

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Breckinridge	20 MAR	J
2	DFC		J
3	SAB OK	20 MAR	J
4			
5			
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
<p>Remarks: MHCHAOS Exhibits 1-9</p> <p>Attached are two sanitized copies of MHCHAOS Exhibits 1-9 approved by DDO which are ready for Mr. Knoche.</p> <p>1 to 2: Is this the way you understand Hank wants it?</p> <p>3 - know speaker instructions forwarded 21 Mar 75</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
			3/20/75
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET	

FORM NO. 1-67 **237**

Use previous editions

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EXHIBIT #1

←
continued

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Breckinridge <i>CK</i>	<i>16 MAR</i>	<i>#</i>
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
MHCHAOS (EXHIBITs 1-9)			
Attached are the nine MHCHAOS Exhibits for Mr. Knoche. They have been sanitized and coordinated with DDO.			
<i>→ Duplicate to tank</i>			
<i>Forwarded if need</i>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
[Redacted]			3/18/75
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 237
1-67

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EXHIBIT #1 RAW

UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

ROUTING AND RECEIPT SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: []	EXTENSION 1758	NO. []
		DATE 14 JAN 1975

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TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		

1.	DC/OPS []			
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

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The attached Chronology was prepared from information available to me in the files held in [] I have avoided any original wording unless it was necessary to paraphrase or in some instances to make cable traffic read easier. On a number of occasions I have quoted directly. Every attempt was made to cite all Book Cables or other traffic going to stations worldwide, and in a number of instances I have selected traffic either to a single station or to several stations whenever it was apparent that the subject matter being discussed was of a policy nature and that it would apply to other stations. There are periods of time when no policy guidance appears to have been sent to the field; there may be correspondence which was not included in any of the volumes which were reviewed in compiling this Chronology.

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FORM 3-62 **610** USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED

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~~SENSITIVE~~CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT MHCHAOS CORRESPONDENCE

1. The first piece of official correspondence available is a memorandum dated 15 August 1967 from the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Thomas Karamessines, to the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Staff. The memorandum states that, based on the discussion with the Director this date (15 August 1967), the Chief CI is requested to take the following steps:

"a. Designation of the officers in the CI Staff who will be the responsible focal points and coordinators of operational activity in this matter. (Harry Rositzke and Dick Ober appear to be excellent candidates, as you suggested.)

"b. The exclusive briefing of specific division chiefs and certain selected officers in each division, on the aims and objectives of this intelligence collection program with definite domestic counterintelligence aspects.

"c. The establishment of some sort of system by Dick Ober (or whatever officer you select) for the orderly coordination of the operations to be conducted, with the responsibility for the actual conduct of the operations vested in the specific area divisions.

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"d. The identification of a limited dissemination procedure which will afford these activities high operational security while at the same time getting the information to the appropriate departments and agencies which have the responsibility domestically.

"e. The establishment of a periodic reporting system, preferably monthly, to gauge progress in the enterprise."

Additionally, it suggests that a cryptonym be assigned so that cable traffic can be handled on a limited basis and it further requests that an interim report be made by 31 October on the steps taken to get into position to implement this program.

(Tab A DDP memorandum dated 15 August 1967)

2. A 17 August memorandum from DC/CI Staff

to Chief, [] concerns the subject of special handling of correspondence on [] concerns the "inter-departmental survey of international connections of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the U.S. with the aim of establishing the nature and extent of illegal and subversive connections that may exist between U.S. organizations and activists involved and Communist, Communist front or other anti-American and foreign elements abroad.) It directs that all correspondence bearing the [] slug be delivered unopened to the Chief of the Area Divisions concerned and advises that the

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Division Chief will be responsible for disseminating information copies to Chief, CI Staff and the DDP. (Tab B memorandum from DC/CI to Chief, [redacted])

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3. A second memorandum also dated 17 August 1967, from [redacted], DC/CI Staff to the Cable Secretariat, covered the cable distribution for sensitive [redacted] project material. (Tab C memorandum dated 17 August 1967)

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4. On 29 August 1967 Director Richard Helms received a letter from the Executive Director of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Mr. David Ginsburg, explaining that the Commission was trying to collect available information on civil disorders occurring within the preceding two years and requesting Mr. Helms to designate someone to work with the Commission. On 1 September 1967 Mr. Helms replied that the Agency stood ready to do whatever it could to help and pointing out that "we do not have direct responsibilities for domestic security and therefore do not conduct, here in the United States, the kinds of activity which could produce the information in which you are interested. Nevertheless, there is some limited material which has come to us from abroad and which can conceivably be of interest to you." (Tab D copy of correspondence cited)

5. Instructions [redacted] were contained in a [redacted] cable dated 31 August 1967 which

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specifically authorized by [redacted] Finally, it instructs that the message be destroyed after reading.

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(Tab L [redacted])

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6. A memorandum for the record dated 31 October 1967, subject "International Connections of the U.S. Peace Movement" was prepared by Richard Ober of the CI Staff and advised that the Agency "is to prepare an independent study on the International Connections of the United States Peace Movement. This Study, which was requested by the President, is to include information from all sources. It will include the names of all individuals in the United States Peace Movement who have connections of any kind with Soviets, Communists, or any foreign persons or organizations." The memorandum further advises that on 31 October 1967 Chief CI Staff laid down the requirements and responsibilities of the Clandestine Services in contributing to this study. It advised that present at that meeting were Mr. Angleton, Chief, CI Staff;

Deputy Chief, CI Staff; ?

Chief [redacted]

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Deputy Chief [redacted] (for Mr. Rositzke);

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CI/[redacted] Richard Ober, CI/[redacted] The memo further delineates areas of responsibility, indicating that the Deputy Director for Intelligence would be responsible for writing the study, CI Staff would be responsible for pulling together all the information available in the Clandestine

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Services and making it available to the DDI. CI Staff would also have the responsibility for obtaining all information available to the Office of Security and through its liaison channels obtaining all pertinent information from other agencies, including the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Secret Service, Defense Department, Army, Navy and Air Force. It further cites by name individuals in the Clandestine Services who have been identified to the DDI as being involved in this effort. It then concludes with a breakdown of the responsibilities within CI Staff. (Tab F memorandum for the record, dated 31 October 1967)

7. A memorandum for the record dated 1 November 1967 written by Richard Ober is an account of the initial meeting between DDP and DDI representatives concerning the "Peace Movement Study." The memorandum explains that the DCI has indicated that the study should be broad in scope, i.e., to include organizations which, although not themselves peace organizations, are affiliated with the overall peace movement. The memorandum covers the procedures that each of the Directorates would follow and where areas of responsibility lie. It states that the DDP is considering sending a book message to field stations and asked the DD/OCI representative to draft requirements to be considered by the DDP. It notes

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that the Director of OCI, reiterated that
although the President did not set a deadline, that the
DCI and the DDI had agreed upon two weeks. (Tab G memorandum
for the record dated 1 November 1967)

8. The first instructions to the field were in a 2 November 1967 Book Cable from the Acting DDP Cord Meyer, released by the DCI Mr. Helms and authenticated by Mr. Angleton, Chief, CI, and coordinated by other senior officers. The Book Cable carries the Rybat indicators and advises that Headquarters is participating in a high-level interdepartmental survey of international connections of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the U.S. and that the purpose of the study is to establish the nature and extent of illegal and subversive connections that may exist between U.S. organizations or activities involved and Communist, Communist-front, or other anti-American foreign elements abroad. Such connections might range from contacts based merely on mutual interests to closely controlled channels for party directives. It advises that information collected by other agencies is being tapped, in addition to our own files and it requests a current check on station holdings, particularly on recent activity related to the 15-21 October demonstrations. It asks addressees to canvass info on file or otherwise readily available and to cable a summary of the findings plus any comments the station might

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consider relevant. It adds that coverage should be limited to evidence of contacts by elements of the U.S. peace movement with foreign groups or individuals. (Tab H Book Cable 49260)

9. On 25 June 1968 a multistation message was sent to certain [redacted] stations by DDP Karamessines with the indicators Rybat [redacted]. It advised that recent high-level Agency/FBI discussions have underscored the need for increased coverage of the activities abroad of [redacted] individuals. It adds that the primary interest is any evidence of foreign guidance, control, training or financial support. (Tab I DIR 11227)

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10. On 3 July 1968 the DDP sent a Book Cable 13667 to almost all stations and bases abroad with the Rybat MHCHAOS indicator. It states that Headquarters is engaged in a sensitive, high-priority program concerning foreign contacts with U.S. individuals and organizations of the radical left. Included in this category are radical students, anti-Vietnam War activists, draft resisters and deserters, black nationalists, anarchists and assorted new leftists. The objective is to discover the extent to which Soviets, Chicom, Cubans and other Communist countries are exploiting our domestic problems in terms of subversion and espionage. Of particular

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interest is new evidence of foreign direction, control, training or funding of any of these radical left groups. It advises that this program has been assigned to Chief, CI and it outlines the special handling procedures which have been established. It also informs field stations that [redacted]

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[redacted] have been superceded by MHCHAOS and should no longer be used. (Tab J Book Cable 13667)

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11. On 10 July 1968 the DDP sent a cable to Domestic Operations Bases in the United States. The cable repeats the text of the Director Book Cable 13667 cited above as Tab J, and requires that each Base Chief discuss the subject matter in the first paragraph with his FBI counterpart. It advises that FBI reps should be urged to refer to his Headquarters any leads which CIA can exploit abroad including Cuba travel. The bases were also advised to simultaneously report to Headquarters where formal coordination with the FBI will be undertaken. (Tab K DIR 15037)

12. On 11 July 1968 Chief of the European Division released a cable to [redacted] ~~which referenced Director 15007, informing the station that the reference redefines and~~ reemphasizes^{ing} high U.S. government interest in the category of collection, ~~that is of special significance~~ [redacted]

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[redacted]

The purpose of the cable is to

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stimulate new operational activity aimed at this target.

It advises that the priority of this effort dictates that

it be made the subject of special exhortations

[redacted]

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[redacted]

It explains that the information

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objective should be to "identify and report on any mechanism

directly serving MHCHAOS activities in the U.S.,

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attracting and harboring deserters, supporting and equip-

ing riots and civil disturbances and providing liaison or

guidance between other foreign Communist groups and U.S.

leftist activists." The message also points out that Head-

quarters realizes that this requirement theoretically crosses

lines with the FBI liaison

[redacted]

but adds that

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we have recently been assured by FBI Headquarters that their

liaison on this subject dealt with individual cases

[redacted]

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[redacted]

adding that the FBI

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is leaving that field to us. It suggests a conference with

the FBI representative to confirm ground rules with respect

to FBI coverage. Finally, it explains that what "we need

now is more evidence

[redacted]

to under-

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take new operational activity specifically designed to derive

information we need in the priority program." (Tab L

DIR 15418)

13. On 7 August 1968 the DCI released a cable

[redacted]

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which requested the station to proceed as soon as possible with an approach [redacted] in accordance with the guidelines stated in the body of the cable and in accordance with instructions contained in Tab J and Tab L. The cable advises that CIA must be responsible for liaison [redacted] on all MICHAOS matters and that this position has been made clear to FBI Headquarters. It recognizes that the FBI would prefer to reserve unto itself exclusive responsibility [redacted] on certain of these matters. It states that FBI Headquarters has been informed that CIA will not accept any limitation on its liaison [redacted] and that we are willing to [redacted] [redacted] supply duplicate reports to the Bureau if [redacted] It instructs the station to inform the FBI that you are discussing matters [redacted] on instructions from Headquarters, that you will [redacted] [redacted] provide to CIA information on these matters including [redacted] and that Headquarters will pass to FBI Headquarters any pertinent information received [redacted] (Tab M DIR 22859)

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14. A Book Cable dated 22 May 1969 was a special channel message to field and domestic stations and bases. It concerned handling of all MICHAOS traffic, advising that

It is to be transmitted by "Restricted Handling" channels only and that due to the extreme sensitivity of all MHCHAOS matters, field stations and bases are asked to keep MHCHAOS traffic under the direct control of the Chief of Station or the Chief of Base. (Tab N)

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15. A memorandum to the Director of Communications dated 20 May 1969 from the DDP requests restricted handling of project MHCHAOS traffic for all stations worldwide. The memorandum cites the releasing authorities, it identified individuals by name who may pick up and deliver traffic, and it assigns after-hour duty responsibility for this material. (Subsequently, similar memoranda were sent to the Director of Communications whenever new people were given related responsibilities.) (Tab O memorandum dated 20 May 1969)

16. A memorandum for the record dated 29 May 1969 by Richard Ober subject is procedures for the restricted handling of Rybat MHCHAOS traffic and states that on instructions from the DDP, Rybat MHCHAOS cable traffic was switched into restricted handling channels on 23 May 1969. The memorandum then goes on to explain the procedures which would apply with respect to handling the traffic. (Tab P is memorandum dated 29 May 1969)

17. An undated memorandum from the Deputy Director for Plans to the Director of Communications established restricted

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handling processing for [redacted] material or traffic. (b)(3)

[redacted] was established to handle communications between the CIA Special Operations Group and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The memorandum also identified the releasing authorities as well as the individuals by name who were authorized to pick up or deliver traffic and the officers to be contacted after duty hours in order of preference. (Tab Q is memorandum from DDP to Director of Communications) (b)(3)

18. Headquarters cable dated 29 May 1969 [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] to continue to forward MHCHAOS information to Headquarters only, adding that if queried they may advise the FBI representative that this is in accordance with instructions received from Headquarters. It also points out that the Agency has been advised by the FBI liaison officer that the Bureau restriction was prepared at the Agency's request and it was being sent to all FBI representatives abroad advising them that MHCHAOS requirements going to countries where there is no FBI representative will in the future be sent via CIA channels only. (Tab R [redacted]) (b)(3)

19. On 20 June 1969 Mr. Tom Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, wrote a memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in which he stated that the President had directed that a report on foreign Communist support of revolutionary protest movements be prepared for his study. (b)(3)

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He advised that "support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign communists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements in the United States. He added that the President would like to know what resources were targeted toward monitoring foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in this country, what gaps in intelligence exist because of either inadequate resources or a low priority of attention, and what steps should be taken, if the President directed, to provide the maximum possible coverage of these activities. The Agency's contribution was requested by 30 June. Mr. Huston added that he was particularly interested in the Agency response to the second part of the President's request, e.g., its present ability to collect information of this type. He added that the President had assigned a high priority to this project and stated that he knew that the Agency would render the utmost assistance in its preparation. On 30 June 1969 General Cushman, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, replied to Mr. Huston attaching a special report on foreign communist support to revolutionary protest movements in the United States. (Tab S contains copies of this correspondence)

20. On 21 June 1969 Headquarters sent a cable (b)(3)

advising that Headquarters has (b)(3)
 been working with the FBI liaison officer for months in order

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to arrive at a procedure which will permit most effective and secure handling in the field while at the same time insure that CIA's responsibilities for coverage of the MHCHAOS target abroad are fully protected. This correspondence states that with regard to MHCHAOS matters the Agency is held responsible by the White House for all foreign coverage. ~~The Headquarters cable makes reference to a cable sent [redacted] which presented the Agency's position as formulated by the Director.~~ (Tab T [redacted])

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21. On 8 July 1969 a Headquarters cable was sent to certain stations. This cable provided guidance to those stations where an FBI representative was assigned. It provides a status report of Agency/FBI relations on coverage of MHCHAOS matters with foreign liaison services. It advises the field that the Agency is held responsible by the White House for all foreign coverage of MHCHAOS matters and must, therefore, retain complete freedom of action to collect from foreign liaison services and disseminate any information so acquired at the Agency's discretion. The cable points out that "in practical terms, this means that we cannot abdicate to FBI representatives abroad by giving them exclusive responsibility for handling MHCHAOS requirements with liaison, either in crash situations or on routine traces."

(Tab V [redacted])

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22. On 14 July 1969 a cable was sent [redacted] which commended the Station's intentions to greatly increase its effort to cover the MCHCHAOS target, pointing out that this is in accord with current very high priority of this target. It also concurs that key assets should be unilateral and adds that Hqs wishes to encourage the Station to make full use of liaison whenever most appropriate. It requests appropriate station comments regarding use of liaison, etc.

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(Tab W [redacted])

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23. On 1 August 1969 a Headquarters cable [redacted] advised Station that all dissemination and liaison with the Bureau and other agencies with respect to MCHCHAOS matters would be done at Headquarters unless otherwise specified.

(Tab W [redacted])

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24. On 16 August 1969 [redacted]

[redacted] that in the future they should

call Headquarters' attention to reporting on PBRAMPART operations of potential MCHCHAOS interest and that this should be done via the MCHCHAOS cable channel. (Tab X [redacted])

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25. On 19 September 1969 Headquarters expressed appreciation [redacted] for the recap and individual reports received [redacted] on various Black Panther Party (BPP) activities in the [redacted] which

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are of high interest at this time. It further advises that Headquarters has already disseminated some information concerning these activities to the highest level of U.S. government and it anticipates further such reports in the near future. It asks the Chief of Station to reread [redacted]

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[redacted] dated 8 July 1969 for basic policy guidance concerning Agency reporting responsibilities on MHCHAOS information collected abroad from foreign liaison services and it adds that in light of the above guidance, the Station should immediately contact the FBI representative and advise him that although he may send [redacted] liaison reports to his Headquarters, he should advise his Headquarters that such reports are for their information only and not for further dissemination, since all disseminations of this nature will be handled by Agency Headquarters to FBI Headquarters. (Tab X

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[redacted]

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26. In a September 1969 memorandum to the Deputy Directors, Director Helms said that he had "recently reviewed the Agency's efforts to monitor those international activities of radical and black militants which may effect the national security. I believe that we have the proper approach in discharging this sensitive responsibility, while strictly observing the statutory and de facto procriptions on Agency domestic involvements."

The Director went on to say that he appreciates that "there are several components within the Clandestine Service with a legitimate operational interest in the radical milieu. At the same time, it should be understood that Mr. Ober's Special Operations Group of CI Staff has the principal operational responsibility for coordinating and developing operations to collect information on aspects of activities abroad which have a direct bearing on U.S. radical and black militant movements." Among other things the memorandum goes on to request the cooperation of all elements. (Tab Z - DCI memorandum)

27. On 27 September 1969 Headquarters responded to a [redacted] which had forwarded an explanation regarding the handling of information. Headquarters points out that as a general guideline in handling future reports received by the Station from [redacted] liaison, they should send them to Headquarters for formal passage to Bureau Headquarters even if the original request for the information to the [redacted] ^{Service} liaison had been made by the FBI. (Tab AA [redacted])

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28. On 20 October 1969 a message to [redacted] Headquarters informed the Stations that in order to "help achieve desired maximum exploitation of existing sources and development of new sources for coverage of the MHCHAOS target, suggest that you discuss our high interest

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in the MHCHAOS field [redacted] It adds that
in addition to arranging for a systematic coverage of the
MHCHAOS target in your area, we are particularly interested
in exploring the possibility of the [redacted] providing

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[redacted]
(Tab BB [redacted])

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29. On 7 November 1969 in a cable to numerous Sta-
tions, Headquarters sent information concerning the Inter-
national Liaison Committee (ILC) of the Stockholm Conference
on peace in Vietnam and its meeting of 11-12 October 1969.
It points out that as a result of the ongoing "Fall Offensive"
of these organizations and other related efforts in the U.S.
and abroad, that it is a major interest by top government
officials in details of any foreign support, inspiration and/
or guidance to such an offensive. It requires reporting
and points out that "Reporting should include coverage of
travel contacts and activities in your area by any Americans
involved in "Fall offensive organizational activity." It
suggests that selected assets should try to elicit info on plans
and programs in the United States as well as on any foreign
aspects. (Tab CC [redacted])

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30. On 9 March 1970 a cable was sent to selected foreign
stations and domestic bases concerning the FBI/Agency relation-

~~ship.~~ The cable was released by Director Helms and it explains the incident which led to the disruption of personal liaison between the Agency and the FBI. (Tab DD DIR 015676)

31. On 20 March 1970 Director Helms sent a telegram to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The subject of that telegram was "Selected radical developments and disturbances, student agitation and antiwar activity in the U.S." The cable advises the Bureau that since 24 February 1970 the Agency has not received teletype reports from the Bureau on the above subject. It adds that the reports are of value to the Agency in fulfilling its counterintelligence mission abroad and in protecting the security of its installations in the U.S. It requests that the Director be advised if such reports are still being prepared by the FBI and if so, requests that the Agency continue to receive them on a regular basis. (Tab EE DIR 019112)

32. On 13 July 1970 a memorandum to the Cable Secretariat covers the subject of an amendment of for MHCHAOS. (b)(3)
It requests that current procedures for MHCHAOS be amended to provide that messages received by the Cable Secretariat bearing the slug MHCHAOS be returned to the Signal Center and not given any distribution by the Cable Secretariat.
(Tab FF 13 July 70 memorandum to Cable Sec)

33. On 10 August 1970 a Book Dispatch was sent to the

Chiefs of Station and Bases covering the subject of restricted handling channel messages. [redacted]

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34. On 1 October 1970 a message was sent [redacted] Station advising the Station that "In accordance with past policy, Headquarters does not wish to become engaged with [redacted] in propaganda operations involving MHCHAOS." This cable was sent in response [redacted] which requested Headquarters guidance in this field. (Tab HH [redacted])

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35. On 17 December 1970 a cable to selected stations provided guidance to those stations where a Bureau representative was assigned. The cable gives current status of Headquarters arrangements with the FBI on coverage of MHCHAOS matters with foreign liaison services. It explains that Headquarters has been working with the FBI liaison officer for a number of months in order to arrive at procedures which will permit the most effective and secure handling in the field while at the same time insuring that CIA's responsibilities for coverage of this target abroad are fully protected. It reiterates that the Agency is held responsible by the White House for all foreign coverage of any MHCHAOS matters and must, therefore, retain complete freedom of

action to collect from liaison services and to disseminate any information so acquired at the Agency's discretion. The cable further goes on to enumerate Director Helm's policy

[redacted] cited in paragraph 13

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above and proceeds to repeat that policy and advises that it is still valid. (Tab II [redacted])

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36. In a 5 August 1971 memorandum for Chief, FE Operations the subject of briefing of an OMB team is discussed. It advises that the OMB visitors to the FE area in the period 19 August through 19 September are not aware of the MHCHAOS program and should not be made aware of it during the FE Division briefing to be held in the near future. (Tab JJ is 5 August memorandum)

37. On 10 August 1971 Headquarters advised certain

[redacted]

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[redacted]

□ The cable advises the Chiefs

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of Station to be forthcoming with the two representatives in terms of the Station Operations Directive (OD), program, targets and size of the official cover station, adding that if possible avoid details of Station budget and specific

operations. On 12 August 1971 Headquarters sent an additional cable [redacted] in an attempt to clarify

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the instructions contained in the 10 August cable citing that use of the term OD should be avoided. It suggests that they talk in terms of program, targets, and size of official cover station, adding that if [redacted] has legitimate budget

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questions they should be answered frankly and to the best of the Station's ability. With respect to operational

matters the Chief of Station should not give specific details as to sources and methods and it adds that [redacted]

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does not expect such details. Directly related to the two above-cited cables, [redacted] asked Headquarters if the subjects are aware of MHCHAOS and should it be discussed. On 10 Sep-

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tember Headquarters sent a message again to the same named [redacted] citing the 10 August and 12 August Director

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cables [redacted] and it advised that "Subjects are not aware of MHCHAOS and this subject should not be discussed with them. If MHCHAOS is raised they should be referred to Headquarters for answers." It also suggests that

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Headquarters be alerted through restricted handling channels if MHCHAOS matters do arise. (Tab KK DIR 168970, DIR 169910,

[redacted] 1201 and [redacted]

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38. On 5 October 1971 Headquarters sent a cable covering guidance to the Station where a Bureau representative

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is assigned. The substance of this cable has been previously cited in paragraph 35 above. (Tab LL [redacted])

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39. On 12 January 1972 [redacted] advised Headquarters that it was unable to locate in Station files a definition of the cryptonym MHCHAOS, adding that though the meaning is generally clear, Station desires an exact definition. Headquarters responded to this cable on 14 January 1972 that MHCHAOS "Concerns a highly sensitive Agency foreign clandestine counterintelligence collection program, traffic concerning which must be transmitted by restricted handling channels only. The program objective is collection of information abroad on foreign involvement with U.S. extremists. The targeting is on Soviet, Chicom, Cuban, North Vietnamese, North Korean and Arab Fedayeen subversive involvement."

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(Tab MM [redacted])

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

40. On 13 March 1972 [redacted] advised Headquarters that the regional security officer had been asked for a name check on U.S. citizens by the Department of State via State cable 037337 dated 3 March 1972. It adds that as part of the local name check process the RSO submits the name to the Station. It explains that the Station has refused to respond to any trace requests on U.S. citizens unless there is some compelling reason to do so, adding

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that no such case has arisen to date. It explains that the Station refusal is based on their understanding that it is Agency policy that field stations will not pass information on U.S. citizens to any other Agency in the field and will report derogatory security information on U.S. citizens in special channel only. It requests that Station be advised if Station's understanding is correct. Headquarters responded [redacted] on

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

16 March 1972 that it is normal State Department procedure to ask the RSO to name trace American citizens with CIA field installations, adding that even if a request for Agency traces is not specifically stated in the State message, the RSO can ask for it. It explains that if Station or Base files contain derogatory information on an American citizen, the RSO should be told to ask his Headquarters to query Agency Headquarters through established channels. It cites FR-51-1 as the applicable regulation. It further explains that if the Station has non derogatory information on U.S. citizens, it should not be withheld without reason.

(Tab MM [redacted])

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

41. On 3 July 1972 Headquarters informed

[redacted]

that Headquarters viewed

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

the New Left as a valid though not a priority requirement for clandestine intelligence collection effort. It adds that we

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desire to continue routine monitoring of New Left activities in order to keep interested U.S. government agencies informed and to maintain a residual counteraction capability for possible future use. It explains that this applies to the New Left as defined broadly, adding that as an exception there is a very high priority Agency requirement for collection of information on New Left groups, individuals who advocate/engage in acts of violence/terrorism particularly with respect to their connections in other countries. (Tab NN DIR 285741)

42. On 9 February 1973 in a cable to [redacted] Headquarters provides the Station with the results of its periodic review of the Station's MHCHAOS collections/reporting efforts. It advises that it is based on the current situation insofar as it is known in relation to hostile foreign exploitation of/support to/involvement in domestic U.S.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(including Puerto Rico) extremists or in relation to [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted] (Tab OO [redacted])

(b)(1)(b)(3)
(b)(3)

43. In a memorandum to the Deputy Directors, dated 29 August 1973, the Director, Mr. William Colby discussed the subject of questionable activities - he advised that he had developed specific instructions on each reported activity. The Director added that the instructions "are included in the attachments to this memorandum, and have the force of specific direction to you to pass on to appropriate subordinates the instructions

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outlined." The memorandum adds that separate packages of these instructions "are being developed for each Directorate in order to respect the sensitivity of some of the activities discussed, including those which are deemed quite appropriate within CIA's charter." The memorandum adds that should any element encounter any difficulties in terms of implementation or compliance that the subject be raised directly with Mr. Colby. It concludes by requesting recommendations for modification or additions to Agency regulations. Attached to the Director's memorandum was a memorandum on the subject of MHCHAOS with a description of what that program concerns. (Tab QQ - The two above cited memoranda)

44. On 5 March 1974 Director Colby released a cable to all Field Stations and Bases advising them of the termination of the MHCHAOS program and providing guidelines under which Headquarters has been operating for some time on certain activities formerly included in MHCHAOS. (Tab RR DIR 8786)

45. On 5 March 1974 a memorandum was sent to the Cable Secretary via the Deputy Director for Operations on the subject of [] distribution of cables bearing the cryptonym [] which superceded project MHCHAOS. (Tab SS - 5 March 1974 memorandum) (b)(3)

46. On 15 March 1974 a cable was sent to Domestic Bases, it referenced [] - the cable repeated that the MHCHAOS (b)(3)

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program has been terminated and that the MHCHAOS channel has been discontinued. It went on to provide guidance on the reporting of information on U.S. citizens. (Tab TT)

(b)(3)