaganda: his attitude struck him as crude, forceful and as inept as those of MOP. It appears that Prisoner disliked SIX on personal grounds. For reasons he again declined to collaborate with the Sec, and his contacts were very much rarer and were undertaken for his own info, and to exchange news with TROTT zu SOLZ and WERTH - his personal friends - who were both working towards the 20 July. After TROTT's execution Prisoner hardly entered the Sec. He states that SIX was not aware of his role as "Espion" for MDO VII, and denies knowledge of SIX's previous association with RSHA VII.
1. Evacuation of BERLIN

Towards the end of Mar 45, Prisoner had a long conversation with SCHELLENBERG in BERLIN, in which he pointed out that their joint efforts to arrange a negotiated peace with the Western Powers had come to nothing, since the pre-requisite for such a move - the liquidation of HITLER - had not been fulfilled. Nor had HIMMLER had the courage to begin direct peace negotiations with the Allies. The time for peace negotiations, in Prisoner's opinion, was now past. He considered, therefore, that his usefulness had come to an end, and did not propose to await the Russian attack on BERLIN; he informed SCHARLLENBERG that he would leave BERLIN with the 6th Staff which was then evacuating to BAVARIA. SCHARLLENBERG did not share Prisoner's pessimism, but asked him to remain in touch with Standf. SANDBERGER, in charge of ad of 6th Staff, who was also going SOUTH.

Prisoner left immediately afterwards with SANDBERGER's party, and arrived some days later at TENGELSEE, where 2nd Munich had put a house equipped with a WT station at their disposal. Finding the accommodation too crowded, Prisoner moved to another billet at BAD HEILBRUNN, in which town Obstof. FABERGEB and four or five others of 6th Staff were also living. During the next few weeks, Prisoner maintains that he did nothing and was NOT in communication with 6th Staff, but he was visited from time to time by SANDBERGER, who kept in touch with the RHINO staff scattered about the district.

2. WT Messages from SCHLLENBERG

About 25 Apr 45 SANDBERGER visited Prisoner and told him that a WT message from SCHLLENBERG had just been received, requesting Prisoner to fly to LUBECK for discussions. Prisoner was at first inclined to refuse, since he was loath to leave BAVARIA again, and, in any case, SANDBERGER could not obtain an aircraft to take Prisoner NORTH. He therefore ignored the message.

A few days later SANDBERGER, in a state of great excitement, again called on Prisoner and told him that a second WT message from SCHLLENBERG had just been received, and that an aircraft was now standing by to take Prisoner to LUBECK. Prisoner was still reluctant to go, but says he allowed himself to be persuaded by SANDBERGER's argument that Prisoner could not know whether SCHLLENBERG had succeeded at the last moment in entering into more concrete peace negotiations. SANDBERGER handed Prisoner a memorandum for SCHLLENBERG on the reorganisation of 6th Staff in the SOUTH, undertaken by KALTENBRUNNEN, which virtually amounted to a dissolution of 6th Staff. SANDBERGER and SKORZYNY were to be in charge of what remained of the GIS in the SOUTH. SANDBERGER urgently requested Prisoner to obtain written instructions from HIMMLER to rescind KALTENBRUNNEN's order.
3. Prisoner flies NORTH

After some trouble, SANDERSON found an aircraft which would take Prisoner to LUXEM. Prisoner left in a Ju 88 at 0330 hrs on 30 Apr 45 from GOLDING airfield (or KOSCHEM) and arrived at LUXEM at 0530 hrs. In LUXEM he contacted SCHELLENBERG's secretary, who told him that SCHELLENBERG was in STRIJEN in connection with the HESS/BOTKE negotiations, but would arrive that evening in VELDENBURG. Prisoner left instructions to wire SCHELLENBERG of his arrival, and in the afternoon flew on to FRENSENBURG. There he heard that CRUSKILL and KARTEN had issued a communique on KARTEN's peace overtures, categorically refusing to entertain offers directed solely to the Western allies. Prisoner concluded that further negotiations were futile, and gave instructions to his aircraft to stand by to take him back to BAVARI, that night.

4. Prisoner meets SCHELLENBERG

Prisoner met SCHELLENBERG at 2200 hrs. SCHELLENBERG asked Prisoner to accompany him in his car to KALMERS or TRAVENBURG. During the journey SCHELLENBERG gave Prisoner a resume of his negotiations with HESS/BOTKE and von POST. SCHELLENBERG's dilatoriness had delayed negotiations until it was too late (he gave SCHELLENBERG his authority on 25 Apr 45) and in the last analysis HIMMLER must bear responsibility, for the senseless destruction of German towns and the heavy German casualties in the last few weeks. SCHELLENBERG was now going to report to HIMMLER on his talks in COMENHELD and he asked Prisoner to be present at the interview to strengthen his, SCHELLENBERG's hand in case of HIMMLER's further procrastination. Prisoner then told SCHELLENBERG of the official Allied communique and bluntly stated that further negotiations with the Western Powers alone were impossible. SCHELLENBERG until then had been unaware of the communique; nevertheless it appears that he still had hopes of arriving at some agreement with the Western Powers, using the German occupation of NORWAY as his trump card. Prisoner then declared his intention of returning to BAVARI as soon as possible. He told SCHELLENBERG that he was not facing up to the grim realities of the present situation, and added that the recent Werwolf propaganda and concentration camp atrocities had been incredible political blunders. SCHELLENBERG said that HIMMLER was aware of this, but appeared powerless against DORAND and GOEDDES, and went on to discuss possible members of an interim govt headed by HIMMLER. In the course of the conversation Prisoner handed SCHELLENBERG SANDERSON's memorandum on the reorganisation in the SOUTH. Prisoner stresses, however, that both SCHELLENBERG and he were concerned with high policy, and took little interest in what KALTENBRUNNER might be doing in BAVARI. SCHELLENBERG obviously considered ANT VI as a thing of the past, but clearly regarded KALTENBRUNNER's action as unauthorized. He would, he said, take it up with HIMMLER.

5. SCHELLENBERG's Talks with HIMMLER

They arrived at KALMERS early. In the morning of 1 May 45 and learned of HITLER's suicide that night (SCHELLENBERG merely said: "Thank God for that!") and of KALTENBRUNNER's appointment as head of the state. (According to the OGO Final Report on SCHELLENBERG, HIMMLER had already seen KALTENBRUNNER earlier that morning and persuaded the latter to dismiss ANT VI immediately. Prisoner has no knowledge of this meeting.)
At about 0900 hrs SCHELLENG was called for a few minutes to HIMMLER, who informed him of the situation, and said that he intended to place himself under DONITZ' orders. He was driving over to FLON, DONITZ' HQ, immediately, and asked SCHELLENG to accompany him to report on the Swedish negotiations and to outline his ideas for the future. Prisoner followed in another car with HIMMLER's adjutants.

6. Conference at DONITZ' HQ

At about 1200 hrs the party arrived at FLON. There, Prisoner learned that MINDENSTUP had been dismissed and SCHERIN-KROGIK appointed Foreign Minister. DONITZ immediately drew HIMMLER into conference, and asked SCHELLENG and Prisoner to work out meanwhile a short memorandum on the next German move in the light of HITLER's death and the TRUMAN-CRUSIUS communiqué of the night before.

SCHELLENG told Prisoner that he (SCHELLENG) was to be KROGIK's deputy and that the memo was required mainly for KROGIK's info. (Contrary to the 0900 hrs on SCHELLENG, Prisoner disputes that KROGIK was at FLON at the time; he remembers that there were several telephone calls to SWITZER, where KROGIK was staying.) SCHELLENG and Prisoner then drew up a short memorandum containing the following points:

a) Unconditional surrender to all three Allies was now inevitable. This implied peaceful cession of NORTHERN and WESTERN Scandi.

b) Nevertheless, time must be gained on the Eastern Front. The Russians must be held as long as possible, thus allowing German troops and civilians to evacuate from CENTRAL AND WESTERN Scandi (this applied especially to CZECHOSLOVAKIA). For this purpose negotiations with the USSR must be protracted.

c) In spite of the "unconditional surrender" clause, concessions should be wrung from the Allies; the most important would be the retention of a central government.

SCHELLENG receives New Instructions

Early in the afternoon SCHELLENG was received by DONITZ to whom he explained the points in the memorandum. He was instructed by DONITZ (7) to leave for COPENHAGEN immediately and resume contact with von POST of the Swedish Foreign Office, to sound the Allied reactions to HITLER's death, and to assure von POST that the new German government adherence to the previous disarmament, evacuation, and other British demands in the memorandum. DONITZ also instructed SCHELLENG to keep in contact with the Swedish Government, and to advise the British Government to evacuate troops and civilians from the Eastern Front. He was not at the time informed of the British offer of unconditional surrender.

Final Trip to COPENHAGEN

SCHELLENG left FLON at about 1500 hrs. He was to travel via FLENSBURG to COPENHAGEN, and Prisoner accompanied him as far as FLENSBURG, where his aircraft was waiting to take him back to BAVARIA.
During the journey SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner had their last exhaustive discussion. SCHELLENBERG once more pressed Prisoner to remain, but the latter declined on the grounds that he thought all further efforts to save GERMANY doomed to failure. He considered his usefulness had ended and did not wish to be publicly associated with the liquidation of the Third Reich. (At the time Prisoner still had political ambitions for the future. A reputation untainted by the "shame" of having been responsible for the armistice negotiations, would have been a valuable asset. Similar charges had ruined the careers of the WEIMAR politicians after the 1914 - 18 war.) Nevertheless, he intimated that should the interim government develop into a government of some stability, he would be available. Privately, Prisoner claims, he anticipated the worst, although he did not state this to SCHELLENBERG.

In the course of conversation, KALTENBRUNNER was briefly touched upon. SCHELLENBERG mentioned that, should Prisoner happen to see SANDURGER or anyone else of the Amt VI staff, he was to tell them that neither HIMMLER nor himself recognised KALTENBRUNNER's orders. Prisoner believes that SCHELLENBERG also said that HIMMLER would countermand KALTENBRUNNER's orders by FD. He states emphatically that no more was said, and that he carried back no other instructions, especially since he stressed to SCHELLENBERG that it was doubtful whether he would see SANDURGER or anyone else. The course of events had overshadowed the internal politics of the RSHA.

9. Memorandum for SCHELLENBERG

In FLENSBURG Prisoner bade a solemn farewell to SCHELLENBERG, and wished him success in the future. SCHELLENBERG asked Prisoner to leave him another more detailed memorandum on German policy after the unconditional surrender, which he proposed to submit to KROSIGK on his return from COPENHAGEN. This document Prisoner drew up that evening; he left it with SCHELLENBERG's secretary in FLENSBURG. It contained the following points:

a) The cardinal aim of German policy must be the preservation of a central German government, in spite of the Allied zonal division. As a suitable figurehead BRUNING's name might be put forward. The Americans should be approached for permission to contact BRUNING. (BRUNING had been mentioned previously by Prisoner in his "REPORT" Reports, see Appendix A, paras 1 and 9). The new government could only include personalities not compromised in the eyes of the Allies.

b) In order to placate the Allies and to gain the above concession, the following measures would have to be instituted immediately:

(i) Dissolution of the NEDP, SS and affiliated orgs.
(ii) Disbandment of Gestapo; seizure of all Gestapo offices and records.
(iii) In view of Allied disclosures of conditions in the concentration camps, a German definition and prosecution of "war criminals" was advisable.
(SCHELLENBERG had mentioned MULLER, Antosch IV, and O getResources as the chief war criminals).
(iv) A strict ban on all Werwolf activities.
c) Prisoner added a personal rider for SCHELLENBERG. In order to preserve his political future, he would have to dissociate himself from HITLER (until the very end, SCHELLENBERG had been unable to appreciate how compromised HITLER was in Allied eyes, and had, in fact, assumed that he would remain in the DONITZ government. HITLER had made SCHELLENBERG; it was, for the latter, a question of personal loyalty.)

Prisoner met OSICK later on in American captivity. He learned from him that SCHELLENBERG had put forward the points mentioned above. Only the ban on Werwolf had been carried out; DONITZ could not bring himself to swallow the rest of Prisoner’s advice.

10. Return to BAVARIA

Prisoner left FLENSBURG by plane at 0200 hrs on 2 May 45. After a dangerous flight during which he was repeatedly chased by British night-fighters, he landed early in the morning in PRAGUE. In the following night he flew on to SALZBURG and continued from there by car. American troops had already overrun BAD TOLZ, and Prisoner had to walk the last 30 km. Prisoner claims that after his return he saw none of the Ant VI staff, and did not even attempt to pass on SCHELLENBERG’s verbal message. He remained in BAD TOLZ until his arrest on 1 Jun 45.

11. Conclusion

Comparison of Prisoner’s and SCHELLENBERG’s statements (vide 020 FFr on SCHELLENBERG, pp 105 - 110) has disclosed discrepancies, the most curious of which is SCHELLENBERG’s omission to mention that he twice summoned Prisoner to LEUBECK for consultation (this has already been confirmed independently by SANDBERGER) and his assertion that Prisoner returned SOUTH on his instructions. All info available bears out Prisoner’s contention that his relation to SCHELLENBERG was solely that of political adviser, and he was summoned to SCHELLENBERG in this capacity during a crucial period in SCHELLENBERG’s political career.

Prisoner merely took with him SANDBERGER’s memorandum on the reorganisation of the SOUTH, but neither Prisoner, SCHELLENBERG nor HITLER attached much importance to KALTENBRUNNER’s activities at the time. Again, SCHELLENBERG’s assertion that Prisoner returned SOUTH on his instructions would seem to be an overstatement; in fact, SCHELLENBERG merely gave Prisoner a vague verbal message which he knew Prisoner, in the circumstances, was most unlikely to deliver.
1. Introduction

Prisoner has been questioned in detail on his foreign travels. It was sought to establish the suggestion thrown out in the brief that there was more in his travels than journalistic reporting; that they in fact served as cover for an economic and political intelligence mission for the GDR or Ausw Abt. Prisoner has emphatically denied this, nor has info come to hand which would indicate that he was anything but what he claimed to be; an influential German political journalist.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that, Prisoner, a journalist with a reputation and ambition, was in close contact with highly placed personalities on whom he impressed his experience and views formed during his travels, the more so, since his real convictions and views were running counter to the current German propaganda. Thus Prisoner was able to exert privately considerable influence (through Albrecht HAUSHOFER on Rudolf Hess, through DIECKHOFF, RABEN AND ABEZ on REBENTROP, much later through SCHOENBERG on HIMMLER).

On his return from the US in 1938, Prisoner made his views on AMERICA's attitude known to high Party and State functionaries assembled at the NUREMBERG Rally (see para 16). After his return from the Middle East in Mar 39, he sounded a warning through DIECKHOFF (see para 9). In Aug 39, dismayed by REBENTROP's intransigent attitude at a conference at FUSCHL (see Appendix B, para 3) Prisoner prophesied that German aggression in POLAND would mean, a) war with the British Empire, b) that the French would not prevent the British reversal of the policy of appeasement, and c) that the US would enter the war six months later. This memo was passed in two copies via Albrecht HAUSHOFER; one copy for Hess and one for HITLER. In Sep 39 Hess' adjutant appeared at Prisoner's Office and confiscated the file copy and shorthand notes as "Top Secret"; this is the only official reaction known to Prisoner. Similar critical memos to Gen Obst JOEL were by-products of Prisoner's visits to SPAIN in 1943 and 1944 (see paras 24 and 28).

Such criticisms of aspects of German foreign policy can hardly be regarded as political intelligence reports, the more so, since they were unsolicited and not premeditated. Prisoner's travels appear to be, therefore, of little CI value. They have been listed briefly in chronological order, and some of his more important journeys have been treated in some detail.

2. Chronology

1925
ITALY
Holiday with Prisoner's parents.

1926
VIENNA and BUDAPEST
Study trip during University summer holidays.

1927
LITHUANIA, ESTONIA and LATVIA
Six weeks' journey, mainly in RUGAS, (TALLINN) and RIGA.
1928 POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Several weeks' journey, gathering material for his doctor's degree, much of which was used in his book "Zwischeneuropa und die Deutsche Zukunft".

1929 summer BALTIC STATES. Several weeks' journey, more material for his book.

1930 summer SWITZERLAND. Attended 3-months summer course in GENEVA at Oxford School of International Relations under Prof ZIMMERM, followed by holiday in SWITZERLAND.

1931 autumn LIDAU. Fortnight's holiday. YUGOSLAVIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY. Six weeks' journey for more material for "Zwischeneuropa". Financed by grant from HETZELBERGER Sociological Institute.

1932 autumn PARIS. Brief trips as free-lance correspondent for "Die Tat". FRANKFURT. Original plans were for a holiday, but became a tour of the BALKANS for MNN on the BALKAN attitude towards the Abyssinian war.

1933 spring CROATIA. Several weeks' journey; visit to Prof IVIC, Prof of Sociology at ZAGREB, followed by holiday on Isle of RAG.

1934 Mar. ROME. Covering MUSSOLINI-DOLFOSS-GOMMOS Conference for MNN.

1935 autumn SWITZERLAND and ITALY. Two weeks' holiday in LOCARNO, GENOA and SANTA MARGHERITA LIGURE. Brief trips to cover stories for MNN (Sudeten question, Anglo-German Naval Agreement, League of Nations Session).

1936 Feb. ROME. Few weeks as correspondent for MNN, dealing with German-Italian relations (AUSTRIA) and Abyssinian war. Prisoner was received by MUSSOLINI.

1937 Jan-Mar MIDDLE EAST. Journey undertaken for MNN. EGYPT, PALESTINE and SYRIA. Details will be found at pages 4 and 5.
Spent one week as guest of the Comité FRANCE-ALLEMANDE at the International World Exhibition. Two weeks' holiday.

Journey undertaken for MNN, also gathering material for his book "Der rassisierte Kontinent". Details will be found at paras 10-14. Stayed there for a few days after return from US, covering Sudeten crisis.

1938 summer PARIS 1938 autumn ITALY
1939 Jan - Mar MIDDLE EAST
1940 Jan COPENHAGEN 1942 RUSSIA
1941 spring ROME 1943 Mar ROME
1944 April COLOGNE 1944 Jun-Jul MADRID and LISBON
1945 May MADRID and LISBON 1945 Aug MILAN and PASIANO
1946 Aug PARIS 1946 Nov COPENHAGEN
1947 Dec COPENHAGEN

Spent one week as guest of the Comité FRANCE-ALLEMANDE at the International World Exhibition. Two weeks' holiday.

Journey undertaken for MNN, also gathering material for his book "Der rassisierte Kontinent". Details will be found at paras 10-14. Stayed there for a few days after return from US, covering Sudeten crisis.

EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN. Second Middle East journey undertaken for MNN. Also gathering material for his book "Juden, Engländer und Araber in P. LASTINA". For details see paras 6-9.

Attending Biennial Exhibition.

Spent one week as guest of the Comité FRANCE-ALLEMANDE at the International World Exhibition. Two weeks' holiday.

Journey undertaken for MNN, also gathering material for his book "Der rassisierte Kontinent". Details will be found at paras 10-14. Stayed there for a few days after return from US, covering Sudeten crisis.

EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN. Second Middle East journey undertaken for MNN. Also gathering material for his book "Juden, Engländer und Araber in P. LASTINA". For details see paras 6-9.
I. JOURNEYS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

3. Purpose

Undertaken for, and financed by, the Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, reporting on the political situation in the MIDDLE EAST.

First Journey, Jan - Mar 1937

4. Itinerary

ALEXANDRIA - CAIRO - LUXOR - ASWAN - WADI HALFA - SUDAN;
by air from KHARTOGH to CAIRO - JERUSALEM - HALFA - TEL AVIV - SYRIA - LEBANON; from there back to ITALY.

5. Contacts and Personalities

a) EGYPT

Germans

German Envoy in CAIRO, HHr von COH-WAGENFELD.
Leg-Sek Dr. SIEGFRIED.
German Consul-General in ALEXANDRIA.
Dr. FISCHER, Private Correspondent of Frankfurter Zeitung.
Very well informed, with many contacts to Arab and Italian circles.

SCHMITZ, Foreign correspondent of MNU.

German businessmen in EGYPT (names forgotten).
Director of German School in CAIRO.
Members of Archaeological Institute. Very well informed about current situation.

Italians

Members of Italian Embassy and Italian Journalists
(through KIRCHER).

British

British Embassy (through introduction of German ambassador).
Mr. HARKNESS, Correspondent of "Daily Telegraph". Through him met a number of Arab journalists and politicians.
Representative of United Press and INS.

French

Correspondent of "Le Temps" and "Echo de Paris".

Egyptians

Nahas Pasha (Prime Minister).
MAHMAR SERID Pasha (Finance Minister).
ASH MUNIR Pasha.

Egyptian Ambassador in LONDON.
Chairman of MISH Cinemas, and directors of MISH Film Studios and Airlines.
Editors of "El Ahram", "El Bukattan" and other journalists.
The first Sheikh of EL AHAR Mosque and University.
Egyptians (Contd)

Officers of Egyptian Army, whom Prisoner met casually in ASWAN.
Several students belonging to radical nationalist circles.
Some of the younger opposition politicians of the Wafd.

b) PALESTINE

Germans

German Consul-General DOHLE and Vice-Consul DITTMAR.
Dr Franz REICHRERT, representative of DSM.
German farmers and business men of German settlement
WILHELMINA near JAFFA.
German business men in JERUSALEM, HAIFA, TEL AVIV.

British

The High Commissioner for PALESTINE, Gen WAUCHOPE.
Public Relations Officer, and some other members of
Administration.

Arab

The Mufti of JERUSALEM.
UNITED ARAB NADI, Leader of ISTIQLAL Party.
Chairman of Higher Arab Committee.
Some other leading Arabs in government positions.
The Mayor of JERUSALEM.
Members of the Arab Committees of HAIFA and TIBERIAS.

Jews

Officials of the VAAD LEUMI.
Officials of the Jewish Agency in JERUSALEM, in various
Jewish settlements.
Jewish writers, lawyers, etc in TEL AVIV.

c) TRANSJORDAN

Emir ABDULLAH

d) SYRIA

German Consul-General SAILER, who introduced Prisoner to
officials of the French Administration and also to
some Syrian politicians (names forgotten).

Second Journey, Jan - Mar 1939

6. Itinerary

EGYPT - SAUDI ARABIA - EGYPT - PALESTINE - IRAQ - IRAN
AFGHANISTAN. Prisoner travelled by air. He returned from
AFGHANISTAN via ATHENS and BUDAPEST to GERMANY.
7. Contacts and Personalities

a) EGYPT

Prisoner looked up his former contacts. In addition he met the following:

Germans

Leg Sek von HEYDEN, of the Embassy, had replaced SIEGFRIED, and had been instructed by the Ambassador to assist Prisoner in every way.

Arabs

King FERUK,
Chief of Egyptian General Staff.
HußIS Affiy Pasha,
Sheik EL MAHAGI of EL ANZAR Mosque.

b) SAUDI ARABIA

Germans

Ges GROEBL, the new envoy to SAUDI ARABIA.

Arabs

King IBBN S.M.D.
Crown Prince FEISAL.
Foreign Minister.
The KIMMAW (Governor) of Province FEJAL.

British

British Envoy, Sir Reader BULLARD.

Italians

Italian Envoy.
Head of SAUDI ARABIA "Air Force".

Americans

Engineers of Standard Oil Co.

c) IRAQ

Germans

Members of the Legation (names forgotten; short talks only).

Arabs

NURI ES SAID Pasha, later Prime Minister.
TASHI Pasha, Minister of War.
Officers of the Dept of Education (Prisoner was interested in the settlement of the Bedouin tribes).
Arab emissary from PALESTINE.
The Mayor of BABIL.
Sheik ASIL, Chief of the SHAILAR Tribe.
8. Publications

A series of twelve to fifteen articles appeared in the IWN after each journey. A large number of photographs were also available to the München Illustrierte Presse. Prisoner's book "Juden, Engländer und Araber in Palästina", appeared in 1938 (DIEDERICHES).

9. Other Contacts

Prisoner denies that he made any other use of the info he gathered on his journeys. The auswärtiges amt was aware that Prisoner had gone, but he did not submit a report on his return. Ges von REDTIG, a personal friend of Prisoner, gave him one or two introductions to Arabs in BR, but other than that, he received no assistance.

Prisoner gathered the impression that, in spite of the appeasement policy in LONDON, the British in the MIDDLE EAST were preparing for war and regarded war with GERMANY as inevitable. He said as much publicly in his articles, and asked his friend, Ges DIEDERICHOFF in the auswärtiges amt, to convey a warning to this effect in official quarters.

II. JOURNEY TO USA

(AUG - AUG 38)

10. Purpose

To report on current developments in the USA, especially on the American attitude towards GERMANY. The journey was undertaken for, and financed by, the MNN, and the München Illustrierte Presse. From May 38 onwards, sixteen articles appeared in the MNN and three illustrated articles in the MIP. Prisoner's book "Der assolose Kontinent" was largely based on impressions gathered during this trip, but did not appear until spring 42.

The immediate reason for the trip was an invitation from DIEDERICHOFF, then German Ambassador in the US, and a close personal friend of Prisoner's. DIEDERICHOFF wrote to Prisoner that he would welcome his visit, since, in his opinion, American affairs were not being fully reported or even understood in GERMANY. DIEDERICHOFF had sent a similar invitation to Rudolf KIRCHER, the editor of the "Frankfurter Zeitung", who had toured the US three months previously.

11. Itinerary

Prisoner travelled with his wife. In NEW YORK they bought a second-hand car and motored through the US. They were given introductions by the German Embassy to many "representative American personalities". German consulates were advised in advance of their arrival, and arranged introductions to local personalities. Prisoner was at pains to keep his tour informal and unofficial.

a) NEW YORK

Guest of the German Gen Konsul BORCHERS, who gave two receptions for Prisoner, at which he met well-known NEW YORK writers and journalists. Among the guests were:
Prisoner also met some of the editorial staff of "Time", "Life", and "Fortune", in particular, Mr. D. VOLFEY, co-editor of "Fortune". He also had several talks with Henry and Claire LUCIE.

b) WASHINGTON

Prisoner stayed for four weeks as guest of DREYER. DREYER complained about YENSSEN's short-sighted policy in his treatment of the US, especially his encouragement of the "Third". He gave Prisoner insight into all relevant secret files, which he brought out with him to his residence. During the four weeks, Prisoner attended the receptions given by the ambassador, two of them in Prisoner's honor. Apart from the Embassy staff, who in turn invited Prisoner to their houses and through whom he met their personal friends, both Germans and Americans, Prisoner was introduced to a number of Senators, representatives and members of the State Dept. He can now recall the names only of Rep. NYE, Senators VANDERBERG, WHEELER, WAGNER and TILD. To all of these, in so far as they needed convincing, Prisoner expounded the beneficial and rational influence of Nazi Germany on Europe, dismissing the shadier side of the picture with a shrug and an assurance that it was designed to keep the ignorant German masses quiet.

Prisoner also had a talk with John LEWIS, then already an opponent of ROOSEVELT's. LEWIS was an attentive listener to Prisoner's smooth account of Nazi "Socialism" for the German working class.

Through the Embassy, Prisoner was granted interviews with the following:

President ROOSEVELT Here Prisoner's charm failed to impress. ROOSEVELT angrily denounced Germany's annexation of AUSTRIA, contemptuously dismissed Prisoner's protest that the annexation was the wish of the "entire Austrian people". As a result of ROOSEVELT's frigid reception and his sincere dislike of Nazism, Prisoner reported - and later elaborated the theme in his book, "Der Masslose Kontinent" - that ROOSEVELT was filled with hatred for all things German, was set on destroying German Kultur, and already then (1938) was preparing for an aggressive war. He rationalized his prejudice by saying that internal difficulties with the New Deal forced ROOSEVELT to focus discontent on an external victim (thriving Germany).

Cordell HILL Secretary of State Routine
Harold ICKES Secretary of the Interior Official
Henry WALLACE Secretary of Agriculture Interviews.
Thorough inspection of the TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, and talks with the two leading TVA officials, Dr. David Lilienthal and Mr. Morgan.

Prisoner called on local notables en route, eg small-town bosses, editors of local papers, judges, etc. Occasionally he visited a celebrity, eg Margaret Mitchell in Atlanta ("Gone with the Wind"). In Hollywood Prisoner toured the film studios.

Prisoner toured the film studios.

Leisurely return east, again stopping to talk to local notables. A week's stay in St. Louis.

Invited by the North-Western University to lecture on a "Pan-European Federation". This talk was badly received, and Prisoner was directly attacked in an after-dinner speech by the President of the University. He also spoke before various clubs and societies in the city.

Through the German Consul, Prisoner was introduced to the General Manager of Ford's, and obtained an interview with Edsel Ford in Dearborn. Extensive visit to General Motors, followed by invitation to address leading automobile industrialists at an informal meeting.

Short stay there; the German Consul introduced him to influential business circles.

Visit to Harvard University.

Prisoner returned to New York, where he remained for a fortnight before leaving for Germany. Dieckhoff came up from Washington, and asked Prisoner to support his apparently lone voice among Nazi politicians at home and impress upon them that the "Stop Germany" campaign in the US was a significant movement away from American isolationism, and was likely to grow in proportion to Germany's expansion. (See para 14).

When Prisoner arrived in Washington, Dieckhoff had shown him a long report on Fritz Kuhn's "Surf" which he had prepared for the Ausw Ant, in which he wrote that this org was run by opportunists, astute politicians and racketeers, and advised that no further financial, political or moral support should be given to it. His report apparently carried no weight in official quarters, and he now asked Prisoner to support him publicly in his paper. Prisoner claims
that during his stay he did not meet Kuhn, or attended a "Bund" rally. Nevertheless, from his talks with Americans he formed the same impression as Dieckhoff, and subsequently reviewed the "Bund" unfavourably. As Prisoner and Dieckhoff had anticipated, this article provoked the AO to indignation. Prisoner was publicly and privately reprimanded by the Propaganda Ministry. He forwarded all this material to Dieckhoff, who, in turn, took the case as an opportunity for sending another official memorandum condemning German backing (his efforts, however, were unrewarded).

Dieckhoff further asked Prisoner to employ George Sylvester Vier Eck as the US correspondent of the MNN. To this Prisoner agreed. This is the only instance where Prisoner is known to have been in direct contact with an informant (with the exception of the "Egmont" period) and may therefore be of interest.

13. VIEBECK's Employment by the MNN

Dieckhoff introduced Prisoner to Vier Eck during his visit in Washington. Vier Eck was an illegitimate son of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had lived in the US for many years. During the 1914-18 war, he edited the pro-German "Das Vaterland" and had many acquaintances among Senators and representatives, especially the isolationists. Dieckhoff used Vier Eck as an informer on the Washington political scene. Apparently in order to help Vier Eck financially, Dieckhoff asked Prisoner to take him on the staff of his paper, but his journalistic abilities were poor, and when Dieckhoff was recalled from the US towards end 1938, Prisoner wished to dismiss the man. Dieckhoff, however, was anxious to continue to receive Vier Eck's reports, asked Prisoner to keep Vier Eck on his staff, and agreed to refund his salary of $500 per month.

Vier Eck's weekly reports arrived by air mail via the Bermudas, and bore, after Sep 39, British censorship stamps. They were addressed to the MNN and were only signed with a rectangle (VIEBECK = rectangle in German), a copy of which was forwarded by Prisoner to Dieckhoff in the Auswartabteilung. The reports contained clippings from American papers and articles, the opinions of citizens in Capitol Hill, interspersed with "inside tips" on future Presidential policy, what notables had been received at the White House, and notes on industrial development and production bottlenecks. Only the latter items were of value. Prisoner states that the reports reflected the current political atmosphere in Washington, and were, for Dieckhoff, a useful complement to the official reports from the German Ambassador, while, after America entered the war, the scarcity of int from the US was such, that even these insignificant messages were valuable.

In spring 41, the MNN paid Vier Eck a lump sum of $10,000, ie eighteen months' salary in advance. Shortly after the outbreak of war, Vier Eck was arrested by the FBI and the connection ceased. Prisoner has since been informed at Oberschleissheim that copies of all reports went were found in Vier Eck's flat in New York. Prisoner is positive that Vier Eck was only working as personal V-man for Dieckhoff, and not for the GIS. He asked Schellenberg in 1944 whether he knew of Vier Eck, but the latter replied in the negative.

14. Prisoner Reports on his US Journey

In Sep 38, Prisoner attended the Nuremberg Party Rally, in order to warn the leading Nazi functionaries that should it come to war with the UK, the USA would, in his opinion, join within six months.
This was in fulfilment of his promise to DIECKHOFF that he would use his influence to support DIECKHOFF's similar views. Prisoner had talks with RIEBENTROP, WEIZSACKER, DITTRICH, MAIS, ROSENBERG, HENLEIN (the Sudeten Leader), CORBET, MAURIN and FRITZSCHE. Except for WEIZSACKER and FRITZSCHE, Prisoner's warning fell on deaf ears. He later learned that the reports of the German military attaché in WASHINGTON, Gen von BOTTICHER, were largely responsible for the prevailing sense of complacent security. Prisoner states that except for this he made no report to any other official quarter.

III. VISITS TO FRANCE

15. Early Aug 40

When Rahn took up his Ausw Ant appointment in PARIS he asked Prisoner, at the time still editor of the MNN, to accompany him as a personal friend, and "adviser" on policy. Prisoner also covered the occupation of PARIS for his paper. He stayed for ten days, and spent most of his time going through French Foreign Office files. He was toying with the idea of preparing a pamphlet compiled from French documents proving French war guilt. He states that he met few French personalities, since these had not yet returned to PARIS, but he had long discussions with Rahn on what he considered the proper policy towards FRANCE.

16. Sep 40

Prisoner returned to PARIS for a few days at Rahn's invitation. He met a number of French collaborators, with whom Rahn and Prisoner discussed the current political situation. Prisoner is still under the impression that the Germans were joyfully received by the French, who, apparently, were able to forget their military defeat. Prisoner also went through more diplomatic documents, but came to the conclusion that there was not sufficient evidence available to produce the sensational pamphlet he had in mind.

17. 10 Dec 40

Prisoner was invited by Gen SCHAAL, GOC of a Ft Lehr Div at REIMS, to lecture to his staff on Franco-German relations. From REIMS Prisoner went again to PARIS, staying with Rahn for a few days. Prisoner states that he arrived at the time of the LAVAL crisis, when ABETZ and RIEBENTROP's policies towards FRANCE for the first time clashed openly. Prisoner spent many hours encouraging Rahn and ABETZ to persist in a "sane", lenient view, as opposed to RIEBENTROP's harsh treatment of FRANCE.

18. 12 - 19 Aug 44

Prisoner went officially to FRANCE for "Signal", in order to gather a personal impression of the invasion and to hear first-hand reports at GHQ Heeresgruppe B, then at SAINT-GERMAIN. Prisoner had lengthy conversation with the IC, Gen HJENSTTRITT, who told him that the campaign in FRANCE was all but over. Prisoner was received by Feldmarschall von KLUGE, who was in a black rage, and told him point-blank that the campaign was lost and that KLUGE, KEITEL and JODOROWSKY were incompetent fools (KLUGE committed suicide a few weeks later).
In PARIS, Prisoner called on ABETZ to discuss the political implications of the German defeat in FRANCE. ABETZ apparently was living in a dream world untroubled by victorious Allied armies; he was then in delicate and complicated negotiations with HERRIOT, whereby ABETZ would formally hand over the Government of FRANCE to a "French National Assembly" (events moved too fast and ABETZ' symbolic ceremony ended in undignified rout).

Prisoner claims that the Parisians, during these last few days, were extremely friendly towards the remaining German garrison. Up to the time when Prisoner left on 19 Aug, three days before the liberation, there was no trace of FPI activities. Prisoner was so impressed by the sympathetic attitude of the citizens that he recorded this in an article in "Signal" called "The Last Days of PARIS".

Prisoner claims that he made no further use of his conversations with ABETZ and von KLUGE. He wrote a lengthy report at OBERURSEL on the subject.

IV. Visits to SPAIN and PORTUGAL

19. May 44, Visit to ESTORIL

Prisoner spent a fortnight at ESTORIL nr LISBON on behalf of the NNN. He stayed at the Hotel Liranor, ESTORIL.

20. Purpose

The purpose of his visit was to gain an objective impression of the effects of the bombing of LONDON, and the political situation generally. Prisoner, listening to British broadcasts and aware of the fallibility of the Propaganda Ministry, suspected that German claims were not in perspective. He was therefore anxious to talk to well-informed persons in a neutral country and check their conclusions against his own.

21. Contacts

Prisoner claims that he did not attempt to contact any member of the GIS in PORTUGAL or GERMANY for inside info. He professed to have had a low opinion of ABW, and believed that German foreign correspondents were much better informed and had their own circle of useful contacts.

As will be seen, some of the journalists were in fact members of the GIS. Prisoner denies being aware of this, and did not seek to inquire into his informants’ sources.

Prisoner recalls meeting the following:

ENNIGEN-HiENE
German Ambassador in LISBON. Formal courtesy call only.

Irene SELIGO
Foreign Correspondent of "Frankfurter Zeitung". Extremely well-informed (Note: Known to have been on intimate terms with Richard SCHMIDT, IPN, LISBON).

Hana SELIGO
DINACAG Correspondent, formerly NNN correspondent in LONDON. Also well informed.
Heinrich BARON Correspondent of "Berliner Börse Zeitung" (Note: Known to have worked for Abw in PARIS; believed to have been a member of the SD in LISBON).

Frau VERMEREN Correspondent of "Des Reich". Exceptionally well informed, with many contacts in Portuguese and Spanish circles. (Note: Mother of Erich VERMEREN of KO TURKEY).

BRAGARD MWN Correspondent, Prisoner later learned that he was "somehow" connected with KO PORTUGAL.

Italian Diplomat (name forgotten) First Secretary (?) at Italian Legation in LISBON, from whom he received a very exact account of the bombing of LONDON, which had been given by an Italian priest recently returned from LONDON.

Prisoner also met officials of the Portuguese propaganda org, whose names he no longer recalls.

A secondary purpose of Prisoner's visit was to organise the purchase of American and allied literature through BRAGARD. Since the war the MWN had been allotted a quota of foreign literature through the Propaganda ministry, but this was insufficient. Prisoner was especially keen to obtain regular supplies of "Fortune", which was well-informed and apparently unaware of security restrictions.

Lastly, Prisoner treated this visit as an unofficial holiday, and spent some time collecting material for his forthcoming book, "The Age of Icarus".

Second Visit

22. Jul 43 Visit to MADRID

Prisoner stayed for three weeks at the German Embassy as guest of Ambassador DICKHOFF. When DICKHOFF was appointed to SPAIN, he invited Prisoner to come and see him. At the time Prisoner was a Lt in the Army, at OKW/PR, and working on "Signal". He arranged with his chief, Gen von REBEL, that he should be officially sent to Gen KRAMER, Wehrmachtattaché at the Embassy, to obtain the General's suggestions for improvement of the Spanish edition of "Signal". KRAMER had barely heard of the paper, and after half-an-hour's talk, followed by an invitation to dinner, Prisoner's official mission was completed.

23. Purpose and Contacts

Prisoner's real purpose was to obtain for his own use info about political conditions in the UK and USA, and on conditions in SPAIN generally, while at the same time taking advantage of his trip as a holiday. Through his friendship with DICKHOFF he had access to all Embassy reports and was in a position to see documents of a "Top Secret" nature, which would normally not have been available to him. DICKHOFF had many conversations with Prisoner, in which they discussed the international situation, and DICKHOFF related such "unofficial" info as had come to his ears. Prisoner further had lengthy talks with Gen Rat KEMPE, the Second Secretary, who also seemed well informed. Prisoner met most of the Embassy staff, but can recall only the names of LAZAR (Press Attaché), Dr PETERSEN (Kultur Attaché) and Gen KRAMER. Prisoner denies that he had any
contacts with RD SPAIN or tried to pump Abw offrs for info. He agrees that probably he met several offrs, but he was not aware of their duties. In any case, Prisoner claims that without a letter from Abw in BERLIN, no Abw offr would have talked openly to an outsider. Further, DECKHOFF, as Ambassador, viewed the activities of the Ko sourly, since he considered it inefficient and consisting mainly of offrs out to have a good time.

Through the Embassy, Prisoner met a number of Spanish journalists and Foreign Office officials, whose names he no longer remembers. He recalls, however, the name of Manuel AZNAR (later transferred to WASHINGTON), with whom he had lengthy discussions about the trend of the war.

Prisoner returned via LISBON, where he stayed for a few days. He again contacted German foreign correspondents stationed there, and pumped them for news about the current international situation. He bought a quantity of Allied literature on the black market, and returned by air to GERMANY.

21. Secret Memorandum

Although Prisoner could not make use of most of the info to which he had been given access by DECKHOFF, he wrote a "Top Secret" report for Maj. SOUM, his departmental chief in WPR, which was passed via DORFF to Gen. Obst JUHL. It gave Prisoner's impressions of the current situation, as seen from SPAIN, and served to reinforce DECKHOFF's pessimistic reports of growing Allied strength. Some straight propagandist articles appeared in "Signal", and additional material was later published in Prisoner's book "The Age of Icarus".

22. MAY 19 Visit to MADRID

Three weeks' visit to the German Embassy as guest of DECKHOFF. Substantially, it was a repetition of his previous visit. "Signal" was persuaded to send Prisoner on a mission to the Wehrmacht to inquire into what purpose he proposed to put the special funds allotted to him for propaganda among the Spanish Blue Div, then already withdrawn from RUSSIA.

23. Contents

As before, DECKHOFF took Prisoner into his full confidence, and showed his "best" documents of interest to Prisoner. Through Embassy contacts, Prisoner met a number of Spanish Foreign Office officials and journalists, among them again Manuel AZNAR. DECKHOFF also gave three receptions for Prisoner, among the guests were:

Spanish priest (name forgotten) reputed to be confidential
adviser to PNUC.

CAVALLERO, The well-known Spanish writer,

MACEDO and diplomatic correspondents of "ABC" and "ABC".

The Bulgarian Ambassador.

Staff of German Embassy.

While Prisoner was in MADRID, the Anglo-Spanish agreement of
2 May 1945, concerning Spanish neutrality, became effective; Spanish
air-deliveries to GERMANY, international zone in TANGIER, etc.
Prisoner had first-hand info on the events preceding it through the
the talks DIECKHOFF had with JORDAN on the subject. DIECKHOFF at the time was forced to put forward RIBBENTROP's policy in his official talks, although he complained to Prisoner about "awful stupidity. DIECKHOFF further stated that KO SPAIN was grossly overstuffed, and giving much more trouble than it was worth (Prisoner has once more denied that he knowingly met any Abw officers or had access to Aw files; in view of the Ambassador's dislike of this org, it would have been an act of disloyalty for Prisoner even to attempt to gather info from that source.)

Part of the Prisoner's stay was simply a holiday. He spent some time gathering more Spanish material for "The Age of Icarus", and accompanied Gen Konsul PICHHOFER on a duty trip to M.L.G., returning by train a week later.

27. Return via LISBON

From MADRID, Prisoner returned via LISBON, where he broke his journey for four or five days. He again contacted his circle of German correspondents which now also included Dr KLUS of the D.L.J. and SERFF of the D.B., and bought quantities of Allied literature available in LISBON. He states that he also had an important talk with ORTEGA y GASSET, the philosopher. This conversation was held with the knowledge of TROTT zu SOLZ; it was a preliminary sounding to find out whether, in the event of a successful assassination of HITLER, GASSET would be prepared to act as intermediary between the new German government and the Western Allies. It appears that ORTEGA reacted favourably to the hints thrown out by Prisoner.

28. Secret Memorandum to JODL

On his return to GERMANY, Prisoner once more wrote a "Top Secret" report on his journey, which was passed to Gen Obst JODL. As far as Prisoner remembers, it contained the following points:-

The Embassy is strongly opposed to special propaganda among former members of the Blue Div; propaganda allotments should cease. Inside info about events leading up to the signing of the Anglo-Spanish agreement; DIECKHOFF's difficulties in SPAIN as a result of RIBBENTROP's "tough" policy; FRANCO's attitude (contrary to German opinion, FRANCO is not a Gauleiter, but a shrewd statesman); Ambassador complains that KO is over-staffed and inefficient; in spite of Spanish promises to the UK, wolfram deliveries to GERMANY will continue as before.

As before, several propagandist articles appeared in "Signal".

29. Connections with KO SPAIN

As will be seen from the foregoing, Prisoner has denied contact with KO SPAIN. He met LEISSER (Prisoner at DIC) for the first time at this Centre. KLEVENSTUBER was known to Prisoner before, but he claims that he was only a slight acquaintance (this has been confirmed independently by KLEVENSTUBER, also Prisoner at DIC).

Shortly after Prisoner's return from SPAIN in Jun '44, KRAMER asked him to meet a friend of his, an Abw officer, who would shortly proceed to SPAIN to take over the KO there and be glad to hear from Prisoner about conditions in SPAIN, specifically of the Ambassador's attitude towards the KO. Prisoner agreed to meet KLEVENSTUBER at his flat in BERLIN. He told him of DIECKHOFF's prejudice against the KO and Abw personnel, and gave him some hints on how to improve public relations between the Embassy and the KO. KLEVENSTUBER asked...
Prisoner for a letter of introduction to DEICHHOFF. The letter
Prisoner wrote was couched in vague and non-committal terms. KLEIEN-
STUDER called once more on Prisoner some months later, during a duty
trip to BERLIN. He thanked Prisoner for his advice, and his visit
was in effect no more than a courtesy call. No int or political inf
was exchanged.

Prisoner denies any knowledge of Spanish int sources. He
was merely aware that OSTRO operated from SPAIN; the name Paul
PUERM does nothing to him. Personal allegations of this kind
refrained from closer inquiry.

Y. VISITS TO DENMARK

30. COPENHAGEN, Apr 44

Officially, Prisoner was sent there by "Signal" to write an
article on German adm in
While in COPENHAGEN, Prisoner met BRüNNER. They systematically
reviewed the international situation. This was of no special
significance, since BRüNNER usually visited Prisoner about once a month
in BERLIN for the same purpose (see Appendix 1, para 15).

31. Visit to COPENHAGEN, Dec 44

This was again of a few days' duration, officially undertaken
for "Signal". By then Prisoner was already working for SCHELLENBERG,
and was given great freedom by "Signal", who were aware of his
highly-placed connections.

The war was drawing to a close and SCHELLENBERG was trying
to send out peace feelers. On the other hand HITLER, KEITEL and
TREBON were in favour of a last-ditch defence of NORWAY and DENMARK.
With SCHELLENBERG's knowledge and approval, Prisoner contacted BEST.
Firstly, he wished to find out whether BEST was still in opposition. He found BEST more strongly opposed than ever, and without prompting, BEST stated categorically that he would never allow DENMARK to become the scene of fighting, and thought TERBOVEN's policy for NORWAY madness. BEST gave Prisoner a biting character-sketch of TERBOVEN, and talked at length about Danish affairs. He though the Danish Resistance movement was insignificant - at the most he estimated it at 30,000 men - and discounted a rising as unlikely. On the other hand, BEST was worried by the Danish strikes, and said he had been ordered to carry out repressive measures. He had, he claimed, asked permission to resign, but had been ordered by HITLER to carry on. Nevertheless, should he be ordered to shoot Danish hostages as reprisals, he would resign rather than be responsible for the executions. Prisoner carefully inquired what connections BEST had with SWEDEN, but BEST apparently had no contacts there. Prisoner hinted that events might be moving fast, and was assured that while BEST was in command, no last-ditch defence of DENMARK would be undertaken.

Prisoner also invited KRAMER to COPENHAGEN, and they had another talk, this time quite open on both sides, since Prisoner, as "Egmont" was aware of KRAMER's activities.

Nothing appeared in print about Prisoner's visit to DENMARK; he merely reported verbally to SCHellenberg the results of his talks.