SOME THOUGHTS ON POLITICAL INSTABILITY

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000621351
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: April 1, 1988

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351TITLE:SomeThoughtsonPolitical InstabilityAUTHOR:(b)(3)(c)VOLUME:32ISSUE:SpringYEAR: 1988Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351'STUDIES ININTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.Al! statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351CApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351An art, not a scienceSOME THOUGHTS ON POLITICAL INSTABILITY(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(c)  excellent article, -The Two Faces of Political Instability,"which appeared in the Spring 1987 issue of Studies in Intelligence, has led meto rethink my own ideas on the subject. I agree that, while the intelligencecommunity has been engaged in political instability analysis for many years,only recently has it begun to approach the problem in a systematic way. (b)(3)(c)article advances the cause, and I hope that my remarks will do the same.Definitions(b)(3)(c)lescribed the two faces of political instability as potential andcommotion. The former is the probability of a sudden, major change in acountry's politics, while the latter consists of events such as demonstrations,strikes, riots, issuances of manifestoes, military states of alert, the emergence ofhitherto underground opposition groups, and increasingly vocal demands for agovernment to quit.I define political instability as observable evidence of non-self-correctingpressure that, if not counteracted by other forces, would lead to a majorchange in policy, regime, or system. The rationale for this definition is asfollows:? Observable evidence is my redundant way of getting around  (b)(3)(c)problem of -instablity as potential- and -instability as commotion.-For me, instability as commotion is a subset of instability as potential.Observable evidence of pressure may take the form of a food riot or ofa blip in the inflation rate, of an assassination or of an increasinglyunequal Gini coefficient. In all of these cases, we are mainly interestedin the potential they show for major change. If the food riot orassassination develops into a revolt, we are no longer talking aboutinstability but rather the results of instability.? By using the term non-self-correcting pressure, I want to emphasizethat most political systems?even in the Third World?are in stableequilibrium. That is to say, any major deviation from normal politicalpractice carries within itself the seeds of its own correction. Thus, if ina certain state the military is accustomed to getting X percent of thebudget and this percentage is reduced, the military will exert suchpressure as may be required to restore its -rightful" share. Even thoughtanks may roll up to the national palace, this will be part of the-normal- process of restoring stability. If an unstable equilibriumexists, however, then the same cut in the military budget could leadeither to a military government or to complete civilian domination?ineither case a -major change- according to my definition.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351___COALF-413EN Instability? By specifying if not counteracted by outside forces, I want tounderline the fairly obvious point that destabilizing pressures can beoffset by stabilizing pressures. For example, a destabilizing economicpolicy may not lead to a "major change," if a loyal and well-trainedpolice force stands in the way.? My definition makes clear that political instability (all other thingsbeing equal) would lead to a major change in policy, regime, orsystem. I use "would" rather than "could" or "might" or "would tendto" in order to avoid the "pressures are building" syndrome that affectsso much writing about political instability. This disgraceful cop-outallows the analyst to come down firmly on both sides. If there is arevolution, the analyst can say that he or she predicted it; if nothinghappens, the analyst can say that pressures are still building. Anystatement that cannot be proved wrong by future events is worthless.EthnocentrismMany political writers both within and outside the community seem tooperate under the unstated assumption that political instability is a ThirdWorld phenomenon (or rather that Third World political systems are inunstable equilibrium while developed world systems are in stable equilibrium).We do not seem to regard repeated political assassinations in this country asinstabilty indicators; how would we feel if the equivalents of Kennedy andKing had been killed in South Africa or South Korea? Blocks of downtownWashington went up in flames in 1968 and no one (in this country, at least)thought the government was about to fall; if the flames had been in BuenosAires or Cairo, would we have been as sanguine? Is massive corruption inMexico City an indicator of instability while massive corruption in New YorkCity is irrelevant? This is not to argue that the same events have the samemeaning in different countries?they don't?but rather to suggest that judg-ments should be conscious and rational rather than unconscious and ethnocen-tric.In this regard, let me make a couple of "outlandish" statements for thereader's consideration:? In terms of "a major change in policy, regime, or system," the comingof de Gaulle in 1958 is right up there with the coming of the Braziliangenerals in 1964 and the coming of Khomeini in 1979. It should havebeen?and perhaps was?predicted by the instability indicators of theperiod.? Mexico is the most politically stable country in the Western Hemi-sphere. Could Canada, Venezuela, or the United States have withstoodan across-the-board fall in living standards which some authoritiesestimate to be as much as 50 percent in four years without a "majorchange in policy, regime, or system"?The Marxists have a faith that the world must keep changing untilcommunism is reached; we have a similar faith that political systems mustcome to resemble our own (or that of the United Kingdom) if they are toApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351Instability --G4)44F+EiettlIXL?achieve long-term stability. We (and the Marxists) would be on firmer groundif we were to admit that these predictions are more a reflection of our desiresthan of our understanding of history and political dynamics.Are Universal Indicators Possible?I have struggled with this question for several years, first with the oldSocial Science Research Division and more recently in my connection with theOffice of Global Issues' Political Instability Quarterly. I am tempted to say no.It seems obvious that, under some circumstances, poverty can be a catalyst forrevolt and, under others, it can sap the will to rebellion. In one countryheavy-handed repression sparks unrest, while in another it keeps unrest undercontrol. In some cases riots lead to further change, in others they act as escapevalves to reduce political pressure. The same can be said for most otherproposed unversal indicators.Recently, however, I have become somewhat more optimistic. Althoughmany of the most important political instability indicators will remain countryspecific?and even universal indicators will have to be ap ? lied with acountry-specific twist?I do spy some universals on the horizon. (b)(6)work on the Youth bulge, while not totally convincing in all of its s etai s,appears to contain a nugget of universal applicability; that is, young people aremore volatile than older people and if, in the relevant population (nation, city,or ethnic group), the youth bulge hits a certain (undetermined) high percentage,-a major change- becomes very likely.My own search for universal indicators?which is still in its preliminarystage and may not pan out in the long run?is along very different lines. Goingback to some insights from a previous incarnation as an anthropologist and toa more recent examination of Indian revolts in colonial Mexico, I have come tothe conclusion that a good part of political stability rests on what I call -implicitpromises and bargains.- When a government or its perceived agent breaks suchan implicit promise, a condition of political instability has been created. Thisappears to hold true across cultures.?The Implicit PromiseImplicit promises and bargains come in many forms. All universitygraduates get white-collar jobs. One-third of your crop goes to the landlord,another third to Church and State, and you keep the remaining third. If youkeep your nose clean, you won't get hurt. The president has no right to involvehimself in purely military affairs. The police can't enter a university buildingwithout the rector's permission. The common land belongs to the village andcannot be taken by the hacendado. The president cannot serve more than oneterm. The -political class- cannot be denied an opportunity to take part ingovernment. We have the right to be ruled by a pious king. Bus fares cannot beraised. If you march with the party and vote right, the party will get your kidout of jail or your wife into a hospital. The government cannot seize your farmwithout due process of the law.' For further discussion of this concept, see the next article, -Political Instability: APsychological Perspective,- by Helene L. Boatner, and the Richard M. Helms book review, ForLust of Knowing.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351InstabilityWhat all of these implicit promises have in common is that they removeuncertainty. They set the ground rules. They let a person (or a group) knowwhat he or she can reasonably hope for (a white-collar Rib, for example) andwhat he or she has no cause to fear (getting hurt if his or her nose is clean). Itis ironic that people?even in the developed countries?take such implicitpromises of the political culture much more seriously than the explicit promisesof politicians and rulers. We are not shocked if a president fails to balance thebudget despite promises to do so; we would be shocked if a president were tosend troops to close Congress.History appears to show that people will accept high degrees of poverty,inequality, hardship, and repression as long as implicit promises and bargainsare not broken. A major cause of the Mexican revolution of 1910 was the failureof the dictator Porfirio Diaz to keep a rashly made promise to step down. Thisexplicit promise entailed the implicit promise of a new political era. During thethree decades of Diaz's rule before he made that promise, he had little effectiveopposition; thus it seems clear that the initial cause of the revolution was notyears of tyranny but the breaking of a promise only a few months old. In asimilar fashion, the Chamorro assassination in Nicaragua?the event that, inmy opinion,Cletermined the success of the Nicaraguan revolution?was seen asbreaking an implicit bargain between Somoza and his nonviolent opposition.Even the Iranian revolution may be basically the result of a broken inplicitpromise that "Iran should remain Iran," rather than the result of corruption,unemployment, SAVAK brutality, or any of the other causes often proposed.The broken-implicit-promise indicator, like all political instability indica-tors, is difficult to use. Although it is (I believe) universal in the sense that itoperates in all societies, it can only be used successfully by someone withcountry-specific knowledge. It will take a Russian expert, for example, to saywhether Gorbachev's use of increased income differentiation to spur produc-tion breaks an implicit promise of relative income equality. And it will take aSouth African expert to tell us whether Botha's slow movement on reform isintended to avoid the politically destabilizing effects of breaking an implicitpromise to his Afrikaner constituency.I want to reemphasize that I do not claim that all political instability canbe reduced to broken implicit promises or bargains. In some cases, this factormay be of great importance, while in others it may have little relevance.Whatever the relevance of implicit promises for instability from the SouthAfrican extreme right, I doubt that they have much bearing on instabilitystemming from the dissatisfaction of the black majority. I suspect thatinstability arising from the Sikh community in India is about equally the resultof broken implicit promises and other factors. At the other extreme, I believethat, if the Chilean military decides to remove Pinochet from the presidency,it will be almost entirely because of broken inplicit promises.The FuturePolitical  instability analysis will remain an art, not a science. And, asarticle implied, the best artists will be those?regretably few(b)(3)(c)either inside or outside the community?who combine deep country-specific84Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351InstabilityApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351--GeftmtyEn-rrA--Lknowledge with a profound understanding of instability patterns throughhistory and across cultures. No computer program will do our job for us.That said, I do believe that indicators can be devised that will make thecountry-knowledgeable analyst's job easier. One set of these indicators must behighly country specific. Another set may depend heavily on demography oreven geography; for example, it may turn out that a revolt is unlikely duringthe rainy season in any tropical nation. A third set of indicators could be basedon the broken-implicit-promise factor?perhaps combined with elements ofGurr's relative deprivation theory. I believe that, in the future, these three setsof indicators will allow a skilled and knowledgeable country analyst to makereasonably accurate projections of major change?or, equally important, theabsence of major change?even in counterintuitive cases where expert opinionis divided. In this best of all possible worlds, we should never again have toread, -Pressures are building, but the staying power of the government shouldnot be underestimated.-This article is-classifiedApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621351