INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000620486
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486TITLE: The Intelligence-Policymaker TangleAUTHOR: Yehoshafat HarkabiVOLUME: 28 ISSUE: Summer YEAR: 1984Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006204860proved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486STUDIES ININTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006204860Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486Complexities and tensionsTHE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE'Yehoshafat HarkabiThe publication of the Kahan Commission report, with its indictment ofthe IDF ? ? Intelligence Chief, reopened the debate on the relationshipbetween the intelligence services and their clientele, the policymakers. Theformal description of how intelligence supplies the policymakers with infor-mation and evaluations as a basis for molding policy is simplistic andincomplete. The relations between these echelons are complex and tension-ridden, as is evident when one looks beyond formal hierarchical structures andprocesses at the influence of informal relations on the workings of administra-tive bodies.The study of the functioning of intelligence services, which has greatlydeveloped in recent years, does not focus only on how the intelligence serviceproduces its reports?information gathering and analysis. It also deals with thecrucial area where the usefulness of the service is put to trial; namely, thetransmittal of the intelligence service's product to the policymaking bodies, the-interface- between intelligence and policy.Intelligence is not an autonomous operation whose raison dere lies initself. Intelligence activities depend on having a clientele to serve. However, itsclients are not necessarily receptive to intelligence, for what they often lookfor is not so much data on the basis of which to shape policy but rather supportfor pre-formed political and ideological conceptions. The intelligence servicefinds itself in difficult straits, for it is aware that many of its efforts will not beutilized or appreciated, and the use made of its assessments and reports willdiffer from its expectations. Matters get worse the more ideologically moti-vated is the regime, for then policy is made more on the basis of ideological in-puts than on the basis of intelligence reportings on reality, which to the extentthat they contradict the ideology may be discarded, and the intelligenceservice ends up frustrated.Policy can be judged according to the extent of its -sensitivity- tointelligence?will it change if a certain evaluation requires such a change? Asa concrete example, what intelligence reporting could induce a change inIsrael's present policy on Judea and Samaria? Does the rigidity of a politicalposition make it impervious to intelligence? An ideological regime may revelin exotic covert intelligence operations, encourage them, and still keepintelligence evaluations at arm's length. Nor is there simple transitivitybetween the quality of the intelligence and the quality of policy. Good? Y. Harkabi is Hexter Professor of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies atthe Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He served as Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence (1955-1959) and as Adviser for Intelligence to Israel's Prime Minister (1977). This article was originallypublished (in Hebrew) in the Bulletin of the Hebrew University Faculty of Social Services. It isreprinted from the Jerusalem Quarterly, Number 30, Winter 1984.? ? Israeli Defense Forces.77Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486Tangleintelligence is no guarantee of good policy and vice versa. Even if intelligenceportrayed reality correctly and its evaluations were accepted, policy alsoincludes other components, such as goals, objectives, and assumptions aboutcausal relations between policy and outcomes, which are not necessarilyintelligence products.Policymakers too have their legitimate complaints against intelligence,claiming that it supplies them with a motley catchall collection of information,containing everything but what is needed at the time; or that it expresses itselfin equivocal and reserved language that leaves them perplexed; or still worse,that its evaluations are not reliable and excessively opinionated.The intelligence service should enter the policymaking process twice:first, by providing data and assessments of the situation, which will contributeto the shaping of policy; and secondly, after the policy has been formulated.Intelligence should also evaluate the likely reactions of adversaries and thirdparties to that policy and its success or failure. However, it often happens thatstatesmen refrain from seeking the intelligence service's opinion on this, forbasic reasons. For by making such a request of the intelligence they elevate itto the position of judging their policy. Thus, a tangle is created whereby theintelligence arm which is a subordinate body becomes an arbiter, a kind of su-pervisor over its masters. What is more, the statesmen may harbor suspicionsthat the intelligence services may cite the difficulties and weaknesses of theirpolicy. Not fortuitously has the intelligence service been dubbed -negativis-tic,- a discouraging factor, for it may tend more to point to drawbacks thancall attention to opportunities. Hence, Kissinger stigmatized the intelligenceservice for pushing toward -immobilism.-The intelligence service itself will not volunteer for the role of policy-monitoring, fearing that it may mar its relations with its superiors, thepolicymakers, and may cause it to collide with conceptions sacred to them, orwith their dreams. For example, once the idea of getting the Phalanges intoaction in Beirut became a desire, almost an obsession, among the Israelipolicymakers, a presentation of the hazards of such a policy placed theintelligence in an uncomfortable position. Similarly, it may be supposed thatan organization like the KGB would be inhibited from presenting evaluationsthat clash with Marxism and with Soviet policy. The intelligence service,therefore, will not volunteer to serve as a traffic signal light flashing red andgreen alternately to the advancing policy carriage.Understanding above WarningThere is an exaggerated tendency to present the intelligence service as ifit were an institution for the sounding of tocsins. The intelligence service is pri-marily an institution for the provision of information which is meant to lead toknowledge and understanding, and is not merely a warning mechanism. Theprincipal line of defense against surprises is -understanding,- not "warning."Warning is in order in times of emergency and before the onset of calamity?but those are few and far between. And if indeed the intelligence service isexpected to warn about impending dangers stemming from an action initiatedby the enemy, it is hard to expect that it also be an institution that warns78Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486Tangleagainst the injurious outcomes of our own policy, or our home-made surprises.That is an important difference, which it seems, the Kahan Commission wasnot alive to. Certainly, the intelligence service would do well were it itself, onits own, to point out the probable consequences of policy, but it is advisablethat the chiefs-of-state understand the intelligence's reluctance to becomeoverseers, august or meek, on their policy and address it with explicit queries,as an invitation for the intelligence's intervention. People are not aware of howcomplicated and difficult is the intelligence service's work of collecting,analyzing and evaluating information. The intelligence service will notwillingly seek out additional troubles for itself. It is not sheer squeamishness.In short, the intelligence service is an institution more for the giving ofanswers than for sounding warnings, especially about our policy. It is the taskof leaders to put questions to it, and if they do not ask, let it not be said thatthey assumed that the service would inform them of its own accord. True,since the intelligence service provides reports on an ongoing routine basis, theimpression might be formed that it offers its opinions on every relevant issueautomatically. That is an error, and it would have been helpful to Israelipolicymaking had the Kahan Commission been alert to it and drawn attentionto these aspects.It may be argued that the intelligence service does not fully discharge itsduty by providing the policymakers with information and assessments, andthat precisely because its product may be critical for policy, the service mustsee to it that its reports are properly understood. However, the intelligenceservice will refrain from testing whether the policymakers have properlyunderstood the material that has been passed on to it, that it will shrink fromtaking the role of a pedantic teacher correcting misunderstandings on the partof the policymakers. Indeed, a pretension on the part of the intelligenceservice to be the policymakers' -mentor- is liable to be counterproductive.It may come to pass that senior intelligence functionaries may differ withthe policymakers' policy. Their critical stance vis-a-vis the adopted policy maybe based on an evaluation of the historical trend, yet they may not be able toadduce factual proof for their position. In most instances, the error of thepolicy line emerges in a clearly decisive way only in the long range, for thefeedback circuit in such matters is slow. In the short range a mistaken policyline does not necessarily entail outcomes that refute it. It may then appear tothe policymakers that their course is succeeding, and that the facts abet it.Hence, the intelligence service cannot use such facts to validate its criticism ofpolicy, for in a confrontation with the policymakers it can avail itself only offacts whose message is clear and evident; and thus its assessments of long-rangetrends may not, in such cases, be serviceable for it. The intelligence criticismof policy may then appear as arbitrary and irksome, even as stemming fromlack of sympathy toward the policymakers themselves. Thus, here too, theintelligence service may choose to withhold counsel. Later, when the error ofthe policy becomes clear, there will be those who will protest that theintelligence service should have warned in time about the mistaken policy,and an inquiry commission may even find the service culpable.79Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486TangleThe intelligence service is aware that it treads on precarious ground and isliable to be singled out for blame in any error, since in every political or mili-tary decision there is an assumption on the situation or a component ofknowledge, the lack of which can be imputed to intelligence. For instance, acommander can decide to outflank and attack from the left, not because theintelligence service advised him to do so. Were decisions based only onintelligence data, decisions and policy would simply "follow- from it andthere would be no need for policymakers. If his attack fails, the commandercan shift the blame to intelligence by contending that it did not warn him thatthe left flank was strong and could not be crushed. Any military action canfail, either because our troops were not good or because the enemy's troopswere. There is no institutionalized body whose job is to evaluate our troops,and thus it is easy to transfer the blame for a military failure to intelligence,which, as it were, slighted the enemy's ability. The intelligence service hasbeen frequently described as the staff's "whipping boy.- Thus, the intelligenceservice is usually a frightened institution. In many fields a human error ofevaluation or judgment is considered as extenuating circumstances; however, itis the fate of intelligence that its error of evaluation is always enshrined in itsbill of indictment. Whereas the popular saying has it that "to err is human,"an almost superhuman perfection is expected of intelligence. We are livingamong our own people with no problems of accession to knowledge and stillare stunned by domestic political developments. But if intelligence does notsuccessfully forecast a political denouement in a foreign country, brows arewrinkled: how is that possible? What inefficiency.Insurance by QuantityAfter the intelligence service has failed in reporting on some informationor evaluation, it is likely to take out insurance for itself by way of enlarging thequantity of its reports and including everything in them, so that it may not befound wanting in reporting. It will then flood the policymakers withintelligence reports. However, over-reporting may be detrimental for theintelligence service influence as important items may be lost in the multitudeof the less important and trivial ones. True, what will eventually proveimportant does not always immediately catch the eye. The statesmen may beable to defend themselves against overabundance of intelligence reporting, byemploying an aide to sift and summarize the material for them. Such an aidefills the role of "intelligence waiter- who marks for his superior what is worthhis attention. What is significant in the eyes of the -intelligence waiter- andthe intelligence service is not necessarily identical. Despite the vital role suchan assistant fulfils for his master, such an intermediary arrangement may alsocomplicate things, for the intelligence service does not know what informationhas reached the policymakers, of what they are aware, and of what not.Furthermore, statesmen may tend to look or rather browse over intelligencematerial, often at the end of an exhausting day when they are fatigued or halfdrowsy.Presumably, it is good that the chief of the intelligence service be on closeterms with the policymakers and have their trust. However, such bosomcompanionship too has its drawbacks. True, the more he is a part of the inner80Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486TangleByzantine court that develops as a matter of course around state chiefs, thegreater is his influence; however, he then also loses perspective and hisindependent critical vision, and gradually succumbs to the conceptions of thepolicymakers. He is then unable to detach himself from festivities ofpolicymaking just like the other self-gratified members of the court who baskin their connections with. power. Thomas Hughes urged that intelligenceshould give the policymakers' utmost support with utmost reservation. Thatsurely is no simple combination.In its reports the intelligence service must differentiate between state-ments of fact and evaluations concerning the future, which are always amatter of conjecture. It is an error to present an evaluation of future trends asif they were facts. The desire of the intelligence people to present a clearcutunqualified opinion is commendable, but it may mislead them to present theirhypotheses about the future developments as if they were foregone conclusionsand final judgments not to be disputed. In reporting evaluations one should nottranscend the amount of certitude the data warrants, and even the probableshould not be offered as the absolutely certain. The intelligence service shouldnot be inhibited from making the policymakers privy to the uncertainties ofevaluation, especially regarding future important developments, tendenciesand intentions. The more the service does that, the more the policymakers willunderstand the quandaries and limitations of the intelligence services and willnot nurture expectations that cannot be met and which in the end may becounterproductive for both policy and intelligence.The intelligence service is judged according to the final quality orsignificance of its output?its reports. The words of our Sages in Pirkei Avot,according to the pains so is the reward,- do not apply to intelligence. Thetoils involved in obtaining the information on which the reports are based havelow visibility, and the intelligence service is prevented from talking aboutthem or from recounting its woes. But without information collection, there isno intelligence evaluation. In fact, in intelligence most of the efforts inmanpower and resources go to information collection. If those efforts, and theefforts to extract evaluations from the information are not appreciated,feelings of bitterness will develop in the service, as if the policymakers, andeven the country as a whole, are ungrateful. These feelings swell when theintelligence people compare the sophistication and advanced methods em-ployed in collection of the information and the production of intelligenceagainst the cavalier fashion or improvisation with which policy decisions aremany a time reached.The intelligence service is represented to the policymakers by its director.He participates (if invited) in meetings or caucuses at which importantdecisions are made. However, as an individual he cannot provide anexhaustive representation of, or reflect the knowledge and wisdom that hasaccumulated in his institution. However broadminded and gifted he may be, itis one of the tragic ironies of intelligence that its chief may constitute a-bottleneck- who detracts from the quality of his service, thus unwittinglydeflating its value and its impact. The consumer of intelligence mustunderstand that and therefore pay heed to the institutional reports and notonly to what comes directly from its chief's mouth.81Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486TangleIntelligence services in our world cost a great deal of money. The Israelipublic has no idea how costly this service is. However, to the extent that thepolicymakers are not aware of how the intelligence can be useful, and what itslimitations are, and do not direct it and ask it questions expressly, the utility ofintelligence is partial and resources are wasted. The great outlays forintelligence are justifiable only if the policy based on its information is of highquality. An unrealistic policy, whether autarkic or autistic, has no need forintelligence and the intelligence service cannot help it. Intelligence efforts areworthwhile only where they contribute to the shaping of a wise policy.82Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620486