

~~EYES ONLY~~
~~SECRET~~

16 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: JMARC Meeting with DDP

PARTICIPANTS: Messrs. Bissell, Barnes, King, Esterline, Eisemann, Hawkins, Drain, Gaines, Beerli.

1. The meeting was held to bring the DDP up-to-date as to JMARC operational planning on the eve of the DCI/DDP briefing of the President-Elect. On the day previous, a JMARC staff meeting had crystallized a new concept, as set forth in the attached memorandum.

2. At the outset of the meeting, C/WH/4 raised two related but separate problems: the loan to Guatemala and the provision of military assistance to quell the revolt.

3. The DDP heard out the JMARC presentation and raised the following questions:

a. Would the effort now contemplated be enough? (JMARC personnel put it that the success of this effort depended in large part on the internal reaction thereto. That reaction should not be importantly different whether our operation consisted of a 600-man mountain-top perimeter or a 1500-3000 man beachhead with airstrip. A more meaningful contrast would be between either of those actions on the one hand and a major joint CIA/DOD action on the other.) The DDP requested that JMARC planning encompass an additional 600-man force, for possible use in a second mountain area.

*not finished
? /*

b. What policy clearances were necessary? The following were enumerated:

[18 Nov 60]

(1) Approval to use a ZI installation for up to 800 men. (JMARC undertook to provide the DDP by Friday noon a specific recommendation complete with installation blueprint and cost estimate.)

(2) Approval to use the Canal Zone facility for up to 200 trainees.

(3) Approval to launch strikes from Nicaragua.

(4) Approval to launch air resupply from U.S. bases.

(5) Approval for one LST, refitted for the purposes of this operation.

EYES ONLY
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4. It was understood that the general reaction of the President-Elect would perhaps determine the further progress of the project. Subject to his indicated general agreement, the DDP undertook to get answers to the above policy questions next week. JMARC undertook to proceed at once to establish directives and instructions to accomplish the revised plan, the date of launching to be 1 February.

5. In general discussion of JMARC problems, it was agreed that consideration would be given to:


a. Gaining internal approval not to polygraph Army increments to the training program.

b. Establishing an officer-in-charge, with full responsibility in the field, in connection with any Nicaragua construction.

c. Reducing substantially the requirements for internal staff clearances.

6. At the close of the meeting the Chief, WH/4, having earlier made passing reference to the possible requirement for U.S. and allied recognition of a provisional government, also stressed the possible requirement that allied governments jointly support the operation from its inception.

7. Very tentative budget figures (in the order of a \$42,000,000 total) were left for the DDP's review.


Richard D. Drain
C/WH/4/P&P

Attachment:

Pre-DDP Staff Meeting

WH/4/P&P: R.D.Drain:jss (17 Nov 60)

Distribution:

1 - C/WH/4

1 - COPS/WH/4

1 - Mallard, Barkley, File

(b)(3)

EYES ONLY

SECRET

15 November 1960

PRE-DDP STAFF MEETING

1. Our original concept is now seen to be unachievable in the face of the controls Castro has instituted. There will not be the internal unrest earlier believed possible, nor will the defenses permit the type strike first planned.

2. Our second concept (1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beach with airstrip) is also now seen to be unachievable, except as a joint Agency/DOD action. Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we cannot staff nor otherwise timely create the base and lift needed.

*This
was
ZAMA
IN EARL*

3. Our present concept:

*But if not
achievable in mid-Nov 60,
what made it feasible in April?*

Land a force of 600 men by LST on beaches from which they would at once move inland and create a safe area in a mountain fastness. These, and those who joined them from within, to be resupplied by airdrop. To launch in late January.

4. Needed to bring the above about:

- a. One LST from Navy, to be outfitted by Navy at our direction.
- b. 200 new recruits, in addition to the 70 in pipeline. Believed that the recruiting would take 5 weeks, the training 4 more.
- c. Use of the Nicaragua airstrip (with repairs thought to take 10 days).
- d. Use of Panama for either training the 200 new recruits, or for holding 200 from JMADD while the new recruits are trained there.
- e. Use of or comparable area for final, Case Officer type training of up to 60 men going in as small groups.
- f. Permission to resupply the 600-man lodgment from U.S. bases (best: Opalocka).
- g. Clear delineation of DPD-JMARC command lines so that the latter can issue orders to the former.
- h. An intimation to the State Department that part of the support for the 600-man lodgment may have to be in the form of U.S. (and allied) recognition of that force and its nominal leadership as a provisional government.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

EYES ONLY

AWD PERSONNEL ^{File}
Black Notebook - ER Job
72-712, Box 9

Approved for Release: 2018/05/01 C03241934

11
BRIEFING JFK RE CUBA

18 Nov 60

~~SECRET~~
VI

(19) Chris

1 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Maxwell D. Taylor

On Friday, November 18, 1960, Mr. Bissell and I briefed the President-elect at Palm Beach, Florida. This briefing included a status report with respect to certain important covert operations and in particular the Cuban Operation. The particular purpose of the briefing was to bring the President-elect up to date with regard to the policy paper on Cuba which had been approved by the President on March 16, 1960 and to outline the progress which had been made towards accomplishing the aforementioned objectives set out in that paper, all of which called for action in the covert field.

It seemed important to advise the President-elect of these facts since he was receiving a large number of suggestions and was under considerable pressure from certain Congressional leaders who were not aware of the action programs which were being developed in the Cuban situation.

The purpose of the briefing was not to solicit the President-elect's approval or disapproval of the program but merely to acquaint him of its existence.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

AWD/ji
1 - DCI

SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/05/01 C03241934

WHERE TO GO
FOR BASES

18 NOV 60

18 November 1960

Pushing for
U.S. bases

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Points re Cuba for Discussion at Special Group Meeting, Saturday, 19 November 1960

1. The present plan assumes the possibility of continuing the use of the Guatemala bases until some affirmative move against Cuba is imminent. If this is not possible, there will of course be a need for additional real estate. On the assumption of continued use of Guatemalan bases, the following points arise:

- a. The removal of about 60 or 70 of the present trainees to form teams for dispatch to Cuba in the very near future. Presumably these teams could be brought up in small numbers and sent from Miami or Key West. The infiltration will in all probability be by water.
- b. The places occupied by the above 60 or 70 trainees can be filled by new individuals who will be recruited for training.
- c. An additional 200 trainees should be recruited in order to raise the total number of trainees to roughly 600 or battalion strength. Some place must be found to train these additional 200 men. One possibility is the new base placed in the vicinity of Camp Randolph in Panama. If this is used, it will require some expansion but this can be done without too much trouble. Another possibility is Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua which the Somozas would permit. At present this consists of a good pier and it has a landing strip but money would have to be spent for facilities and for all support assets. A third possibility, though perhaps remote, is one of the Bahamas. Permission would still have to be obtained for this from the British. Finally, some U.S. real estate is possible if approved by the Special Group. In the case of the U.S., obviously two further possibilities exist: one is to use a military or other official installation; and another is to obtain private property for the job. In the latter case, the situation would be essentially the same as existed in the bases said to have been photographed in the recent Life article.
- d. Finding additional bases if more than 200 additional trainees are to be recruited and prepared for action. The reason for this is that it would seem impossible from the point of view of timing to start training these individuals as a reserve only after the departure of the initial battalion. The time gap under these circumstances would be too great to make the reserve practical. Consequently training should overlap ~~the~~ to some extent. The only way that I can see that this can be accomplished

SECRET

Cuba from 8 Oct 60

- 2 -

is through U.S. real estate as mentioned above or Puerto Cabezas or conceivably a sizeable Bahama island if approved.

2. On the assumption that the present Guatemala bases must be vacated, all the above points arise plus the need for real estate on which to place the present trainees in Guatemala.

3. Although it is recognized that there are many practicalities to Puerto Cabezas, I, for one, would like to state a very strong view that the use of Nicaragua for training, i.e. over a reasonably extended period of time, would be highly undesirable. The news will get around and it will be a political disaster for the U.S. with respect to all political elements in Latin America who have any association or similarity of views with Betancourt. In the long run this would, I think, mean that even if successful in Cuba, we would lose an unacceptable amount of face with these countries. Conceivably, if we carefully prepared the ground with Betancourt et al in advance, we could explain our position. In view of the type of operation involved, however, such an explanation is substantially impossible and probably undesirable. Puerto Cabezas might be used on the other hand as a strike base *ugh!* (faute de mieux) provided the use was for a very short period of time. Again, however, I would hope that for the same reasons mentioned above, Nicaragua would only be used as a last resort.

4. Under any circumstances a strike base must be developed. It will be remembered that ~~that~~ the original plan called for propaganda activities, training activities and then "invasion" activities of some sort. ~~For~~ the propaganda is reasonably in hand, all the foregoing discussion has to do with training activities while to date nothing has been accomplished in finding a strike base. The present sites in Guatemala are not adequate, nor is any other available real estate. In addition, the present plan does not contemplate the immediate acquisition after the first assault of a strike base on Cuban soil. Of course the best possibility for such a base would be U.S. territory. As indicated above, probably the next best from the purely military view point would be Nicaragua while other possibilities are pretty limited either for political reasons, e.g. the Bahamas, or for the geographic reasons already indicated.

C. Tracy Barnes
A/DDP/A

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EYES ONLY

16 Nov 60

Agency re. report original Cuba file
COG Pol. File

SPL. GROUP
MTGS - CUBA

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS - CUBA

MISC #19

16 November 1960.

1. Mr. Merchant said that Assistant Secretary Mann has come to the firm conclusion that the continuance of our base in Guatemala "places too much strain on the government of Guatemala" and that he believes this operation must be moved to the U. S. On the other hand, Mr. Merchant is unwilling to accept such a move under today's circumstances. He thus perceives two alternatives: (a) moving the Guatemala installation to other countries outside the U. S., under the same general type of cover, and expanding the scope as necessary, (b) to change the entire basic policy of the U. S. toward Cuba, i. e., to adopt an overt anti-Castro policy, leading probably to a break in diplomatic relations and a series of appropriate acts of an overt nature.

2. Mr. Gray said that it was his understanding that the U. K. would be willing to provide us with all the facilities necessary as an alternative to Guatemala and other required expansion. All of the others present, including myself, said that it was highly unlikely that we could get enough concessions of this nature and magnitude. I said further that, while I was not in a position to prejudge the situation at the moment, there would probably be real difficulties in obtaining alternate sites elsewhere outside the U. S., sufficient to meet all requirements.

[PARRON T. ...]

3. Mr. Merchant then referred to a message, which none of the rest of us had seen, from Ambassador Muccio. He said this described the refusal of a group of junior Guatemalan officers to go along with orders of the President of Guatemala to commit elements of the Guatemala air force, and some of the Cuban trainees, against the rebels. Mr. Merchant appeared to view this development with extreme gravity, commenting that it might well lead President Ydigoras to withdraw permission for us to continue in Guatemala. I said I was unable to comment intelligently, not having seen the message, but in view of Ydigoras' past attitudes I would be surprised if this particular incident would have such a far-reaching effect.

Dumb comment
re: Ydigoras
asked for
MAD unit.

4. I also said that our people were at that moment engaged in a searching re-evaluation of the entire situation, including the spectrum of our capabilities and the possibilities of successful conclusion of the Cuban operation as originally conceived. All of the members of

~~SECRET~~

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EYES ONLY

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the Group seemed pleased with this. Mr. Merchant then said that he considers it essential to have a meeting before next week, and Saturday morning was finally decided upon.

5. I also took this opportunity to discuss the draft memo of suggested guidance for the Department of Justice, which it had been agreed would be prepared for Mr. Yeagley. Mr. Gray concurred; Messrs. Merchant and Irwin concurred subject to further checking within their respective departments. I raised the question of the proper channel through which Mr. Yeagley would receive this advice. After some discussion, it was decided that the best method might be for the members of the Group to initial the paper and send it directly to Mr. Yeagley. It was agreed that I would discuss this matter with him. (Note: I later talked to Yeagley telling him we would ready with the final paper immediately after the Saturday meeting. He thought that the proposed method of transmission would be satisfactory, although he wanted to talk to the Attorney General about it. He said the only possible objection he could perceive is that the succeeding incumbents might find this procedure insufficient. He also said that he had just had a report from his representative who had been investigating the situation of exile groups in the Miami area. This individual reported that several sources had suggested that legal action against a few people of the Masferrer type would be beneficial to over-all U.S. interests; Yeagley was pleased to hear that our guidance was along the same general lines.)

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EYES ONLY

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS - CUBA

*Majority of group
Oppose continuing +
want more overt action.
No one pushes
SO BISSELL/MANN
continue*

19 Nov 60

19 November 1960.

1. Mr. Merchant began by stating that in his opinion we are putting more burden on the Guatemalan government with our training base than that government can support for very long. He noted that Mr. Mann believes the solution is to move our training activities to the U.S., but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get away with this, particularly if an increase in numbers is contemplated. Therefore, the only solution would seem to be to move to another base or bases in other countries; this would involve the same burden on the other countries as now exists with respect to Guatemala. Although he has not discussed this point with Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take another look at Cuba and if the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains unchanged then we should consider shifting our entire posture. This would involve a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a government in exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some training in the U.S.

*Merchant for
and Guat. +
more
overt*

2. Mr. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain training anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he does think we could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said that he believes everyone in Guatemala knows by now the true nature of our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized before the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. rather than in Latin America. He recognized that this would be highly embarrassing for this country, but that for most Latin American governments it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending OAS investigation of Guatemala, and conceded that OAS support would be required to carry out training successfully in the U.S. To this, Mr. Merchant replied that he did not think exposure of such activities on American soil would be acceptable, particularly in the U.N.

*Mann
wants out +
controversy
(unclassified)*

*Strange
idea*

3. Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time with Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Guatemala. He said that we have developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside

*COG Pol. Fall
SPL. GROUP
MTGS - CUBA*

SECRET

MISC #19

SECRET
EYES ONLY
-2-

Bissell
1. Recognize from or Guat.
2. Saipan. Saipan as most
secure for long (later
then US or PR)

investigation, but that this is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He said that within about four weeks an alternate site could be established in Nicaragua but that this would be very expensive, would tie us into the Somoza brothers, and would call attention to Nicaragua in the same way as Guatemala.

4. Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities for constructive change in the training operation, some for the immediate future and some over a period of longer range. They include:

a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles. This story could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long or how effectively.

b. A guarded military facility in the U.S. This could be handled more securely, but the existence of an area where peculiar things are going on could not be kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be private property such as the King Ranch, but this would take longer to arrange than a military base.

c. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is fairly remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already trying to get the U.S. Marines out.

d. [redacted] Saipan. This would be very secure but would require a large amount of airlift.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone. At this location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost certainly know where they were.

5. [redacted] that a military base could be made available, such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas. He said that the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort of cooperation with Tracy Voorhees' Committee on Cuban Refugees. He felt also that the U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has been contemplated to date. General Lansdale said that he and General Bonesteel were of the same opinion.

*Does not
for more
overt (b)(3)
action
(suggested
by Bon-
esteel &
Lansdale)*

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SECRET
EYES ONLY

6. Mr. Gray supported this general position, stating that when the current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was different than it is now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable amounts of bloc arms and have organized a militia, and Mr. Gray wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be. Mr. Dulles acknowledged that it would be necessary to have internal support if the Castro government were to be successfully overthrown; he felt that there is reason to believe such support might develop, perhaps within the militia itself.

Gray for more info + doubts adequacy of force.

** Dulles
1. has
internal
support +
believes it
might be
available*

7. Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for a one or two year wait, presumably to see whether the tide might not turn in our favor. He said that in the meantime we could infiltrate small groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone a decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general connection, Mr. Bissell said that even if it is finally decided that overt U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of trained Cubans available. Therefore, our present activities should be continued in any case.

*Mann -
wait + see*

*Bissell
continuation
of operations
will be need
for case*

8. Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of splitting the present body of trainees into three or four groups should be examined urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann's estimate that the OAS investigation might take place in two or three weeks). Alternate sites to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFB and Fort Randolph. The latter location should absorb no more than 200. [redacted] cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should at the present time be considered as a holding operation rather than a continuation or stepping up of present training. The possibilities of establishing a kind of CGC under the Voorhees auspices should be examined.

*Critical advice
become
MUSH!*

(b)(3)

9. Mr. Parrott tabled the draft of suggested advice to Mr. Yeagley in connection with Cuban exiles. [redacted] it was not desirable to give Mr. Yeagley any piece of paper. He suggested that Yeagley should simply be advised that the Group feels the best method of procedure might be to prosecute one test case, e.g. Masferrer, but not to institute wholesale prosecutions. In answer to a question, Mr. Parrott stated that he did not know whether this procedure would satisfy Mr. Yeagley, but that he would discuss it with Mr. Gray, who had by that time left the meeting. (Later, Mr. Gray talked to Yeagley, who appeared satisfied with the oral guidance.)

(b)(3)

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~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

-4-

10. Mr. Bissell summarized the results of the first U-2 flight over Cuba and asked for the Group's permission for two additional sorties to fill in the remaining 50% coverage. The Group agreed, subject to Mr. Gray's concurrence. (This was obtained later.)

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INTERNAL CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

PLAN FOR BRIEF
JFK -- all sorts of
new versions!

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: C/WH/4/P&P

61
17
8
JFK

NO.

DATE 17 Nov 60

1. Use two
600 men
to me to
interview

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

2. Joint Support
of allied govt. for
the op.

1. C/WH/4

17 NOV 1960

JFK

Chief WHD

~~*NOTE~~

3. Evidence that
what became Zapata
was here ruled out.

4. ~~Assistance~~ had
been given by
Frontier to Gull staff
(11-13 Nov 60)

EYES ONLY
SECRET

VI

EYES ONLY

SECRET

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS - CUBA

where to go, want
COG Pol. Fall
how to do it
23 Nov 60
SPL GROUP

MTG - Cuba

MISC #19

23 November 1960

on
of 2001-1960
from the
notes!

1. Mr. Bissell reported that further consideration following the meeting of last Saturday had led to a tentative conclusion that Saipan would be the best place to which to move the bulk of the Cuban trainees. He emphasized the security advantages of the location, and said that it is believed the move can be accomplished with our own transportation plus two roundtrips by C-124s. These we would request the Department of Defense to provide. We would probably move some small commando-type units - about 50 men - to Fort Fort Randolph. Mr. Bissell also stressed the fact that additional construction costs would be significantly less at Saipan than anywhere else.

Bissell pushes Saipan

2. The DCI agreed in general with this preliminary thinking. He urged, however, that the matter of morale of the trainees be borne constantly in mind, and that the move not be accomplished all at once. General Lansdale agreed. Mr. Dulles also asked that President Ydigoras be informed.

Dulles
deferring
on Saipan

3. Mr. Bissell concluded that plans would not be firmed up until receipt of Defense's report on facilities available in the U.S.

4. Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines. He explained that we have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to give much support to it. He said that it is highly questionable whether this attempt will take place on the reported time schedule, or indeed at all, but emphasized that this illustrates how initiative might be taken by others, so that we could be presented with drastic requests for assistance on very short notice. Mr. Bissell also mentioned the report of possible major sabotage to be carried out in the very near future. In addition, he said that we now have six B-26's, plus eleven crews, available for combat, with other aircraft for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might be used for refueling in the event of actual operations, but that the immediate objective would be to obtain strips on the Isle of Pines. Mr. Dulles remarked that this would of course require an active revolt.

Bissell was a critic - he ready in com.

Cuban crews - if so, not combat ready!

Bissell not thinking forward at this time?

5. Mr. Dulles also mentioned the proposal by Peter Grace to encourage Father Peyton (described as a sort of Catholic Billy Graham) to carry out activities in Cuba.

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