SUPPORTING US ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000620566
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985

TITLE:AUTHOR:VOLUME:Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Supporting US Arms Control Activities(b)(3)(c)29 ISSUE: Spring YEAR: 1985Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566proved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566STUDIES ININTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of. the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Intelligence obligations and responsibilitiesSUPPORTING US ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES *(b)(3)(c)A senior arms control official once commented that intelligence informa-tion represented power, and its interpretation was, therefore; much too impor-tant to be left solely to intelligence agencies. His remark was a manifestation ofan endemic tension between intelligence producers and their customers in thepolicymaking offices of the Executive Branch. This tension is caused, interalia, by the proposition, advanced by professional intelligence officers, that theintelligence community should "tell it like it is and let the chips fall wherethey may," and the dichotomous view of many policymakers that intelligencejudgments should take policy considerations into account, even to the extent ofskewing them to support policy when necessary.The necessity of dealing with Congress adds another dimension to theIC/Executive Branch relationship. A suspicious Congress inevitably examinesthe basis and rationale for US foreign policy decisions, including the intelli-gence underpinnings. Oversight committees monitor intelligence findings forcompleteness, objectivity, and timeliness, placing the intelligence communityin an awkward position when policy decisions appear to be inconsistent withintelligence. Satisfying both "customers" in these circumstances requires a surefoot and a previously prepared walkway (well-established and mutually bene-ficial relationships).Internal considerations also shape the manner in which the intelligencecommunity operates to fulfill the obligations and responsibilities placed on itdirectly or indirectly by the Executive Branch and Congress. The intelligencecommunity is not a monolith, but a conglomerate of individual agencies withvarying responsibilities, idiosyncrasies, pressures, and bureaucratic interests.Like any family, it has its squabbles, and how well it operates in many in-stances is dependent on how well "Father CIA" listens to and accommodatesthe problems and interests of the family members.Finally, bureaucratic considerations and competition for "turf" withinCIA when major accounts are up for grabs have not been totally withoutimpact in determining internal organization to deal with important problems,and the arms control account(s) are no exception in this respect.Relationships with the Executive BranchThe basis for dealing with arms control matters, as well as all nationalsecurity matters in the US Government, is derived from the National SecurityAct of 1947, as amended, and a series of implementing directives, including? This article consists of extracts from a reportStaff.(b)(3)(C)]prepared for the Arms Control IntelligenceSECRET 91Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566SECRET Arms ControlExecutive Orders, Presidential Decision Memorandums, House and SenateResolutions, other Acts of Congress, and directives issued by or in the name ofthe Director of Central Intelligence.Successive administrations, beginning with President Nixon's, have allused the NSC structure in managing arms control matters. Within this statu-tory framework, the DCI and the intelligence community operate basically ona combination of guidance and tasking from the President and the NSC (andfrom DOD in the case of the military intelligence departments) and self-generated projects based on experience and, we hope, on foresight. How wellit works depends, to a large extent, on the principal players and their personalrelationships, beginning with that of the DCI and the President he serves.Tasking by the NSC on arms control matters has been accomplishedthrough committees or working groups headed by NSC, State, ACDA, or DODchairmen and containing representatives from the principal agencies havingarms control responsibilities: NSC, State, DOD (OSD and JCS are representedseparately), ACDA, and CIA representing the IC.In providing intelligence on arms control matters to the policymakingcommunity, the IC, under the direction of CIA, has come to observe a numberof tenets whose value has been established over time. They are:? Provide coordinated intelligence, highlighting differences within theIC where they exist and the reasons for them.? In making intelligence judgments (an art, not a science), tell it like it isand let the chips fall where they may.Stay out of policy unless intelligence equities are involved?thenspeak up.Maintain the integrity of the IC. Don't let policy agencies make orinfluence intelligence judgments, or otherwise get into the intelligencebusiness.Accept tasking (and priorities) only through the established NSCmechanism?don't let individual agencies tie up limited resources.The tenet of objective intelligence, especially, deserves amplification.There has been nothing more difficult for an intelligence officer in my expe-rience than attempting to convince incoming administrations that their inter-ests are best served by a product that is objective and void of policy -tilts.- Ifany administration is to be convinced of the virtues of objective intelligence,the IC must follow a number of rules in the production and disseminationprocess, to wit:? The assessments should be presented dispassionately.? Assumptions and uncertainties should be spelled out, as well as thesensitivity of the conclusions to these two factors.Where new intelligence is sensitive politically, the administrationshould be forewarned, prior to publication, to permit timely formula-tion of a policy response.92 SECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Arms Control SECRET? Where impending policy decisions appear to be inconsistent withavailable intelligence information, the apparent inconsistencies shouldbe pointed out so the administration can determine, in advance, howto deal with them on the Hill and in the media.Organization for Arms Control SupportIn general, the development of institutionalized IC support? to the Exec-utive Branch on arms control matters has been evolutionary, emanating froma series of internal decisions, which have been tempered and refined over time.Organizational and operating precepts established within IC components bythese decisions include:The use of existing production elements and analysts to provide sub-stantive support on arms control matters as an extension of their nor-mal responsibilities. An additional layer of redundant production unitswith narrowly focused responsibilities has been avoided.? The formulation of small but high-level staffs in each major compo-nent to oversee, supervise, and coordinate support provided by variousproduction elements on all arms control matters.? The vesting of responsibility for day-to-day operations in CIA at thelowest substantive level commensurate with the existing managementstructure and a reasonable span of control.? The utilization of the NFIB (formerly USIB) and other similar struc-tures to oversee preparation of coordinated IC substantive intelli-gence.The establishment of new IC entities only when it is deemed abso-lutely necessary (e.g., DCI Steering Group on Monitoring StrategicArms Limitations).? Insistence on the principle that intelligence analysis be performed byprofessional intelligence analysts without benefit of help from policyagencies.? The proposition that IC inputs to arms control deliberations be clearlyidentifiable and separate from subsequent analysis taking into accountpolicy as well as intelligence considerations.CIA Internal OrganizationCIA internal organization for arms control support began modestly in theearly 1960s when a single division (NED/OSI) was responsible for support tothe negotiating and monitoring of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of1963. NED's responsibilities were subsequently expanded to encompass theThreshhold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974, the Treaty on UndergroundNuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET), signed in 1976, and thenearly completed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the negotiating ofwhich was abandoned by the US late in the Carter Administration. Followingthis same concept, a single division (currently TF Division, SOVA) has beenresponsible for supporting MBFR.SECRET 93Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566SECRET Arms ControlThe SALT negotiations, beginning in 1969, represented the first instancewhere substantive support to a negotiation crossed division, office, and evendirectorate spheres of responsibility. Internal responsibility for the SALT Inegotiations was placed within a single office (OSR)..The focal point for sub-stantive work was a joint DDI/DDS&T SALT support team. This team, draw-ing upon production offices in both directorates, supervised the preparation ofCIA inputs to the SALT policy community, supported CIA advisors with theSALT delegation, and advised and supported the DCI, the DDI, and theDDS&T on SALT-related matters. While the team performed admirably un-der the circumstances, there were tensions emanating from the fact that whilethe DDI was in charge, DDS&T production offices were responsible for a largeshare of the analytical work required, a circumstance that exacerbated estab-lished rivalries and competitive spirit between the two directorates.With the conclusion of the SALT I Agreements in May 1972, it becameapparent that CIA support to SALT activities would have to be reorganizedand expanded. Not only would the Agency have to support continuing andmore comprehensive negotiations, but it would, in addition, be responsible formonitoring Soviet compliance and providing intelligence support to the UScomponent of the US/USSR Standing Consultative Commission. The commis-sion had been established to implement the SALT I Agreements and to dealwith matters of compliance.Following a transition period, a SALT Support Staff (SSS) was formedunder a Staff Chief who began as the senior -inside man- on SALT mattersand subsequently took over from the DDS&T as the senior -outside man"representing the DCI within the NSC structure and in dealing with Congress.The Chief, SSS reported to the DCI, the DDCI, the DDI, and the DDS&T onSALT matters, and subsequently, on the ASAT negotiations as well. The newregime was in place and operating in December 1973, and continued through-out the remainder of the decade.There were significant changes in staff operations over time. The originalDDI/DDS&T SALT Support Team had functioned .almost exclusively as amiddleman, receiving requests for substantive support through the Verifica-tion Panel mechanism, farming the work out to appropriate production offices,and transmitting the responses when they were received. There were twoproblems with this procedure.The first involved a requirement for quality control. Most requests weretime-urgent and responses were turned out quickly and with little or no officeor division level review. The second problem emanated from the fact thatmany requests required inputs from more than one production office. Therewas a requirement in these instances that responses be synthesized into a singlepaper, professional in style, substance, and cohesion. The logical solution toboth these problems was to increase the size of the staff, when necessary, andto people it with analysts capable both of turning out cohesive reports, andexerting quality control in the process. This required that office chiefs cooper-ate by making available seasoned analysts of outstanding ability for tours onthe staff. This was accomplished gradually, as managers at all levels came torecognize the long-term benefits of such a program: exceptional training for94 SECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Arms Control SECRETthe analysts involved, including service as advisors on the delegations overseas;and reduction in office workloads as more requests were answered by staffanalysts after coordination with the office with substantive responsibility. Re-luctant managers were also nudged by analysts who desired assignments in ahighly visible policy area with exceptional "perks."The SALT Support Staff was disbanded in January 1980 and replacedwith the current Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS). This move had beenin the making for some time, since DCI Turner and successive NFAC Direc-tors Bowie and Clarke were disturbed that there was no single entity theycould go to on matters requiring an overview of the entire arms control spec-trum (which had grown to include BW/CW and multilateral negotiations on avariety of subjects). Under the terms of its charter, the ACIS provides a centralpoint in CIA for the general oversight of the intelligence aspects of all armscontrol activities involving the US Government (non-proliferation is not con-sidered an arms control matter in this context). In practice, it exercises directsupport to SALT (now START), INF, the Standing Consultative Commission,ASAT and BW/CW arms control activities. It monitors the status of otherarms control activities, including TTBT, LTBT, PNET, and MBFR, to enableit to keep abreast of the requirements and capabilities of the IC to meetpresent and future needs for monitoring arms control agreements, as well asproviding intelligence support in the preparation and coordination of the an-nual Arms Control Impact Statements required of ACDA by the Congress.Intelligence Community OrganizationIC organization for arms control support was established conceptually inthe early 1960s when, under the auspices of the DCI, responsibility for mon-itoring the LTBT was mandated by USIB to its Joint Atomic Energy Intelli-gence Committee (JAEIC). This mandate was later expanded to include re-sponsibility for the intelligence aspects of the TTBT, PNET, and CTBT.When it became clear that SALT I Agreements would be concluded,there were discussions?not limited to the IC?on how and by whom theWashington SALT Community and the Standing Consultative Commission(SCC) would be provided evaluated intelligence on the status of Soviet com-pliance, guidance on disclosure of intelligence information, and a channel forlevying special collection requirements on the IC. ACDA, for example, pro-posed formation of a -Special Intelligence Group,- chaired by CIA, but in-cluding as members representatives of State, ACDA, and DOD. From an in-telligence perspective, such an arrangement would have the disadvantage ofgiving policy agencies an equal voice with intelligence professionals in carry-ing out IC responsibilities for directing the use of collection assets and inanalyzing the resultant data. A preferred approach would be to have the in-telligence aspects of verification under the direct control of the DCI, withparticipation by policy agencies beginning only after finished intelligence re-ports had been furnished to the appropriate NSC sub-groups.While there was substantial disagreement within CIA as to how SALTsupport should be institutionalized, everyone agreed that the IC should orga-nize itself before someone in the Executive Branch preempted the DCI in thisSECRET 95Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566SECRET Arms Controlrespect. There were two schools of thought as to the approach to be taken.Both were based on the precedent established in conjunction with the LTBT in1963, i.e., that the USIB structure be utilized. The first was that the existingUSIB organization be used, calling upon the appropriate existing committeesfor support. Advocates argued that a new infrastructure would waste resourcesunnecessarily. The second approach was to establish a new USIB Committeeon the basis that a select unit was preferable because of the diversity of thetask, its importance, and the need for visibility.The second approach was selected, only slightly modified. A USIB Mem-orandum of 27 June 1972 established a USIB (later the DCI) Steering Group onMonitoring Strategic Arms Limitations reporting to the DCI, and through himto the NSC. Chaired by the DDCI, its members included the DDI and theDirectors of DIA and State/INR. Its responsibilities include:? The preparation of periodic reports on the status of Soviet compliance.? The investigation of possible treaty violations.? The preparation of intelligence materials for use in SCC discussionswith the Soviets.While the major purpose of the DCI in institutionalizing IC organizationfor SALT was to draw a line between intelligence and policy participation inthe verification process, it also served to rectify an internal situation which wasdetrimental to the proposition that the policy community should be furnishedcoordinated intelligence. During the SALT I negotiations there had been nosPecial IC organization for SAT I' slinnort(b)(1)(b)(3)(o)(b)(3)(n)The views ofDIA and IN It were tunneled through OSD, JCS, and State representatives.This led to not infrequent occasions where Working Group discussions woundup in debates on the validity of CIA intelligence judgments in one area oranother. The opportunity for DIA and INR to participate in SALT as fullmembers of the IC effort was long overdue and beneficial to all, as was theinclusion of a DIA representative on the Intelligence Team supporting the USdelegation in Geneva.Tasking, Analysis, and ReportingWith its charter in hand and a working group established, the SteeringGroup lost no time in institutionalizing its procedures to ensure that technicalcollection systems would be properly tasked and data from them and othersources would be properly processed, analyzed, and reported. Tasking require-ments for SALT I (and later SALT II) were developed and incorporated intooverall Imagery, SIGINT, and HUMINT tasking plans. A reporting processwas also institutionalized for maximum utility. In addition to preparing timelyad hoc reports on Soviet activities relating to compliance, the Steering Grouphas been providing, semi-annually, a formal hard-copy monitoring report cov-ering the status of collection systems, coverage statistics, and listing Soviet96 SECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Arms Control SECRETactivity with respect to each individual obligation contained in the SALTAgreements. The monitoring report has been improved and expanded over theyears to include agreements reached in the SCC, as well as to incorporateSALT II provisions.Preparation of these monitoring reports is a major effort, requiring theexpenditure of substantial analytical and production resources. From time totime, questions arise as to whether the effort is worth the cost. In my view, itis essential for at least three very important reasons:? It forces a detailed review of Soviet compliance with a myriad ofobligations on a routine basis, helping to ensure that nothing signifi-cant falls through the cracks. This is particularly important as analystsfamiliar with treaty obligations are replaced by those who are not.It points, on a periodic basis, to collection shortfalls in various substan-tive areas, aiding in redress through ad hoc tasking of appropriatecollection systems.? It provides a unique formal record both of Soviet activities related tocompliance and of the historical development of Soviet strategicforces limited by the agreements.Support to DelegationsSenior Intelligence Advisors to the START, INF, and SCC delegations arefull members of those delegations, both in internal deliberations and in neeo-tiating sessions with the Soviets.  (b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)SECRET 97Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Arms Control(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)Dealing With CongressSince the beginning of the SALT process, Congress has displayed an en-during interest in arms control negotiations. There was considerable debatebefore the Senate bestowed its -advice and consent- to the ABM Treaty andInterim Agreement (IA). Despite the fact that the agreements had been signedby a conservative President with impeccable anti-communist credentials, con-cern over the unequal limits of the IA was reflected in an amendment,fathered by Scoop Jackson, which warned that a future treaty on strategicoffensive arms should not limit the US to forces numerically inferior to those ofthe Soviet Union. This amendment led in SALT II to two years of difficultnegotiations to achieve equal aggregates without compensation for USforward-based systems, the so-called FBS issue.Continued congressional interest in SALT was demonstrated following theVladivostok Accord, which documented agreement on equal aggregates.Though an Executive Agreement and, therefore, not subject to congressionalapproval, the accord was blessed by supportive resolutions in both the Houseand the Senate, an act which reminded the Administration that Congress hada role, sanctioned by the Arms Control Act, in any agreement limiting USarms.An expanding role in the negotiations culminated in 1977 in the namingof all Senators and 46 Representatives as official Congressional Advisors to theUS delegation. This move was approved by President Carter over the strongobjection of his National Security Advisor, who argued that congressional in-volvement in the negotiations impinged on the principle of separation of pow-ers, and, in any event, would further complicate an already complex opera-tion. The winning argument posited that bringing the Congress in early wouldfacilitate the ratification process. From the perspective of travel-hungry con-gressmen, the program was a magnificent success. Some 74 -advisors- visitedthe delegation in Geneva and got to -negotiate- with the Russians. From thedelegation viewpoint, the program was, at best, a nuisance, since many of thevisitors -negotiated- without benefit of instructions or knowledge of the USposition, and a few ignored solicitations about protection of intelligence infor-98Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Arms Control RETmation and sources. Entertaining lawmakers was also costly and time-consuming to delegation members working 12 to 14 hours a day.With the demise of the SALT II Treaty, congressional interest in armscontrol matters waned perceptibly, as did the requirement for frequent andexhaustive briefings. More recent events have rekindled congressional concernswith respect to arms control.Unlike the evolutionary process which characterized development of ICrelationships with the Executive Branch and with internal IC organization forarms control support, the state of the relationship between the IC and Con-gress has usually been transient and sometimes volatile. In general, the rela-tionship is influenced by the rapport, or lack thereof, between the DCI and thecongressional leadership, particularly the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of theForeign Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations and, above all, the Over-sight Committees. In this respect, the DCI, whose first loyalty must be to thePresident he serves, can be aided by an experienced and professional liaisonstaff, and in the arms control area by an IC spokesman who has established amutually beneficial rapport with staff chiefs and principal staffers for the con-gressional "movers and shakers" in the national security area.On specific issues, however, even a well established relationship can bestrained in circumstances where Administration policy is perceived to be inconflict with intelligence assessments or particularly when an unpopular Ad-ministration policy action is supported by IC judgments (or actions). The im-portant thing in these circumstances is not to let a short-term, volatile situationdamage the long-term relationship. This is best accomplished by observing theprincipal tenets developed for dealing with the Executive Branch; i.e., provid-ing a quality product objectively and dispassionately, and refraining fromdiscussing the policy aspect of matters devoid of intelligence equities. It is alsoimportant that IC spokesmen are deemed to have the confidence and trust ofthe DCI, and to be accurately representing his views.Finally, in dealing with Congress, it is extremely important that IC rep-resentatives be thoroughly versed in substance, acutely aware of the policyimplications of the information they are providing, and deft in "dancing"around difficult or loaded questions without appearing to be unresponsive orevasive. This requires a good deal of experience in thinking on one's feet, andthorough preparation. It is usually not difficult to identify "dicey" areas and toprepare answers in advance on a contingency basis. Rehearsals can also help inthis respect. Most presidential appointees are rehearsed exhaustively prior tobeing subjected to the adversarial process associated with confirmation hear-ings. A cardinal rule is to reply to questions succinctly and without embellish-ment?and above all, not to volunteer information. While testimony of ICrepresentatives before Congress is not normally regarded as adversarial, atleast in theory, I personally found it useful to view it in this light when pre-paring for appearances on the Hill.This article is classified SECRET.ET 99Approved for Release: 2014/07/29000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566BLANK PAGEApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Arms ControlSTATUTORY PROVISIONSNational Security Act of 19471. Provides for a National Security Council - Title I Section 101.2. Provides for a CIA - Title I Section 102.a. Places it under the NSC.b. Authorizes DCI to form advisory committees (e.g., NFIB).3. Provides for Congressional Oversight - Title V Section 501.a. DCI and other IC heads to keep SSCI and HPSCI "fully and(preserves existence of these committees).b. President and Intelligence Committees to establish procedures.consultation with DCI, establish procedures to protect againstsures.Central Intelligence Agency Act of 19491. Provides for Administration of CIA.Executive Order 12333 December 1981ATTACHMENTcurrently informed"House and Senate, inunauthorized disclo-1. Identifies NSC as highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for,and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, andspecial activities, and attendant policies and programs.2. Authorizes NSC to establish such committees as necessary to carry out its functions (e.g.,IGs and SIGs).3. Charges DCI with:a. Acting as primary advisor to President and NSC on National Foreign Intelligence.b. Establishing committees or advisory groups.c. Full responsibility for production and dissemination of National Foreign Intelligence.d. Authority to levy analytic tasks on departmental intelligence production organiza-tions "ensuring that appropriate, mechanisms for competitive analysis are developedso that diverse points of view are considered fully and differences of judgment withinthe IC are brought to the attention of national policymakers."4. Provides for cooperation with Congress in performing its oversight responsibilities asprovided in National Security Act of 1947.a. Procedures to be issued by DCI, implemented by IC component heads, and approvedby Attorney General. NSC decides if Agency and A.G. are at loggerheads.Presidential Decision Memos1. Set up NSC network for conducting national security deliberations (e.g., IGs and SIGs).Senate Resolution 4001. Establishes a Select Committee on Intelligence to:a. Oversee and make continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs ofthe US Government, and to submit to the Senate appropriate proposals for legislationand report to the Senate concerning such intelligence activities and programs.101Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 CO0620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Arms Controlb. Make every effort to assure that the appropriate departments and agencies of the USprovide informed and timely intelligence necessary for the Executive and LegislativeBranches to make sound decisions affecting the security and vital interests of thenation.c. Provide vigilant legislative oversight over intelligence activities of the US to assurethat such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the US.2. Requires that the Head of any agency or department involved in intelligence activities:a. Keep the Select Committee fully and currently informed with respect to intelligenceactivities, including any significant anticipated activities, which are the responsibilityof, or engaged in, by such department or agency (e.g., evidence of violations; changesin monitoring capabilities).b. Furnish any information or documentation in the possession, custody, or control ofthat department or agency, or person paid by that agency or department, wheneverrequested by the Select Committee with respect to any matter within such commit-tee's jurisdiction.Rule XLVIII of the House of Representatives1. Establishes a Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to:a. Review all proposed legislation, messages, editorials, petitions, and other matters re-lating to the CIA, the DCI and other agencies comprising the intelligence commu-nity.b. Review authorizations for appropriations for IC organizations and activities.2. Establishes the right of other House Committees to:a. Study or review any intelligence or intelligence-related activity to the extent thatsuch activity directly affects a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such com-mittee.b. Obtain full and prompt access to the product of intelligence and intelligence-relatedactivities of any department or agency of the government relevant to a matterotherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee.Arms Control Act of 19611. Article 37 (Derwinski Amendment) requires the Director, ACDA, in order to insure thatarms control proposals made or accepted by the US can be adequately verified, to reportto the Congress on a timely basis, or upon request:a. The degree to which proposals are adequately verifiable by NTM.b. In the case of existing arms control agreements, any significant degradation or alter-ation in the capacity of the US to verify the various components of such agreement ortreaty.This attachment is unclassified.102 SECRApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Arms ControlUnitNSCInterdepartmentalGroups (IGs, SIGs, etc)CIA (and depart-mental components)Intelligence Commu-nity (IC)NFIB (USIB)JAEIC/WSSIC &Working GroupsDCI Steering Group/Monitoring WorkingGroupsSenate Select Com-mittee (SSCI)House Select Commit-tee (HPSCI)ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTUREStatutory BasisNational Security ActExecutive OrderNational Security Actof 1947Executive OrderExecutive OrderExecutive OrderExecutive OrderNational Security Actof 1947 (Amendment)National Security Actof 1947 (Amendment)This attachment is classified COBy WhomImplementedPresidentPresidentCongressPresidentDCIDCIDCIDCISenateHouseIAL.ATTACHMENT 2HowImplementedExecutive OrderPresidential DecisionMemorandumCIA Act of 1949;Executive OrderDCI DirectivesDCI DirectivesNFIB MenorandumNFIB MemorandumSenate Resolution 400Rule XLVIII of theHR103Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566? Arms ControlATTACHMENT 3Key TasksInformation onSoviet ForcesSubject to LimitationMonitoring StudiesChanges in MonitoringCapabilitiesCompliance AnalysisSupport to CongressTASKING STRUCTURESource ofTaskingNSCStateDODSelf-generatedNSCACDA (Sec 37, ArmsControl Act)ACDA (Sec 37, ArmsControl Act)SSCI (SR 400,Sec 11a)NSCSSCI (SR 400,Sec 11a)2National SecurityAct of 1947Senate Resolution400; HR Rule XLVIIIHowResponseBy WhomImplementedNIEs,SNIEs, IMs, DCIIIMs, etc 'Memoranda, IMsIlMsMemorandaSALT MonitoringReportMemorandaSalt MonitoringReportMemorandaReportsBriefingsDCIDCIDCIDCI'It is significant to note, as depicted on this chart, that tasking is generated by requirementsof Executive Branch agencies either directly through the NSC mechanism, or self-generated bythe IC in anticipation of a requirement. The manner in which the response is implemented, in-cluding the vehicle, has been and is the prerogative of the DCI subject to the approval of theNSC. Thus, internal IC organization for arms control support to the Executive Branch, and thepublications associated with this support, have all been initiated within the IC.2 The SSCI is briefed on the intelligence aspects of compliance issues and furnished a copyof the SALT Monitoring Report. It does not receive copies of ad hoc reports on individual com-pliance issues prepared by the IC for policy consideration.3 There have been occasions when the President or his National Security Advisor haverequired clearance (or at least consultation) with the White House prior to furnishinginformation to Congress. One example in the arms control area was the furnishing of materialsto the House Pike Committee in 1975. All materials, once sanitized by the IC, were furnished tothe committee after review by the NSC Staff.This attachment is classified GONE104Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000620566