


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TO: PRIORITY SECSTATE WASHDC//INR//, USCINCSO MIAMI FL,  
USCINCFJCOM NORFOLK VA, JFIC NORFOLK VA, CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA,  
COMMARFORLANT

TEXT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~--NOFORN

DIST: 14 AUGUST 2000

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: SECURITY ASSESSMENT FOR THE 15 - 17 AUGUST 2000 VISIT OF  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO BUENOS AIRES

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SUMMARY:  THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT ANY  
GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL IS PLANNING TO CARRY OUT OR PROMOTE DISTURBANCES  
OR ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE VISIT TO ARGENTINA BY THE U.S.  
SECRETARY OF STATE. GIVEN THE HISTORY OF UNSOLVED TERRORIST ACTIVITY  
IN BUENOS AIRES ASCRIBED TO HIZBALLAH WITH PROBABLE IRANIAN SUPPORT,  
ARGENTINA IS ALWAYS ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A THIRD BOMBING IN

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THE CITY, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE A NUMBER OF EXTREMIST ISLAMIC GROUPS ARE PRESENT IN THE TRIBORDER AREA, AND SOME LATIN AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE REPRESENTATION IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. ARGENTINE AUTHORITIES, HOWEVER, ARE CONFIDENT THAT THERE IS NO PLANNED THREAT AGAINST THE SECRETARY, NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION OF PLANNED VIOLENT ACTS THAT MAY HAVE AN IMPACT ON HER VISIT. ALTHOUGH DEMONSTRATIONS MAY BE ORGANIZED, THE MOVEMENT OF VISITORS WILL BE PLANNED TO AVOID UNDESIRABLE CONFRONTATIONS. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIVISION OF THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OFFICIAL VISITS AND WILL BEAR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE VISIT WITH THE AERONAUTICAL POLICE AT EZEIZA AIRPORT, THE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE, AND THE PROVINCIAL POLICE POSSIBLY AUGMENTING THEIR EFFORTS. THE SECRETARIAT FOR STATE INTELLIGENCE, ARGENTINA'S PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, WILL PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] STREET CRIME AND HOTEL ROBBERIES, AT TIMES VIOLENT, ARE A GROWING PROBLEM IN BUENOS AIRES BUT ARE MORE LIKELY TO AFFECT ADVANCE AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS RATHER THAN THE SECRETARY'S PARTY.

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT ANY GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL IS PLANNING TO CARRY OUT OR PROMOTE DISTURBANCES OR ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE DURING HER 15-17 AUGUST 2000 VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES. THE VISIT HAS BEEN WIDELY DISCUSSED POSITIVELY IN PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA. THIS CITY HAS BEEN THE SCENE OF TWO BLOODY TERRORIST ATTACKS, HOWEVER, ONE ON 18 JULY 1994 AGAINST THE ARGENTINE-ISRAELI MUTUAL ASSOCIATION (AMIA), IN WHICH 86 PEOPLE WERE KILLED, AND THE OTHER ON 17 MARCH 1992 AGAINST THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN WHICH 25 PEOPLE WERE KILLED. IN BOTH INCIDENTS VEHICULAR BOMBS WERE EMPLOYED. OFFICIALS ASSIGNED TO THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES PROVIDED AT LEAST SOME SUPPORT FOR THE AMIA ATTACK. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH HIZBALLAH CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE ISRAELI EMBASSY BOMBING, THERE IS INFORMATION BUT NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE TO BACK UP HIZBALLAH'S LINK TO THE AMIA BOMBING. BOTH CASES REMAIN UNRESOLVED, A POLITICALLY EMBARRASSING ISSUE WHICH BESIEGED THE FORMER GOVERNMENT OF CARLOS ((MENEM)) AND WHICH CONTINUES TO BURDEN THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF FERNANDO ((DE LA RUA)). GIVEN THE HISTORY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ARGENTINA, THERE IS ALWAYS CONCERN THAT BUENOS AIRES COULD BE THE SITE OF A THIRD ATTEMPT, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC REPORTING OF SUCH PLANNING. THIS CONCERN USUALLY IS HEIGHTENED FOLLOWING VIOLENCE AGAINST HIZBALLAH OR PALESTINIANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SINCE THE 1992 BOMBING WAS A REPRISAL FOR AN ISRAELI ATTACK IN LEBANON. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] IN LATE JULY 2000, THE JUSTICE MINISTER PUBLICLY SAID THERE WAS NO REASON TO FEAR ANOTHER TERRORIST ATTACK AGAINST A JEWISH TARGET IN ARGENTINA, ADDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS ALERT TO ALL POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIVITY. [REDACTED]

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2. IN THE TRIBORDER AREA OF BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, AND PARAGUAY

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THERE IS A LARGE MUSLIM COMMUNITY [REDACTED] LOOSELY ORGANIZED GROUPINGS OF SUNNI ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS, PRINCIPALLY THE GAMA'AT AL-ISLAMIYAH (IG), AND THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (HAMAS). ALTHOUGH THE LATTER TWO HAVE YET TO CONDUCT ANY ACT OF VIOLENCE IN THE REGION. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE DISRUPTION OF HIZBALLAH GROUPS IN CIUDAD DEL ESTE, PARAGUAY, AND THE ARREST IN JANUARY 1999 OF AL-SAID HASAN MUHAMMAD AL-((MUKHLIS)), AN IG MEMBER IMPRISONED IN URUGUAY SINCE THEN AND AWAITING EXTRADITION TO EGYPT ALLEGEDLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE 1997 MASSACRE IN LUXOR IN WHICH 58 TOURISTS WERE KILLED. THESE GROUPS POTENTIALLY COULD SEEK TO REDRESS HIS IMPRISONMENT [REDACTED]

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OVERALL, THE U.S. ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS HAS ALWAYS MADE U.S. OFFICIALS ATTRACTIVE TARGETS, AND THE WELL-PUBLICIZED RECENT U.S. PEACE EFFORTS IN CAMP DAVID MAY HEIGHTEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTENTION FROM THESE GROUPS. U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE NOT BEEN THE TARGET OF ANY TRIBORDER EXTREMISTS, HOWEVER, SINCE THE 1997 REPORT OF A THREAT TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN ASUNCION, PARAGUAY.

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3. THERE ARE NO ACTIVE DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERRORIST GROUPS IN ARGENTINA WHICH WOULD POSE A THREAT TO THE SECRETARY. HISTORICALLY, BETWEEN 1992-1996 THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE (ORGANIZACION REVOLUCIONARIA DEL PUEBLO--ORP), A CRIMINAL BAND, CONDUCTED LOW-LEVEL TERRORIST ACTS IN ARGENTINA, ALTHOUGH NONE AGAINST FOREIGN TARGETS. IN EARLY JULY 2000, A SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FSLN) SPONSORED 'MILITARY BRIGADE' REPORTEDLY FINISHED TRAINING IN NICARAGUA AND MEMBERS WERE EXPECTED TO TRAVEL TO SOUTH AMERICA. THE BRIGADE WAS TRAINED WITH FINANCING FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC) WHICH BEGAN THIS ONGOING EFFORT AS AN INVESTMENT TO BUILD INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PRESENCE. HOWEVER, THE EFFORT EVOLVED TO BECOME PART OF A NEW FARC STRATEGY TO "VIETNAMIZE" ITS ACTIVITY IN RESPONSE TO NEW U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO COLOMBIA. MEMBERS OF THE BRIGADE AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN THIS ALLEGED EFFORT INCLUDE CUBANS, PERUVIAN TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA) MEMBERS, AND MEMBERS OF OTHER GROUPS WHICH CONSIDER THE U.S. AN ADVERSARY. [REDACTED]

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5. ARGENTINES FREELY AND OPENLY EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS, WHICH OFTEN MEANS DEMONSTRATIONS. THUS FAR IN THE YEAR 2000 THE U.S. EMBASSY HAS BEEN THE FOCAL POINT FOR A NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATIONS REGARDING U.S./NATO ACTION IN KOSOVO AND ANTI-IMF DEMONSTRATIONS. THESE DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY ARE LED BY ONE OR ANOTHER OF A LOOSE COALITION OF EXTREME LEFTIST PARTIES IN ARGENTINA, SUCH AS THE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST LEAGUE (LA LIGA SOCIALISTA REVOLUCIONARIA (LSR) AND THE WORKERS PARTY (PARTIDO OBRERO--PO). THESE GROUPS ARE RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT POLITICAL PLAYERS BUT CAN USUALLY COUNT ON FAVORABLE COVERAGE FROM LEFTIST ELEMENTS IN THE MEDIA. SOME OF THE LEFTIST GROUPS ARE ALSO JOINED BY MEMBERS OF THE "FRONT FOR A COUNTRY IN SOLIDARITY" (FREPASO), WHICH FORMS PART OF THE RULING ALLIANCE COALITION. THE DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE ALL BEEN PEACEFUL, LIMITED TO SHOUTING, BANGING DRUMS, PASSING OUT FLYERS, AND WRITING ANTI-U.S. SLOGANS ON THE SIDEWALK ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE EMBASSY. THAT SAID, THE VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WHOSE PROMINENT ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MEDIATION IS WELL KNOWN HERE, MAY PROVIDE A LOGICAL TARGET FOR DEMONSTRATIONS. WITH THE ABOVE POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS, THERE ARE NO OTHER INDICATIONS AT THIS TIME THAT ANY GROUP PLANS TO HOLD DEMONSTRATIONS THAT MIGHT PURPOSELY THREATEN, EMBARRASS, OR IMPEDE THE SECRETARY OF STATE DURING HER VISIT. WHEREAS MOST DEMONSTRATIONS ARE USUALLY PEACEFUL, AT TIMES AGITATORS, [REDACTED] INFILTRATE THE CROWDS AND TRY TO STIR UP TROUBLE. THESE, HOWEVER, RARELY ESCALATE BEYOND FISTICUFFS. WHILE MOST PROTESTS ARE PLANNED TO BE NONVIOLENT, SOME HAVE BEEN MARRED BY VIOLENCE DUE TO OVERZEALOUSNESS BY THE POLICE. THE SECURITY FORCES CLOSELY MONITOR PROTESTS AND STRIKES, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING THE U.S. EMBASSY OR VISITORS, AND WILL REROUTE MOTORCADES OF VISITING OFFICIALS WHEN NECESSARY TO AVOID CONTACT WITH ONGOING DEMONSTRATIONS. [REDACTED]

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6. THE INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT DE LA RUA AND HIS NEW GOVERNMENT IN DECEMBER 1999 HAS NOT RESULTED IN ANY DISCERNIBLE DISTANCING OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES ON POLICY ISSUES. WHILE THE DE LA RUA GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERING MOVES SUCH AS A MODERATE INCREASE OF ITS DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN IRAN UNDER PRESSURE FROM COMMERCIAL AND BUSINESS INTERESTS, PRESIDENT DE LA

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RUA'S MID-JUNE 2000 VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES WAS PERCEIVED LOCALLY AS GENERALLY SUCCESSFUL AND LENDING PRESTIGE TO ARGENTINA'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE. THE VISIT ALSO HELPED PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE EXCELLENT COOPERATION THE MISSION RECEIVES FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA ON KEY ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES. FORMER PRESIDENT MENEM'S JUSTICIALIST PARTY (PERONISTS--PJ) IS NOW AN OPPOSITION PARTY TO DE LA RUA, WHO WAS ELECTED BY THE ALLIANCE OF THE RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR) AND THE FRONT FOR A COUNTRY IN SOLIDARITY (FREPASO). ALTHOUGH THE MINORITY FREPASO ELEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE CAN BE VOCAL IN ITS CRITICISM OF U.S. POLICIES, THE MAJORITY UCR ELEMENT WOULD PROBABLY NOT ALLOW IT TO TAKE ANY PUBLIC ACTION WHICH MIGHT EMBARRASS THE ADMINISTRATION DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY FOR ANY VIOLENT ACT TO EMANATE FROM THE FORMAL POLITICAL PARTIES IN ARGENTINA.

7. ARGENTINA CONTINUES TO FACE THE DEEPEST, LONGEST RECESSION OF THE PAST DECADE. ONE OF THE CHIEF PROMISES OF THE DE LA RUA ADMINISTRATION WAS TO ADDRESS INEQUITIES CREATED BY THE HUGE ECONOMIC CHANGES, PRIMARILY PEGGING THE PESO TO THE U.S. DOLLAR AND PRIVATIZING MOST STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES, MEASURES WHICH WERE ENACTED DURING THE FIRST MENEM ADMINISTRATION FROM 1989-1995. HOWEVER, DE LA RUA'S GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DELIVER ON THIS PROMISE DUE TO ITS RESTRICTIVE IMF COMMITMENTS. MOREOVER, THE UNEMPLOYMENT LEVEL HAS INCREASED UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT FROM 14.5 TO 15.4 PERCENT (THROUGH JULY). ANOTHER MEASURE WHICH HAS CAUSED MAJOR DISCONTENT WAS THE MAY 2000 DECISION TO REDUCE SALARIES GOVERNMENT-WIDE BY 12-15 PERCENT IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH IMF REQUIREMENTS. SOME CRITICS SEE PRESIDENT DE LA RUA OPERATING LARGELY IN REACTION TO THE IMF'S STRICTURES ON FISCAL POLICY AND NOT TO A CENTRAL THEME OR COHERENT POLICY. INTERNECINE WARFARE WITHIN HIS ALLIANCE COALITION, INCREASED UNEMPLOYMENT, PROLONGED RECESSION, AND THE PERCEPTION OF INDECISION AND INCOMPETENCE HAS LED TO A FLUCTUATING APPROVAL RATE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOVERNMENT. THIS MANIFESTS ITSELF IN CONTINUOUS STRIKES, WORK STOPPAGES, AND PROTESTS FROM PREVIOUSLY PROTECTED SECTORS, INCLUDING ORGANIZED LABOR, TRUCKERS, TEACHERS, AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, WHO FEEL THEY HAVE LOST OUT WITH THE CHANGES. IT IS POSSIBLE ANY/ALL OF THESE GROUPS MAY ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE USING ANTI-IMF THEMES, ALTHOUGH TO DATE WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS ANY SUCH PROTESTS ARE PLANNED OR THAT VIOLENCE WOULD BE PLANNED AS PART OF SUCH PROTESTS.

8. BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE EXCELLENT, BUT A NUMBER OF NETTLESOME BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES, SUCH AS PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS, ATTEMPTS BY SOME U.S. STATES TO CONTINUE RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN ARGENTINE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND, MOST RECENTLY, THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION BY THE US OF ARGENTINE BEEF IMPORTS DUE TO A FOCUS OF FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE IN ANIMALS WANDERING INTO ARGENTINA FROM PARAGUAY) COULD SURFACE DURING THE VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE. NOTWITHSTANDING THE LIKELIHOOD OF DETRACTORS USING THE VIP VISIT TO SERVE THEIR OWN POLITICAL AGENDA, WE EXPECT PRESS COVERAGE TO BE MOSTLY FAVORABLE FOR THE VISIT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THE VISIT MAY, HOWEVER, PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR DISSATISFIED GROUPS TO PROTEST BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES, THE IMF, EXTERNAL DEBT ISSUES, AND, POSSIBLY, THE U.S. ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF CUBA. IN ADDITION, LEFTIST CRITICS MAY CHARGE THAT THE DE LA RUA GOVERNMENT IS KOW-TOWING TO ITS "CARNAL" AMERICAN ALLY IN IMPLEMENTING DEREGULATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND

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9. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIVISION OF THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE (AFP) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OFFICIAL VISITS AND WILL BEAR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE VISITS. THE AFP WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE PERSONAL SECURITY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WITHIN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES.

A. IN BUENOS AIRES, THE AFP WILL BE IN CHARGE OF SECURITY FOR VIP MOVEMENTS, LODGINGS, AND ALL SITES WHERE ACTIVITIES WILL TAKE PLACE FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. THE AFP WILL HAVE AT ITS DISPOSAL ALL ITS RESOURCES, TO INCLUDE AN EXPLOSIVES BRIGADE, U.S.-TRAINED CANINE TEAMS, A SPECIAL SUPPORT SWAT GROUP (THE GEOF UNIT -- GRUPOS ESPECIALES OPERACIONES FEDERALES), AND AN AIR SQUADRON. THE AERONAUTICAL POLICE WILL BE IN CHARGE OF AIRPLANE SECURITY AT EZEIZA AIRPORT AND ALL OTHER AIRPORT FACILITIES, SECURITY OF THE LUGGAGE, AND ANTI-EXPLOSIVE CONTROLS. THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE WILL AUGMENT MOTORCADE MOVEMENTS FROM EZEIZA INTO THE CAPITAL.

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11. LIKE ANY LARGE, COSMOPOLITAN CITY, BUENOS AIRES ENDURES ITS SHARE OF CRIME, AND THIS IS A GROWING PROBLEM. MOST CRIME AFFECTING VISITORS HAS BEEN NONVIOLENT. AGGRAVATED ROBBERIES, SHOOTINGS, WHILE NOT COMPLETELY UNHEARD OF WERE UNTIL RECENTLY UNCOMMON. NOW, INCIDENTS OF ARMED INVASIONS OF BANKS, RESTAURANTS, SHOPS, AND RESIDENCES BY CRIMINAL GROUPS OCCUR WITH GREATER FREQUENCY. GIVEN THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VISITS, THE OFFICIAL PARTY ITSELF SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY CRIMINAL ELEMENTS. AT TIMES, HOWEVER, SOME ADVANCE AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO VARIOUS CRIMINAL, BUT TO DATE NONVIOLENT, ACTIONS. IN SEPTEMBER 1998, FOR EXAMPLE, A

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VISITING U.S. SECURITY ASSESSMENT TEAM WAS MUGGED BY A GROUP OF ROBBERS ON THE "FLORIDA" PEDESTRIAN SHOPPING STREET. IN NOVEMBER 1998, THE ROOMS OF A U.S. DELEGATION IN BUENOS AIRES FOR A UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE WERE ROBBED OF CASH, JEWELRY, AND LAPTOP COMPUTERS. WHILE IN BUENOS AIRES, THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS NORMAL VIGILANCE AND THE COMMON SENSE REQUIRED WHEN TRAVELING TO ANY LARGE CITY.

POC: COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.

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ACQ: [REDACTED]

DISSEM: [REDACTED] SENT TO [REDACTED] USCINCSO, USCINCFJCOM, JFIC, CINCLANTFLT, COMMARFORLANT

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WARNING: REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

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CABLETYPE: IRIS MILITARY 5.0.4.

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RELNO: [REDACTED]  
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