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July 30, 2014
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December 1, 1980
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TITLE:AUTHOR:VOLUME:Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583Serving Intelligence Clients(b)(3)(c)24 ISSUE: Winter YEAR: 1980Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583 pproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583INTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.All strateme_nts of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583CONFIDENTIALAs much effort must go into the care and feedingof consumers as goes into production to ensuremaximum impact for finished current intelligence.SERVING INTELLIGENCE CLIENTS(b)(3)(c)Intelligence analysts labor long and hard to reach and coordinate significantconclusions which their supervisors and senior officials review and massage for clarityand terseness. A sophisticated, attractive product is sought by the use of graphic artsand the most modern publication and printing techniques. Then, an excellent outputtoo often is left to the vagaries of the distribution system.Production analysts and their supervisors too often see the fact of publication asthe end of their effort. Experience shows, however, that distribution lists and bluenotes from the Director or his Deputies do not guarantee that the information reaches,or is read, by the reader for whom it is intended. Although much of the intelligenceproduct reaches the policymakers through staffers who peruse intelligence documentsin preparing studies and recommendations for their principals, its impact is indirect.These simple truths manifested themselves to me while an intelligence aide to theSecretary of the Treasury from 1972 to 1974.THE CONCEPTIn 1971 the Secretary of the Treasury became a member of NFIB (then USIB).Late that year George Shultz was appointed to that office. Seeking guidance about therole Treasury should play, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms appointedtwo CIA employees?representing DDO and NFAC (then DDI)?to assist in organiz-ing a contribution to collection (from the Treasury attaches) and to develop a sys-tematic availability of finished intelligence to the Secretary. It is the latter functionaddressed in this article.The Department of the Treasury received multiple copies of selected finishedintelligence products. Due to the absence of a secure building, these were filed andmade available on request to the few officials holding suitable clearances. Thus, unlesssenior Treasury officials had prior knowledge of the existence of an intelligence pub-lication, they remained ignorant of much of the material sent to their Department.The Secretary received regularly only one document?a hand-carried copy of NSA'sunevaluated daily Sigint Summary. Like most senior officials, he did not distinguishbetween raw information and finished, evaluated intelligence; an intelligence logo orletterhead symbolized an intelligence product.The Secretary was amenable to rectifying this situation and instructed that heshould receive an oral intelligence briefing daily, that all substantive intelligence docu-ments directed to the Office of the Secretary be screened by his intelligence briefer,and that recommendations be made regarding clearances for his Assistant Secretariesto assure that information vital to the performance of their duties was made availableONFIDENTIAL 33Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583? CONFIDENTIAL Serving Intelligence Clientsto them. His satisfaction with CIA support subsequently caused him to direct that allmembers of the Economic Policy Board, ? which he chaired, be briefed daily.Thus began an experience that was exhilerating and exhausting?but most of allthe fulfillment of an analyst's dream: to observe and participate in the near finalprocess of intelligence, its consideration by the policy decision maker. I learned manylessons which I happily share with others in the hope of fostering profound change inintelligence output.Treasury OrganizationDevising a system to provide intelligence products to officials in the TreasuryDepartment was physically taxing but not a great problem. Each day at 0600, over-night CIA publications and selected pieces of traffic were delivered. NSA furnishedsignificant items from its take, and State Department sent a selection of cable traffic.The Treasury's own tickers provided press and FBIS material. All formed the grist forpreparation of the daily briefings.When William Simon became Secretary in 1974, the author appreciated his priorattendance at the Agency's speed reading course. Mr. Simon chose to have his briefingwith breakfast, just after 0700, allowing one hour for the briefer to assimulate theovernight take. I found he digested world affairs with the same assiduity he did hisgrapefruit. It became a peripatetic briefing, usually ending up in the washroom wherethe Vietnam situation the Secretary's teeth simultaneously got the broad brush.Interviews with the officers designated by the Secretary quickly revealed thoseinterests and responsibilities that should be supported by intelligence. Because only thecommunications area of the Treasury building was secure, officers were orally briefeddaily, or provided with hand-carried folders of relevant material, according to theirchoice. A secure vault was established where officers' materials were filed and wherestandard classified reference materials were kept for their perusal.Not everyone at Treasury was enamored of this intelligence attention. DeputyUndersecretary for Monetary Affairs Paul Volcker initially declined the offer of sup-port, noting that when he needed information on international economic develop-ments he phoned the likely foreign source of information. (He abhorred "skulking inthe corridors, eavesdropping.") Mr Volcker was later won over to intelligence whenshown clandestine reporting that an ostensible ally was -setting him up," permittinghim to turn aside what might have become an embarrassing situation.Other skeptics, many of whom never became comfortable even with the knowl-edge that intelligence analysis was addressing problems in Treasury's area of substan-tive policy reponsibility, at least grudgingly admitted that intelligence helped to con-firm their own analyses.Broader ContactsA fascinating and educational part of the tour involved association with membersof the Economic Policy Board. Unlike the development of a system within the Depart-ment of the Treasury to purvey finished intelligence, with the EPB approaches had to'The Economic Policy Board (now The Economic Policy Group) during the period under considerationincluded Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz, Chairman; Executive Director Kenneth Dam; EconomicCounselor to the President Ambassador Kenneth Rush; Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent; Chairmenof the Council of Economic Advisors Herbert Stein; the President's Special Trade Representative Ambas-sador William Eberle; and Chairman of the Council of International Economic Policy Peter Flanigan. TheEPB provided guidance to the President of both domestic and international economic policies.34 CONFIDENTIALApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583Serving Intelligence Clients CONFIDENTIALbe designed for the widely differing physical and substantive situations and personal-ity of each member.Ideally, a psychologist should match the briefer to his principal. Although Sec-retary Shultz was of impressive stature, his desk was on a platform so he looked downon his visitors. A man of little facial expression, he chose to look directly into the eyesof a speaker. Unless he commented in his soft-spoken yet steely manner it was difficultto ascertain his reaction. Equally unnerving was Mr. Flanigan's habit of standingbehind the briefer?which left me addressing an empty chair.Common to all was the never-ending need to be made familiar with the servicesand capabilities of the intelligence world. During the two-year period in which therewere nine changes of EPB members, it became clear that it was the individual'sperception of the role to be played, as well as his/her influence in decision-makingbodies and relation to the Chief Executive, rather than the title of the office held bythe member, that dictated the support intelligence required. The President regularlymade assignments of responsibility that related more to the individual's ability, in-terests, and background than to job title.The Executive Branch may appear highly structured, but in fact it is highlypersonalized. With each change of incumbency, a whole new set of interests andcapabilities is brought into the picture. Varying relationships develop with the ChiefExecutive, and tasks are not only given to the new official, but they are also assignedor reassigned widely. Even without a change of incumbency, it is important to keep asharp watch for Presidential details. During my tour, the role of chief negotiator onthe sensitive problem of US economic relations with Japan shifted among the VicePresident, the President's Special Trade Representative, the Chairman of the Councilof Economic Advisors, and the Secretary of Commerce. Keeping abreast of suchchanges in assignment is vital to insure that intelligence is properly exploited by thepolicymaker/negotiator.I found that close daily contact with officials?and their willingness in most casesto permit a review of their appointment calendars listing meetings they would attendor chair, foreign officials they would host, trips they would make?permitted thetailoring of intelligence support to their needs. On this point, Henry Kissinger was notthe only official to make unheralded trips abroad. Often a confidential foreign visithad significance beyond the publicized trips of Administration officials. During the1972-1973 international monetary crises, intelligence support for the secret meetingsfar exceeded in importance the more regular intelligence assistance supplied.It was not surprising to find each Cabinet Secretary or Presidential adviser had aquite individual style and approach to assigned responsibility. As regards intelligence,some read, some listened; some were receptive, some hostile; some were attentive,some few were querulous and distracted. Many opted to avoid -IN- boxes, relyingsolely on aides to screen incoming material?which required a dual contact to makecertain that the principal was well-served by assisting the aide in making judgmentsabout what should be forwarded or discarded. This required a careful balance to avoidoverloading the official and yet faithfully representing intelligence output.One official insisted that he always be briefed privately, that his staff not beinformed of our exchanges. Another asked that his personal staff be cleared to partici-pate in the briefings. A third was briefed privately but would indicate items to bebrought to the attention of particular subordinates. Most did not regularly read anygeneral intelligence publication, preferring to be given specific items for study andfrequently asking for summaries with important background details underscored.CONFIDENTIAL 35Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583?CONFIDENTIAL Serving Intelligence ClientsIn addition to understanding these idiosyncracies, it was necessary to establish apersonal relationship with each official. Perhaps the most bizarre incident that led to awarm and lasting association involved Dr. Herbert Stein?a man of stern demeanorbut, I discovered, with an impish proclivity. I was ,4iici,?1 unmercifully in front of hisstaff for a considerably off-mark estimate of a (N(1 )  election outcome. Beforethinking, I blurted out that I felt quite at home with that mis-estimate in the presenceof the Council of Economic Advisors. The first uproarious laugh came from Dr. Steinwith whom, from that point, and easy relationship existed.Almost universally, these senior officials developed a strong desire to be in chargeof the briefings. They sought information related to an imminent meeting or a prob-lem in which they were embroiled. Only with tact and persistence could they be led toconsider those analyses that are the major purpose of intelligence?reporting develop-ing situations that would in the future require decisions. It became an interestingcontest between what the policymaker wanted to know and what the intelligence aidethought he should know.Again, personal contact was invaluable in this area. It permitted, withperseverence, the preparation of the policymaker to influence forthcoming problemsrather than merely to react to them. It also made it possible to retrieve and re-presentolder published materials relevant to situations in which he/she had become involved.With some frequency, routine intelligence output had no relevance for many consum-ers at the time of its production, yet was welcomed as thought-provoking analysissubsequently. Often current intelligence became -current- when consumed ratherthan when produced.Although OER had published considerable data on Soviet and world agriculturalprospects and Moscow's need to import grains from major suppliers (read the US),much of that reporting had not been absorbed by those about to participate in thedecision on US grain acreage allocations in 1973. The preparation of a packet ofexisting materials and an update briefing provided an economic rationale for whatotherwise would have been largely a domestic political decision.And yet I would make clear that in two years of briefing a large number ofappointed officials, I found none unintelligent. Quite the contrary: they were busypeople with-a- tendency to problem solve using their considerable native intelligenceunless specific help was laid before them. On being designated -oil czar- in 1973,Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Simon vowed to become expert in that field. Whileboth CIA and the Department of the Interior briefed and provided written materials,his ability to sort, evaluate, and digest information and isolate the real issues, led to amastery of the subject that was generally typical of the ability of policymakers.On many occasions daily personal contact contributed to improved targets forintelligence exploitation. Busy officials are unlikely on their own to investigate ways toelucidate reports they read, but with great frequency they asked me for fuller ex-planation or analyses into related areas of intelligence. Chairman Herbert Stein of theCouncil of Economic Advisors recommended content and format for a quarterly sum-mary economic analysis that appeared in OER's Economic Intelligence Weekly.  (b)(1) (b)(3)(n)  SERVICE TO CLIENTSHow should intelligence assure that it makes an appropriate and major contribu-tion to a decisionmaker too busy to search out all relevant information? How do we36 CONIIDENTIALApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000617583Serving Intelligence Clients COWIDENTIALmake maximum and telling use of the production of the intelligence analyst, much ofwhich derives from exciting -finds" in his daily take but which may not match theimmediate need of a consumer?I believe there is no substitute for personal contact. Exposure to random intel-ligence production does not alone meet policy needs and the busy executive is unlikelyregularly to search out a channel for clarification or to supplement his knowledge. Hewill, however, with an established face-to-face daily encounter, ask questions, solicithelp, and often provide grist for the intelligence mill based on his experiences when todo so requires nothing more than a few moments of his time. The above article isConfidential.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00061758337