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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

DDI/NIC #4690-82  
3 June 1982

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Chairman, National Intelligence Council *H.S.R.*

FROM : Hans Heymann, Jr.  
National Intelligence Officer at Large

SUBJECT : Chemical Warfare and Toxin Use: Need for  
Intelligence Focal Point

SUMMARY

Because of the growing national security significance of the CW/Toxin Use issue, this memo recommends the designation by the DCI of a central point of responsibility for monitoring, energizing and coordinating the Intelligence Community's far-flung efforts to collect, analyze and interpret technical and episodic information (including human and environmental samples) pertaining to CW/Toxin use in Third World conflicts, to provide a single, authoritative point from which intelligence findings will be conveyed to the policy community, and to assure coordinated briefings and appropriate intelligence liaison in support of overall US goals. It further recommends that this central point of responsibility be [redacted] of OSWR who would be responsible to the Director through the Chairman of the NIC. [redacted] would work with and through an upgraded Community mechanism, e.g. a revamped WSSIC CBW working group. DIA is prepared to cooperate in such restructuring. The DDI, D/OSWR and [redacted] concur in this recommendation.

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1. Is There a Continuing CW Use Intelligence Task?

With the issuance of the SNIE on CW/Toxin use in February, the publication of the declassified version as a public document in March, and our global briefing tour to propagate the findings in April, the US Government's case on this issue has been about as well established as can be expected in an environment of public resistance and skepticism. This does not mean, however, that the major intelligence task is now behind us. On the contrary, the need for a substantial intelligence effort, -- both current and long range -- will almost certainly intensify.

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On the supply side:

- o The chemical attacks appear to be continuing -- at least through April -- and the flow of samples is accelerating. The efficiency and technical adequacy of our sample analysis program, however, continue to be called into question by knowledgeable US scientists. We need to improve that program.

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- o Sustained use of CW and toxins in Third World conflicts and a growing belief that these weapons are cost-effective may lower existing social inhibitions against their use and could lead to actual or alleged proliferation of such use.

On the demand side:

- o Public and media interest in the issue has been piqued and their appetite for "conclusive proof" seems insatiable. Though we may feel that the USG has now adequately proved its case, we will be under continuing pressure to provide a steady flow of reinforcing evidence.
- o In terms of US arms control concerns, our finding that the USSR is systematically violating international conventions has disturbing implications for US-Soviet and Soviet-multilateral relations. It further erodes what little public trust remains in Soviet compliance and poses intractable problems for verification intelligence.
- o In terms of US national security concerns, some crucial unanswered questions about the potential toxicity of tricothecenes, the solvents in which they might be disseminated, and other, even more lethal kinds of toxins that may be developed in the USSR or elsewhere, pose an new set of tasks for intelligence.

In sum, the Community will be expected to produce more rather than less intelligence on this issue for the foreseeable future.

2. How Well are we Organized?

Our performance is uneven. Some aspects of our modus operandi are working well:

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- o The physical movement of medical and environmental samples from field to headquarters (DIA) seems to be functioning smoothly.
- o Routing of samples from headquarters (DIA) to laboratories is now done routinely and expeditiously, and reasonably good track is being kept of the location and disposition of samples in train.

Other aspects of our performance, however, are seriously deficient:

- o Assignment of samples to laboratories and presentation of results.
  - Collateral intelligence on attacks -- medical symptoms, victims' statements, suspected CW agents involved, etc. -- are not carefully reviewed as the basis for determining what tests and measures should be undertaken and with what priorities, and for selecting the best qualified lab to conduct the tests.
  - Those having the responsibility and resources for assigning laboratory tasks are effectively decoupled from those in the analyst-user community who ought to be driving the requirements.
  - The exposition of analytic results is not being couched in appropriate scientific language or presented in sufficient detail to satisfy the needs of the intelligence analyst or the expectations of the broader scientific community.
- o Interpretation of the findings. There is at present no requirement that laboratory results be reviewed and evaluated by analytic elements of the Community before they are released to policy agencies. Thus no agreed intelligence judgments on these results are prepared. Direct release to policy elements of raw laboratory results -- without any evaluation of their significance and limitations -- has repeatedly led to official misinterpretations and overstatements.
- o Absence of a Community focal point. There is a pressing need for having an authoritative person or place charged with managing the interagency analytic process and with responsibility for conveying technical intelligence judgments on CW use to US policy elements. The lack of such a Community focal point has caused a State Department policy bureau (PM) to follow the practice of simply reaching down into any technical intelligence element or laboratory and extracting from it unevaluated, incomplete and sometimes misleading data or pieces of a story, and to pass these to policy principals (and often to the media) as if they were agreed Intelligence Community judgments. State (PM) -- and the CW Use Working Group that it chairs -- would surely welcome a more orderly intelligence process, better integrated support, and an ability to rely on a responsible single point of contact.
- o Uncoordinated briefings. Individual intelligence elements are presently providing unilateral briefings to official and semi-official audiences on aspects of the CW use issue without informing,

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consulting, or requesting participation of other cognizant intelligence elements. This has led to embarrassingly injudicious and incomplete presentations being made to such distinguished groups as the Defense Science Board. While we cannot impose censorship on other agencies' briefings, better communication among Community elements would lessen the chances of an inadvertent gaffe.

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- o Linkage to third country governments. There is presently no vehicle for providing or facilitating briefings and technical support to other Western or non-aligned governments through their representatives, say, at ASEAN or at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.
- o Broader estimative studies. We should anticipate a demand for follow-on intelligence assessments of the broader implications of CW use for US, NATO and Third World security interests.

3. Recommendations

Clearly, not all of the above deficiencies can be easily corrected, but the single action most likely to improve our intelligence performance would be the designation by the DCI of a respected Community officer [Redacted] [Redacted] -- to be responsible to him for the functions described above. [Redacted] extensive involvement and effective performance in all facets of the issue qualify him uniquely for this role. In carrying out many of the listed tasks, [Redacted] would have to work closely with and through a Community mechanism -- either a substantially upgraded and recast CBW Working Group of WSSIC or a newly created joint intelligence committee or subcommittee. [Redacted] DIA's chief of S&T intelligence, with whom we have discussed this proposal, is prepared to cooperate fully in any restructuring of the WSSIC group along appropriate lines.

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I should note that we have considered a number of alternative proposals. These include the designation of an existing office in the Community to assume a central coordinating role; reliance on the existing WSSIC working group; creation of a new Community "center" for CW use intelligence; or abrogation of the responsibility totally to Defense. For a variety of reasons, we have rejected these alternatives.

Indeed, discussions with a number of senior Community officers concerned with the issue reveal a strong consensus in favor of the proposed approach, as well as agreement that [Redacted] is the best choice for the role. There is also a strong feeling that, because of the Community nature of the task and in order to strengthen his access to key players as well as to

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reinforce his DCI mandate, [ ] should be responsible in this activity to the Director through the Chairman of the NIC. Bob Gates and Wayne Boring concur in this recommendation. In view of my own involvement in the subject, I would expect to serve as the NIO action officer for C/NIC.

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Finally, on the policy side, we have discussed this issue with the NSC Staff (Don Gregg, Sven Kraemer, Cary Lord.) They are strongly supportive of the proposed initiative and offered their active help in sorting out the intelligence interface with policy, especially as regards linkages among the key players -- State, ACDA and ICA.

If you approve of the proposed approach, I could work with your staff to develop an appropriate draft DCI directive to NFIB members for your consideration.

*Hans*  
Hans Heymann, Jr.

APPROVE

*W. J. Casey*

Director of Central Intelligence

16 JUN 1982

DATE

DISAPPROVE:

Director of Central Intelligence

DATE

OTHER:

Director of Central Intelligence

DATE

*If this is worth doing, I suggest [ ] be appointed as an NIO/Monitor for a PCR on chemical warfare in addition to his other duties while discharging coordination role.*

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI  
DDCI

THROUGH : C/NIC

FROM : Hans Heymann, Jr.  
NIO-at-L


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Distribution:

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1 - OSWR, [redacted] (b)(3)  
2 - NIO-at-L/HH  
1 - DDI Reg.  
NIO-at-Large/HHeymann, [redacted] (b)(3)  
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