




Director of
Central
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Special Analysis

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
Gandhi Under Stress

Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's frustration about the lack of progress toward his foreign policy goals and the growing influence on him of his personal staff and of military and intelligence officials probably presage an increasingly hardline Indian foreign policy, particularly toward India's neighbors.

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~~Although Gandhi remains personally committed to strengthening relations with the US, he may become more impatient with what he views as US delays in releasing advanced technology.~~

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
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Gandhi's reactions over the past seven months to three incidents involving Pakistan—the war scare in January, the attempt on his life in October, and the hijacking of the Pan Am airliner in Karachi in August—demonstrate his frustration with his inability to improve relations with Islamabad.

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His public attacks on Pakistani President Zia during each of the crises and his willingness to approve a show of force during the recent border crisis eventually gave way, however, to attempts at conciliation.

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Gandhi's growing impatience with the performance of cabinet and senior foreign policy officials has resulted in several abrupt firings and resignations in recent months, reducing the influence of longtime professional diplomats in the Ministry of External Affairs. He is now consulting a few people on his personal staff and officials in military and intelligence circles who have tended to take a hard line on India's relations with its neighbors. They argue that the projection of military power and covert action can advance Gandhi's goals.

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Gandhi is also turning to high-risk physical activities, fast driving and parasailing, probably to relieve the tensions he feels in his job. He has told the press that he misses his privacy and time with his family and resents the intrusion of security officers and procedures.

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Changing Tactics To Achieve Goals

~~Gandhi shows no sign of abandoning his goals of strengthening India's relations with the US while maintaining ties to the USSR and of securing India's preeminence in the region. Although he prefers deliberate, nonconfrontational diplomacy, Gandhi is likely to seek~~

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[Redacted]

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scapegoats for failures and to turn more frequently to hardliners in the military and the intelligence services to help get things done, particularly when dealing with neighboring states. (S NF)

India's recent agreement with Pakistan to withdraw military units from the border has reduced tensions between the two countries, but Gandhi will be looking to Zia to implement other agreements on trade and antinarcotics trafficking, which they discussed last month, and to take measures to control the infiltration of Sikhs into India. If there is no progress on these issues, Gandhi may become receptive to those who favor covert action against Pakistan. [Redacted]

(b)(3)

New Delhi is probably headed for another round of high-risk brinkmanship this spring over the Sino-Indian border. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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(b)(3)

Implications for the US and the USSR

~~Gandhi's frustrations are unlikely to cause dramatic changes in relations with the US, but they may affect New Delhi's diplomatic exchanges with Washington and others during periods of uncertainty.~~

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

Difficulties in India's relations with the US, Pakistan, or China will not necessarily translate into gains for the Soviets, however. [Redacted]

[Redacted] New Delhi is disappointed with what it views as inadequate Soviet diplomatic support during India's recent tensions with Pakistan and China. If the Sino-Indian border heats up this spring, the Indians are likely to look again to Moscow for strong public support, which the Soviets will probably not be willing to provide.

[Redacted]

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