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5 November 1959

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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PART II (continued)

extremist factions and brought the party to the point of an open break. The present leadership, which has the support of Moscow in its moderate position on internal and external issues, probably will be able to contain the dissidents by making some concessions.

[redacted]

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CEYLON Page 7

Ceylon's Dahanayake government remains in a vulnerable position despite its survival of a no-confidence motion in Parliament on 30 October. Cabinet dissension, the ruling group's dangerously slim parliamentary majority, and charges implicating leading government officials in the assassination of Bandaranaike make for instability. Prime Minister Dahanayake's concern over these factors probably was responsible for the adjournment of Parliament until 24 November, after only three days in session.

[redacted]

(b)(3)

UNREST INCREASING IN BELGIAN CONGO Page 8

Severe rioting in the Belgian Congo interior near Stanleyville, which cost the lives of about 70 Africans during the week end of 31 October, marked the first spread of serious nationalist disorders outside the lower Congo. The clashes between natives and Belgian troops followed in the wake of attacks on Belgian policy by several nationalist groups. In Brussels the government has accepted opposition Socialist proposals for round-table conferences with Congolese leaders in November in an effort to ensure the holding of the communal and territorial elections in the Congo in December.

[redacted]

(b)(3)

FRENCH ALGERIAN PROGRAM Page 10

In view of the broad public support De Gaulle has won for his Algerian program, announced on 16 September, his current "information" campaign appears primarily designed to overcome army dissatisfaction. He has felt it necessary to call for "absolute loyalty and discipline" in carrying out his policies, and the emphasis being placed by top military and civilian officials on France's long-term presence in Algeria seems aimed at army extremists who fear De Gaulle may "abandon" Algeria. This apparent hardening of the French position has distressed moderates who had hoped to see early and fruitful negotiations between Paris and the rebels.

[redacted]

(b)(3)

ITALY MAY GRANT TRADE CONCESSIONS TO USSR Page 11

Pressure by Italian industrialists may lead the Segni government to grant the USSR substantial additional credits following the forthcoming Italian-Soviet trade talks in Rome.

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
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Chinese Communist action along the Tibetan frontier has highlighted divisions in the Indian party along "nationalist" and "internationalist" lines, while the failure of the "Kerala experiment" emphasized the conflict between proponents of a "peaceful, parliamentary" approach to power and those advocating more aggressive tactics. Party Secretary Ajoy Ghosh, caught in the middle, leads a faction favoring a policy which in effect compromises differences between the extreme positions on both internal and external questions.

The increasing isolation of the Communist party in India, due to its inability to take an unequivocal stand for or against Peiping's actions, has caused a greater upheaval in Communist ranks than any previous issue. Alarmed over the prospect of losing much popular support, certain "nationalist" Communists, notably parliamentary party leader S. A. Dange, were impelled to side with the general Indian reaction against China and publicly air their disagreement with the official party position.

The moderate leadership probably will manage to contain the extremists by making some concessions to their demands. The recent renewal of Sino-Indian border clashes in Ladakh has left the moderates with no



GHOSH

alternative but to take a more critical stand against Peiping, thus narrowing the gap between them and the "nationalists." On internal policy, the moderate leadership probably will appease the proponents of aggressive tactics by allowing them to organize a more extensive underground apparatus in case of future need, while outwardly the party maintains the parliamentary approach.

The present leadership will be aided in its efforts to keep the party on a moderate course by the numerous expressions of support Ghosh has recently received from top Soviet party leaders. Moscow apparently feels that Communist interests in India--at least while Nehru is in power--will be best served by avoiding either the "nationalist" or "internationalist" extremes.

(b)(3)

CEYLON

The Ceylonese Government is in a vulnerable position despite the defeat on 30 October of a no-confidence motion by 48 to 43 votes. Serious cabinet dissension, the ruling party's dangerously slim parliamentary

majority, and rumors implicating leading government officials in the assassination of Prime Minister Bandaranaike cast doubt on Dahanayake's ability to maintain the government in power through the remaining 18 months of its term.

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During the vote the government rallied its maximum strength, which had been reduced shortly beforehand by the dismissal of a cabinet minister indirectly implicated in the assassination and by the resignation of a government worker. Two opposition members were absent, and two abstained. The ruling group's success thus depended on the continued reluctance of a few opposition elements to force early elections and--for the first time since the present government was elected under Bandaranaike in April 1956--on the votes of six nonelected appointees.

Public awareness of charges implicating top government officials in Bandaranaike's assassination probably has increased considerably since the relaxation of press censorship on 20 October. The press has heaped ridicule and criticism on Dahanayake and the cabinet, and has supported opposition demands that Finance Minister De Zoysa resign because of his association with one of several

suspects and the rumored involvement of his two brothers. One government member during the no-confidence debate advocated De Zoysa's expulsion. At least six cabinet members also favor such a move, and it seems unlikely that the government can avoid dismissing or at least suspending him pending the outcome of the investigations.

Dahanayake's concern over his government's position probably was responsible for the adjournment of Parliament until 24 November, after only a three-day session. In the interim, Dahanayake presumably will try to consolidate his position as leader of the ruling party, to mend or at least suppress the government's rifts, and possibly to increase his parliamentary majority by bargaining with moderate opposition elements. To accomplish this he would have to prove as able a tactician as Bandaranaike and possibly to improve on Bandaranaike's efforts to cope with the island's long-standing economic and communal problems. (b)(3)

UNREST INCREASING IN BELGIAN CONGO

Severe rioting in the interior of the Belgian Congo near Stanleyville, which cost the lives of about 70 Africans during the week end of 31 October, marked the first spread of serious nationalist disorders outside the lower Congo. The clashes between natives and Belgian troops, in the wake of attacks on Belgian policy by several nationalist groups, suggest that nation-

alist extremism may have reached proportions which will jeopardize territorial and communal elections scheduled for December.

The Stanleyville disturbances were triggered by a meeting of the Congo National Movement (MNC) independence group, at which Patrice Lumumba, leader of one of its factions, called for a campaign of civil

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