


SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/08/30 C05153085



Washington, D.C. 20505



26 May 1982

Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Identical Ltrs to
SSCI - Goldwater &
Mazzoli

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I know I share your concern with respect to allegations by former Department of Justice Attorney John Loftus that the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) arranged to bring Nazi war criminals into the U.S. I asked for and have received a staff report about this matter which I am forwarding to you.

The Agency has spent considerable time reviewing its files for information about former Nazis who have entered the United States. First, in connection with a 1978 Comptroller General's report (Tab B), later in connection with an investigation of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs under the leadership of former Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, and more recently in connection with the Department of Justice's effort to find, denaturalize and deport Nazi war criminals, Agency officials have reviewed the available records on some 500 individuals whose names were submitted to us. In addition to Office of Security and Directorate of Operations files, records of predecessor organizations, such as the Office of Policy Coordination, have been searched. It was on the basis of these searches that the enclosed report has been written.

You can be assured the General Counsel and Deputy Director for Operations will cooperate fully with your Committee in any inquiry into this matter.

Sincerely,

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

THIS LETTER IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT

SECRET

(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2018/08/30 C05153085

Staff Report: Allegations Concerning U.S. Government
Assistance in Immigration/Naturalization of
Alleged Nazi War Criminals

1. On 16 May 1982 John Loftus, former Attorney, Office of Special Investigations, Department of Justice, appeared on CBS "Sixty Minutes." During his appearance on television, Loftus claimed that Frank Wisner smuggled Nazi war criminals into the United States as part of an operation of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). These allegations arise in a historical context summarized below. (U)

2. John Loftus stated that OPC functioned as an arm of the State Department. According to the final report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate (the Church Committee), "OPC's budget and personnel were appropriated within CIA allocations, but the DCI had no authority in determining OPC's activities. Policy guidance -- decisions on the need for specific activities -- came to the OPC director from State and Defense, by-passing the DCI." Church Committee Report, Book I at 106. The Church Committee Report goes on to state that Admiral Hillenkoetter, DCI from 1947 (when CIA was formed) until 1950, "resented the fact that he had no management authority over OPC.... Hillenkoetter's clashes with the State and Defense Departments as well as with Frank G. Wisner, the Director of OPC, were frequent. Less than a week after taking office [as DCI in 1950, Walter Bedell] Smith announced that as DCI he would assume administrative control of OPC and that State and Defense would channel their policy guidance through him rather than through Wisner.... Between 1950 and 1952 Smith took several interim steps to encourage coordination between [OPC and OSO]. In August 1952 OSO and OPC were merged into the Directorate for Plans." Id. at 108. (U)

3. Although it is not clear from Loftus' television appearance, Loftus knows of the history of OPC as stated in the Church Committee Report. In the first draft of his book, Belarus, submitted for review by CIA, Loftus stated, "OPC was designed to take its orders from a joint State-Defense Department Committee.... Wisner and the OPC were to remain independent of the CIA's control but not of its budget." Belarus (first draft July 1981), by John Loftus at 9/19. Loftus goes on to state

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(b)(3)

that, "[i]n 1950, General [Walter Bedell] Smith called Wisner into his office and told him point blank that from now on any guidance from the Military and the State Department to OPC would first come through his desk. Wisner refused.... Between 1950 and 1952, OPC and OSO operated on paper as separate divisions of the Directorate of Plans of the CIA.... OPC continued to operate in much the same independent manner as before." Id. at 10/25 - 10/26. (U)

4. The passages quoted above from Loftus' manuscript are consonant with the Church Committee Report, although the manuscript reflects Loftus' interpretation of the facts to the effect that Wisner operated independently in the face of any and all attempts to establish control over OPC. (U)

5. In 1978, at the request of the Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) investigated allegations of a widespread conspiracy to obstruct probes of alleged Nazi war criminals living within the United States. As part of its investigation, the GAO submitted to CIA for traces the names of 111 alleged Nazi war criminals residing in the United States. As is reflected in the final report issued by the GAO in 1978, CIA cooperated fully in this investigation. (U)

6. Shortly after the GAO issued its report, an Office of Special Investigations (OSI) was established within the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Nazi war criminals who entered the United States illegally. Since its establishment, OSI has submitted to CIA for traces over 350 names of alleged Nazi war criminals residing within the United States. Included within this list were 18 Byelorussians provided by John Loftus when he worked for OSI. Although the list submitted by OSI overlaps to some extent with the list submitted by GAO, CIA has searched for information concerning close to 500 alleged Nazi war criminals. (U)

7. Four employees of the Directorate of Operations (with over 100 years of DO experience among them) spent approximately six months researching Agency files for information relating to Loftus' allegations or to the 500 individuals about whom we were asked. DO file searches revealed that CIA has information on approximately 80 of these individuals. CIA had contact with approximately 40. Based upon the notes and recollections of the DO researcher in charge of CIA's investigation of these allegations, CIA contact with 21 of these individuals occurred after they obtained entry into the United States. In 7 cases there was contact before and after immigration. A summary of these cases follow: (S)

a. Gustavs Hilger, a German national, was brought into the United States in 1948 under Public Law 110, with the concurrence of the Departments of Justice and State. Hilger had served as a senior official in the German Foreign Ministry before and during the War and was used on the basis of his expertise in Soviet affairs. He returned to Germany in 1953 at the request of the German Government to resume a position in the German Foreign Ministry. He relinquished his U.S. citizenship at that time. Allegations concerning Hilger's Nazi activities first surfaced after 1953. This information was made available to GAO and appears in the final GAO report (with the exception of Hilger's name which remains classified). (S)

b. Stansilav Stankevich, a Byelorussian whose name was specifically mentioned by Loftus on the "Sixty Minutes" program, worked for a CIA proprietary in Munich which produced propaganda material beginning in 1954. Stankevich applied for an immigration visa in 1950 but I&NS denied his application because of his Nazi background. He applied again and in 1956 was the subject of investigation for his Nazi activities, under the Refugee Act of 1953. According to DO files, Stankevich gained entry to the United States in 1958. The records do not show that the Agency assisted him to immigrate, but do reflect a request that I&NS permit Stankevich to leave the U.S. to return to Munich, without losing his PRA status, to resume his work for the proprietary. (S)

c. Tscherim Soobzokov, a Circassian was recruited in Amman, Jordan in 1952. In 1955, Soobzokov terminated his CIA relationship in Jordan to immigrate to the United States. After he arrived in the U.S., CIA recontacted Soobzokov and renewed its relationship with him. (S)

d. Nikola Abramtchik, a Byelorussian, was recruited in Paris in 1951. Abramtchik worked on border crossing operations, propaganda and the collection of intelligence overseas. CIA rejected Abramtchik as a candidate for PL 110 status. However, when Abramtchik applied for U.S. immigration, CIA did inform the U.S. Consulate that he was "favorably known to us." After Abramtchik arrived in the U.S., CIA continued its relationship with him. (S)

e. Juozas Brazaitis, a Lithuanian, was first contacted by this Agency in Germany during 1949-1951. These contacts were infrequent and appeared to cease when Brazaitis immigrated to the United States in 1951. In June 1954 he was cleared for use as a recruiter and as a source of foreign positive intelligence and was under contract for these purposes until 1957 when his contract expired. He was considered again for employment as a consultant on Lithuanian emigre matters in late 1961 but was not used. (S)

f. Ladislav Niznansky, a Czechoslovakian, was hired in Germany in 1953 as a journalist for Radio Free Europe. He had previously cooperated with the U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps in Germany. In 1962 Niznansky was tried in absentia in Czechoslovakia as the alleged leader of "Edelweiss," a special unit of Hitler's espionage organization in Slovakia. Niznansky applied for immigration to the U.S. in 1964 while still employed with Radio Free Europe and the Agency made available to the Department of State the above charges. (S)

g. Vladimir Secen, a Croatian, first became of interest to this Agency circa 1960 in the Dominican Republic, but there is no record of any actual contact with him at that time. He immigrated to the United States in 1962. In that year, the FBI recommended him as a source to this Agency and he was contacted sporadically from that time until 1974 when all contact was terminated. (S)

8. One other case should be mentioned: Otto Albrecht von Bolschwing, a German, became an agent in Austria immediately after the War. In 1953 he told his case officer of his intention to immigrate to the United States. The case officer cabled Headquarters and said he had advised von Bolschwing to withhold information concerning von Bolschwing's Nazi background upon arrival in the United States. Headquarters sent a reply cable instructing the case officer that under no circumstances was he permitted to counsel anyone to lie to officials of the U.S. Government and ordered the case officer to advise von Bolschwing accordingly. The case officer in a cable acknowledged the instructions. Our files additionally contain a notation that the Agency would inform I&NS that von Bolschwing had cooperated with the CIA; however, no such files have been located and the case officer is dead. The facts as stated in this paragraph were provided in full to the OSI. (Von Bolschwing was not on the GAO list.) After full review of the CIA records on von Bolschwing,

the OSI filed suit against him alleging that he obtained his U.S. citizenship illegally. Von Bolschwing died recently after he voluntarily gave up his U.S. citizenship. (S)

REPORT BY THE Comptroller General OF THE UNITED STATES

Widespread Conspiracy To Obstruct Probes Of Alleged Nazi War Criminals Not Supported By Available Evidence— Controversy May Continue


There was, in the past, a lack of progress by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in investigating and prosecuting alleged Nazi war criminals residing in the United States.

Controversy has existed as to whether the lack of progress was due to a conspiracy involving Service personnel and possibly other Federal agencies.

It is unlikely that a widespread conspiracy existed, but GAO cannot absolutely rule out the possibility of undetected, isolated instances of deliberate obstruction. GAO's investigation was hindered by the effect of the passage of time on the availability of information and limited access to agencies' records. In any event the inherent difficulty in establishing the existence of a conspiracy must be recognized.

Recently, Service efforts in this area have improved.

The Chairman, House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law requested this report.



GGD-73-73
MAY 15, 1978

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Stanley Sporkin
General Counsel

EXTENSION

NO. 15

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS: (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

DOS

19 MAY 1982

The issue of alleged Nazi war criminals in the U.S. and particularly the allegations of U.S. complicity in their immigration has become of interest to the Congress as a result of a recent interview on "Sixty Minutes." During that program a former DOJ attorney listed a variety of allegations about the U.S. Government's complicity.

DDO

We have prepared a letter and report which sets forth what we know about the matter. Usually we wait to respond on matters of this kind. In this instance I think we should initiate the exchange, although the call is a close one.

ExDir

DDCT

DCL

5/26 26 MAY 1982