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CIA		
ANCHORY FT GEORGE G MEADE MD, SECSTATE WASHDC//INR/DSITA/SCT//, DIA WASHINGTON DC, JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC, DA WASHINGTON DC, DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC, ONI WASHINGTON DC, CNO WASHINGTON DC, DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC//ATAC/0022//, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, JWAC DAHLGREN VA//J2//, DEPT OF TREASURY, DOEHQ//IN//, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SECRET SERVICE//ID//, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASH DC//OIPR//, DEA WASHDC//OI//, US CUSTOMS SERVICE W, COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION//S-60//, FAA NATIONAL HQ, US NRC WDC, USCINCEUR INTEL VAIHINGEN GE//J-2//, JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//DOA//, US SURVEY DIV SHAPE BE, CDRUSAREUR DCSINT HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB-IAD//, UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE//INO//, COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2/N22//, COMSIXTHFLT, USCINCTRANS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL, USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB, COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//, USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA, JFIC NORFOLK VA, CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA, COMMARFORLANT.  S E C R E T/NOFORN		
SERIAL: PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC)	; DIA FOR TERRORISM.	(b)(3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY		
WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE		
REPORT CLASS S E C R E TNOFORN		
DIST: 23 FEBRUARY 2001		•
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COMMENTS BY CSE DIRECTOR NONO LUTULA ON THE STATUS OF

SUBJ:

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	THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DROC PRESIDENT LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA AND EXPECTATIONS OF CSE'S ROLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOSEPH KABILA		
DOI:		(	b)(1)
			b)(3) (b)(1)
SOURCE:		`	
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1		·	
SUMMARY:	NONE		
TEXT:	1. NONO ((LUTULA)), DIRECTOR OF		(b)(1)
THE NATIO	ONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE (CSE) AND A MEMBER OF THE		(b)(3)
	ON INVESTIGATING THE ASSASSINATION OF FORMER DEMOCRATIC	•	(5)(5)
	OF THE CONGO (DROC) PRESIDENT LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA, TOLD	·	
	F THAT THE ASSASSINATION WAS CARRIED OUT BY TWO MEMBERS OF		
1.	IDENT'S CLOSE PROTECTION DETAIL, IN A CONSPIRACY THAT LAIMED HAD BEEN ORGANIZED OUTSIDE OF THE DROC.	•	(b)(1)
.!	LUTULA DID NOT IDENTIFY WHERE THE CONSPIRACY HAD BEEN		(b)(1)
	D OR BY WHOM.) LUTULA IDENTIFIED THE ASSASSINS AS		(b)(3)
<del>-</del>	" AND GEORGES ((MIRINDI)), BOTH MEMBERS OF THE BASHI TRIBE		•
i	E TO FORMER CONGOLESE ARMED FORCES COMMANDANT ANSELME	•	
( (MASASU)	)) NINDANGA, WHO WAS EXECUTED ON KABILA'S ORDERS IN		
NOVEMBER	2000. COMMENT: RACHIDI IS RACHID		(b)(1)
KASAREKA	, WHO WAS NAMED IN PRESS REPORTS AS THE PRESIDENTIAL		(b)(3)
1	D WHO FIRED THE SHOTS THAT KILLED KABILA ON 16 JANUARY		( )( )
2001.)	•		
:	ACCORDING TO LITTLE MIDING! HAD DEEN INTERDOCATED		
1	ACCORDING TO LUTULA, MIRINDI HAD BEEN INTERROGATED LY BY FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY		
1	MILE ((KANENGELE)), WHO HAD PREPARED A REPORT ON MIRINDI		
19	RELATIONSHIP TO MASASU, THIS REPORT APPEARS NOT TO HAVE		
!	ED UPON AT THE TIME. LUTULA ALSO SAID THAT COMMUNICATION		
BETWEEN I	KABILA'S CLOSE PROTECTION DETAIL AND OTHER DROC SECURITY		
ORGANIZA:	FIONS HAD BROKEN DOWN BECAUSE OF MISTRUST AND		
MISCOMMU	NICATION, WHICH LUTULA BLAMED ON THE CLOSE PROTECTION		
DETA L'S	"MISTRUST" OF ANR AND CSE AND A "RUPTURE" OF		•
COLLABORA	ATION BETWEEN THEM.		
3	LOOKING AHEAD, LUTULA SAID THAT PRESIDENT JOSEPH	·	
	) WOULD CONSULT WITH THE CSE IN THE FORMATION OF A NEW		
	NT AND THAT THE ORGANIZATION WOULD NEED TO PROVE ITSELF TO		
	PRESIDENT AS A RELIABLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION. LUTULA	•	
SAID THAT	CSE WAS EXPECTED TO HELP JOSEPH KABILA TO BECOME A		
STATESMAN	N AND TO TAKE POLITICAL POSITIONS THAT WOULD ENHANCE HIS		
STATURE E	BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE DROC.		
	ANTHER A CHARGE WINE WAS A LOOP AND A COORD AND A DE-		
	LUTULA STATED THAT THE 1999 LUSAKA ACCORDS NEEDED TO BE AND THAT THEY HAD BECOME A SIGNIFICANT HANDICAP ON DROC.		
	AIMED THAT THE ACCORDS HAD BEEN FORMULATED BY THE U.S.		
1	THEY HAD GIVEN MEMBERS OF REBEL FACTIONS EQUAL STATUS AS		
	S OF THE STATES INVOLVED. LUTULA SAID THAT 30 OF THE 50		
	HO HAD SIGNED THE ACCORDS HAD LEFT THE REBELLION, AND HE		
*	THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO SUBORN THESE FORMER		
:	N ORDER TO OBTAIN A MAJORITY AND, THEREFORE, CONTROL ANY		
EVENTUAL	INTERCONGOLESE POLITICAL DIALOGUE.	• •	
<u> </u>			/L\/4\
5.	COMMENT: DURING THE EARLIEST STAGES OF THE		(b)(1)
INVESTIGA	ATION, THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY WAS MARKED BY A LACK OF		(b)(3)
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EVEN BASIC INFORMATION ON THE ASSASSINATION, POSSIBLE PERPETRATORS. THERE WERE NO DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFYING THE MEMBERS OF KABILA'S DETAIL, THEIR WEAPONS AND PROCEDURES, OR EVEN THE LAYOUT OF THE "MARBLE PALACE" WHERE THE ASSASSINATION TOOK PLACE.)	
POC: COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.  ACQ:  DISSEM:	(b)(1) (b)(3)
	(b)(1) (b)(3)
USUN, US SURVEY DIVISION SHAPE, USCINCEUR, EUCOM JAC, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT, USCINCSOC, JSOC, USCINCTRANS, USCINCJFCOM, JFIC, CINCLANTFLT, COMMARFORLANT	(b)(1) (b)(3)
WARNING: REPORT CLASS S E C R E TNOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.	
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