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**Terrorism Review** (b)(3)

26 March 1987.

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**Terrorism Review** [redacted]

26 March 1987

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**Terrorism Review** (b)(3)

26 March 1987

**Focus****France—What Will LARF Do Now?** (b)(3)

A panel of judges found France's most wanted terrorist, Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, leader of the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), guilty of complicity in two murders and one attempted murder of US and Israeli diplomats. In a surprise move, he was sentenced to life in prison, even after government prosecutors asked for a 10-year sentence. French public opinion greeted the tough sentence and guilty verdict on all three counts with approval. Both President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac have publicly stated (b)(3) Abdallah will not be pardoned, an act that is now his last legal recourse.

The citizens of Paris braced for retaliatory bombings like those of February, March, and September of 1986, conducted by followers of Abdallah seeking his release. Over 1,000 policemen were brought into Paris during the trial. So far the group's threats have not materialized, and observers are wondering (b)(3) how much longer LARF will refrain from terrorist attacks in France.

French security officials see a combination of three reasons for the calm during March: LARF also was surprised by the trial's outcome and is building a network for future attacks; the group has been deterred somewhat by the additional security in Paris; and Syria has been pressuring LARF not to attack French targets. Each of these factors probably has some validity:

- LARF's current capability to act in Western Europe is uncertain, but the group probably was just as surprised by the verdict as more seasoned observers and may, in fact, be weighing its options while at the same time rebuilding its infrastructure in France.
- Paris is, indeed, better prepared to handle another bombing campaign like those of last year, but it is by no means certain that the group will conduct another such campaign—and the current high level of security cannot be sustained indefinitely.
- Syrian pressure on the group may have figured in the March calm and will become even more important in the coming months. (b)(3)

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**Syria—The Key Player**

(b)(3) France explored many avenues to halt the bombings in September 1986, and Syria probably played a key role in restraining LARF. Damascus controls the area of northern Lebanon where the Abdallah family and other clans with LARF members are located, and Syrian officials have told LARF leaders that they would not tolerate further attacks on French soil. There were none in the six months preceding the trial. Syrian President Assad may

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have been motivated initially by international condemnation of the Syrian role in well-publicized terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom and West Germany in 1986. Since the fall of 1986, other factors probably have bolstered Syria's stake in better relations with Paris. Several months of negotiations for badly needed French wheat apparently resulted in a sizable grain deal in mid-March, and Damascus may hope that old French-Lebanese ties can be invoked to keep Maronite Christians from opposing Syrian efforts in Beirut. It is by no means certain that Syria can restrain LARF indefinitely. (b)(3)

LARF's family-based structure was a major asset during its operations in Europe in the early 1980s—most members were from a handful of families in two villages in northern Lebanon. The resulting security kept the group safe from penetrations. That strength has become a disadvantage, however, because to augment its ranks LARF would have to turn to nonfamily members for recruits. The group's reliance on a network of extended families, and the concentration of their financial and property holdings in a small area of Lebanon, make LARF a virtual hostage to Syrian pressure. Abdallah family leaders reportedly are chafing under Syrian restrictions. (b)(3)

Yet some of the most dangerous members of LARF are not family members and may be able to operate more freely. Jacqueline Esbir—Georges Abdallah's girlfriend and the suspected assassin of Israeli diplomat Barsimantov in Paris in 1982—and Salim al-Khuri, Abdallah's key aide in earlier years, are at large and may be planning some action. They reportedly are currently in Western Europe and probably were the driving force behind the massive bombing campaigns in 1986 that killed and wounded scores of French citizens. (b)(3)

#### LARF's Next Moves

LARF may believe a presidential amnesty following the May 1988 French election to be the earliest practical opportunity for Abdallah's release. Because of the publicity the trial received, it is highly unlikely that he would be pardoned before then. If the group has been told an eventual pardon may be forthcoming, it may refrain from attacks against French interests for the next 14 months. (b)(3)

LARF not want to wait for an uncertain future pardon, the group could turn to other venues, such as Lebanon, in which to stage attacks. An operation in France—or elsewhere—could be launched more quickly if the LARF's longtime Palestinian ally, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command (PFLP-SC), were to provide logistic and weapons support, as it probably did during the bombings of 1986. In fact, the PFLP-SC may have been responsible for the 18 March bombing of a restaurant in Djibouti that left 11 persons (four of them French military personnel) dead. The choice of venue, target, and victims suggests the group, based in nearby Aden, may have acted on LARF's behalf. We do not know the extent of Syrian control over the PFLP-SC or whether Damascus has attempted to restrain the group as it has LARF. (b)(3)

We believe that LARF probably will seek to exact revenge on French interests, but cannot rule out a return to anti-US operations. Attacks on US targets are possible, since the United States played a major role in pressing for Abdallah's trial. Any

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such attacks probably would be similar to the assassination of Lt. Col. Charles Ray in 1982 and the attempt on the life of the US Consul General in Strasbourg in 1984. Before the bombings in 1986, LARF was best known for selective, violent assassinations, as when it killed the Israeli diplomat.

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If LARF is still determined to carry out more terrorism on Abdallah's behalf, one course of action offers a greater chance for success with fewer drawbacks. The group could try to seize, or buy, French hostages in Lebanon or elsewhere and try to negotiate a trade or a pardon for Abdallah. Given Paris's publicly acknowledged policy of hostage negotiations—French hostages have been freed in Lebanon—LARF may calculate it could force Paris to cut a deal.

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This tactic of putting pressure on the government without alienating the public worked once before: in March 1985, LARF members Esbir and Al-Khuri kidnaped French diplomat Gilles Peyrolles in Beirut and successfully negotiated a swap for Abdallah. The deal fell through, however, after Peyrolles was released, perhaps giving LARF an incentive to seize more than one hostage the next time around. The French Government may already be preparing for such

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**Highlights** (b)(3)

**Significant Developments** (b)(3)

**Western Europe**

**France**

**Arms Cache Discovered in Paris**

French police have linked an arms cache discovered on 4 March in Paris to the terrorist apparatus led by senior Fatah security official Colonel Hawari. According to Ziyad Hashash, one of those arrested in connection with the cache, Hawari introduced him in 1984 in Tunis to his principal operative in Western Europe, Muhi-al-Din al Jabir aka Mutran. Mutran arranged for Hashash to receive and store weapons and explosives that were to be used in attacks outside France. Hashash reportedly received two arms deliveries—in December 1984 and in June 1985. A third delivery was planned but never received, probably because Mutran was arrested in July 1985 in Rome for possession of forged documents. (b)(3)

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**Italy**

**Summit Seven Experts Agree on Bonn Declaration Update**

The Summit Seven Experts' Group on Terrorism approved a modest expansion of the 1978 Bonn Declaration on hijacking at a meeting in Rome on 13 March. The declaration, which already commits the seven countries to suspend air traffic with any country that fails to extradite or prosecute suspected hijackers, now will cover anyone involved in any form of terrorist act against civil aviation. The experts also accepted a Canadian proposal to extend the declaration to future aviation conventions. The Italians expressed their desire for a broader declaration on terrorism at the Venice economic summit in June. (b)(3)

Stiffening the Bonn Declaration will fulfill a commitment made by the heads of state at last year's Tokyo economic summit and is a small—but positive—step in counterterrorist cooperation. Concern for the safety of European hostages, the revelation of US arms sales to Iran, and the current Italian Government crisis limit the prospects for a strong new counterterrorist statement at the summit. In general, the summit countries are likely to resist any additional proposals for specific measures that would limit their political flexibility. (b)(3)

**Portugal**

**FP-25 Members on Trial**

The outcome of the current trials in Lisbon of members of the leftist terrorist group Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) will affect the group's ability to conduct future operations. On trial at present are 73 members of FP-25 who were arrested

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in a police roundup in June 1984. Currently about 20 members are at large and using the name Armed Revolutionary Faction, but they have not carried out any attacks since the fall of 1986. (b)(3)

FP-25 leaders and key members are being tried by a panel of three judges. The trial must be concluded by 19 June, because Portuguese law forbids holding a prisoner longer than three years without sentencing. The prosecution has asked for the maximum 20-year sentence for popular folk hero Otelo Sarvaiva de Carvalho and 10 other alleged organizers of the terrorist network. Some members may receive stiff sentences, but the case against others is weaker. (b)(3)

**Spain****Death of Basque Fatherland and Liberty Leader**

The accidental death of ETA-M leader Domingo Iturbe Abasolo, known as "Txomin," on 27 February in Algeria may create a leadership vacuum. Txomin was expelled from France last summer and sought asylum in Algeria. He reportedly continued to influence the group, and police estimate that 45,000 Basques marched in Txomin's funeral procession, evidence of his popularity in the Basque region. (b)(3)

Txomin's death is likely to exacerbate internal conflicts because he was able to mediate between hardline and moderate factions within ETA-M. ETA-M will be hard pressed to replace Txomin because other would-be leaders are in prison or exile. No one in ETA-M's current leadership cadre reportedly has the stature and qualifications to take effective control of the group. In addition, France's policy of expelling ETA-M members has eroded the group's support base and reduced its ability to recruit new members. (b)(3)

**Middle East****Lebanon****Assassin of French Attache Arrested**

Lebanese authorities announced on 27 February that Mohamed Hassan Tulays, a recently arrested car bomber, had confessed to the assassination of France's military attache in East Beirut on 18 September 1986. Tulays further admitted his membership in Hizballah, which he said was responsible for other attacks in Lebanon, including:

- A car bombing on 21 January 1986 in Furn al-Shabek.
- The assassination attempt on 7 January 1987 against former President Camille Chamoun.
- A car bombing on 30 January in Al-Zalqah.
- An attempted truck bombing in early February in Al-Dawrah.
- An attempt on 6 February to park a bomb-laden car in Hazmiyah, East Beirut, that resulted in his arrest.

The Tulays family also may be connected with the kidnaping in mid-February of Maronite politician Jean Ubayd, a senior adviser to Lebanese President Gemayel. (b)(3)

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**Latin America**

**Bolivia/Peru**

**Terrorist Sites Discovered**

Bolivian security forces have discovered two possible terrorist training sites that the police suspect are being used by the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso (SL). The discovery of the camps follows the arrest last month of several SL affiliates in La Paz.

[redacted] This is the first substantial report of SL training and operations inside Bolivia and suggests the group may intend to expand its operations beyond Peru. Sendero Luminoso may be taking advantage of Bolivia's lightly patrolled borders, largely inaccessible rural areas, and poorly equipped security forces in order to move supplies and train new members. Moreover, the camps—bordering one of the group's new operating areas in Peru—probably were chosen to facilitate cross-border activities. [redacted]

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**South/East Asia**

**Laos**

**Bomb Explodes During Soviet Foreign Minister's Visit**

On 9 March a bomb exploded outside the Soviet cultural center in Vientiane during Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's first official visit to the Laotian capital. The blast, which apparently was set off by a timing device, shattered windows and killed one person—possibly the terrorist rigging the bomb—and injured another. The unusual bombing incident may have been intended to embarrass Laotian and Soviet officials rather than cause casualties. The perpetrators

(b)(3) are most likely local dissidents or Lao resistance forces staging from Thailand.

[redacted]

**Pakistan**

**Massive Truck Bomb Targets Afghan Refugees**

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[redacted] a massive truck bomb that killed 14 persons and injured more than 70 others when it detonated in Peshawar on 14 February. We believe the bomb was intended for the

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offices of one of the main Afghan resistance groups, but it exploded near a primary school, causing death or injury to many children. The truck bomb was the most lethal explosion yet in the KHAD-inspired terror campaign in Peshawar. It touched off two days of violent rioting directed at the Afghan refugees in the area. There were renewed calls by local residents for Afghan refugees to be moved from major Pakistani cities and confined to camps. Soviet and Afghan agents have been stepping up their terrorist campaign to force Islamabad to withdraw support for the Afghan resistance. (b)(3)

**Sri Lanka****Boobytrapped Water Truck Explodes Prematurely**

On 14 February a water truck accidentally detonated, while members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE)—the largest and most powerful Tamil insurgent group—were rigging it with 100 kilograms of gelignite. Some 60 persons died and many others were injured in the explosion, which occurred in a small village in northern Sri Lanka. The guerrillas apparently planned to drive the truck inside a nearby Army camp and then detonate the explosives. The terrorist who was welding a hole in the truck, however, apparently tapped a high-line transformer for power, causing a short that touched off the explosive. Many nearby houses were destroyed by the blast. Sixteen insurgents died, including at least four prominent leaders. The LTTE's chief training officer and explosives expert reportedly was the most senior casualty in the blast. Reacting to a series of massive protests, including a strike by the residents of Jaffna, LTTE leader Prabhakaran publicly apologized for the deaths, an unusual action. (b)(3)

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**An Overview of Middle Eastern Terrorism in 1986** (b)(3)

The Middle East kept its place as the principal venue for international terrorist attacks in 1986 and, consistent with recent years, accounted for approximately half of all incidents worldwide. State-supported terrorists—backed by Libya, Syria, and Iran—reached unprecedented levels of violence in several dramatic attacks that occurred mostly in Western Europe. In Lebanon, the kidnappings of hostages continued unabated last year—two Americans were released, but one was killed and three more kidnaped. Warring militias—particularly Palestinians and all stripes of Lebanese Christians and Muslims—waged vicious internecine battles, and year's end saw the involvement of many Middle Eastern terrorist groups in the war of the camps in Beirut. (b)(3)

**State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Year of Spectacular Violence**

In 1986, Libya and Syria were the major state sponsors to use terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Terrorists backed or directly guided by those countries carried out attacks that resulted in unprecedented international political and military repercussions:

- The United States responded to evidence of Libyan involvement in the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin in April by launching retaliatory airstrikes against Tripoli and Benghazi.
- The United Kingdom broke off diplomatic relations with Damascus after Syria was implicated in the attempted bombing of an El Al airliner at Heathrow Airport after the conviction of Nizar Hindawi, the terrorist who gave his unwitting girlfriend a bag packed with explosives to carry on board. Moreover, London led the effort to urge the European Community to impose economic sanctions on Damascus.
- West Germany temporarily recalled its Ambassador from Damascus after discovering Syrian complicity in the March bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Union in West Berlin. (b)(3)

Reactions by the state sponsors to these measures varied. In the immediate aftermath of the airstrikes, Qadhafi responded with a series of terrorist actions, but Libyan activity slackened somewhat in the last half of 1986:

- Circumstantial evidence points to Libyan involvement in the shooting of a US Embassy communicator in Khartoum one day after the strike on Tripoli.

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- In Ankara authorities apprehended two Libyans on 18 April as they approached the US Officers' Club to attack it with grenades received from the Libyan People's Bureau. The Libyans said they had been instructed to cause the "maximum amount" of US casualties.
- Libya probably had a role in the shooting in Sanaa, North Yemen, of another US diplomat on 25 April. T (b)(3) ects under arrest include a Libyan.

The level of Libyan terrorist activity dropped in the period from the last week in April through mid-July, but Tripoli resumed terrorist planning in midsummer. We believe the August attack on the British Air Force base at Akrotiri, Cyprus, was a Libyan-instigated operation intended as further retaliation against Britain for allowing American aircraft based in the United Kingdom to be used in the airstrikes. (b)(3)

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The publicity surrounding the trials of terrorists involved in Syrian-supported incidents in London and West Berlin severely embarrassed Damascus. We suspect that the lack of terrorist activity on the part of Syrian-supported groups after September was, in part, attributable to Syria's desire to keep a low profile in the terrorist (b)(3) in order to dampen Western criticism. (b)(3)

Iranian leaders in 1986 remained committed to the use of international terrorism to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. Tehran, however, was involved in fewer incidents than in 1985—probably because Iranian leaders have become more selective in their use of terrorism as a foreign policy instrument. Iran continued to provide significant support to the Lebanese Hizballah organization and to benefit from its activities, including the holding of Western hostages. Iran also benefited directly from its ability to threaten to use terrorism, particularly in the Persian Gulf states. Iranian-backed terrorists carried out attacks against oil facilities in Kuwait in June (b)(3)

**Palestinian Terrorism: Fewer Incidents**

Palestinian terrorists conducted significantly fewer attacks in 1986 than in the previous year, contributing to a falloff in Middle Eastern terrorist spillover into Western Europe. The abatement of intra-Palestinian squabbles—perhaps only a temporary development—appeared to be a primary cause of the reduction in Palestinian terrorism. (b)(3)

Palestinian terrorists, nevertheless, staged several dramatic attacks. In April a bomb exploded aboard TWA Flight 840 over Athens, killing four Americans.

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The Abu Nidal Group was less active in 1986 than in the previous year—probably largely because of its apparent standdown at Syria's request on anti-Jordan

attacks. The group returned with vengeance in September when it attempted to hijack a Pan Am flight in Karachi, in which 21 persons were killed. The operation clearly involved Libyan logistic support. The Abu Nidal Group probably also conducted the assault on the Istanbul synagogue the next day, killing 22 Jews. The group continued to receive support from both Syria and Libya in 1986, although Damascus tried to improve its image in the West by appearing to crack down on some of Abu Nidal's publicly known members in Syria. At year's end, there was no evidence that Damascus intended to break its ties to the group. (b)(3)

The Abu Musa group apparently joined the list of Palestinian groups that have committed terrorist acts in Europe. In June a suitcase bomb intended for an El Al flight from Madrid exploded prematurely at a check-in counter in the airport, injuring 13 persons. Police traced the suitcase to a Palestinian who claimed to be a member of the anti-Arafat Abu Musa group. (b)(1)  
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We believe Abu Musa has carried out at least one other operation in Western Europe, but the group has generally operated in the Middle East. (b)(3)

In Israel, Middle Eastern terrorists carried out several notable attacks in 1986. The PLO launched the bloodiest attack in Jerusalem since 1984 when terrorists hurled grenades at Israeli soldiers and their families near the crowded Western Wall in October, killing one person and injuring 69 others. Israeli security officials subsequently arrested three suspects, who claimed to be members of Islamic Jihad who were recruited into Fatah. In July, members of the PFLP and the Syrian-backed Lebanese Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) attempted a commando attack on an Israeli resort town. Four terrorists and two Israeli soldiers were killed. (b)(3)

**Lebanon: The Kidnapings Continue**

In Lebanon the violence between warring militias continued throughout the year. In many cases, neither the perpetrator nor the target could be conclusively

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established. We do not know, for example, the terrorists responsible for a series of bombings in July and August in East and West Beirut in which 76 persons were killed, nor their exact intended targets. In the fall, the French contingent of the UN peacekeeping force in south Lebanon suffered several attacks, and a French diplomat was assassinated as he entered the French Embassy in East Beirut. Information received in early 1987 suggests that Hizballah was responsible for the assassination of the French diplomat (b)(3)

Westerners were not the primary victims of the constant violence in Lebanon, but they remained an important target, especially for kidnapers. Elements of Hizballah—using a variety of covernames—probably were responsible for most of the kidnappings, although in some cases freelance terrorists may have taken hostages in order to sell them to the highest bidder. Four members of a French television crew were kidnaped in March; three eventually were released in June and November. Two Americans, Father Lawrence Jenco and David Jacobsen, were released in July and November, respectively, but three more—Frank Reed, Joseph Cicippio, and Edward Tracy—were kidnaped in the fall. At the end of the year, we judge that they were still in the custody of Hizballah, along with Americans kidnaped as long ago as March 1985. One other American, Peter Kilburn—along with two British citizens—was executed following the US airstrikes on Tripoli and Benghazi. We believe Libya was involved in the executions (b)(3)

**Outlook**

Middle Eastern groups proved increasingly willing in 1986 to carry out indiscriminate attacks designed to cause maximum casualties and gain worldwide publicity. This trend is likely to continue into 1987. Any lull in terrorism because of the preoccupation of many Middle Eastern groups and their state sponsors with the fighting in Beirut probably will be only temporary. (b)(3)

In 1986 it became increasingly difficult to assign responsibility for specific terrorist acts to a particular group, especially in the Middle East. The group affiliation of over half the terrorist incidents that we attribute to Middle Easterners last year remains

unknown. We believe the growing use of freelance terrorists accounts for part of this problem. The chaotic conditions in Lebanon initially provided the setting for this development, which also provides state sponsors the deniability they seek for their terrorist operations. Lebanon will continue to play a key role in facilitating contacts among terrorists, and the trend toward anonymous terrorist incidents is likely to continue. (b)(3)

In our judgment, prospects for the early release of the hostages are not good. We are virtually certain that the captors represent Shia extremist elements and that decisions about their fate will be made by Hizballah's leaders, in consultation with Iran. Syrian or Lebanese pressure to release them is unlikely to sway Hizballah. (b)(3)

State sponsors will continue to use terrorism to further their own objectives, but they will make serious efforts to avoid detection.

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Both Syria and Libya are likely to view the frequent and continued use of surrogates—particularly radical Palestinians—as a way to prevent their fingerprints from being discovered at the scenes of their crimes. (b)(3)

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


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## Tracing Terrorist Explosives (b)(3)

Explosives stolen from a quarry in Ecaussines, Belgium, in 1984 appear to have been dispersed widely throughout Europe, and we expect there will be more terrorist incidents using these explosives. After a number of bombings in 1984 and 1985 conducted by four West European terrorist groups using the explosives, French and West German authorities in 1986 began to find more of the explosives that had been cached for future use. At least 550 of the 815 kilograms stolen remain unaccounted for and probably are in terrorists' hands (b)(3)

The explosives have been used in attacks by the French group Action Directe (AD), West Germany's Red Army Faction (RAF), the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), as well as another Belgian group, the Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action (FRAP). This common use represented the strongest evidence of cooperation among these groups in a Euroterrorist campaign that reached its peak in late 1984 and early 1985. There were no attacks using the explosives in 1986, to the best of our knowledge. (b)(3)

The most recent discoveries have been linked to AD and the RAF. French police found some of the dynamite during a raid on a farmhouse near Orleans, France, in which four key leaders of AD were arrested on 21 February. The discovery in Orleans marked the first time any of the explosives have been tied directly to one of the groups since January 1986. That month, Belgian police uncovered a large quantity of the explosives during raids on CCC safehouses. (b)(1)  
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 (b)(3) police in Duesseldorf, West Germany, arrested two French Corsicans on 4 March 1987 in possession of 1.5 kilograms of explosives that may have come from the quarry in Ecaussines. Local authorities believe the Corsicans intended to sell the explosives to the RAF, but the dynamite has not yet been conclusively tied to the quarry theft (b)(3)

French police also found a small quantity of the dynamite in September 1986 in a cache associated with a Marxist Iranian group that possibly has ties to

the CCC. We do not know how the "Iranian People's Fedayeen Guerrilla Organization" obtained the 6 kilograms of explosives, but Belgian police found fingerprints of two of the group's members in the apartment of a key CCC leader who was arrested in June 1986. This was the first indication the explosives stolen in Ecuassine (b)(3) gone to a non-European terrorist group. (b)(3)

### Who Was Responsible?

Police have never made any arrests for the theft, but there is plentiful circumstantial evidence that members of one or more of the terrorist groups that used the explosives were involved in the theft. Witnesses reported seeing RAF hardcore member Sigrid Sternebeck near the quarry at the time of the attempted break-in on 1 May. Furthermore, a CCC communique correctly identified the commercial names of the dynamite and the amount stolen. They went on to claim "internationalist revolutionaries" stole the explosives, (b)(3) group did not directly take responsibility. (b)(3)

The timing of the groups' attacks following the theft and the links among members of the groups also suggest the break-in was carried out by one or more of the groups. The RAF, AD, CCC, and FRAP launched a coordinated campaign against NATO that ran from August 1984 through December 1985 and used the explosives stolen from the Belgian quarry in as many as 18 of their attacks. Before the campaign, in July 1984, West German authorities had discovered documents indicating that the RAF intended to embark on a three-pronged effort, suggesting planning was well along before the Ecaussines theft. Although we do not know when the groups began planning their activities, the complexity, pace, and duration of their operations suggest they needed a significant amount of time to prepare, including locating and acquiring the explosives for the bombings.

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**Accounting for the Explosives**

On 4 June 1984, approximately 815 kilograms (kg) of explosives—75 kg of Tolamite, 45 kg of Dynamite-3, 150 kg of Triamite, and 545 kg of Iremite—were stolen from a quarry near Ecaussines, Belgium. Two earlier attempts to break into the explosives storage area over the preceding four months had been unsuccessful, but police believe that two to five persons finally used electrical power tools and other equipment (b)(3) cut through a reinforced armored door.

[Redacted]

Since the theft, only about 165 kg of the explosives have been found intact. This is the amount French, Belgian, and West German authorities have confiscated in safehouses or taken from explosive devices placed by terrorists but which failed to explode. Analyses of residue from bombs that exploded during 1984 and 1985 in Belgium indicated some could have been made from the same type of dynamite stolen from Ecaussines.

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Analysis of the residue of bombs used in some successful attacks by the Red Army Faction and Action Directe indicated they did not contain explosives from Ecaussines. (b)(3)

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we estimate that approximately 261 kg of the explosives—about one-third of the haul—have been confiscated from or used by West European terrorists. We have no evidence that Middle Eastern terrorist groups have used any of the explosives in their attacks in Western Europe, including the series of bombings the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction carried out during September 1986 in Paris. (b)(3)

Through links among members of the four groups, a network existed by which they could have distributed the explosives. For example, Pierre Carette, one of the founders of the CCC, reportedly printed some documents for AD in 1982. Carette also had close ties to the RAF. He was a member of the Belgian Support Committee for the RAF prisoners and was suspected of playing a support role in the RAF's attack in 1979 on US Army Gen. Alexander Haig in Belgium. In addition, West German police found a map in July 1984 at an RAF safehouse that was marked with the same points on a NATO pipeline that CCC bombed the following December. Joint communiques issued during the Euroterrorist campaign in 1984-85 and documents seized by French police at an AD safehouse in February 1986 point to the ties between the

RAF and AD. Our knowledge of FRAP's ties to the other groups is less detailed. The fingerprints of two AD leaders were found in a FRAP safehouse in 1985. On the other hand, the CCC claimed to know nothing about FRAP in a communique issued in April 1985. (b)(3)

We have little information about the explosives confiscated in March 1987 from the Corsicans in Dueseldorf, especially whether the dynamite came from Ecaussines and how the men acquired the explosives. The two reportedly have long French criminal records. If the explosives were from the quarry, the involvement of these men raises the possibility that

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criminals stole the explosives and transferred them to the terrorists—not a unique situation. A Swedish gang reportedly admitted in January 1987 selling Swedish military munitions they stole in November 1986 to terrorists for operations in Belgium and in France. (b)(3)

#### Where Are the Rest of the Explosives?

There is strong evidence the terrorist groups had custody of a large amount of the stolen explosives, although we have not been able to determine that the four organizations had all that was stolen or how much each group had. In at least two cases, the explosives appeared outside the groups. On 24 April 1985, a Turkish national was arrested in Paris with 400 grams of the dynamite he claimed was given to him by a North African in Belgium, but French police believed he was connected with AD. The Iranians arrested last September in France with approximately 6 kilograms of the explosives may have obtained the dynamite from the CCC through Pierre Carette. He was arrested in December 1985, suggesting the Iranians had already acquired the explosives. We do not yet know if the Corsicans arrested in West Germany have access to more than the 1.5 kilograms found in their car. (b)(3)

The coincidental timing of the arrests of Belgian terrorists, confiscation of 100 kilograms of the explosives in eight of their safehouses, and the end of the Euroterrorist bombing campaign suggest the CCC had the major share of the explosives held by any of the four West European organizations. It has been associated with the largest amount of the stolen explosives that has been confiscated or used by any of the four groups. (b)(3)

The RAF and AD may still have some of the explosives. They made only three bombs—amounting to 48 kilograms of dynamite—from their share of the Ecaussines haul, but these were discovered and disarmed before they could explode. Residue from their subsequent bombings indicates they have not used dynamite from Ecaussines since December 1985. The discovery of some of the dynamite in the AD safehouse in February, however, shows the AD still had some of the explosives. West German police have not turned up any of the explosives in RAF safehouses

discovered since 1985, but, like AD, the RAF may be husbanding its supply (b)(3)

Despite the recent discovery of more of the explosives, we are no closer to knowing for sure how much is in terrorist hands. Nevertheless, due to the continuing appearance of the explosives with terrorists, we estimate that the remaining explosives likely are controlled by terrorist groups, particularly the RAF and AD. Belgian authorities have not uncovered any more CCC or FRAP caches since January 1986. Because we have no indications that members of these defunct groups in custody have been forthcoming about the existence of any more caches, we cannot rule out the possibility that they still have some of the explosives hidden away. (b)(3)

One ominous prospect is that the dynamite has made its way beyond the original four users and could appear in the hands of other radical terrorist groups. If criminals stole the explosives—a possibility raised by the arrest of the Corsicans—and did not transfer the entire 815 kilograms to the CCC, FRAP, RAF, and AD, the probability increases that more groups could get the explosives from those anxious to sell them. Alternatively, if the RAF and AD have all of the explosives that remain with active terrorist groups, they may not be interested or have the means, to share it with others. (b)(3)

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**Chronology of Terrorism—1986-87**

*Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.*  (b)(3)

**31 December** *Chile: Unidentified individuals armed with pistols and submachineguns threaten employees of the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration in Santiago. No one was injured in the incident. A telephone call from an unidentified male claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of the "11 September Commandos."*  (b)(3)

*Uganda: Handgrenade explodes at a crowded bus stop in Kampala, injuring six people. Witnesses say that the grenade was thrown from a three-story building across from the bus stop. No claim of responsibility has been made.*  (b)(3)

**13 January** *Namibia: Bomb explodes at a gas station in Gobabis, killing one man. A second bomb was found nearby and defused. There was no claim of responsibility.*  (b)(3)

**14 January** *Cyprus: Police at Larnaca airport deport a group of Palestinians trying to enter the country. Police believe they planned to attack Syrian targets in Nicosia. The Palestinians were refused permission to telephone a contact in Cyprus and were put aboard a plane that left for overseas.*  (b)(3)

**28 January** *Turkey: Three members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) involved in a village raid on 24 January surrender to police. Another two militants were expected to give themselves up. The security forces arrested 23 persons in connection with the incident.*  (b)(3)

**30 January** *Turkey: Four Palestinians on trial for the murder in July 1985 of a Jordanian diplomat end a hunger strike in an Ankara jail after prosecutor's visit. They were protesting a court decision refusing their release. The prosecutor reportedly promised to help them.*  (b)(3)

**Late January** *Turkey: Istanbul police arrest two university students for suspicious activities and distribution of leaflets signed by the leftist terrorist group Dev Sol. Several books and publications containing leftist propaganda also were confiscated.*  (b)(3)

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- 1 February** *Israel: Rockets land in field in Galilee.* The PLO claimed responsibility. (b)(3)
- 3 February** *Turkey: Martial law court in Erzurum acquits 218 suspects in Dev Yol (Revolutionary Way) and Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) trials.* In the Dev Yol trial, 89 suspects were acquitted of charges of belonging to an underground organization and arranging illegal meetings to promote the ideology of their group. There were 129 suspects acquitted in the PKK trial. (b)(3)
- 5 February** *Chile: Bombs damage several pylons of the national high-voltage power network, causing power outages in Santiago and the coastal towns of Valparaiso and Vina del Mar.* No organization has claimed credit for this attack. (b)(3)
- Early February** *Turkey: Military court in Diyarbakir sentences Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) founder to eight years in prison.* Sakine Polat previously had been tried six times and given various prison terms; this latest sentence raises her total term of imprisonment to 59 years. (b)(3)
- Turkey: Security forces capture seven members of an illegal organization in Istanbul.* The suspects are alleged members of a Marxist-Leninist group. Forged identity cards and organizational documents also were seized. (b)(3)
- 7 February** *Turkey: Suspicious fire destroys San Theater in Istanbul, killing the night watchman.* Fire officials claim a short circuit caused the accident, but the police suspect arson by Islamic fundamentalists. The theater was staging a play that was harshly criticized by conservative Muslims. (b)(3)
- Argentina: Bomb explodes at the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party committee headquarters in Buenos Aires.* The explosion caused damage to the building but no casualties. (b)(3)
- 15 February** *Gaza Strip: Molotov cocktail thru (b)(3) Israeli bus outside police station.* No injuries or damages occurred. (b)(3)
- Israel: Car bomb explodes near hospital in Kfar Saba.* Bomb detonated prematurely, wounding several suspected terrorists. (b)(3)
- Mid-February** *Turkey: Ankara military court sentences suspected members of the Dev Yol (Revolutionary Way) Eskisehir branch.* Of the 104 suspects, two were sentenced to death and one to life imprisonment. Another 52 received prison terms ranging from three to 15 years and 46 were acquitted. (b)(3)

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**Turkey: Diyarbakir military court sentences Rizgari Organization members.** One defendant received five years at hard labor, another had his sentence increased to 24 years, and five others were acquitted. The court also sentenced a Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) militant to 10 years in prison. (b)(3)

**Turkey: Authorities discover weapons cache in Ceylanpinar.** A total of 147 (b)(3) handguns were buried together with 284 magazines and other ammunition. (b)(3)

16 February

**Argentina: Bomb explodes outside newspaper agency in Mendoza.** Numerous windows were broken but there were no casualties. No group has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

18 February

**Turkey: In Eruh, separatist Kurdish Workers Party militants raid the home of the village religious leader, whose two brothers (b)(3) as watchmen.** Two civilians were killed and four others were injured. (b)(3)

**West Bank: IDF kills Nablus taxi driver whose cab struck several Israeli soldiers.** Local Palestinians believe (b)(3) accident caused the incident, and charged that the IDF overreacted. (b)(3)

**West Bank: Unidentified individual throws molotov (b)(3) oil at settlement near Nablus.** No damage or injuries were reported. (b)(3)

**West Bank: Unidentified persons throw molotov cocktails in village near Jenin.** The firebombs exploded but caused no damage or injuries. (b)(3)

19 February

**Peru: Tupac Amaru (MRTA) took over 12 radio stations in Lima (b)(3) broadcast messages attacking the government.** No injuries were reported. (b)(3)

20 February

**Israel: Vandals set fire to entrance to East Jerusalem (b)(3) of Israeli Bank Hapoalim.** No group has claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

21 February

**Gaza: Molotov cocktail damages parked Israeli vehicle.** There were no injuries. (b)(3)

**Israel: Arson destroys (b)(3)-owned shop.** Witnesses claim they saw three Israelis leave the scene. (b)(3)

**Peru: Bomb explodes harmlessly near the Presidential Palace.** President Garcia was bestowing a decoration on Guatemalan President Cerezo at the time of the explosion. (b)(3)

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22 February

**Israel: Unknown individual throws smoke (b)(3) at souvenir shop in East Jerusalem.** No damage was reported. (b)(3)

**Israel: Grenade thrown in Jerusalem wounds 17 persons, including 12 Israeli border policemen.** Both Fatah's Force 17 and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility. (b)(3)

**Zambia: Explosion rips through a Lusaka post office, causing extensive damage to the building.** No injuries were reported and no group has claimed responsibility for the explosion. (b)(3)

24 February

**Spain: Basques stone Renteria town hall in protest over expulsions by France.** There were no injuries or clashes with police in the incident. (b)(3)

25 February

**Turkey: During arms smuggling trial in Diyarbakir government prosecutor accuses Libya and Syria of aiding the Kurdish Workers' Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.** The five suspects in the trial, who are charged with smuggling arms into Turkey from Syria for the separatists will face 15-to-25 year sentences if convicted. (b)(3)

**West Germany: Group of 21 Kurds briefly occupy the BBC radio office in Charlottenburg, protesting the treatment of Kurds in Sweden.** In January 1987 several Kurds were detained when Swedish authorities investigated the possibility of Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) involvement in the Olof Palme killing last year. (b)(3)

**West Bank: Israeli extremists vandalize Ar-Rub refugee camp, smashing windshields, and solar panels, and painting threats on Arab houses** (b)(3)

25-26 February

**Spain: Prime Minister Gonzalez gives speech indicating possible repeal of antiterrorist legislation.** This would limit jail retention time of suspected terrorists from 10 to five or six days. (b)(3)

26 February

**Spain: Police defuse 20-pound bomb outside Barcelona synagogue.** No group claimed responsibility for planting the device, but police suspect Middle Eastern terrorists. (b)(3)

27 February

**Spain: France expels three suspected Basque guerrillas, turning them over to Spanish police in San Sebastian.** These new expulsions bring the total number to 39 since July 1986. (b)(3)

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- 28 February** *Spain: Bomb explodes at Gerona provincial courthouse, causing extensive damage but no injuries.* The Catalan separatist group Terra Lliure claimed responsibility. (b)(3)
- Spain: France expels suspected Basque terrorist to Spain.* The suspect, a former counselor in Pamplona for the radical Herri Batasuna coalition, sheltered Basque Fatherland and Liberty members in the city before fleeing to France six years ago. (b)(3)
- Gaza: Homemade bomb slightly damages Israeli bus parked near police station.* Anonymous caller in Beirut claims credit on behalf of Force 17. (b)(3)
- (b)(1) *Peru: Four Sendero Luminoso terrorists botch mortar attack against President Garcia's residence.* (b)(3) the mortar exploded in the terrorists' hands. (b)(3)
- 2 March** *West Bank: Nablus observes first anniversary of Palestinian Mayor al-Masri's assassination.* Israeli authorities restricted public gatherings to prevent a possible outbreak of violence. (b)(3)
- 3 March** *West Bank: Israeli bus near Amari refugee camp in Ramallah is target of Molotov cocktail.* Israeli soldiers arrested one Arab youth. (b)(3)
- 4 March** *Costa Rica: Unidentified group leaves small bomb in the driveway of the private residence of President Arias.* The bomb did not explode. (b)(3)
- 5 March** *Spain: Terra Lliure detonates bomb at television relay station in Gerona.* There were no injuries, and the extent of damage is unknown. (b)(3)
- West Bank: Three Israeli settlers attempt arson attack on Muslim religious school in Hebron.* The settlers were arrested. (b)(3)
- 6 March** *Honduras: Powerful bomb explodes in front of the home of Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) spokeswoman Adela Icaza.* A leftist group claimed responsibility for the bombing. (b)(3)
- 7 March** *Spain: Bomb explodes at town council building in Baracaldo.* There were no injuries. No group claimed responsibility, although the police suspect the Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization. (b)(3)

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9 March

**Spain: Two masked gunmen seriously wound Spanish Army lieutenant as he is driving to work in Vitoria.** No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but the police suspect the Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization. (b)(3)

**Spain: Six French-manufactured vehicles set on fire in various parts of Barcelona.** The arson attacks followed the arrival on 7 March of the body of Basque Fatherland and Liberty organization leader Txomin, who was killed in a car crash in Algeria on 27 February. (b)(3)

10 March

**Colombia: Members of the National Liberation Army abduct Canadian oil engineer in Arauca Province.** The victim is an employee of the US-owned firm Occidental Petroleum, and the incident marks the first such kidnaping this year. (b)(3)

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