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23 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Contact with Mr. David Young, Formerly of White House Staff

1. The undersigned had one personal contact with Mr. Young, which occurred on Saturday morning, 16 September 1972. The meeting lasted about 30 minutes (roughly from 12:00 noon to 12:30 P.M. on that date) and took place in the following circumstances.

(a) On that Saturday morning, the DCI Duty Officer was [redacted] Sometime before 12:00 noon [redacted] received a telephone call from Mr. Young during which the latter complained about an alleged "security leak" to the press from either the Central Intelligence Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency. Specifically, Mr. Young referred to a Dan Rather (CBS) broadcast of 15 September which allegedly contained a whole series of leaks — including a report that both the CIA and the DIA had informed the President that the bombing and mining campaign against North Vietnam had not cut off Hanoi's supply lines to its forces in the south. Dan Rather, in his broadcast, attributed part of his information to an earlier story by Tad Szulc of the New York Times. (A transcript of the Dan Rather broadcast is attached at TAB A.)

(b)(3)

(b) The above description of this telephone call was given to me orally by [redacted] after the fact. [redacted] also told me that in the same telephone call Mr. Young had requested a complete list of all individuals, by name, who had access to any of our reports which might have been the basis of this leak. Mr. Young further informed [redacted] that he was going to come out to the CIA building in Langley to talk to [redacted] and asked [redacted] to have the requested information ready for him.

(c) After having finished his telephone conversation with Mr. Young, [redacted] called Mr. Edward Proctor, who was on duty in the office of the DDI that Saturday. Mr. Proctor, in turn, called the undersigned, who was the SAVA Duty Officer, and asked the undersigned to determine what CIA report or reports might have provided the information in the alleged leak, and who had received copies of any such report or reports.

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(d) The requested information was readily available, and I took it to Mr. Proctor's office. He and I both proceeded directly to [redacted] who was sitting in the Director's office. At that point I explained to [redacted] that the Dan Rather broadcast was based in part on an earlier Tad Szulc article, and that we had already sent a memorandum to the Director (and to the Director of Security) in which we described three Agency reports from which the Tad Szulc leak might have come. I gave a copy of this memorandum to Mr. [redacted] and told him that the same three Agency reports were also the only ones from which the Dan Rather "leak" could have come. This memorandum from SAVA to the Director also listed all individuals outside the Agency who had received copies of the three reports. After reading the memorandum and discussing it briefly with me, [redacted] asked me to remain with him and participate in the discussion with Mr. Young, and I agreed. Mr. Proctor then returned to his own office, and to the best of my knowledge was not further involved in the incident. (Attached at TAB B is a copy of the SAVA memorandum to the Director described above. Also at TAB B are a copy of the buckslip under which the memorandum was sent to the Director of Security, and a copy of the New York Times article by Tad Szulc.)

(e) Mr. Young arrived shortly thereafter. [redacted] and I explained to him that the Agency had already made a thorough check of its reporting in view of the possibility of a "leak" in the earlier Tad Szulc article, and that Dan Rather by his own statement had obtained the information which he had attributed to CIA from the Szulc article. We then allowed Mr. Young to read the SAVA memorandum to the Director which is attached at TAB B. My recollection is that Mr. Young took notes from this memorandum, but that he did not take a copy away with him. I am not, however, certain that my memory is correct on this point.

(f) Mr. Young then requested that we provide him with the names of all individuals within the Agency who had worked on or had access to any of the three reports described in the SAVA memorandum to the Director. [redacted] was reluctant to provide such a list, and for several minutes there was an exchange between him and Mr. Young on the propriety of our providing a list of analysts' names. Finally we compromised and gave Mr. Young the names of the heads of the offices within CIA which had been involved

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in preparing the reports. To the best of my recollection, the names which we provided were:

Mr. Edward Proctor

[redacted]
Mr. Paul Walsh

Mr. Richard Lehman


Mr. John Huizenga

Mr. Maurice Ernst

My own name, of course, was also given to Mr. Young. Mr. Young then indicated that he might contact the Director on the following Monday in an effort to obtain more names. The meeting ended amicably at that point, and Mr. Young departed.

(g) The following day, 17 September 1972, [redacted] wrote a very brief note concerning this incident to [redacted] and the undersigned. In this note (see TAB C) [redacted] indicated that he was going to discuss the incident with the Director on Monday, 18 September. I do not know whether he did or did not do so. I also do not know whether Mr. Young ever contacted any Agency representative again on this subject.

2. I have had no other contacts, before or since, with Mr. David Young.



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