




National  
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# Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

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1/28/80

An Intelligence Memorandum

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
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### Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (U)

#### Summary

International public reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been overwhelmingly negative, although in varying shades of intensity.

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In the case of several states, negative private reaction among government leaders has been masked by silence or in some cases lukewarm public support for the invasion. Some public backing for Moscow, particularly by radical Arab states, has hidden private apprehensions over future Soviet goals.

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As expected, outright approval has come only from those states having well-established relations with or dependent on the USSR, such as the hardline Warsaw Pact states, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Angola. And Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria, while providing official support, have expressed private fears to US diplomats that the invasion will hurt their growing economic relations with the United States.

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The nature of the reactions and the motives behind them have varied with each country's geopolitical, economic, military, and religious concerns:

- Most of the 18 votes against the UN General Assembly resolution calling for the removal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan came from Communist or Marxist countries or from states heavily dependent on Moscow for economic and military support.
- Many Near East and South Asian nations see the Afghan situation as a problem between the superpowers in which they should not become involved.
- Many other developing countries view the crisis in superpower versus Third World terms.
- Islamic religious political parties and groups worldwide have been hostile to the Soviet intervention.

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*The author of this paper is Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis. It has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia and with the Office of Economic Research. Research was completed on 23 January 1980. Questions and comments are welcome and should be directed to the Chief, Afghan Task Force, (U)*

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On the issue of sanctions and reprisals against the Soviet Union, few states are taking action on their own. Those that are can generally afford to, both financially and militarily, because of solid relations with the United States.



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Some states, such as Egypt and China, have publicly promised aid to the Afghan guerrillas. Most small, developing nations, however, probably prefer collective action, if any, and may go no further than their vote on the UN resolution.



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Some of the smaller African nations appear to have abstained from the vote to avoid endangering their access to aid from either the West or the Communist bloc. Yet, some who have sought Soviet aid, such as Jamaica, voted in favor of the UN resolution, possibly at some cost to themselves.



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### Worldwide Reaction to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (U)

#### Arab States

Moderate Arab states have generally condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Of the radical Arabs, only Iraq has criticized the Soviets. The other radical states and the Palestinians have offered varying degrees of public support to Moscow, although some are privately critical and apprehensive about Soviet goals in the region. [redacted]

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Within the moderate ranks, only Egypt has taken concrete steps to penalize the USSR. The recent tentative improvement in Egyptian/Soviet relations has all but collapsed. Cairo has canceled plans to send an ambassador to Moscow and has ordered a sharp reduction in the Soviet diplomatic presence in Egypt. Cairo has repeated its offer of military facilities for US use in dealing with crises in the Middle East and has appealed to other Islamic states to join a united anti-Soviet campaign. High-ranking Egyptian officials have met with—and promised military assistance to—exiled Afghan leaders. (U)

Saudi Arabia and Morocco, which do not suffer from Egypt's diplomatic isolation within the Arab world, worked with Pakistan to convene a meeting of Islamic Foreign Ministers. This gathering has resulted in a call for increased assistance to Pakistan, Iran, and the insurgents in Afghanistan, further condemnation of the Soviets, and suspension of Afghan membership in the Islamic conference. The sole Arab member of the UN Security Council, Tunisia, joined with non-Arab Islamic members in sponsoring the Soviet-vetoed resolution calling for an end to foreign military involvement in Afghanistan. All of the moderate Arabs voted in favor of the General Assembly resolution. [redacted]

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Of the radical Arab states, South Yemen has defended the Soviets vigorously because of its arms supply relationship with the USSR and because the two countries recently signed a friendship treaty. Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization also have backed the Soviets publicly, but with notably less enthusiasm. Members of the Arab "Steadfastness Front"—Syria, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, and the PLO—met in Damascus on 16 January in an attempt to marshal renewed Arab backing for their anti-Egypt and anti-US campaign. All references in their concluding joint statement that pertained to the USSR were positive, and they praised the policies and orientation of the new government in Afghanistan. Algeria, Libya and the PLO nonetheless decided to participate in the Islamic Foreign Ministers meeting on Afghanistan. Iraqi President

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Saddam Husayn has personally condemned the Soviets, fueling speculation that Baghdad's apprehensions about Soviet goals in the region might ultimately lead Iraq to abrogate its friendship treaty with the USSR. [redacted]

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Arab media comment on the Afghan situation has made clear that many Arabs, even the moderate small states of the Persian Gulf, see the crisis primarily as a problem between the superpowers that the Arabs would be wise to avoid. This attitude reduces the likelihood that the Arabs will cooperate with the United States in any anti-Soviet action that carries risks or costs for them. Some Arab spokesmen have coupled their attacks on the USSR with warnings against possible US military action in the Persian Gulf region. (u)

Some of the Arabs have defended their mild responses to the Soviet invasion as being in line with their policies concerning the occupation of Arab land by a US proxy—Israel. The Arabs clearly believe that the unresolved Palestinian question, not Soviet expansionism, is the most serious threat to political stability in the Middle East. (u)

**Israel**

The Israelis predictably interpret recent events in Iran and Afghanistan as support for their longstanding contention that the central destabilizing factor in the region is not the Arab-Israeli conflict but a combination of Soviet expansionism, growing domestic instability in the Muslim states, and the Islamic revival. Given its perception of rapidly worsening regional instability, the Begin government will be even less willing to consider major concessions on Palestinian autonomy. Instead, Begin will increasingly emphasize the critical "larger" need for cooperation on regional security among the United States, Egypt, and Israel. [redacted]

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**Iran**

Iran has officially condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and many Iranian officials, both secular and clerical, have strongly criticized the Soviets. The Soviet Embassy in Tehran has been attacked twice by Afghan and Iranian crowds. Already strained relations between Tehran and Kabul have deteriorated further. By recent Iranian standards, however, the reaction has been restrained. Ayatollah Khomeini has not publicly commented directly on the Soviet move, and Iran has taken a low profile in the UN. In part this has reflected Iran's preoccupation with the hostage crisis and its need for Soviet support in the UN Security Council. In addition, the Iranians are well aware of Soviet military power and do not want to provoke their northern neighbor. [redacted]

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**South Asia**

Among the South Asian countries, India's reaction to the events in Afghanistan has been the mildest. The responses of the other four countries have been far more negative, and all have been tempered by regional and domestic considerations. Only one state, Pakistan, is directly affected by the Soviet invasion, but it tends to view the situation as both an opportunity and a long-term threat. [Redacted]

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Strongly critical of the Soviet intervention, Pakistan organized a conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers, which began in Islamabad on 27 January. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia agreed beforehand that the conference should condemn the Soviet Union, call for the immediate withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, refuse recognition of the puppet regime in Kabul, pledge support to the Afghan resistance movement, and study the possibility of imposing economic sanctions on the USSR. These actions would be consistent with Pakistan's vehement public denunciation of the Soviet action, based on real fears about Soviet intentions concerning Pakistan, particularly Baluchistan province, as well as the long-term effect of a Soviet military presence on Pakistan's borders. [Redacted]

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The convening of the Islamic Foreign Ministers, however, is only one of Islamabad's tactics for lining up support for its position. Negotiations with the United States and China will lead to other possibilities. The Pakistani Government does not consider a massive Soviet invasion of Pakistan likely. It sees a real chance of border clashes or Soviet meddling in Baluchistan, however, and has, therefore, demanded large infusions of economic and military aid. [Redacted]

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India, whose foreign and defense policies are decided by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, has accepted the Soviet invasion. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Several factors temper the Indian reaction, including India's longstanding distrust of Pakistan and Gandhi's nervousness over the possible rearming of Pakistan by the United States and China; India's fear of a possible challenge to its undisputed regional superiority and its well-known distaste for superpower involvement in the subcontinent; Gandhi's deep suspicions of Chinese and US foreign policy motives and her close ties to the Soviet Union; and India's large Muslim minority. [Redacted]

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India is looking for benefits that may result from the Soviet invasion; the most important would be the cessation of the insurgency and the removal of Pakistan's reason to support the insurgents and rearm. India sees value in Pakistan's survival as a buffer and it fears that Pakistani aid to the Afghan

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insurgents might bring Soviet reprisals and ultimately lead to the country's further destabilization. Gandhi would prefer to develop a regional response to the crisis that would undercut Pakistani rearmament, but the traditional enmity between the two countries makes cooperation unlikely [Redacted]

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Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have all strongly condemned the Soviet invasion. In late December and early January, Bangladesh was active in promoting Security Council action on Afghanistan and was an early supporter of the calling of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference. Demonstrations by Islamic groups took place in front of the Soviet Embassy in Dacca, and there were reports that some Soviet cultural and trade centers would be burned and destroyed, allegedly with the tacit approval of the Bangladesh Government. [Redacted]

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Bangladesh leaders still condemn the invasion privately, but they have begun to mute their public criticism under increasing Soviet pressure and to minimize their role in advocating the Islamic conference. President Ziaur Rahman reportedly has stated that faced with the choice of alienating the United States or the USSR, he would not hesitate to alienate the United States first. Bangladesh is inclined to follow other Islamic states, particularly Saudi Arabia, rather than pursue its own initiative on the invasion issue to avoid exposing itself to further pressure from the Soviets. [Redacted]

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Nepal supported the UN resolution calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, but probably will not take an active role in any efforts to implement it. Ultimately, Nepal's reaction will be largely dictated by its geographical location between two giants, India and China, who have adopted significantly different responses to the crisis. Sri Lanka also supported the UN resolution, but subsequently has adopted a quieter "wait-and-see" attitude. [Redacted]

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**East and Southeast Asia**

Beijing's public reaction to the Soviet invasion has combined a drumbeat of criticism with calls for an unspecified action by antihegemonists to thwart the Soviet move. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Foreign Minister Huang Hua recently visited Islamabad to discuss additional Chinese economic and military assistance for Pakistan and Chinese help for the Afghan rebels. China also has decided to postpone a second round of political negotiations with the Soviets. [Redacted]

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Japan's denunciation of the Soviet invasion was quickly backed by clear and public measures, such as deciding to support any COCOM decision to restrict high-technology exports to the USSR, postponing a visit by a Soviet

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parliamentary delegation, putting a brake on cultural and political relations with Moscow, cutting off future aid to Afghanistan, and increasing aid to Pakistan by 50 percent. While Prime Minister Ohira is inclined to accept stiffer economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, he has had to move cautiously. Politically, he needs business support and is under substantial pressure from the business sector not to disrupt commercial relations with the USSR. Ohira thus is looking for strong West European—particularly West German—support for sanctions before making a final decision. [redacted]

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South Korea is deeply concerned about the Afghan situation and wants a firm US response. Editorial comment has termed the Soviet move “an outright act of aggression.” Commentaries also note that the US reputation as a “credible protector” of its allies is at stake and support President Carter’s retaliatory measures. On 7 January, South Korean President Choe Kyu-ha warned that South Korea should not regard the Afghan situation as “a fire on the other side of the river,” because it would affect Korean economic and security matters. North Korea, in keeping with its practice of not taking sides in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, has not commented publicly on the Soviet move. (U)

In general, Southeast Asian reaction to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has been highly condemnatory, particularly in Muslim states such as Indonesia. All levels of Indonesian society have expressed strong public disapproval, and on 6 January President Suharto, in a televised budget message, called for the “withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan’s territory,” saying also that the military intervention “shakes the foundations of world peace.” Indonesian students have staged several peaceful demonstrations in Jakarta and three other major cities. They also have demanded the recall of the Soviet Ambassador because of remarks he made to a student delegation on 4 January and have called for the severance of Soviet-Indonesian relations. (U)

The Malaysian Government issued a statement on 3 January calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and political and religious organizations have backed the government with protest statements of their own. In Singapore, a Foreign Ministry statement on 31 December called the Soviet action a “clear signal to Asia that in the 1980s it will be the target of Soviet ambitions” and “a clear warning that Western imperialism, now largely defunct, is not without a successor.” [redacted]

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The predominantly government-influenced media in the Philippines have registered strong disapproval of the Soviet invasion. Although official statements have been scarce, largely due to preoccupation with local elections set for 30 January, the Philippines cosponsored the “Uniting for

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[REDACTED]

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Peace" resolution in the UN Security Council, which moved the Afghanistan question into the General Assembly. Moreover, President Marcos has privately confided his concern over Soviet actions, adding that, despite political differences with the United States, continued American access to Philippine bases is essential to stability in the region. [REDACTED]

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Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanan publicly denounced the Soviet invasion as interference in the internal affairs of a nation and as a threat to regional and world peace. The Thai Government supports US sanctions against the USSR and has privately expressed its willingness not to sell the USSR any grain products in the near future. Thai Muslims have demonstrated in front of the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok. The Burmese Government has not spoken out officially—in keeping with its customary low posture—but Burmese officials have expressed dismay. [REDACTED]

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Australia and New Zealand have backed their strong condemnations of the Soviet Union with several concrete actions. Australia has announced that it will not make up any of the shortfall in US grain sales to the USSR; has suspended talks on Soviet fishing in Australian waters, plus all other talks, visits, and exchanges; has suspended port calls by Soviet scientific vessels; and has dropped consideration of Aeroflot flights through Australia. [REDACTED]

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New Zealand is reviewing its relations with Moscow. On 22 January Wellington cut the Soviet fishing quota in New Zealand waters for the license year beginning 1 April. Official visits to the USSR have been canceled and trade talks left in abeyance. A Soviet correspondent also has been expelled. New Zealand stopped short, however, of cutting its agricultural exports to the Soviet Union on the grounds that an embargo would further damage the depressed New Zealand economy and would hurt New Zealand more than the Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

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**Africa**

Twenty-three of the 104 UN members that voted in favor the of UN General Assembly resolution calling for the removal of foreign troops from Afghanistan were Sub-Saharan African states. These countries are either pro-Western or genuinely nonaligned. Some of them—mainly small, weak states that may have felt protected by the UN umbrella—took the opportunity to make additional public statements condemning superpower interference in the Third World. Liberian President Tolbert, in his capacity as chairman of the Organization of African Unity, appealed to Fidel Castro, chairman of the nonaligned movement, to condemn Soviet actions in Afghanistan. The three African countries that voted against the resolution—Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique—all have close ties with and are to some degree dependent upon the USSR. They could be expected to support the Soviets on almost any issue. [REDACTED]

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Of the remaining 17 states 11 abstained and six were absent or did not vote—all for a variety of reasons. Some of the abstainers were left-leaning states and some were special cases. Most probably abstained in order to avoid jeopardizing their access to aid from either the West or the Communists. For example, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea, which recently installed new pro-Western regimes, abstained either because of disorganization or a desire to keep their options open. Zambia's abstention and lack of any official statement probably represents an attempt to protect its bilateral ties with the USSR. But it did vote with the United States on the motion referring the Soviet-Afghan issue to the General Assembly, its Foreign Minister has privately reprimanded the Soviet Ambassador, and its government-influenced press later denounced the Soviet intervention. [redacted]

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The six nonvoting states included some, like South Africa, which seldom participate in UN votes. The Central African Republic probably believed it could not vote on this issue in view of the recent French operations in its territory. The new government of Chad is strongly opposed to foreign intervention, but probably believed its own situation was too fragile for it to criticize anyone. [redacted]

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### Latin America

Latin American reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been almost universally critical. The Caribbean and Central American countries—with the exceptions of Cuba and, surprisingly, Grenada—voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution calling for the removal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Nicaragua abstained, and only Dominica, whose pro-US government has no representative accredited to the UN, failed to vote. On balance, the voting confirmed other evidence that the Soviet action has boosted the US position and has seriously hurt the USSR in the region. [redacted]

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The USSR has done specific harm to its relations with Costa Rica—and possibly with Jamaica and Panama as well. Costa Rican leaders have made a direct link between the invasion and the threat posed by domestic labor strife—allegedly abetted by Communist involvement. Action against Soviet and Cuban diplomats is quite possible. Jamaica, which has tried long and hard to cultivate the Soviets, supported the resolution first in the Security Council and later in the General Assembly. Prime Minister Michael Manley attempted privately to reassure pro-Soviet leftists among his supporters, but adopted a public position strongly critical of the USSR. Panamanian officials have made no comment on whether the Soviet move might cause a delay in plans—previously set for midyear—to establish relations with the Soviets. [redacted]

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Jamaica's socialist ally, Guyana, voted in favor of the UN resolution, but issued a very mild public statement—attributable in part to its current desperate search for external aid and its apparent desire to present the least offense to any party. 


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Mexico cosponsored and voted for the Security Council resolution calling for the emergency session of the General Assembly and voted for the resulting resolution. Mexico's Security Council representative, Foreign Minister Castaneda, characterized Soviet actions as "invasion, armed intervention." The Mexicans also attempted to encourage the Nicaraguan representative to speak against the Soviet action. In Mexico, however, government and ruling party officials have made no comment and are trying to remain low-key. Nicaragua, despite some reported internal disagreement, chose abstention as the best way to demonstrate its nonalignment. Apparently the Nicaraguans were surprised that the majority of nonaligned nations voted to condemn the invasion. 


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Grenada's surprising decision to join the 18 largely Communist countries opposing the resolution probably reflects Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's infatuation with Cuban President Fidel Castro. 

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In South America, all governments have criticized the Soviet invasion. The two grain exporting nations, Argentina and Brazil, however, have made clear that they intend to let market forces control their grain sales to the USSR. The Soviet Union has become a key market for Argentine agricultural products, and the Argentines, for economic reasons alone, welcome an opportunity to expand that market. A wide variety of reporting indicates that Argentina will ignore US appeals to reduce grain sales to the USSR. US policies on human rights, nuclear proliferation, and military cooperation have exasperated the Argentine leaders, who apparently see the current grain situation as an opportunity to retaliate. 

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The Brazilians also will continue to sell soybeans and derivatives to the Soviets for many of the same reasons. In the past, however, the Soviets reportedly have been reluctant to buy Brazilian soybean meal—which is the bulk of what Brazil has to sell—fearing that it might be contaminated with swine fever. The prospects of any significant increases in Brazilian exports to the USSR, therefore, may be limited. 

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The Peruvian Government apparently has decided to forgo Soviet financing of the economically important Olmos hydroelectric and irrigation project. The Soviets, who had given the impression they were willing to finance the first stage of Olmos, had been pleased about the Peruvian Foreign Ministry's "prudent" communique of 3 January on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and they believed that Peru's "positive view of their conduct"

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indicated a Peruvian desire for good relations with the USSR. The Soviets also apparently had counted on using their leverage on the Olmos project as a means of keeping the Peruvian Government in line. The Minister of Finance, however, with the President's concurrence, suddenly canceled a long-planned trip to Moscow to negotiate the financing—thus effectively scrubbing the deal—because a visit at this time would not have been in accord with the principles of Peruvian foreign policy. The decision appears to have been heavily influenced by the growing world consensus against the invasion. [redacted]

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The Soviet invasion has posed a dilemma for the Cuban Government. Castro, as nominal leader of the nonaligned movement, undoubtedly felt some obligation to take a stand against the Soviet action, but Cuba's overwhelming dependence on the USSR brought strong pressure from Moscow. Cuba's difficulty was reflected in Havana's reluctance to offer immediate, unequivocal support for the Soviet position. The vital nature of Cuba's economic and military links, however, decisively determined Havana's position. The Cuban media eventually came out on the side of the Soviets, and Cuba voted against the UN resolution condemning the intervention. A lengthy Soviet military action could undermine Cuba's efforts to woo wealthy Arab states as well as Castro's pretensions to world leadership via the nonaligned movement. The Soviet action may place some temporary strains on Cuba's relationship with Moscow, but it is unlikely—by itself—to produce serious tensions. [redacted]

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### Western Europe

The West European countries predictably have condemned the Soviet invasion, and the European press, for the most part, has been more critical of the Soviets than individual governments. Many articles compare the situation to the 1930s and chide Europeans for not responding to Soviet aggression in practical ways. While individual governments are united on broad policy concepts, they are divided on what specific actions to take against the Soviets. Most countries welcome the stronger US reaction to the Afghanistan situation, but their own concrete steps in curtailing relations with the Soviet Union will be carefully measured to each country's individual requirements and will be cloaked as much as possible by the UN and other international means. [redacted]

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All NATO members have condemned the Soviet intervention, but divergent national positions and domestic constraints are preventing them from forging a strong Alliance reaction to the invasion. The British have been the strongest supporters of US sanctions and have called for a special North Atlantic Council meeting to endorse specific sanctions of their own. French policy toward the Soviets has hardened, but the French still see Afghanistan as an East-South rather than an East-West issue. The French Government

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issued a statement on 23 January that termed the Soviet invasion "unacceptable." But France would like to preserve its special relationship with Moscow and probably will insist that the allies respond individually to the Soviet actions. The West Germans see the invasion primarily as a challenge to Third World countries around Afghanistan and believe that those states should take the lead in condemning the Soviet invasion. All allies agree that arms control talks with the USSR should proceed. Few West Europeans of any political persuasion believe that the crisis should mark the end of detente. The West Germans, especially with their emphasis on Ostpolitik, wish to keep East-West lines of communication open. [redacted]

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The European Community member states clearly want the EC, not NATO, to lead the West European response to the Soviet intervention. The EC countries believe that an EC response might be more palatable to non-Western countries than NATO or other US-led actions. The West Europeans want to act together on issues with potential implications for their own security and are more comfortable supporting US policy in a forum like the EC, which is not dominated by the United States. At the EC Foreign Ministers meeting on 15 January, the ministers voted to divert aid from Afghanistan to Afghan refugees in Pakistan and to prevent West European suppliers from undercutting US curtailment of agricultural exports to the USSR. Divergent national interests, however, will make support on other specific economic measures difficult to obtain. The Soviets' detention of dissident Andrei Sakharov, however, may lead to greater West European support for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. [redacted]

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West European Communist reaction has been harsh. The West European Communists are now less restrained than initially in their criticism of Moscow. In particular, the Italian Communist Party has hardened its criticism of Soviet actions, while cautioning against US overreaction. The Spanish Communist Party, as well as smaller parties, also consider Soviet actions to be violations of national sovereignty, although they place their comments in the context of such Western "provocations" as the December decision to deploy new theater nuclear weapons in Europe. The French Communist Party not unexpectedly stands out as the most supportive of the Soviet action, as reflected in the recent conversations—highly publicized by the Soviets—between party bosses Marchais and Brezhnev in Moscow. The smaller Portuguese Communist Party, in keeping with its strong pro-Moscow bent, also has completely backed the Soviet invasion. [redacted]

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**Eastern Europe**

The Warsaw Pact countries varied in their press coverage of the Afghan crisis during the first days of the invasion. Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East German commentary was the firmest in support of the invasion, while Hungary and Poland remained relatively restrained. Subsequently, with the

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exception of Romania, media coverage has assumed a uniformly militant tone, defending the Soviet action and condemning alleged support of the Afghan rebels by "external forces," usually identified as the United States and China. Underneath the predictable public attitudes, however, private feelings are varied. It appears that all of the East European regimes are deeply disturbed by the implications of the Soviet move and concerned that any long-term setback in East-West relations may worsen their economic difficulties and reduce their political latitude. (U)

Hungary, where popular reaction is reported to be overwhelmingly negative, has expressed the hope that bilateral relations with the United States will be as little affected as possible. Bulgarian officials have stated privately that they hope bilateral relations can be kept separate from propaganda matters and will continue to improve. The Czechoslovak press has adhered to its customary pro-Soviet, anti-US line; perhaps out of concern for popular reaction, however, official commentary has been sparse. [redacted]

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Although East Germany's public support for the USSR remains unqualified, the leadership apparently was surprised by the vehemence of the Western reaction. Recent speeches and press reporting have played down the Afghan situation and devoted more space to the need for detente, arms control negotiations, and business as usual. The Poles probably fear that the cooling of US-Soviet relations will affect US-Polish relations or, even more importantly, overall East-West relations. More than any other East European country, Poland has benefited from detente and needs economic assistance from the West. According to US diplomats in Warsaw, Polish officials are embarrassed at defending the Soviets and have expressed pessimism about the future course of US-Polish relations despite American assurances that the United States will seek to pursue a "differentiated" policy toward Eastern Europe. [redacted]

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Romania, predictably, has parted company with its East European allies; it has refrained from recognizing the new Afghan Government, and President Ceausescu has implicitly condemned the Soviet invasion. Privately, Romanian officials have made clear their alarm over the implications of the Soviet act and have solicited US support. At the same time, however, they have avoided direct public criticism of Moscow and have linked the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan with the cessation of external assistance to Afghan rebels. In a recent speech, Ceausescu pessimistically described the current international situation as the most tense since World War II, warned that "wide-scale military confrontation" threatened, and exhorted his countrymen to be prepared to defend Romania. Ceausescu also appears fearful that a chill in East-West relations will sharply reduce Romania's latitude to pursue its autonomous foreign policy and apprehensive that the

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Soviets may be inclined to meddle in neighboring Yugoslavia after President Tito dies. 

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The Yugoslav Government has officially condemned the Soviet intervention and expressed "astonishment" and "deep concern" about developments in Afghanistan. Yugoslav media have challenged the Soviet assertion that the USSR moved at the invitation of authorities in Kabul, and the press reported with unprecedented speed the fact that President Carter sent a letter to Tito. The Soviet intervention has heightened Yugoslav anxiety about Soviet intentions in the post-Tito period. One senior Yugoslav official reportedly told a group of associates that he views the Soviet action in Afghanistan as a "blueprint" of what could happen in Yugoslavia after Tito dies. 

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