SOVIET STAFF STUDY

THE TIE THAT BINDS - SOVIET INTRABLOC RELATIONS
Feb 1956 to Dec 1957
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Moscow's debt to Peiping in 1953. The Soviets accept China's place in the Communist sun. Peiping is given a free hand in Asia. Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visit Peiping in tribute to Chinese prestige and extend long-term economic assistance to Mao. The Kremlin recognizes Communist China as "coleader" of the bloc in February 1955. Peiping postpones its Taiwan ambitions as a concession to Moscow. Soviet-Chinese relations are undisturbed at the start of 1956.

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Effect of 20th Congress in Satellite Parties ............ 9

"National Communists" gain new influence in the satellite parties. Pressure for reinstatement of Nagy grows in Hungary. Large bloc of Polish central committee members demands the return of Gomulka to the politburo. "Stalinist" Bierut dies, and new party secretary Ochab allows the official regime
newspaper to air Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin for the first time in public. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia unmask "Stalinists" in April. Polish party takes only token steps to curb freedom of expression.

Cominform Dissolved

Communist "information bureau" had become an embarrassing reminder to Khrushchev and Tito of 1948 rupture of relations. Better organizations for handling bloc business had rendered the Cominform obsolete. Propaganda value of the dissolution recognized by both Soviet Union and the West.

Satellites Continue Liberalization

Reaction to "Stalinism" is widespread in the satellites by spring 1956. Even ideologically rigid regimes make token concessions to 20th congress doctrine. USSR announces a troop cut in East Germany.

Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Blossom

Tito visits Moscow in June 1956 to cement agreement of previous year. Basic ideological differences emerge clearly as Khrushchev and Tito fail to agree on whether Yugoslavia is again a member of the bloc. Conference communique is a patent concession to Yugoslav ideology, the forerunner of future agreements between Socialist and Communist parties. Western source sees Tito's willingness to voluntarily "line up in the Soviet column" a potentially negative factor in future Western relations with Yugoslavia. Importance which Kremlin attaches to good relations with Tito indicated by Molotov ouster.

Rakosi Ousted

Party first secretary of the Hungarian party was an unreconstructed "Stalinist" standing in firm opposition to "Titoism." Rakosi was no longer in control of the Hungarian party. Suslov probably served him an ultimatum in June presaging his demotion in July. Gero, the new first secretary, apologizes to the Yugoslavs for "slanders" of the past. Liberal faction of the Hungarian party continues to press factional struggle for party control throughout summer and early fall of 1956.
Poznan Riots

Disturbances in Poland drive a wedge between the Molotov and Khrushchev factions in the Soviet hierarchy. Khrushchev's thesis on liberalization is upheld by a resolution on 30 June, justifying the denigration of Stalin and denying the existence of a crisis in international communism. Tour of Poland by Khrushchev and Bulganin incites the Poles still further. The Soviet leaders blame the worker riots on "Western agents"; the Polish party's central committee confirms the legitimacy of workers' grievances.

Belgrade Reflects Bloc Crisis

Belgrade continues to hail satellite independence as rumors circulate of the Soviet central committee's warning to the European satellites against imitation of the Yugoslav "road." Khrushchev flies to Belgrade without warning in September and urges Tito to withhold support from the bloc's "revisionist" states. Tito returns to Crimea with Khrushchev for conferences with Soviet presidium, and Hungarian party boss Gero. Belgrade's Borba signals failure of talks. Tito continues to woo the East European satellites.

The Lid Blows Off

The Polish October. Gomulka regains party control and defies Soviet interference in internal affairs. Polish party clings to alliance with USSR as "indispensable prerequisite of the Polish road to socialism." Catholic Church reaches working agreement with the new regime.

Moscow's Reactions to Poland

Khrushchev caught by surprise. The Soviet press displays indecision over proper attitude toward Polish events. A Western source in Moscow discloses Moscow's decision to make the best of the situation.
Hungary Revolts

Gero's speech extolling Soviet Union touches off a spontaneous uprising. "Deviationist" Imre Nagy swept back into power. Revolt directed against communism itself. Nagy promises multiparty system, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and neutralization of Hungary. Suslov and Mikoyan arrive in Budapest on 31 October. The myth of independence in the satellites comes to an end.

30 October 1956 Declaration

The USSR's declaration on the satellites is the most definitive since the 20th congress. Moscow declares its intention of playing a more active role in bloc affairs in effort to re-establish unity. "Liberalization" defended as correct. Moscow admits "outright mistakes" in past dealings with bloc countries. All satellites to remain on equal status with USSR, provided that they maintain "continuing bonds of interest" with one another and with the Soviet Union. Eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from the satellites is held possible. Document a Soviet attempt to reassert control in bloc and salvage lost prestige and influence before world.

The End of the Rebellion

All bloc countries recognize Kadar regime. Peiping hails Soviet military intervention in Hungary as the "second liberation" of the country. Few details of the revolt are available in the bloc.

New Problems to Be Faced

Soviet Union placed reliance on a "hard core" of orthodox Communist leaders in 1956 attempt to sponsor "liberalization" in the satellites. Policy details were left to local party cadres. The satellite parties became engrossed in internal disputes and factional strife and failed to agree, even individually, on meaning and practical application of "liberalization." Moscow underestimated anti-Soviet opinion and overestimated the ability of Communist politicians in the satellites. Failure of overtures toward Yugoslavia left a powerful, rival force free to subvert the satellites from a position of comparative sanctuary.
After the Polish and Hungarian debacles, Soviet Eastern European policy was directed primarily at the re-establishment of bloc stability. Subordination of national interests to those of the USSR was called for. A new policy combining political repression and economic concession began to emerge. Soviet policy occupied a position midway between "Stalinism" and 20th congress reformism.

Repression in Hungary

Kadar abandons hope of ruling by popular consent. Hungary again becomes a police state. General strikes and sporadic armed resistance continue into December, but the revolt has been crushed.

Stabilization in Poland

Internal freedom marks the atmosphere in Poland. The Polish press attacks Soviet actions in Hungary and accuses present Soviet leadership of sharing guilt for the uprising with Stalin. Gomulka leads a party and government delegation to Moscow on 14 November to regularize relations with the Soviet Union. 18 November communiqué grants Poland political and economic concessions in return for Gomulka's promise to keep Poland in the bloc. The agreement again demonstrates Khrushchev's disposition toward pragmatism.

Peiping Warns Moscow

Chinese regime's official press organ counsels USSR on 21 November against the possibility of future mistakes in the "proper relations between socialist countries." Peiping calls "great-nation chauvinism" the chief stumbling block to good relations between members of the Communist camp.

Yugoslavia Reacts

Moscow deliberately stalemates relations with Belgrade in November 1956 in an effort to isolate ideologically the "Yugoslav virus" in Eastern Europe. Tito fights back and accuses Soviet collective leadership of
lack of progress beyond the negative condemnation of the "cult of Stalin." The Yugoslav leader discloses the failure of his September conferences with Soviet presidium members. Pravda castigates Tito for "meddling" in another party's affairs.

Political Stick and Economic Carrot

Increased hostility toward local Communist parties reported in the satellites as the regimes simultaneously tighten political controls and relax economic restrictions. Terror increases in Rumania and Bulgaria. "Soft-line" economic policies dictated as much by Soviet self-interest as by the state of unrest in the bloc. All East European countries announce consumer concessions in the months following October.

Moscow's New Conservatism

Khrushchev admits in December that 20th congress decisions might have contributed to turmoil in the bloc, and promises a special plenum of the central committee to "adapt" the decisions. At the end of 1956 Poland alone remains an unorthodox satellite. Gomulka continues to withhold recognition of the USSR as ideological leader of the bloc, and persists in the liberalization of Polish society. Moscow sets about the political isolation of Poland as a Czechoslovak-East German party communique on 21 December 1956 pledges the two countries to combat "Polish...reaction." Yugoslavs offer Gomulka support.

Peiping's Road to Socialism

People's Daily on 29 December publishes an elaborate statement on the Chinese "road to socialism." The Chinese party concedes the existence of "contradictions" between Communist states and parties, but holds that the "fundamental experiences" of the Soviet Union should guide all Communist parties. The article criticizes Yugoslavia for challenging the rectitude of the Soviet system. Peiping reiterates its belief that the two principal dangers to good intrabloc relations are "great-nation chauvinism" and narrow "nationalism."
Liberalism on the Rocks.......................... 26

Soviet-satellite party conference in Budapest in January 1957 ends three years of "national Communist" experimentation in Eastern Europe. "Further consolidation of the Communist camp is called for under slogan of "proletarian internationalism"—subservience to the will of the USSR. Kadar announces re-establishment of a "proletarian dictatorship" in Hungary. Poland is the only exponent of "liberalism" in Moscow's European bloc.

Chinese Influence........................................ 28

Mao's "hundred flowers" speech of May 1956 and his February 1957 definition of contradictions within communism created enormous interest in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland. The Chinese have a serious stake in satellite stability. Peiping a logical mediator of Soviet-satellite differences. Chou En-lai's trip to Moscow and Warsaw in January an attempt to compromise differences between the USSR and Poland. Gomulka pledges his regime to the principle of "proletarian internationalism" and praises bloc unity. Moscow accepts Mao's beliefs on "great-nation chauvinism" and "nationalism."

Polish-Soviet Understanding.......................... 29

November agreement and Chinese good offices result in a modus vivendi between Moscow and Warsaw. Three outstanding points of difference remain. High-level Polish delegation to Peiping in April 1957 garners Chinese praise for Gomulka's post-October program. Gomulka walks a tightrope between placating Soviet demands and preserving his October program.

Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Freeze and Thaw Again.... 29

Khrushchev sets about isolation of Tito at the start of 1957. Shepilov deliberately provokes the Yugoslavs. Party relations practically terminated by the end of February. Moscow follows ideological insult with economic hurt. Peiping remains neutral. Decline of satellite unrest in April encourages the Soviet Union to woo Tito again. The Albanian party is again the intermediary. Belgrade responds after the Yugoslav party learns that Moscow has advised all satellite parties to strive for a rapprochement with Belgrade. A joint declaration of desire for closer relations is issued on 6 June.
Presidium Purge in the USSR......................... 32

The expulsion of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov from the Soviet party's presidium gives Khrushchev a free hand in his Yugoslav overtures. Soviet credits to Yugoslavia are "thawed" in July. Tito and Khrushchev meet on 1 August.

Tito-Khrushchev Meeting in Rumania.................. 32

The Communist leaders agree on like views and overlook differences. The Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of 1956 endorsing "different roads" is revalidated. Joint call for "concrete forms of cooperation" among all Communist parties leaves door ajar for possible Yugoslav participation in international Communist organization at a future date.

Tito-Gomulka Meeting................................. 32

September conference goes down the line in favor of Soviet foreign policy. Tito and Gomulka endorse bilateral party meetings rather than the multilateral meetings favored by the USSR. Gomulka continues to withhold recognition of USSR as the leader of the bloc. Both Tito-Khrushchev and Tito-Gomulka conference communiqués demonstrate the conviction that quarrels should be kept in the family in an effort to present a solid ideological front to the capitalist world.

Gomulka Tightens Up.................................. 33

Gomulka is forced to balance dilemmas in Poland. The first steps to muzzle press criticism of the Soviet Union are taken in February 1957. In March the Polish leader refers to the Hungarian revolt as a "counterrevolution," reversing his position. Polish party disavows the term "national communism." Gomulka vigorously defends his October program at a May plenum of the Polish party's central committee, and emphasizes importance of alliance with the USSR. In an extemporaneous reply to criticism, Gomulka recalls the ravages wrought by the Soviet Union to Poland during and after the war, and claims that his program is designed to prevent a recurrence of similar events. Poland's problems are primarily economic in nature. Gomulka and East Germany's Ulbricht meet in June and Gomulka exacts payment for Ulbricht's earlier reference to "Polish reaction." Polish leader calls for a "Baltic Sea of Peace" and expresses friendship for "all the people" of Germany, a reference obviously directed at Bonn.
Orthodox Satellites Tighten Policies

Throughout the winter of 1956-57 the hard-line satellites resort more and more to political repression and terror. The Czech and Hungarian parties follow Moscow's lead and urge multipartite party conferences as opposed to the bilateral discussions favored by the Poles and Yugoslavs. The Czech press publishes the edited version of Mao Tse-tung's "100 flowers" speech on 21 June 1957. Party secretary Hendrych terms its provisions "inappropriate" for Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian party grows more Stalinist.

Post-Presidium Shake-up

All the satellites endorse the purge of the Soviet central committee. Bulgaria and Rumania undertake local purges. Poland and Yugoslavia interpret Khrushchev's victory as the forerunner of a more liberal Soviet policy toward the bloc countries—a hope not to be realized. Failure of Mao's liberal experiment in China in the spring of 1957 strengthens Peiping's support for the new Soviet line in Eastern Europe. From Moscow's point of view, the reimposition of a hard line in the satellites has been successful.

Mao Grows Some Weeds

The Chinese reap the bitter fruit of their policy of letting 100 flowers bloom. The spring flood of criticism from party members shocks the regime. The party's "rectification campaign" of April 1957 leads to the curtailment of public criticism in June. "Anti-rightism" and "rectification" become a single campaign designed to squelch all domestic opposition. As a result of bitter experience Mao and other Chinese leaders are more sympathetic to Moscow's problems in Eastern Europe.
The Polish Exception

Labor unrest and economic distress severely test the Gomulka regime in mid-1957. Gomulka tightens press censorship. Plenum of Polish party's central committee in October attempts to revitalize the apathetic Polish Communists. Gomulka announces a bloodless "verification" of all party members. The greatest threat to party solidarity, according to Gomulka, is "revisionism."

The Bloc--One Year After Hungary

Unity is reflected on the surface. Dissidence is under control. Stability increases. "Liberalism" is confined to economics.

IV. 40 YEARS OF COMMUNISM AND A NEW COMINTERN

The month-long congress of world communism in Moscow. The central "party line" emerges victorious. Lacking a name and nebulous in organization, the gathering was the 1957 version of the earlier Comintern congresses. Provisions made for future meetings. 21 November policy declaration is signed by all bloc parties. The document coordinates attitude toward "revisionism" and formalizes the leading role of the USSR in Communist party affairs. Evidence of some compromise in the document's vague and often ambiguous phraseology of the basic principles of communism. Declaration itself commits the bloc parties to a narrow doctrinal channel. The Moscow conference did not actually solve any of the bloc's problems. Tito's absence an indication of his refusal to accept Soviet sovereignty in party matters at the risk of further alienating the West. The November events reasserted Soviet ideological primacy in the bloc and marked the return of central direction to the world Communist movement.
On the eve of Stalin's death in 1953 the Soviet empire extended half way across Europe to the West and included the "heartland" of Asia to the east. With the dictator's demise the USSR was forced to take cognizance of an historical truism. No empire in the history of the world had managed to survive solely through force of arms. The Roman Empire, the longest-lived precursor of Soviet expansionism, had been prudent enough to solicit the voluntary cooperation of its subject peoples in the Romanization of its hinterlands. Such a policy had been rendered only lip service under Lenin and Stalin. The Soviet Union, after World War II, ruled its Eastern European provinces by military might and the frank use of terror. It economically exploited a sullen, uncooperative group of captive states. Productivity in the bloc remained marginal, public opinion was anti-Soviet, and in much of the outer world communism itself was regarded as a distasteful foreign philosophy. The USSR, as the self-styled heir of Marxism, was committed to the ultimate communization of the world and yet had been unable to communize the disgruntled proletariat at its own doorstep. The correction of this situation posed a major problem for Stalin's successors.

The USSR's post-Stalin policy thus was designed so as to transform its slaves into willing allies, and, coincidentally, to render international communism more palatable to the non-Communist world. This paper will examine the manner in which this policy was implemented from the time of Stalin's death through the end of the year 1957, with particular emphasis on the events following the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist party in February 1956.
I. STALIN'S DEATH AND THE NEW LOOK IN THE BLOC

The Soviet empire which Stalin ruled after World War II was a supremely centralized political, economic, and administrative entity. Yet only two years after his death, the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist party enunciated a doctrine of "liberal Communism" based on the sweeping decentralization of powers among the constituent parties of the bloc. The immediate origins of this radical change were two negative circumstances prevailing at Stalin's death in March 1953: the lack of a clear-cut law of succession to power in the USSR, and the state of chronic crisis which characterized the postwar Soviet economy. The new Soviet leadership was initially preoccupied with internal affairs to a far greater degree than had been the latter-day Stalin regime. This shift in political accent made the years from 1953 to 1956 a time of drift and uncertainty for the countries of Eastern Europe. Simple reaction to "Stalinism," rather than a positive approach to the problems of the bloc, was the common denominator of Soviet-Satellite relations during this three-year span.

Economic Relaxation

Moscow's tendency to withdraw into itself was most evident in the economic field. The Kremlin retained over-all policy control of the satellite economies, while striving to disengage itself from the mechanics of day-to-day planning in the bloc.

In 1953 and 1954 the USSR sold its interests in the last remaining joint stock companies in East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. In September 1954, in the new edition of a standard text "Political Economy," it told the countries of Eastern Europe to use local resources more intensively and decrease proportionately their dependence on Soviet assistance. Each country was to base its economy on those factors which influenced its "individual historical development...the level of its own productive forces...special characteristics of its class relationships." A gradual reduction of Soviet advisers and technicians in the satellites contributed to the impression of a return of national prerogatives to the bloc countries.

Political Relaxation

Beginning in the spring of 1954, when it recognized the sovereignty of the German Democratic (East German) Republic, the USSR took steps to foster the illusion of increased political independence in the bloc. A great deal of lip service was paid to
the equality of all socialist countries. Satellite political leaders visiting Moscow were afforded VIP treatment not at all consonant with their former status as Kremlin flunkeys.

There were no "liberalization directives" in the satellites. It was a period of trial and error, with Eastern Europe following Moscow's lead whenever possible. The Beria purge, subordination of the security police to political control, and emphasis on "socialist legality" in the USSR produced counterpart campaigns at national levels all across Eastern Europe.

As the relaxation of controls became more general, popular criticism of the local and Soviet regimes became more outspoken. The East German uprising in June 1953 was the most serious expression of the virulent anti-Soviet feelings which lay just below the surface in the satellites. The USSR prudently chose to regard the development in East Germany as a remnant of the Stalin era, and followed armed suppression of the demonstrations with a number of economic concessions designed to assuage the discontent of the East German workers and to present the new Soviet hierarchy in the best possible light before the world at large.

First Steps Toward Belgrade

In late May 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin flew to Belgrade to do public penance for the alleged sins of Beria and to lay the foundation for a new Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. The communiqué which ended the meeting on 2 June announced that "different forms of the development of socialism are the exclusive business of the peoples of the respective countries." This was a major and far-reaching concession for the Kremlin leadership to make. Not only did it endorse Tito's heretical brand of Communist ideology, but it invited national-Communist deviations in the countries of the bloc.

Effects of the Interregnum

Moscow had opened a Pandora's box in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet leaders failed clearly to foresee the consequences in the first flush of their reaction to the Stalin era. The rapidity with which the doctrine of "liberal Communism" later swept Eastern Europe could only have been conjectured in mid-1955. The policy sought to foster willing cooperation in the building of the Soviet empire by granting a semblance of independence to the builders. The result was, at the start of 1956, a facade of national-Communist states in Eastern Europe whose leaders were both confused as to their precise role in the post-Stalin Soviet empire and unwilling to exercise political initiative in their respective countries.
If there was uncertainty in the satellites after the death of Stalin, there was none in Communist China. The Chinese seized the opportunity to increase their stature politically and economically.

In 1953, Moscow found itself doubly in debt to the Chinese. Full payment had not yet been made for Communist China's participation in the Korean War, and Peiping was in a position to create an incident over Formosa which would easily lead to a general war. This latter eventuality was to be avoided at all costs, and in itself was enough to guarantee a sympathetic hearing for Chinese petitioners in Moscow.

Peiping had entered the Korean conflict only after receipt of firm assurances from the USSR that the bill would be paid by the Soviets in the form of a modern army and increased economic assistance. Part of the account had been prepaid in 1950 when Stalin guaranteed the Chinese against attack by Japan or its allies and extended an economic development loan of $300,000,000 to Peiping. The Chinese considered the balance of the debt due on Stalin's death.

The period from 1953-1956 was marked by sporadic displays of ill temper on both sides as Peiping's prestige in Asia and consequently its bargaining position in Moscow continued to grow. This circumstance, however, was gradually accepted by the Kremlin and was balanced by the USSR's conviction that concerted diplomatic and economic efforts in Asia and the bloc were mutually advantageous. Moreover the stature of the Peiping regime as the first great-power Communist state in Asia and its continued acknowledgment of the Soviet Union's role as leader of the socialist camp redounded to Moscow's benefit in the propaganda battle with the West. A decision was made to go along with Peiping so long as the Chinese remained in close political alliance with, and economically dependent on, the Soviet Union.

In May 1953, the 1950 economic agreement was expanded to provide for Soviet aid in the construction of 141 basic industrial enterprises in China.

In January 1954 the Cominform journal formalized the USSR's acceptance of China's new place in the sun in hailing Mao Tse-tung as "an outstanding captain... who creatively and in a new way has characterized the Chinese revolution as a special type, now typical for the revolution in colonial and semicolonial..."
countries." For the first time Moscow conceded that a model other than its own might be appropriate for a country seeking the "road to socialism." This relaxed attitude gave the Chinese Communists a free hand in Asia and set up spheres of influence within the bloc. This was more than Tito had been able to achieve in almost six years of wrangling with the Kremlin. Clearly, the Soviet Union had recognized and accepted the limitations implicit in any European power's attempt ideologically to proselytize the Asian countries. The Kremlin's collective leadership was more willing to compromise in Peiping than in Belgrade for it stood to lose far more through exacerbation of the Chinese than through antagonizing Tito, the lone heretic on the fringe of the European satellites.

In October 1954, Moscow's new collective leadership publicly threw its full weight behind Communist China's new stature in the bloc. Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan led an impressive array of Soviet dignitaries to Peiping simultaneously to salute Red Chinese sovereignty and to conclude a comprehensive agreement on Soviet concessions. The industrial construction program of 1953 was extended to include 15 new projects. An additional long-term loan of $130,000,000 was written into the agreement for the purpose of equating China's level of production in 1959 with that of the Soviet Union in 1932; and an extensive program of Soviet-staffed technical assistance was set up. Joint construction of two new strategic rail links with the USSR and the return of the Port Arthur garrison to the Chinese were provided for. In keeping with the precedent it had set in the Eastern European satellites, Moscow agreed to sell back to Peiping its shares in four remaining joint stock companies.

Moscow's acceptance of the Chinese lead in Asia was underlined in February 1955, after Bulganin and Khrushchev had succeeded the "inexperienced" Malenkov. The Chinese People's Republic was thenceforth hailed by the Kremlin as "coleader" of the Communist camp. The mantle of authority bore with it, however, an implication perhaps not to Peiping's taste. As equal partners, neither Moscow nor Peiping was directly responsible for the acts of the other. The Soviet Union could conveniently deny responsibility for Ma's Formosa policy, for example, should the international climate so dictate. In this connection it is worth noting that the Communist Chinese continued to cite the Soviet Union as sole leader of the bloc, reaffirming Peiping's role as the junior partner.

Moscow's coolness toward the Taiwan adventure eventually had its desired effect. Early 1955 was the high-water mark of Peiping's propaganda preparation for an offshore invasion. By the spring of the year Moscow could assume that those Chinese Communist leaders who may have favored an early assault on Taiwan had been effectively reoriented.
SECRET

At the beginning of 1956 the Soviet Union and Communist China had reconciled those differences carried over from the Stalin era. Moscow offered Peiping strategic materials and economic assistance at a rate and volume commensurate with Chinese desires, and continued to support Mao's position in international affairs. The Chinese Communists reciprocated by proclaiming the close and indissoluble nature of their alliance with the USSR, by ceding first place in bloc affairs to the USSR, and by avoiding explosive situations which might lead to a general war. There were no known anti-Soviet leaders or factions in the Chinese party, and the Moscow-Peiping alliance showed no signs of cracking in the foreseeable future.

II. THE 20th PARTY CONGRESS: ITS PURPOSE AND ITS RESULTS
(Feb-Oct 1956)

At the beginning of 1956 the Soviet Union seemed to be more concerned with normalizing its relations with Yugoslavia and the West than with theoretical dissertations with the satellites over "liberalization."

In February 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev displaced Georgi Malenkov, and collective leadership in the USSR entered a new phase. At year's end they were still intoxicated with the "spirit of Geneva." In a New Year's Eve address, the party first secretary and premier jointly called for a vastly increased program of East-West cultural and commercial contacts, citing the folly of war in the light of Soviet developments in the atomic and rocket fields.

In early September 1955 the USSR and Yugoslavia launched a broad new program of economic cooperation. Agreements were signed providing for increased trade, scientific and technical exchanges between the two countries, and a long-term program of Soviet aid in industrial construction. A draft agreement on nuclear cooperation with the Yugoslavs was concluded on 3 January 1956. Ideological differences remained a potential obstacle to a complete rapprochement, but the impression prevailed that a political meeting of the minds had only to await the next conference between the leaders of the two Communist states.

The Soviet 20th party congress convened on 14 February 1956. The congress legitimized the expression of a negative reaction to "Stalinism," but did not unify the bloc ideologically as may have been hoped for by the Soviet party. Satellite politicians had been too long deprived of initiative immediately to apply the broad generalities of the Khrushchev line to concrete national policy. The congress, therefore, accelerated divisive influences already at work in the bloc.

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This, in essence, was the Marxist world outlook which Khrushchev presented to international communism at the party congress:

1) All countries of the world are moving toward socialism. Regardless of national characteristics, a revolution must denote the end of capitalism in each country. This crisis, however, need not be violent in nature, but may assume the form of a "parliamentary revolution," i.e., Communist infiltration of a government as in Czechoslovakia in 1948. Once a workers' government has gained control of a country, it is obliged to select the method of building socialism which best corresponds with the economic, social, and political conditions of the particular country.

2) The "fatal inevitability" of war between Communist and capitalist countries no longer exists since the socialist bloc is in possession of the weapons and technology necessary to prevent such an occurrence, and disavows war as an effective instrument of national policy.

3) The world is divided into two opposing blocs--Communist and capitalist, plus a number of nonbloc "peace-loving," non-Communist states, chief among which are: India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt and Syria, Finland, and Austria.

4) It is essential in the interests of preserving peace that the Communist camp of nations assumes the initiative on improving relations with the capitalist countries of the West.

The Soviet first secretary's analysis of domestic issues was another guidepost to the future course of events in the satellites. Khrushchev called for a successful conclusion of the campaign to subordinate the state security apparatus to party control and to restore "socialist legality" to the country's national life, promised a continuation of "collective leadership" in the Kremlin, and emphasized the fact that, although heavy industry was to maintain first place in the Soviet economy, consumer wants would henceforth "not be neglected."

Molotov, on 18 February, admitted that Soviet foreign policy in the past had been inflexible and that he, as foreign minister, had been guilty of "underestimating the new possibilities of the postwar period." He pledged the Soviet Union to extend the hand of friendship to all countries of the world which "opposed military blocs," and to all socialist parties of the non-Communist countries.
Khrushchev's violent 8-hour polemic against Stalin delivered to a closed session of the congress manifested the importance which the Soviets attached to a change in party policies at home and in the bloc. The speech was rife with unpleasant implications for those bloc Communists who in the past had been the most conscientious adherents of the Soviet party line. Past orthodoxy suddenly became an offense against Marxism-Leninism. This speech evoked the most dramatic post-congress reaction in the satellites.

Satellite Reaction to 20th Congress

Satellite Communist leaders left Moscow feeling that Marxist orthodoxy had been rendered even more vulnerable than before the congress to incursions by the liberal factions of their respective parties. The other impressions which they carried home were less defined. "Titoism" was now a respectable credo, a living example of a "separate road" to socialism. Therefore, as "Stalinist" Communists were purged, "Titoist," or national Communists should now be rehabilitated.

Khrushchev had decried the negative features of the rigid Soviet foreign policy of the past, and had indicated that in the future ideology would more than ever reflect, rather than shape, policy. Pragmatism, the Soviet leader's forte, had been reconfirmed.

Bloc Communists could conclude that policy changes as well as personnel shifts were in order. The new policies must be the antithesis of Stalin's rigid rule by terror. This augured the dawn of an era of liberal Communism in Eastern Europe, with two important questions left unanswered by the congress—how much change was there to be, and what were the limits of change? Moscow had told the bloc what it should not do, but had not drafted a practical thesis on what it should do. The result was a policy vacuum in Eastern Europe which persisted through the fall of 1956. For almost a year, events rather than policy ruled the satellites and eventually forced the USSR to suspend its promises of socialist equality in a desperate effort to keep the Communist bloc intact in Eastern Europe.

Yugoslav Reaction to 20th Congress

The Yugoslavs, after the congress, were in an "I told you so" mood. Politika, in Belgrade, termed the Khrushchev program a "new page in Soviet history, a technical and modern, progressive and elastic, and also more humane stage than the previous one." The newspaper particularly endorsed the congress'
formulation of "administrative socialism" and communism through parliamentary forms, and added that these tenets had always formed the basis of Yugoslav communism. In private conversation, however, Vice President Kardelj admitted that he had been "astounded" at the magnitude and scale of the Soviet indictment of Stalin. Kardelj insisted that the Tito regime had not had an inkling in advance of the scope of the denigration campaign, and recalled that Khrushchev and Bulganin had actually defended Stalin, while berating Beria, during their visit to Belgrade in 1955.

Effect of 20th Congress in Satellite Parties

Nationalist elements in the satellite parties began to demonstrate their newly acquired prestige in March. There were reports that a liberal bloc in the Hungarian party's central committee had strongly backed a petition for reinstatement in the government submitted by ex-Premier Imre Nagy. Nagy had been ousted by arch-Stalinist Party First Secretary Rakosi in 1955 as a national deviationist. Under continuing pressure the Rakosi regime on 29 March ceremoniously rehabilitated a deviationist less likely to embarrass the party, Lazlo Rajk, former Hungarian interior minister executed as a "Titoist" in the Stalin era.

In Poland a group of about 250 central committee members were reported by the Western press to have demanded the return to the politburo of the purged right deviationist, Wladyslaw Gomulka. The prototype Polish Stalinist, Boleslaw Bierut, died on 12 March and was replaced as party first secretary by Edward Ochab, a relatively orthodox, Soviet-trained Communist, Moscow-oriented but free from the taint of personal association with the excesses of the Stalin era. Following Ochab's ascent to the top party post, Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw's regime newspaper, aired Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin for the first time in public. After quoting Khrushchev's dictum that from the early 1930's onward Stalin's rule produced "profound distortions, damage and crimes," Trybuna went a long step further and asked where the other leaders of the Soviet party had been during this period.

The sentiment for liberalization in the satellites began to crystallize in April 1956 and resulted in a number of actions directed against policies and individuals associated with the Stalin era. Bulgaria became the first satellite to unmask a home-grown "cult of personality" when the party's central committee leveled the charge against Vulko Chervenkov, outspoken anti-Tito premier. In mid-April, Chervenkov was ousted from his government posts and replaced by Anton Yugov, who had narrowly escaped liquidation as a "Titoist" during the Bulgarian purge trials of 1949.
On 25 April, the Czechs offered a sacrificial lamb to Moscow when they removed Defense Minister and First Vice Premier Cepicka from the government. A son-in-law of Klement Gottwald, deceased party chairman and president, Cepicka had been a "hard-line" Communist, but no more so than many of his accusers in the "model satellite" regime.

The dismissal of three top-level Polish security police officials on 20 April echoed Khrushchev's call for a "return to socialist legality" in the USSR. One of those ousted was Radkiewicz, former minister of state security, who from 1944 to 1954 personified "Stalinist" police terror in the country, having supervised the arrest of Gomulka and his supporters in 1948.

Poland was also the first Eastern European satellite to admit that the public clamor for further reform menaced party control of the country. In mid-April the government announced the removal of the minister of culture for failure properly to control "freedom of expression" in Poland. On 27 April the Catholic bloc of deputies openly challenged an abortion law submitted to the Sejm for approval, and a mass meeting of Warsaw writers accused the regime of harboring "Stalinist remnants." The writers demanded the election of a new party politburo, an unheard-of appeal in the Communist world, one which would have brought instant suppression six months earlier. In late April it evoked only a stern rebuke from Party First Secretary Ochab who, on 29 April, cautioned the "politically unstable" elements in the Polish party against further attacks on party policy.

Cominform Dissolved

On 18 April, satellite Communists were nominally cast adrift from the parent Soviet party when the Cominform was dissolved by Moscow to "facilitate cooperation with the Socialist parties" of the non-Communist world. This move had been anticipated in the West following the 20th congress. The Communist "information bureau" was an embarrassing reminder to both Khrushchev and Tito of the 1948 rupture of relations, and provided the non-Communist countries with a tangible whipping boy for anti-Communist propaganda. The actual business of the bloc could be more efficiently handled by existing organizations such as the Warsaw Pact and CEMA groups, while the current emphasis on "peaceful coexistence" made desirable a de-emphasis of ideological clannishness on the part of the bloc countries. The demise of the Cominform was in the nature of an addendum to Khrushchev's keynote speech at the Moscow congress, and was recognized on both sides of the "iron curtain" as one more tactical maneuver in the Soviet Union's war of words with the capitalist world.
Satellites Continue Liberalization

By the end of May even the most ideologically rigid Soviet satellites had made at least token concessions to 20th congress doctrine. Hungary removed its barbed wire and minefields from the Austrian and Yugoslav frontiers, Rumania reduced its security police by 10 percent, the East Germans announced their intentions to lift restrictions on travel to West Germany. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia promulgated internal amnesties and invited their political exiles abroad to return home without prejudice. The Hungarian Government pardoned and restored to his former post as chairman of the Bench of Bishops the second-ranking Catholic prelate in the country, Archbishop Groesz, sentenced to life imprisonment in 1951 for conspiracy against the state. The Poies ousted Jakub Berman, deputy premier and long-time associate of Stalin, from the government and politburo. The Rumanians similarly disposed of their deputy premier, Petrescu, after accusing him of a whole catalogue of crimes associated with the "cult of personality." The Soviets announced a reduction of forces in East Germany which provided for the withdrawal by May 1957 of 30,000 Soviet ground and air force troops from the ersatz sovereign republic.

Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Blossom

On 2 June 1956, Tito arrived in Moscow with Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj and Foreign Minister Popovic to place the final seal on the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement outlined at Belgrade in June 1955. Tito had not addressed the Russians as "comrades" since 1948. He used the term in greeting his hosts at this meeting, saying the time had arrived when all that "separates us will be overcome and when our friendship will receive a new and still firmer foundation."

The outcome of Tito's visit to Moscow, however, was not quite the complete agreement that the Yugoslav leader had predicted. The conference pointed up the fact that basic ideological differences still existed between the two antagonists of the Communist world. Khrushchev, speaking at Moscow's Dynamo Stadium on 19 June, announced that Yugoslavia had once again taken its place "within the camp of socialism," and spoke of the "monolithic unity of the socialist countries" which this development ensured. Tito speaking next reiterated his conviction that "our way is different from yours." The "difference" in building socialism, Tito stated, was no bar to cooperation between the two countries, but the implication was inescapable that Yugoslavia still chose to disassociate itself from the new Communist commonwealth of nations.
This impression was substantiated by the declaration issued jointly by the two parties at the conclusion of discussions on 20 June. The communique was a patent concession to Yugoslav ideology. Unlike Khrushchev's Dynamo speech, the communique refrained from assigning Yugoslavia a place in the bloc, and went even further than the 20th congress in its assertion that "the roads and conditions of socialist development are different in different countries." Interparty co-operation, the communique went on to say, "should be based on complete freedom of will and equality, on friendly criticism, and on the comradely character of exchange of views on disputes between our parties." Both parties recognized the necessity for the development of broader relations between Communist states and "progressive movements" in the non-Communist world.

A reliable Western observer in Moscow at the time of the Tito-Khrushchev meeting characterized the party declaration as a forerunner of closer ties between the socialist parties of the free world and the Communist parties of the Sino-Soviet bloc, a model for future agreements among "progressive" movements of the world. He saw the Yugoslavs as willing to "line up in the Soviet column" as a result of Khrushchev's acceptance of Tito's "different road" to socialism. The USSR's amenity to ideological compromise foretold a period of even more liberal relations with the satellites. This turn of events, the commentary concluded, was not necessarily an "unalloyed advantage to the West" since Yugoslavia, faced with a liberal Soviet policy, had voluntarily chosen to identify itself with the USSR's aims and policies.

Tito's good-will visit to the Soviet Union was paralleled by an incident indicative of the importance which the Kremlin attached to cementing good relations with the Yugoslavs. Molotov, the old Bolshevik foreign minister who had so bedeviled Tito during the Stalin era, was dropped from his foreign affairs post and replaced by Shepilov, a candidate more acceptable to the Yugoslav leader.

Rakosi Ousted

A second occurrence at this time was less publicized but even more significant in terms of Soviet-bloc relations. While Tito was in Moscow, Soviet party presidium and secretariat member Suslov, the USSR's foreign party trouble shooter, journeyed to Budapest to evaluate the political situation in Hungary at first hand. The importance of this trip lay beyond the fact that the Hungarian party was seriously factionalized, or that the party first secretary, Rakosi, was an unreconstructed Stalinist who was despised both within and outside his party.
The Polish party, too, was faction-ridden, and Czechoslovakia
and East Germany both were headed by party secretaries no more
liberal than Rakosi. But whereas Novotny and Ulbricht maintained
a tight grip on their party control mechanisms, Rakosi had lost
control of the Hungarian party. His influence, even among the
hard-line Communists who had once supported him, was now nega-
tive. In addition he was an implacable enemy of Tito, and this
was not the time for a manifestation of anti-Tito sentiment in
Eastern Europe. This circumstance probably explains the timing
of the Suslov trip.

The Soviet emissary may have served Rakosi with an ulti-
matum, or may actually have arranged for his replacement. A
month after Suslov's surprise visit to the Hungarian capital,
on 18 July 1956, Rakosi was deposed as first secretary of the
Hungarian party and replaced by Erno Gero, a hard-line Com-
munist as orthodox as Rakosi in his ideology, but more accepta-
able to conservative Hungarian party members and less outspoken
in his condemnation of Tito. One of Gero's first acts in his
new office was to announce that an open letter would be im-
mediately dispatched to the Yugoslav Communist party expressing
Hungary's "profound regret" for the "slanders" of the past.

The liberal faction of the Hungarian party won several
politburo seats in the wake of Gero's election, but gained
little in the way of real political influence. In his initial
speech as first secretary, Gero stressed the need for still
tighter party discipline; reaffirmed a 30 June central committee
resolution condemning the "malignant antiparty movement formed
around ex-Premier Nagy," Hungary's outstanding national Com-
munist politician; endorsed the correctness of the Hungarian
party's line since the 20th congress; and promised modest im-
provements in the standard of living and in working conditions.
Gero was not the independent-type Communist that the liberal
wing of the Hungarian party had hoped for, and the factional
struggle continued unabated throughout the late summer and early
fall of 1956.

Poznan Riots

The second violent outbreak of worker discontent in the
satellites after the death of Stalin occurred at Poznan, Poland,
on 28 June 1956. Striking workers, disturbed over police de-
tention of several members of their grievance committee, rioted
in the city, damaging party buildings and attacking the regime's
security troops.
The Poznan riots appeared to confirm the opinion of that faction in the Soviet party led by Molotov which had argued even before the 20th congress that a little freedom in the satellites was a dangerous thing. First Secretary Khrushchev, however, could still muster a majority of the presidium behind his thesis of controlled liberalization. On 30 June the central committee of the Soviet party issued a resolution explaining and justifying the denigration of Stalin and reaffirming the correctness of the campaign against the "cult of the personality." The central committee denied the existence of a crisis in international socialism, but warned of the dangers of dissension among Communist parties, citing Poznan as an example of the consequences. It appeared that the Russians were content, for the time being, to continue the myth of satellite autonomy.

Bulganin and Khrushchev spent the last week of July in and about Warsaw on a fence-mending, face-saving mission designed to bolster Communist prestige in Poland. The time-tested Soviet tactic of the "carrot and the stick" was never more in evidence. The Soviet leaders for the first time publicly implied that the USSR would guarantee the Oder-Neisse border with Germany, but warned the Polish press against pursuing de-Stalinization too avidly.

Bulganin's address in Warsaw on 23 July was to haunt Soviet leadership throughout the next year. Speaking of Polish internal affairs as if he were a member of the regime, he blamed the Poznan disturbances on Western agents and provocateurs, made no mention of the workers' legitimate grievances which the Polish party had already acknowledged, and warned that the Soviet Army stood ready to intervene in the event that reform should turn to counterrevolution in Poland. The Polish party's central committee met in executive session even as the Soviet visitors were leaving Warsaw, and issued a resolution restating the regime's intention of proceeding with liberalization and correcting the low level of living which had caused the Poznan incident.

Poland's determination to resist the ideological brow-beating which the Soviet Union sought to administer was emphasized in two statements which high-level Polish Communists volunteered to a Western official in Warsaw. Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz asserted that his country was steadily acquiring greater independence of action and could be useful to the West in a liaison role with the bloc countries. Julius Kat-Suchy, Poland's ECE delegate in 1956, reinforced this view and added, "Poland has more freedom of action than the West knows," and this is "only the beginning."
Belgrade Reflects Bloc Crisis

Soviet-Yugoslav relations during the early fall of 1956 gave the best indication of a change in Moscow's Eastern European policy. Increasing intellectual ferment in the satellites throughout the spring and summer and the Poznan riots in late July had convinced the Kremlin that it was necessary, after all, to define the limits of the political thaw in the bloc—a serious omission of the 20th congress. Over this point Moscow and Belgrade found each other at odds. Tito wanted Moscow to keep hands off the internal policies of the individual Communist countries. In particular, the Yugoslav leader encouraged a free hand for local politicians in Poland and Hungary, the very centers of revisionist unrest which most concerned Khrushchev. As the Yugoslav press continued in September to hail increasing indications of satellite independence and "different roads to socialism," it was apparent that Moscow's post-Stalin political and economic wooing of Yugoslavia had neither lured Tito back into the bloc nor altered his desire for more influence in the conduct of Eastern European affairs.

The new phase of strained Soviet-Yugoslav ties was introduced by rumors in early September that the Soviet central committee had circulated a letter to all European satellites warning them against imitation of the Yugoslav "road to socialism." After the 20th congress Tito had resumed contacts with the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Rumanian parties and could consider such a warning only as fresh evidence of Moscow's distrust of his political course. The Soviet press contributed to this conclusion. After a flurry of praise for the Soviet-Yugoslav June party communiqué, which confirmed the correctness of Tito's "separate road," it fell silent on the subject until late August when Pravda and Izvestia blasted national communism and praised the unity of the Communist bloc in Europe. Belgrade maintained a watchful silence in the absence of direct action by Moscow. The Yugoslav economy was now tied too closely to the bloc for Tito to risk precipitous action over nothing more concrete than an ideological abstraction. By the end of the summer of 1956, 30 percent of his country's foreign trade was conducted with bloc countries.

On 19 September, Khrushchev flew to Belgrade on 48 hours' notice. The Soviet and Yugoslav leaders conferred for eight days at Tito's Brioni villa on the problems that had driven a wedge between the sometime allies. During this unusual meeting, the Soviet first secretary apparently warned Tito that he (Khrushchev) alone managed to restrain the Soviet presidium from a more overt denunciation of Yugoslav tactics in Eastern
Europe. Reliable Yugoslav officials later reported that Khrushchev adamantly refused to compromise on a single point at issue and almost completely repudiated 20th congress doctrine on "different roads to socialism." Continued Yugoslav encouragement for revisionary movements in the satellites would cost Khrushchev his majority in the presidium, the Soviet leader asserted, and Tito would once again find himself deprived of the ideological and economic support which Khrushchev personified. These threats were hardly calculated to inspire Tito's cooperation in quelling the rush toward national communism, a movement which he had already publicly sanctioned. The same sources which had saved Yugoslavia in 1948 were still at hand, the lifeline to the West was still open and, even in the case of another outright break in relations, "Titoist" Yugoslavia would survive.

The impasse in views at which the two Communist leaders had arrived may have prompted Tito to accept Khrushchev's invitation to return with him to the Soviet Union for continued discussions with other members of the Soviet presidium and Gero, his Hungarian counterpart. This meeting, beginning on 27 September 1956 in the Crimea, apparently served only to define more clearly the areas of disagreement between the two antagonists. The difference basically was the same one that was fought out in Poland and Hungary in October, "hard-line" vs. "soft-line" communism in the satellites. Moscow was ideologically compromised in its attempt to quell the forces which it had unleashed at the 20th congress, and this political embarrassment contributed to the indecision which it carried over into the October events.

The failure of the Soviet-Yugoslav discussions to alter Tito's Eastern European policy was confirmed on 7 October, when Borba, Belgrade's most important newspaper, praised the struggle for revision in Hungary and the replacement of Stalinist norms by "new, fresh tendencies" which made "any attempt to return to the old ways" extremely difficult. At about the same time Belgrade announced that a Hungarian party delegation including Gero and Kadar would arrive on 15 October for bilateral talks. A Bulgarian party delegation headed by Party First Secretary Zhivkov was waiting in Belgrade when Tito returned from the USSR, and, on 7 October, signed a declaration re-establishing party relations with the League of Yugoslav Communists, an indication that Moscow's September warning to the bloc had not been fully heeded.
The Lid Blows Off

Whatever further action the Soviet Union may have anticipated taking to neutralize Yugoslav influence in the bloc was buried beneath the rush of events in late October. On 15 October the Polish party announced that Wladyslaw Gomulka, the right-deviationist heretic of 1948, would participate in a plenum of the central committee on 19 October, at which time his appointment to the central committee and politburo was anticipated. The "Polish October" developed rapidly during the next week. The plenum met as Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan and Kaganovich flew to Warsaw to attempt an 11th-hour reversal of events. Gomulka successfully resisted their threats of armed Soviet intervention, as well as opposition from "old-guardists" within the Polish party, and on 21 October won election as first secretary of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) party, a victory which established him as the strongest single figure in Polish politics since the end of World War II.

The new Polish strong man was outspoken in his opposition to Soviet domination of his country's internal affairs, forced collectivization of the countryside, and one-sided exploitation of Poland's industry by the Soviet Union. He did not, however, favor a break in state or party relations with the USSR, and this critical distinction proved to be his salvation. Gomulka insisted from the moment he took office that alliance with the Soviet Union was an indispensable prerequisite of the "Polish road to socialism." Soviet military garrisons would remain in the country in accordance with Poland's Warsaw Pact agreements. Moscow's guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line was sufficient justification for this concession in the minds of most Poles. Coupled with Gomulka's firmness in linking his regime's future with that of the USSR, his armistice with the Catholic Church guaranteed the initial success of Poland's "quiet revolution." Party and church both worked to channel popular anti-Soviet feeling into activities beneficial to the future of the country. In attaining this end they were assisted by the graphic moral lesson on the folly of an anti-Communist uprising which was simultaneously enacted in Hungary.

Moscow's Reaction to Poland

The upheaval in Poland appears to have genuinely surprised the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's unscheduled arrival in Warsaw was spontaneous, and the Soviet press was caught off balance by the fast-breaking Polish events. On 20 October, while Khrushchev blustered in Warsaw, Pravda charged the Polish press...
with seeking to "undermine socialism" and to "shake the foundations of the people's democratic system." The Soviet paper accused the Poles of publicly renouncing Marx and Lenin, and calling for the restoration of capitalism. "Even anti-Soviet pronouncements are to be heard," Pravda continued, a fact which "pains the Soviet people." On 23 October, however, with Khrushchev back home and Gomulka riding the crest of a wave of popular approval in Poland, both Pravda and Izvestia republished an editorial from the 22 October Trybuna Ludu in Warsaw which explained the details of the new "Polish road to socialism," and declared that the keystone of the Polish political structure was firm friendship with the USSR, "based on the ideological unity of Communist parties, complete equality of states, and the full solidarity of our nations." Western sources in Moscow and Warsaw reported that the USSR, caught unawares, had decided to make the best of the situation in Poland and publicly to approve the Gomulka regime at an opportune time.

Hungary Revolts

In Hungary, unlike Poland, events were allowed to proceed too far for any "national Communist," however moderate, to stem the flood of anti-Soviet feeling. Party First Secretary Gero's speech to the nation on 23 October extolling the continuity of Hungary's ties to the "glorious" Soviet Union touched off a spontaneous revolution which forced the Hungarian party to restore "deviationist" Imre Nagy to power as premier, and to elect Janos Kadar, with a reputation as a moderate Communist, party first secretary. The revolt, however, was directed against communism itself rather than against abuses in the Communist system, and Nagy, whatever his coloration, was a Communist politician. His appeals to end the uprising fell on deaf ears, and he was forced to concessions which would have removed Hungary from the Communist bloc if they had been implemented. On 30 October, Nagy called for restoration of a multiparty political system and on 1 November informed the Soviet ambassador of Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the neutralization of the country. Suslov and Mikoyan had arrived in Budapest on 31 October, probably with advance information of Nagy's ideological defection.

On 4 November, as the Soviet Army renewed its assault on the Freedom Fighters, Nagy was replaced by Kadar who, regardless of past leanings, was so compromised in the eyes of the population as to be useless in any role except that of a Soviet puppet. In crushing the Nagy regime, the Soviet Union also destroyed the myth of the independence of satellite governments.
Reform without Moscow's blessing was not to be tolerated, and every government in Eastern Europe in the final analysis would continue to owe its very existence to the whim of the Soviet Union. Gomulka reiterated this truism frequently during the next year and used it to his advantage in restraining Polish "revisionism" which, in its more outspoken forms, could have seriously threatened the stability of his regime.

30 October 1956 Declaration

On 30 October 1956, Moscow made its most definitive declaration of satellite policy since the 20th congress. Although formulated against a backdrop of revolt, the statement was more than a Soviet response to the urgent problem of revolution in Hungary; it was a reassessment of 20th congress doctrine, the operations annex so conspicuously absent from the original resolutions of the congress. The paper represented a Soviet attempt to wipe the mistakes of the previous year from the slate and make a clean start. Moscow now declared its intent to play a more active role in the direction of bloc affairs. Unity was to be re-established at all cost. The statement reaffirmed the correctness of "liberalization" in Eastern Europe, but the USSR admitted it had made a number of "outright mistakes" in its dealings with the countries of the bloc. All satellite states would continue to enjoy "equality" in negotiating with the Soviet Union, the declaration continued, provided one vital condition was met--"continuing bonds of interest" between all states in the bloc. This qualification implied the indefinite perpetuation of Communist-controlled governments, "loyal" or at least "friendly" to the Soviet Union. Moscow's confidence in the attainment of this conditional equality, said the Kremlin, was based on the firm conviction that "the people of the socialist states (will) not permit foreign and internal reactionary forces to undermine the basis of the People's Democratic regimes." Having reaffirmed the binding nature of its permanent role in satellite affairs, the USSR conceded the countries of the bloc nominal independence in selecting their specific "roads to socialism." Further, the Soviet Union withheld the hope that intergovernmental negotiations "within the framework of the Warsaw Pact" might lead to the eventual withdrawal of Soviet military forces and civilian "advisers" from the Eastern European countries.

The new policy statement served as a guideline for the satellites in their relations with the USSR throughout the ensuing year. It did not mark a return to "Stalinism," but it was a considerably more conservative and far more detailed document than the ill-starred 20th congress manifesto. This time there was no doubt as to who was to call the policy shots in the satellites.
There were a number of urgent reasons for the full-dress review and redefinition of Soviet-satellite policy. Soviet international prestige had suffered a body blow as a result of the Polish and Hungarian events. The situation demanded that an attempt be made to salvage some fragments of 20th congress policy in order to reassert Soviet control in Eastern Europe. Secondly, and probably most important, the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union was based on a foundation of anti-Stalinism and liberalization within its sphere of influence. A radical reorientation of that policy at this juncture would have seriously undermined the power position of the Soviet Union in the world at a time when it could ill afford to appear uncoordinated. Finally, some attempt had to be made to justify the variance in policy existing toward Poland, a government "friendly" to the Soviet Union, and Hungary, a government which had been "undermined" by "foreign and internal reactionary forces." It may even have been hoped that, as a bonus effect, the declaration would enable Nagy to cope with the rapidly deteriorating situation and to establish a Gomulka-like government in Hungary. Khrushchev stated in Moscow on 7 November that the Soviet Government had agreed to support Nagy, and had abandoned this position only when it became clear that "Nagy had lost control and was in the hands of a fascist, counterrevolutionary group."

The End of the Rebellion

By the end of the first week in November all the satellite countries, plus China and Yugoslavia, had endorsed the Kadar regime. On 5 November, the official organ of the Chinese regime, People's Daily, hailed Soviet military intervention in Hungary as the second liberation of that country by the Soviet Army. Peiping had borne with the Hungarian and Polish parties in their demands for the relaxation of controls within the bloc. The Chinese, however, now made it clear that they had no intention of sanctioning any party's secession from the Soviet orbit. Yugoslavia regretted the necessity for armed action but rationalized it as vital for the preservation of socialism in Hungary. The other countries in the bloc continued to condition their citizens to accept the inevitability of Soviet intervention, but released few details on the size and scope of the conflict.

New Problems to be Faced

The first ten months of 1956 had seen the Soviet Union turn a new corner in its Marxist-Leninist labyrinth. Preoccupied with internal affairs and still mindful of the pointless terror of the Stalin era, the Soviet leadership had sought
to base its power in Eastern Europe on a "commonwealth of socialist states," administered by a hard core of local, "hard-line" Communist leaders. The new Soviet policy was intended to give the appearance of increased national independence which in actuality would ensure more effective control through the willing cooperation of the satellites themselves. Moscow reasoned that so long as the various Communist parties maintained a monopoly of power in the countries of the bloc, and their external and military policies were closely integrated with those of the USSR, internal "liberalization" would have the same beneficial effect in guiding the energies of the masses into productive channels as did the incentive system in the Soviet economy. Independent solutions for internal problems were encouraged, while edicts and directives from Moscow were de-emphasized in favor of general principles within which the local parties were to work out the particulars of execution. The detachment with which Moscow viewed satellite affairs prior to the October events, however, militated against the essential ideological unity which the "commonwealth" idea presupposed. The parties of the bloc had become engrossed in internal squabbles, factional strife, and ideological recriminations. Least of all was there agreement on the application of "liberalization."

Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania liberalized their regimes little and Albania, not at all. Hungary, at the opposite extreme, had attempted to de-Communize, the one unforgivable "reform," while Poland had stopped on the brink, and had established a government in some respects more liberal even than Tito's Yugoslav regime.

Moscow erred in underestimating the force of anti-Soviet opinion in the satellites, as Mao Tse-tung was later to err in China, and in overestimating the ability of local communist politicians to work effectively without detailed instructions from the center. In addition, the failure to cement a rapprochement with Yugoslavia left a powerful, rival Communist camp on the fringe of the bloc, free to exploit Soviet miscalculations in an effort to pry the satellites loose from Moscow's "commonwealth." Even before the Hungarian revolution had ended, polemics between Belgrade and Moscow over the causes of the uprising threatened to widen the breach irreparably.

III. THE RETURN TO ORTHODOXY (Nov 1956 - Nov 1957)

In the year following the Polish and Hungarian debacles the overriding goal of Soviet Eastern European policy was the re-establishment of bloc stability. Moscow continued to back
away from its imprecise doctrine of "liberalism." The Soviet Union sought to establish a synonymous relationship between the slogans of "socialist unity" and "proletarian internationalism," the latter a Stalinist dialectic which required the member states of the empire to subordinate their own national interests to those of the USSR. A new policy compounded of political repression and economic concession began to emerge in the bloc. The end result was a formula midway between "Stalinism" and 20th congress reformism.

**Repression in Hungary**

In Hungary, Kadar at first pledged his regime to the pursuit of a liberal policy not unlike that of Imre Nagy. However, the mass deportation of Hungarian civilians to the USSR and the Soviet kidnaping of Nagy as he emerged from refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy shattered any hope of Communist rule by popular consent. After mid-November, Hungary rapidly degenerated into a police state, a Soviet puppet-province, unrelieved for the moment by any trace of post-Stalin political liberalism.

Spearheaded by the industrial workers' councils which had cropped up at the outbreak of the revolution, the immediate cause for reversion to terror was an extremely effective general strike on 21-22 November. Malenkov arrived in Budapest on 23 November, possibly with new orders for a "get tough" policy, and on the 26th, Kadar told a nationwide radio audience that "counterrevolutionaries must be hunted down and rendered harmless." On 9 December, martial law was declared throughout Hungary, arrests were stepped up, regional workers' councils were outlawed, and the possession of arms by private citizens became a capital offense. Resistance continued. Another 48-hour general strike paralyzed the economy on 11-12 December, and sporadic outbreaks of armed violence were reported in parts of the country. Nevertheless, the back of the uprising had been broken and the pattern of the future hard-line regime established.

**Stabilization in Poland**

As another generation of terror began in Hungary, Poland exhilarated in the heady atmosphere of internal independence. The Polish press launched a bitter attack on Soviet actions in Hungary. *Zycie Warszawy*, Warsaw's leading evening paper, likened the Hungarian revolt to the Poznan riots and observed that the Hungarians had been guilty only of seeking to exercise that sovereignty which the USSR had guaranteed them at the 20th congress. The present Soviet leadership had to share with Stalin the blame for the uprising, the press explained, since its policy toward Hungarian reformism had been a "senseless theory."
On 14 November, Gomulka led a Polish party and government delegation to Moscow to re-examine Polish-Soviet relations in the light of the October events. The resultant communiqué on 18 November confirmed the "Polish road to socialism" in return for Gomulka's agreement to maintain close bonds of alliance with the USSR, to keep Poland in the bloc, and to sanction the "temporary" presence of Soviet military forces in Poland. The announcement pledged "complete equality" of the two countries, "respect for territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs," and cited Moscow's 30 October declaration on the satellites as its basis. The political agreement was augmented by an economic accord which granted Poland concessions greater than had ever been extended by the Soviet Union to a satellite country, including trade with the USSR at world market prices and the cancellation of Poland's postwar debt.

Khrushchev as usual had subordinated ideology to politics. With the signature of the Polish-Soviet "truce," the USSR admitted that national communism—even though both parties refrained from so designating the Gomulka regime—was not heretical per se, so long as the practitioner maintained a close alliance with Moscow. Actually the Kremlin had little choice in the matter. Soviet pressure for tighter controls in Poland at this point would probably have resulted in another satellite bloodbath, with the fighting possibly spreading to the two Germanies, almost certainly leading to a general war. The USSR was no more inclined to gamble on such an eventuality in Europe than it had been in Asia. This logic placed Poland in a most favorable bargaining position. Gomulka took advantage of the circumstances to make Poland the outstanding exception to the more reactionary Soviet policy toward the satellites which followed the Budapest declaration.

Peiping Warns Moscow

Although Peiping joined the other countries of the bloc in the accolade of praise for the Polish-Soviet truce, the Chinese added a note of warning. People's Daily counseled on 21 November against the possibility of future mistakes in the "proper relations between socialist countries." The editorial condemned both "great-nation chauvinism" and "narrow nationalism," but emphasized that the former abuse of power continued to constitute the chief stumbling block to good relations between the members of the Communist camp. Peiping thus informed Moscow that it did not consider the Kremlin an infallible executor of Marxism-Leninism, and made it clear that the Chinese would continue to reserve the right of independent judgment in the event of new difficulties within the bloc.
Yugoslavia Reacts

As Yugoslav-Soviet relations had faithfully mirrored Soviet policy in Eastern Europe in the pre-October period, so now they reflected the swing back to orthodoxy in the bloc. Moscow's primary task, the re-establishment of tight control over the bloc countries, predicated the ideological isolation of Belgrade and the discredit of the Yugoslav pattern of independent communism. Recriminations were again in order, and the Kremlin chose to use Albania to this end. On 8 November, Enver Hoxha, the Albanian party's first secretary, an unreconstructed "hard-line" Communist, strongly implied in a Pravda article that Tito had been to blame for the Hungarian revolt. Yugoslav Vice President Colakovic was reported to have commented on 11 November that the Hoxha article was the "final blow" to Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement and that henceforth relations, particularly party relations, would be only "correct."

The Yugoslav President took the offensive personally in a speech to his party activists at Pula on 11 November in which he laid the blame for the Hungarian revolution squarely on Moscow's doorstep. Collective leadership, according to Tito, had failed to progress beyond the negative condemnation of the "cult of Stalin," had "ignored the strivings of the working masses," and had permitted the survival of elements "endeavoring to revive Stalinism" in the USSR and other Communist states. Tito explained that his September meetings with Soviet leaders had convinced him that the "Stalinist faction" had "forced its attitude...to a certain extent" on the liberal wing of the Soviet hierarchy, and had prevented the spread in other Communist countries of the "separate roads" doctrine which had been endorsed by the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1955 and 1956.

Pravda rebutted on 23 November with a long editorial accusing Tito of spreading the propaganda of "reactionaries who endanger international proletarian solidarity" by distinguishing between Stalinist and non-Stalinist factions within communism at a time when party unity was the only significant issue. Tito was in error, Pravda added, in trying to establish the Yugoslav road as the only one and in "meddling" in other party's affairs. The Soviet-Yugoslav feud, thus publicly joined, grew progressively more bitter during the winter of 1956-57.

Political Stick and Economic Carrot

Ripples from the Polish and Hungarian events were felt throughout the satellite world. The regimes reacted more or less uniformly by tightening political controls while simultaneously relaxing economic restrictions. Increased hostility
toward local Communist parties was reported in Rumania, Bulgaria, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Rumanian and Bulgarian regimes resorted to frank terrorist tactics and began to carry out mass arrests. The Czechs and Rumanians initiated vigorous anti-American propaganda campaigns and increased their harassment of Western diplomatic communities.

The continuation of "soft-line" economic policies in the satellites was dictated as much by the self-interest of the USSR as by the state of unrest in the bloc. After 11 years of Soviet domination the Eastern European countries were more than ever dependent on economic assistance from the Soviet Union and, as their state of industrial sophistication continued to advance, the attendant drain on Soviet resources threatened to curtail the Communist economic offensive in the nonbloc countries of Asia and Africa. Economic incentives had proved a predictable and efficacious means of increasing industrial production in the USSR, and the same system was now applied piecemeal to the satellites. Pacification of the populace was a bonus effect of the policy which compensated to some degree for the sudden political crackdown. In the months immediately following October all Eastern European countries announced price reductions, increased wage scales, raised family allowances, reduced quotas for compulsory deliveries of agricultural products, set more ambitious housing goals, and promulgated other consumer concessions. Moscow's failure to object to Poland's bid for American economic aid in November was at least partially due to the Soviet desire to escape the burden of fiscal succor for its satellites. Political factors alone are not enough to explain the relative grace with which the Kremlin reacted to the news of Polish-US negotiations.

Moscow's New Conservatism

Moscow's new political conservatism was confirmed on 13 December 1956 when Khrushchev for the first time admitted that the decisions of the 20th congress might themselves have been the catalyst for the subsequent turmoil in the bloc. The Soviet first secretary told a European minister that that body's decisions, although correct in essentials, had to be "adapted to developments which have taken place since the congress." Khrushchev promised consideration of these matters by a special plenum of the central committee before the end of the year.

At the end of 1956, Poland alone continued to defy classification as an orthodox satellite. Gomulka still withheld his recognition of the USSR's ideological primacy, and persisted in the actual political liberalization of Polish society. Moscow's
desire to isolate revisionist Warsaw was plainly evidenced on 21 December when a Czech-East German party communiqué pledged the two countries to combat the "attempts of Polish and foreign reaction to weaken Poland and the entire Socialist camp." As though in reply, a high-level Yugoslav party delegation traveled to Warsaw to join the Poles in reasserting their contention that many roads led to socialism. In a communiqué on 29 December, both sides agreed that bilateral interparty relations "under present conditions" constituted the "most correct" method for effecting cooperation within the bloc. Negotiations of wider scope on "individual questions" were not excluded, but it was clear that both Tito and Gomulka foresaw few occasions on which multiparty discussions would be appropriate.

Peiping's Road to Socialism

Communist China clarified its views on intrabloc relations when Peiping's People's Daily on 29 December published the most elaborate statement on the distinguishing features of the "road to socialism" to emerge from any capital in the bloc. In a 14,000-word article, "More on the Historical Experience of the Proletariat," "antagonism" between "imperialism" and "socialism" was held to be the basic fact of the world scene. The article admitted that there existed "contradictions" between Communist states and parties, but insisted that these must be "subordinated" to the "struggle against the enemy." Those who cannot see this, the Chinese grumbled, are "definitely not Communists."

Peiping followed Moscow's lead in chastising the willful Yugoslavs. The paper contended that the "fundamental experiences" of the Soviet Union must be adopted by all Communist states. Further, Tito was criticized for claiming that Stalin's "mistakes" were inherent in the Soviet system rather than personal perversions of Communist principles. "Mistakes" of the sort Stalin propagated, the article continued, "did not originate in the Socialist system."

The statement concluded with a warning that only "relations of equality" among Communist parties could guarantee the unity of the bloc and safeguard its members against the two principal internal dangers of the contemporary era--"great-nation chauvinism" and "narrow nationalist tendencies."

Liberalism on the Rocks

A conclusive period was put to national communism's brief day in Eastern Europe by the Soviet-satellite party conference in Budapest during the first week of January 1957. In deliberate
contrast to the Polish-Yugoslav position on bilateral party relations, the conference was attended by delegations from five bloc countries—the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. "Socialist equality" was honored in word, but the real business of the meeting was to augur the return of "hard-line" communism to the satellites. The West, it was explained, had mounted a new "cold-war" threat which had almost succeeded in wresting Hungary from the bloc, and which demanded "further consolidation" of the Communist camp and concentration on building a solid front of bloc unity under the cloak of "proletarian internationalism"—subservience to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev and Malenkov steered the conference away from "separate roads to socialism" or the Yugoslav position on the Hungarian revolution.

The Hungarian Government on 6 January implemented the "freeze" which the conference had ordained. Kadar, on that date, proclaimed the return of a "proletarian dictatorship" in Hungary and gave first priority to "proletarian internationalism" as a motivating influence in the formulation of national policy. He attributed the October revolution to "foreign elements" and accused the Nagy regime of "treachery," the first time since the revolt that a high Hungarian official had attributed antistate motives to the deposed premier. Kadar further decreed a speed-up in the "reconstruction of the countryside" in the socialist pattern, with particular emphasis on a renewed collectivization campaign. During the uprising the collectivized portion of agriculture had shrunk from 20 percent to 3 percent of the country's arable land, and this was the first call for remedial action by the government.

"Revisionism" was dead in Hungary, and the camp of "liberalism" had been reduced to a single exponent, Poland, in the USSR's eastern sphere.

Following the October 1956 events, satellite leaders began a round-robin of visits to Moscow and to one another's capitals. The themes of the ensuing talks were those stressed in Moscow's 30 October declaration on the satellites and in the 4 January Budapest communiqué—solidarity of the socialist camp, a new Western threat to bloc stability, and status-of-forces agreements sanctioning Soviet arms in the satellites. East Germany was repeatedly assured of its sovereign status.
Chinese Influence

The Chinese diagnosis of socialism's ills in December 1956 was one of a series of theoretical dissertations from Peiping which influenced bloc affairs during the troublous 1956-57 period. Mao's "hundred flowers" speech of May 1956 and his February 1957 dictum on the nature of contradictions within socialism were seized on by the Poles as proof that liberalism and communism were not mutually antagonistic concepts. Reduced to simplest terms, what Mao actually believed was not nearly so important in Eastern Europe as what satellite politicians said he believed. Polish Communists interpreted Mao's theories as implicit support for Gomulka's "road to socialism." There were reports in December 1956 that Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz had been in touch with Peiping on several occasions during the October crisis and had received renewed assurances of Chinese Communist support for the Warsaw course of action.

China, for its part, had a double stake in satellite affairs. Peiping's economy was heavily reliant on the $400,000,000 worth of industrial and transportation equipment which arrived yearly from Eastern Europe, and Communist prestige had been badly undermined in Asia by Moscow's military adventure in Hungary. Restoration of stability in Eastern Europe was vital to China. Mao's party had always acknowledged the Soviet Union as the model for all socialist countries even while sympathizing, in part at least, with Polish desires for more freedom in the determination of internal affairs. Peiping was thus in a peculiarly favorable position to arbitrate outstanding differences between Moscow and the independent-minded Poles. It was in the role of arbitrator that Chou En-lai visited both Moscow and Warsaw in January 1957.

Gomulka conceded more in the joint Sino-Polish communiqué of 16 January than in any other policy statement he had made since his ascent to power in October. The document acknowledged Gomulka's position that national differences exerted sufficient influence on the development of socialism to require different forms of communism in different countries. But in return Gomulka committed himself to the support of "proletarian internationalism" and "the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism"--pledges omitted entirely from the Soviet-Polish agreement of mid-November--and praised bloc unity. The Polish first secretary was not ready, however, to ratify the Soviet version of events in Hungary or to tender the Soviet Union first place in bloc affairs.
The Warsaw declaration was a forerunner of the Sino-Soviet communiqué signed in Moscow on 18 January. This document again emphasized bloc unity in the face of renewed "Western imperialist" threats, prescribed "genuine consultation" among bloc states as the solution for future difficulties, and repeated Peiping's December warning against both "great-nation chauvinism" and "narrow-nationalism." In deference to the Poles, there was no mention of who led whom in the bloc.

Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz and politburo member Ochab garnered further moral support for the Polish brand of communism during their visit to Peiping in early April 1957. A joint Sino-Polish statement reaffirmed the January declaration, praised Gomulka's post-October accomplishments, and anticipated Poland's "increasingly important contributions to...the great family of socialist countries." As they had in January, the Chinese omitted the customary obeisance to Moscow as leader of the Communist bloc and refrained from terming the Hungarian revolt "counterrevolutionary."

Polish-Soviet Understanding

As a result of the 18 November Polish-Soviet agreement and Chou's good offices in January, Poland and the USSR arrived at a modus vivendi. Both countries gave ground from earlier held positions, until only three outstanding points of difference remained: Moscow's right to rule the bloc, the interpretation of events surrounding the Hungarian revolution, and whether Gomulka was truly building socialism. As late as December 1956, Kommunist, monthly periodical of the Soviet party, accused the Polish party of conducting "an offensive against the most sacred possessions of the working class...the great experience gained by the Soviet people and its Communist party on the road to socialist construction." Moscow's tone of voice was lower after the January communiqués, and Gomulka's ability to placate Soviet demands while preserving intact the essentials of his October program contributed to his overwhelming victory at the polls on 20 January in Poland's first relatively free election since World War II.

Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Freeze and Again Thaw

By the end of January 1957 the first phase of the consolidation of the European satellites had been completed. Non-bloc Yugoslavia was alone an outspoken critic of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, and, in February, Khrushchev assigned himself the task of cutting Tito off from the party councils of the bloc until the harder Soviet line had had an opportunity to
re-establish orthodoxy fully in the Eastern European parties. The Soviet party deliberately checkmated its relations with Belgrade when Shepilov, in his final report as foreign minister, told the Yugoslavs on 12 February that there would be no improvement in relations between the two countries until Yugoslavia changed its ideological attitude. As Khrushchev probably anticipated, the Yugoslavs replied in kind on 14 February when Borba retorted that further developments would depend exclusively on the Soviet attitude and that Yugoslavia's policies remained unchanged. On 26 February, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic told the Yugoslav Parliament that if the USSR still hoped to see Belgrade in its "socialist camp," it was "wasting its time." By the end of February, party relations between the two Communist powers had all but terminated. Moscow's ideological boycott was reinforced by economic chastisement calculated to hurt the Yugoslavs in the critical area of industrial development. A moratorium was placed on further Soviet aid under the terms of the economic agreements of 1955. Outright repudiation of the agreements was withheld, however, which contributed to the impression that the move was in the nature of economic blackmail, intended to inspire Belgrade to cease agitating for reform in the bloc.

During this name-calling interlude in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Peiping occupied neutral ground. The Chinese Communists opposed the dispute in a relatively passive manner, avoiding explicit censure of either participant. On 5 March, Chou En-lai observed that until such time as the outstanding differences between socialist states could be resolved by comradely discussion, the correct course would be to "reserve differences while upholding our solidarity." March statements of other Chinese leaders continued to refer to Yugoslavia as a legitimate socialist state and tended to minimize the bitter exchanges between Moscow and Belgrade.

By mid-April the decline of unrest in the bloc made it expedient for Khrushchev once again to better his relations with Yugoslavia. It was no more politic now than it had been in 1955 to allow a free hand to a hostile Communist state on the border of the empire. Yugoslav influence no longer posed the threat to bloc solidarity that it had in the fall of 1956 and the winter of 1957. All the satellites, except Poland, were again approaching political conformity, and Poland did not now pose a serious threat to stability because of Gomulka's reassertion of internal control, the country's geographical situation, and its professed alliance with the bloc. Khrushchev's first peace feeler was directed through the same channel as his declaration of hostilities the previous fall—the Albanian party. On 15 April the
Soviet first secretary told the Albanians that the Soviet Union wished to concentrate on "what brings the people of...two countries together in the struggle for socialism," the first indication of a shift in the wind from the USSR. On 24 May, apparently after some soul-searching, Belgrade rose to the bait when Politika, the Yugoslav's theoretical journal, quoted Tito's statement that Yugoslavia intended "to take the initiative" to prevent "the further sharpening of relations" with Moscow. Tito took note of the fact that the USSR had stopped attacking Yugoslavia and had "insisted that other countries also treat Yugoslavia differently and not attack it from unprincipled positions." This seemed to confirm a late May report from Belgrade that the Yugoslav party was in possession of a confidential Soviet memorandum advising all satellite parties to strive for improved relations with Tito's regime and the Yugoslav party "for the time being...in spite of ideological differences." On the same day that Politika printed the Tito interview, the Soviet party's central committee sent cordial birthday greetings to the Yugoslav President, and was rewarded by a reply in which the marshal predicted an immediate improvement in Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of the bloc.

A visit to the Soviet Union by Yugoslav Defense Minister Gosnjak in June, Tito added, would be in the spirit of "coexistence and cooperation with everyone."

On 6 June, Moscow and Belgrade issued strong declarations of their desire for friendlier relations with each other. Pravda sounded the keynote of the Soviet campaign—"only the imperialists stand to gain"—by a continuation of the Soviet-Yugoslav feud. Nevertheless, the old ideological differences remained unresolved. Pravda classified the proposed rapprochement as "an advance in the spirit of proletarian internationalism," while Belgrade's Borsa termed it an expression of Yugoslavia's policy of "active coexistence" with all countries of the world. Moscow thus stressed the oneness of the socialist camp, while Belgrade emphasized the independence of the Yugoslav position.

Despite these initial overtures, positive Soviet action to effect a reconciliation with Tito was delayed until after the Soviet presidium purge of late June. The Molotov faction apparently had resisted even tentative attempts to renew party relations with the Yugoslavs because of their conviction that Yugoslav influence had been instrumental in causing the acute unrest in the satellites the preceding fall.
Presidium Purge in USSR

The expulsion of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov from the presidium of the Soviet party gave Khrushchev a mandate for his policy of "aggressive friendship" with Yugoslavia. Immediately following the Moscow house cleaning, Khrushchev told the Czechs that he intended to seek an understanding with Tito "at the first opportunity" despite the theoretical differences which still separated them. In mid-July, Yugoslav Vice Presidents Kardelj and Rankovic conferred with Khrushchev in Moscow; Soviet credits to Yugoslavia were "thawed" on 29 July; a "working level" Soviet delegation, the first since 1948, arrived in Belgrade on 1 August; and the same day Tito and Khrushchev met personally in Rumania.

Tito-Khrushchev Meeting in Rumania

The Rumanian meeting was keyed to the Soviet statement of 15 April. No signed communiqué was issued, but Radio Moscow indicated that there had been a prior understanding to agree on like views and to overlook differences of opinion. The conference confirmed the "actual significance" of their 1956 declaration that "roads and conditions of socialist development are different in different countries" and advocated "concrete forms of cooperation" among all Communist parties. This latter invocation left the door ajar for a future attempt at Cominform - or Comintern-like cooperation without the irksome restrictions of these earlier organizations.

The Soviet-Yugoslav understanding on the Danube set the stage for a new round of Yugoslav-satellite party conferences. Tito's immediate and enthusiastic acceptance of the 10 September Rumanian proposal for a Balkan conference strongly suggested that this gesture had been one of the topics on the Tito-Khrushchev agenda.

Tito-Gomulka Meeting

The Tito-Gomulka conference which began in Belgrade on 10 September may be regarded as an extension of the Soviet-Yugoslav August meeting. The two independent Communists endorsed Soviet foreign policy point by point and minimized the ideological differences which still separated them from the Soviet party's position. The conference communiqué, however, used the same terminology as the December 1956 Polish-Yugoslav party statement in encouraging bilateral party relations as the most valuable form of interparty cooperation. Gomulka referred to the USSR as "a neighbor and ally, the first and strongest socialist
state," a Communist verity to which Khrushchev could hardly object, yet one which withheld recognition of the USSR as leader of the bloc. Tito's strong endorsement of Poland's Oder-Neisse border with East Germany removed a major point of distinction between Yugoslav and Soviet foreign policy.

Conclusion of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement was a testimonial to Tito's belief that Khrushchev represented a new school of more flexible Soviet policy which might one day bring Soviet communism closer to the Yugoslav model, and to the conviction of both parties that the unity of the international Communist movement must take clear priority over ideological squabbles "within the family." It was not, however, an ideological surrender by either party. In this sphere sharp differences were suppressed, not solved. Although Eastern European communism was still ideologically muddled and internally factionalized, its parties were agreed on the advantage of presenting an unbroken front to "capitalism." To this end Yugoslavia and Poland both found common cause with the Soviet Union and with the countries of the bloc.

Gomulka Tightens Up

Like Tito, Gomulka had accepted Soviet emphasis on Communist unity and had withdrawn from some of the more radical implications of his October policies. Like Tito also, however, he insisted on the inviolability of what he considered the essentials of his reforms, and based his compact with the USSR on mutually acceptable compromises rather than on ideological surrender. In January, Chou was reported to have told the Polish first secretary, "Do what you want but don't talk about it," a frank warning against irritating Soviet sensibilities during the unity campaign. This problem plagued the Polish leader throughout the year.

Gomulka had promised freedom of the press in October, but had also warned against "antisocialist forces" at work within Poland. He kept the "revisionist" press in check during the first half of 1957 by balancing these two abstractions in the desired proportion. The outspoken "enragé" journals continued to demand more liberal actions than the regime was prepared to take, but because of their limited interior circulation, and unofficial status, they escaped the full weight of government censorship for some time. Życie Warszawy and Trybuna Ludu, the principal government and party organs, could not be permitted the same tolerance, however. When they persisted in taking a dangerously anti-Soviet line, Gomulka dismissed their editors and replaced them with more "conservative" journalists. On 27
February he warned that most of Poland's journalists and writers had "broken with socialism" and had become the "mouthpiece of 'petty bourgeois' ideology." This was strong language in the new Poland, although liberal sentiment was still too strong to permit an effective crackdown on the press until the fall of 1957.

Gomulka's desire to minimize his ideological conflict with the Kremlin became more evident in March, when, for the first time, he referred to the Hungarian revolt as a "counterrevolution and termed it "a mad attempt to overthrow the Socialist system" at the very moment when Hungary had stepped onto the road of the correction of past mistakes." Prior to that time the Polish party had held that the uprising was a product of the same forces which had caused the Poznan riots, legitimate popular grievances against a reactionary Communist regime.

In March, also, the Poles disavowed the term "national communism" as descriptive of the "Polish road to socialism." Such a description, according to the party's theoretical journal, Nowe Drogi, implied the limitation of Communist influence to "narrow national confines," the antithesis of Marxist theory. These semantic distinctions cost Gomulka little in popular support, but contributed to the appearance of the outward solidarity of the Communist camp. The cause of "right communism" for the present was a dead letter in Hungary, and the mass of the Polish population paid little attention to the party's ideological gyrations. Gomulka's domestic popularity had other than theoretical roots, and, so long as he held out against Soviet dictation of Poland's internal policies and a return of economic exploitation by the USSR, he was on reasonably firm ground in paying lip service to the Kremlin's version of abstract Communist theory.

At a mid-May plenum of the Polish party's central committee, Gomulka reaffirmed his October policies, and indicated that his subsequent concessions to Soviet policy had been little more than superficial adjustments to a difficult political situation. "The road to socialism in different countries can take forms other than those of the road to socialism in the Soviet Union," Gomulka told the meeting. The Polish party, its first secretary said, would continue to oppose forced collectivization, restrictions on free speech, and would support coexistence with the Catholic Church for an indefinite time to come. Poland, Gomulka said, would stand firmly behind its alliance with the Soviet Union, its friend, ally, and protector of the Oder-Neisse frontier.
Gomulka's true feelings toward the USSR were revealed in his extemporaneous reply to a direct attack by one of the "Stalinist" members of the central committee who had demanded a return to orthodox communism on the Soviet model. The first secretary heapedly recalled the ravages which the Soviet Army had wrought in Poland in the course of its "liberation" in World War II, the imprisonment of Poland's wartime party leaders on a whim of Stalin, and the ruthless exploitation of the Polish economy by the USSR in the years before the October events. Repetition of these humiliations was a certain consequence of a return to the pre-October party line, he said, and all his actions were directed toward avoiding this ultimate folly. The transcript of this speech did not appear in the published text of the plenum, but tape recordings of it were circulated among high echelon officials of government and party. The Soviet leadership could thenceforth have suffered no illusions as to the fact that the USSR's physical proximity, far more than a common view of a shared philosophy, kept Poland in the Soviet bloc.

Gomulka's most urgent problem was economic in nature. Low productivity, low wages, and a low standard of living were a vicious cycle that beset the almost bankrupt country. The only immediate source of relief appeared to be foreign aid. The Soviet Union in November 1956 had underwritten a portion of Poland's debt; but credits, foreign exchange, and machine goods from the West were badly needed, and Gomulka was not one to permit ideology to stand in the way of national survival. Between October and June he concluded economic agreements with Austria, England, Sweden, and France and in June received his first American aid in the form of a $95,000,000 trade agreement. Trybuna Ludu characterized the agreement as "exactly what we had asked for," and as significant in helping "to break down East-West trade barriers" and "lessen international tension."

At the end of June, Gomulka conferred in Berlin with Walter Ulbricht, East German "hard-line" party leader, probably at Moscow's suggestion. The Poles had been highly indignant at Pankow's reference in December to "Polish and foreign reaction," and took the occasion of the June conference to exact payment for the insult. Ulbricht, in a joint communiqué utterly at variance with his prior position, endorsed the actions of the Polish party since October 1956 and agreed with Gomulka that "historic conditions and national characteristics" may determine the forms and methods of approach to communism in different countries. This was a far cry from the bristling hostility which the East Germans had previously displayed toward the "Polish road."
The bilateral government communique went down the line with Soviet foreign policy and introduced a new note in calling for a "Baltic Sea of peace." A neutralized Baltic had traditionally been a dream of Russian policy makers, and the inclusion of the satellite governments in the scheme was probably envisaged by Moscow. Poland's role in Baltic negotiations, and its future relations with other riparian countries, however, could differ materially from Moscow's script for the plan. The Baltic is Gomulka's only window on free Europe, and Soviet sponsorship of the "sea of peace" plan could afford Poland an opportunity to widen its contacts with the West without antagonizing the USSR.

Another indication of Gomulka's desire to foster closer contacts with the Western European community was his use of the Berlin conference to express his desire for friendly relations with "all the people" of Germany. Gomulka had sporadically pressed for diplomatic relations with Bonn, but the highly volatile Oder-Neisse question prevented serious negotiations in that direction. This reference let the Federal Republic know that Poland still hoped for a rapprochement.

Orthodox Satellites Tighten Policies

Throughout the period of the 1956-57 winter "freeze" in Eastern Europe the orthodox satellites consolidated their "hard-line" policies. In April the Bulgarian regime increased its use of terror to dispel the last remnants of Hungarian sympathy in a still restive population. Mass deportations and student expulsions were reported, and the government admitted that its intellectuals refused to conform to strict party discipline. In Hungary the reactivated security police again put a tight lid on "illicit" political expressions, the liberal Hungarian writers' union was suspended in January and its leading figures arrested, and Minister of State Marosan declared that since not enough "fascists" had been hung in 1945, "they had better be hung in 1957." Rumania struggled with widespread unemployment and stilled a brief flurry of intellectual dissent in the spring. Albania was still a product of the Stalin era.

The orthodox political line of Poland's satellite neighbors was typified in the Czechoslovak party conference held in Prague from 13 to 14 June 1957. The Czech central committee urged "multipartite discussion of important political and ideological questions," an unabashed criticism of the Polish and Yugoslav position. Party Secretary Hendrych found "important strata" among the intelligentsia and working class susceptible to "Western-sponsored subversive concepts--revisionism, national
Of these alien deviations, "revisionism" constituted by far the greatest threat to international communism. These mistaken notions, Hendrych continued, must be replaced by traditional Marxist-Leninist concepts and a return of "socialist realism" in Czechoslovak arts and letters. For two years Czechoslovakia had experienced the stirrings of liberal thought each spring, and dissatisfaction with the regime's cultural policies persisted, particularly in independent-minded Slovakia. Hendrych termed this attitude "ultimately unacceptable." A renewed drive for collectivization of agriculture, the bellwether of orthodox communism, was promised the nation's farmers. Above all, the secretary concluded, Czechoslovakia's indissoluble ties of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union must be further strengthened and defended.

The Hungarian party had already denied the validity of Mao Tse-tung's "100 flowers" theory, but had not published the text of the Chinese leader's speech. The Czech press became the first in the satellites to reproduce the edited edition of the speech on 21 June after Hendrych had termed it inappropriate for application in Czechoslovakia, where traces of "imperialist espionage and subversion" survived.

The newly constituted Hungarian Socialist Workers' (Communist) party held its "first annual" conference two weeks after the Czechs adjourned, and echoed the Czech line without significant variation. The conference packed the party's politburo and central committee with ill-disguised "Stalinists," elected Jozsef Revai, former hard-line ideological czar, to the central committee, and condemned "counterrevolutionaries" who sided with Nagy against the regime. Kadar told the conference that "brotherly friendship with the USSR must be represented courageously and without shame."

Post-Presidium Shake-up

Another indication of the return of regimented uniformity to the satellites came following the Soviet presidium shake-up which was announced on 3 July. Every satellite, without hesitation, endorsed the purge unequivocally. Bulgaria and Rumania purged their politburos; Hungary belatedly reaffirmed the essential correctness of 20th congress doctrine but gave no indication of reimplementing liberal policies.

Poland and Yugoslavia welcomed the Khrushchev victory as indicative of a more liberal Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. Khrushchev, however, during the remainder of the summer, made it clear that regime stability, not a particular political shading,
was the sine qua non required of each satellite leader. The Soviet first secretary smiled on the ultra-Stalin-like Novotny in Czechoslovakia, and called East Germany's Ulbricht the "most faithful of all the faithful." This was not liberalism, no matter what the standard of measure. Everywhere Khrushchev went he was met and followed by slogans of bloc unity, the basic theme of Soviet policy since October 1956. This was not at all incongruous. Khrushchev had been sufficiently shaken by the Hungarian and Polish events of the fall of 1956 to accept the conclusion that a relaxation of political controls in the bloc was the surest way to dissipate Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

From the Soviet viewpoint the reimposition of a hard line had been reasonably successful. Controls in each country, except Poland, were now adequate to suppress public displays of dissidence, and a firm and rapid endorsement of Soviet policy decisions could now be relied on in Eastern Europe. There was no incentive for further ideological experimentation.

**Mao Grows Some Weeds**

During the spring of 1957, the Chinese Communists, too, harvested the bitter fruit of their "100 flowers." Mao Tsetung in an unpublished address in February had urged his party cadres to stimulate criticism from the people. The order was carried out with exemplary Communist zeal, and throughout the spring a torrent of intellectual criticism against the party's monopoly of power and basic policies rained on the regime. Some of the most vociferous complainants were Communist party members. The entire experience was a bitter one for Mao and those advocates of the "hundred flowers" policy who, like him, had overestimated popular support for the regime and underestimated the depth of the unreconciled opposition.

A party "rectification" campaign, designed to improve party agitators' techniques in handling the masses, was launched in April. In June, Peiping published a strenuously edited official version of Mao's February speech which put severe limitations on popular criticism of the party's power position and major policies, including its policy on relations with the USSR. Simultaneously the regime unveiled an "antirightist" campaign aimed at those who had heeded the earlier parole to attack the regime. In August, as reaction gathered momentum, "antirightism" and "rectification" were merged into a single steamroller effort to squelch antiregime utterances in the country.
These developments, whatever their consequences in the domestic context, undoubtedly rendered Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders more sympathetic to Soviet problems in Eastern Europe, and more ready to agree to the hardening Soviet position relative to the satellites.

The Polish Exception

The Gomulka regime in Poland continued to walk a narrow tightrope between accommodation to Soviet wishes and the preservation of its independence. A wage strike of 12,000 transport employees in Lodz tested the economic policy severely in August 1957, but Gomulka remained firm and the strikers returned to work convinced that the country lacked the funds necessary for an increase. The failure of the economy to improve at the rate anticipated by most Poles was reflected in increasingly caustic press treatment of the regime and its policies. In early fall Gomulka tightened censorship and, in October, closed down the "revisionist" student journal Po Prostu. The student demonstrations which ensued were not directed against Gomulka personally so much as against the bureaucracy of the lower echelons of the regime. They became disorderly only when rowdy delinquents turned them into a violent holiday, representative of the frustrations of Polish youth in general.

The 10th plenum of the Polish party's central committee from 25-27 October concerned itself less with relations with the USSR than with Gomulka's call for a new spirit of vitality in the party. Liberalization had continued to a point at which party influence had all but disappeared in the countryside, and was only nominal in the other strata of society. The plenum emphasized Gomulka's determination to adhere to the "broad democratic liberties and national freedoms" which had been instituted in October. The press was promised that its right to "constructive criticism" would be preserved, but was told that "anti-socialist" or "anti-Soviet" criticism would not be tolerated. Gomulka announced a bloodless "verification" of all party members designed to weed out the opportunistic and apathetic. The fight, as the first secretary pictured it, was to continue against both "revisionists" and "dogmatists," those who advocated a return to "Stalinist" principles, "revisionism" being viewed as the greater of the two evils. No new action to solve the economic crisis was projected.

Gomulka's problems were now internal. If he could succeed in stabilizing his economy and in restraining his press from ill-considered attacks on Soviet policy, he would stand to gain from Khrushchev's status quo outlook on the bloc.
The Bloc--One Year After Hungary

Eastern Europe on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the Russian revolution was again a functional unit in the Soviet empire. Dissidence was under control, bloc solidarity was externally a fact, and liberalism had been confined to the economic field, where it existed more by definition than as a reality.

IV. 40 YEARS OF COMMUNISM AND A NEW COMINTERN

On 6 November 1957 Moscow became a stage for the most imposing array of Communist notables to gather in 22 years. The meeting was ostensibly in honor of the achievements of 40 years of Soviet communism, but Khrushchev's anniversary-eve keynote address served actually to kick off a month-long congress of world communism. This occasion, for the Soviet Union, marked the accent of the steep hill up from the 1956 nightmare of Budapest and Warsaw, the culmination of a full year's effort to achieve a multilateral declaration of faith in the future of Soviet-style communism. The Kremlin badly needed, for propaganda purposes abroad and for psychological effect within the bloc, a spectacular demonstration of the restoration of Communist unity in its sphere of influence, and this was its chosen forum. Sixty-four Communist parties celebrated the return of the tent-meeting as a facade for Moscow's central direction of the international party line. Although the gathering was nameless out of deference for the sensibilities of the Polish, Chinese, Yugoslav, and Italian parties, nevertheless, a new Comintern was born in Moscow in November. The participants took care to establish the precedent-setting nature of their convention by announcing, before adjourning, their intention of convening as often in the future "as the need arises."

Of the three policy statements issued by the Moscow conference, by far the most important in terms of Soviet-bloc relations was the joint declaration of policy signed by the USSR and the 11 other parties of the bloc on 21 November. Khrushchev's 6 November speech outlined the essential points of this document, and the "peace manifesto" signed by all attending parties on 22 November reiterated well-worn Soviet foreign policy aims, never the object of serious controversy in the bloc.

The policy declaration itself was more notable for its 12 signatures than for any inherently new ideas. Substantively the document paraphrased 20th congress doctrine, with the addition of new, admonitory control clauses. For the first time,
however, all the parties of the bloc agreed, publicly and in concert, that, while "dogmatism" remained a serious threat, "the main present danger is revisionism."

In Moscow the recent Chinese inclination to condemn internal satellite revisions became clearly evident. The Chinese Communists had maintained since the revolutionary fall of 1956 that "great-nation chauvinism" constituted the principal threat to the ideological solidarity of the bloc. Peiping now withdrew from this position in favor of the USSR's contention that "revisionism" was the acute present danger. This policy switch directly reflected Mao's unsettling experiences at home the previous summer when the attacks on his regime by Chinese "revisionists" had attained an unexpected degree of intensity and bitterness.

Mao also joined Gomulka in acknowledging the ideological leadership of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Peiping had habitually hailed the USSR's state leadership, but always before had stressed the "equality" and "independence" of all Communist parties. Even now the theoretical concession, which Mao's adherence to the policy declaration implied, was not absolute, for he reserved the right to continue to innovate "socialist development" within the Chinese party and to exercise guiding influence over the other Communist parties of Asia. In like manner, Gomulka could take refuge, should an occasion demand, behind the extremely broad generalities which the declaration proposed as the nine basic principles of communism. Nothing in these relatively innocuous platitudes interdicted the Polish party's post-October course. There was evidence, on the contrary, that Moscow had leaned over backward to satisfy Gomulka in the formulation of the principles. No other explanation, for example, so plausibly accounts for the curious, Bukharinistic phraseology of the basic principle on agricultural policy which calls for "gradual socialist reconstruction," entirely omitting specific references to collectivization.

Despite the anomalous wording of portions of the declaration, the countries of the bloc, in following Moscow's political lead, committed themselves to an extremely narrow doctrinal channel. Implicit in this endorsement was a profession of the correctness of the USSR's role as custodian of true Communist doctrine. Both ideological heresies cited in the declaration, "dogmatism" and "revisionism," were, by definition, deviations from a correct, doctrinal norm, to be enunciated and interpreted by the Soviet party. The Soviet Union thus regained, by default, its unique role as oracle of the Communist world. By common consent Moscow was awarded the right to condemn as "dogmatic" or "revisionist" any politically embarrassing independent satellite action, a development fraught with future significance.

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Nothing was really solved at the Moscow congress. Behind the spangles of ideological unity, the basic problems of the individual differences which distinguish and separate the countries of the bloc remained. The remarkable thing about the policy declaration was the fact that a group of influential Communist leaders, so acutely aware of national prerogatives, could agree among themselves not to disagree in public. This, in a sense, was a tribute to Mao who, throughout 1957, had urged public agreement on the countries of the bloc. The Moscow meeting put this advice into practice on a grandiose scale. Pressing problems, involving obvious conflicts of opinion, were either discussed in private or were filed for future disposition. Nothing, for example, was said about the extent of legitimate self-determination permissible in Communist countries, or the future course of agricultural collectivization in the bloc. The nine principles were worded to promise all things to all people yet nothing specific to anyone. The show was the thing in Moscow in November. And this came off almost without a hitch.

A discordant note in Moscow's carefully staged chorus of Communist unity was managed by Tito, sulking in Belgrade with a sudden attack of political lumbago. The Yugoslav leader found himself in late October in a particularly delicate political position which manifestly excluded his participation in the founding convention of a Comintern-type organization. Tito's recognition of the black-sheep East German regime had struck a sensitive nerve in the West, and had placed in serious jeopardy Yugoslavia's professed intent to arbitrate East-West differences as a nonbloc neutral. Khrushchev's rude dismissal of Zhukov, Belgrade's candidate for champion of the liberal line in the Soviet presidium, undoubtedly served to weaken further Tito's resolve to consummate his previously burgeoning rapprochement with the Kremlin.

As early as 7 November, Belgrade's Komunist blasted the product of the Moscow meeting as unrepresentative of the Yugoslav viewpoint. The party weekly restated Tito's "separate roads" thesis, and concluded that socialist forces were so varied that it was "incorrect to supply universal recipes prescribing how the rule of the working class should be achieved... what should be the forms of authority, which are the compulsory forms of social ownership, etc." Tito thus succinctly dismissed the bloc's nine principles before they had been committed to paper. Even without the East German complication, it would have been incongruous for the Yugoslavs to bind themselves to an ideological commitment such as that drawn up at Moscow. The declaration was weak enough in its final form; compromises of the type which Tito would certainly have demanded would have rendered it entirely meaningless.
In summary, the November congress reasserted Soviet ideological primacy in the Communist bloc and signaled the return of a centrally conceived and promulgated world Communist "line." November gave no cause for revision of the early fall's assessments of Soviet-satellite relations, although it presaged a resumption of the Soviet-Yugoslav vendetta as the coat of ideological whitewash applied in August 1957 began to peel. Unity under duress continued to characterize interparty relations in the bloc. The manner in which the 40th anniversary of the Russian Revolution was celebrated guaranteed the continuation of a "hard-line" policy in the Soviet sphere for a considerable time to come.