THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SHAH

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0000621356
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July 30, 2014
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December 1, 1988
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Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356TITLE:AUTHOR:VOLUME:TheDeclineandFallWinterofthe ShahYEAR:1988(b)(3)(c)32ISSUE:Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356 roved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356STUDIES ININTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006213560 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356 (b)(3)(n)Contributing FactorsTHE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SHAH (b)(3)(c)In The Eagle and the Lion, published by the Yale University Press in1988, author James A. Bill offers a version of events in Iran which skirts manymajor issues in favor of a view implicitly accepting the current government asan inevitable representation of the desires of the majority of Iranians. Forexample, the author reacts negatively to a major historical issue facing Westerngovernments: is it ever appropriate to intervene in a Middle Eastern country infavor of American and Western interests? For many, the answer until well intothe 20th century was an easily accepted -yes.- The supposed superiority ofWestern culture and the primacy of our interests were readily accepted byforeigners and nationals of most Middle Eastern countries as suitable justifica-tions for intervention. With the end of World War II, this facile judgment fellinto question, leading in time to the freeing of many countries from Europeandominance and eventually to a renaissance of a variety of ancient cultures, and,of more relevance to Bill's book, a return to the fundamentals of Islam.While Iran never was colonized by the West, it experienced the impact ofEuropean culture. Under Reza Shah, it opted for a Western rather than anIslamic orientation. In 1953, Western countries had no qualms about interven-ing to protect what they saw as their fundamental interests. In the process,Western nations incurred a debt to the man they returned to the Pahlavithrone, thus reducing future Western policy alternatives when that leader'srule began to disintegrate. Bill, writing at the end of a dynasty, takes it as agiven that intervention has been bad for Iran, in that it somehow prevented theemergance of true Iranian rulers. This implicit assumption underlies Bill'sdebunking of alternative views, while avoiding responsibility for the excessesand anachronisms of the rulers who succeeded those linked to the West. Toaccept Bill's approach and his underlying bias in favor of nonintervention is todo a disservice to those Iranians who have made a commitment to Westernculture as offering alternatives and balance to traditional systems. By re-examining arguments dismissed by Bill, it may be possible to do some smalljustice to those in Iran who have lost the most to Islamic fundamentalism orwho remain committed to the Western principle of representative government.For an intelligence officer, covering this ground may assist in formulatingpredictions and judgments on the future directions of Iranian developments.Opposing TheoriesBoth intelligence analysts and operations officers are warned early in theircareers to beware of conventional wisdom. The Eagle and the Lion is anexample of such "wisdom.- The author subscribes to the popular "volcano"theory, which holds, as Bill puts it, -that the Shah's regime, backed by one ofthe most powerful military machines in the Third World, collapsed in the face (b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062135653 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356(b)(3)(riShahof a massive popular uprising in which millions of citizens marched in thestreets during a year of generally peaceful demonstrations." This is a faultythesis, and Bill skims over some basic questions while contructing it. Because heaccepts this explanation as obvious, he also sees no need to defend it withdetailed arguments and documentation.Bill accuses the US Intelligence Community of failing to build theunderstanding of Iran which might have led to a more enlightened andsuccessful US policy. His charges that US intelligence was severely debilitatedby bureaucratic infighting and limitations artifically imposed by MuhammadReza Shah Pahlavi are particulary disturbing. From my personal perspective (b)(1)  (b)(3)(c)believe such charges do not hold up. Bill's focus is on the forces which emergedto replace the Shah and the ignorance within the US Government of who theywere and what they represented. Bill argues that, if US policymakers hadknown the answers to these questions, there might have, been an earlier andmore complete US break with the Shah in favor of these new forces. Bill'ssympathies are clearly with the Iranian masses, whom he accuses the officialAmerican community of scorning in favor of a seemingly invincible Shah andthose who slavishly supported him.Readers'of the book will be surprised and disappointed by how lightly Billsketches the events surrounding the Shah's ouster. He treats the outcome asinevitable, as another case in which a tyrant is sent packing by oppressed massesfinally fed up with corruption and the loss of moral values. Although Bill hintsthat there were those who knew the Shah would go, he does not cite any solidpredictions being put on paper beforehand.Bill's book is a polemic against insensitive and ignorant bureaucrats,backed with a plea to listen instead to academics whose understanding is deeperand unwarped by worldly consideration. More important, Bill is biased in favorof a historical perspective which assigns greater weight to the role played by"masses" and "classes" than to the role played by leaders. In my view, he makesa basic mistake when he fails to appreciate the role of the "great leader" in theMiddle East.My view, which was formed in the last half of 1978, is that the Shahabdicated in place and that he alone was responsible for his ouster. In contrastwith the volcano theory, I favor the "genie in the bottle" theory of events inIran?the Shah removed the cork and unleashed the genie, who in turnfrightened the Shah into abdicating.Liberalization DisasterAnyone who tries to understand why the Shah was ousted must satisfac-torily explain why this happened in 1979 and not earlier or later. Bill skims overthe reasons with a retrospective emphasis on economic and religious factorswhich drove the masses to action. He mentions the Shah's liberalizationprogram as a factor, but he does not give it the weight that I believe it deservesas the answer to the question of why events unfolded when they did. Bill citesthe -Pahlavi invincibility thesis,- or the -Pahlavi premise,- as a phenomenonof -shared image- among American officials which distorted their view of the54- Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356(b)(3)(n) Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356Shah -gEC'grF(b)(3)(n)political realities, especially the mood of the masses. In hindsight, there is aneasy appeal in Bill's theory that, if the US had looked behind the scenes, theforces forming to act against the Shah could easily have been identified.Bill ignores another possibility, however, that does not fit his theory.According to this second theory, the Shah was indeed invincible in themid-1970s. In true Middle Eastern fashion (Saddam Hussein in Iraq comes tomind), the Shah had built a repressive mechanism that was impervious topressure from below, because the Shah, using Savak, had fragmented andcowed the opposition. As Bill acknowledges, the Shah had the money andpolitical skills to coopt large sections of the opposition. Only the terroristMujahedin-e Khaki and the Charik-e-Fedayeen-i Khalq registered seriousdissent through their armed struggle. The Shah easily dominated the Shiaclergy, many of whom were in the pay of Savak, after a hard-won victory in1963 and the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini. Why, then, did the Shah decide toliberalize? Among other reasons, Bill cites the one td which I always sub-scribed?the Shah wanted above all else to ensure the survival of his dynasty.To do so, he undertook, as supreme manipulator of Persians, to make politicalchanges to broaden support from a perpetually disgruntled population whichhe knew his young son could not control and rule under the Shah's system of aone-man monarchy. The Shah also launched this program because he believedthat events from 1963 to 1977 had erased the shame of his cowardly flight fromIran in 1953 and demonstrated his courage and his dominant political skills toboth the Iranian people and himself. In the confident ruler's view, liberalizationwould allow for greater popular participation but still under a continuingPahlavi dynasty.The period from the summer of 1977 to the summer of 1978 was markedfirst by concession and then by repression, as the Shah floundered through adisastrous liberalization program. In his paternalistic approach, he deniedIranians a view of his objectives, leaving the fragmented opposition to shape aone-plank platform for liberalization?get rid of the Shah. The Shah's handlingof the program gave all Iranians the first glimpse of his vulnerability. It becameobvious that his vacillation between concession and repression was a sign thathe did not know what he was doing. The Middle Eastern ruler's iron fist hadbegun to shake, and the opposition became increasingly confident that the Shahcould be overthrown. (b)(3)(n)In this context, I recall a discussion in October 1978hich centered on the fate of Middle Eastern rulers, once the oppositionsense their vulnerability. Ayub Khan's downfall in Pakistan, begun by hisillness, was a case in point. The fall of another Pakistani leader, Zulfikar AliBhutto, was an even better example?one that was not lost on the Shah. DuringBhutto's last weeks in power, the Shah told a visitor that Bhutto -must brazenit out- and dispel any sense of vulnerability.By mid-October 1978,  (b)(3)(c) onlya miracle would save the Shah. This judgment was based on the sense that theShah was not of the stuff needed to avert disaster. Once the Shah had freed thegenie, he dissolved into an indecisive and frightened monarch who could notApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062135655 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356(0)(.3)(n)?Shahsave himself or his supporters. The Shah was not overwhelmed by a massuprising. Rather, he was not up to the task of handling the dissenting forces hehad released.Other Negative FactorsStudents of the Shah's downfall have to answer the question of why hefailed so badly. At the time, we saw some contributing factors, but we did nothave a complete picture. Although we were unaware of his cancer, we believedthat health might have been a factor. As early as May 1978, there were rumorsthat the Shah had a serious illness. In retrospect, the Shah concealed his ailment,probably limiting knowledge of it to his French doctors and to a few in his innercircle. (A recent book, The Shah's Last Ride, by William Shawcross, suggeststhat the Shah and the Empress did not even acknowledge to one another thathe had cancer.) During the summer of 1978, there also were widespread rumorsthat the Shah had been wounded in an assassipation .attempt. The Shahinadvertently encouraged such speculation by withdrawing to the Caspian formost of the summer. When he returned to Tehran in August, he began anotherround of concessions and repressions which underscored his vulnerability.A more fundamental  mistake in our appreciation of the situation wasmade when we lost sight of the Shah'scowardly performance in 1953. I also believe that the death in 1977 of formerCourt Minister Asadollah Alam robbed the Shah of his most astute politicaladviser. Without Alam, the Shah was unable to cope with the fast-breakingsituation or to make quickly the sound political decisions necessary for survival.To achieve a genuine understanding of events in Iran, other questions,either lightly touched upon or ignored by Bill, must be considered. Amongthese are:'Why did the mullahs and not pro-Western moderates inherit powerfrom the monarchy??Why did the Iranian military collapse?'Could the US have saved Iran from the clerics?Turkish InfluenceBill makes no mention in his book of Turkey's great leader, KemalAtaturk, and the influence he had upon affairs in Iran. In his book on RezaShah, Donald Wilber offers a key insight into how Reza Shah was influenced byAtaturk's reshaping of the Turkish people and Ataturk's successful attempt torelegate Islam to a secondary position in favor of westernization. Reza Shahadopted Ataturk's westernization objectives as his own, and he, and later hisson, successfully pursued that policy until 1978. In 1963, the Shah crushed themullahs, and they did not reemerge as a contender until the Shah lost his grip.Why had Turkey succeeded and Iran failed in continuing westernization? Inmy view, Reza Shah and his son ignored the differences between Turkish andIranian nationalism. Reza Shah returned from visiting Turkey to impose aPersian nationalism which was built upon sand, trying to copy in a land of great56Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356(b)(3)(n)(b)(1)(b)(3)(n) Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356Shah SECRET (b)(3)(n)diversity the example of a homogeneous Turkish people (Kurds excluded)whose language and history allowed them to build a durable nation committedto westernization.Islamic RevivalWith Turkey's continuing adherence to Ataturk's secular principles inmind, Bill's theory of the inevitable reemergence of Islam is not as obvious ashe would argue. Rather, other causes must be sought to explain why Islamreplaced the monarchy. The primary cause, I believe, was the nature of theShah's rule. Reza Shah, and, especially his son in the later years of his rule,destroyed the institutions whose support was crucial for the Shah's liberaliza-tion program. Chief among these would have to be individuals groupedtogether in associations dedicated to maintaining programs favoring western-ization. In 1977, the Shah set out to enlist such support. The chaotic advancesand retreats of 1977-1978 clearly suggest, however, that he had never graspedthat his earlier repressive policies had weakened his natural allies to the pointwhere they lacked the will and courage to defend their national interests in theface of an Islamic resurgence.In this situation, the mullahs had a natural advantage which was never tobe overcoMe. Of all of the opposition forces, only the mullahs had an existingorganization capable of asserting itself. Each mosque was a political unit that  could field a street force.   Other potential politicalforces, including the National Front, were organizationally incapable ofmatching the already immense human resources of the clergy. By October1978, the more Western potential actors had resigned themselves to Khomeini'sleadership filling the vacuum created by the Shah. One by one, potentialleaders paid their respects and offered subjugation in Paris to the exiledAyatollah.Military and Political CollapseWith the monarchy dissolving and pro-westernization forces capitulatingto the Ayatollah, the military was the only institution capable of limiting theextent of the clergy's power. I seriously overestimated the potential of themilitary to shape events after the Shah's departure, partly because it was hardto believe that a 400,000-man force would ever abdicate its responsibility toitself and its families. As I watched the military disintegrate, the idea was everpresent that other military institutions with which I was familiar would neveraccept such an end. Can one imagine the Indian Army abandoning the fieldand retreating to the barracks in the face of threats to its power and existence?Later, I was to watch the Turkish Army resume power in September 1980 toend in a day an anarchic threat to Ataturk's revolution.Looking back, the explanation seems to lie in the unique relationshipbetween the Shah and his military. We had one clear warning beforehand thatthe military would collapse, but I tended to discount it because it seemed(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062135657(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(c) Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356(b)(3)(n)inconceivable.Shah(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(c)that the military itself, like Persian nationalism, was founded on the sand of theShah's person.The Shah himself nurtured an every-man-for-himself ethic when he threwhis loyal supporters to the political wolves in the fall of 1978. The fate of Savakhead General Nimatullah Nassiri is an excellent example. Nassiri had manyfaults, but his courage and loyalty to the Shah were not among them. In 1953,Nassiri had obeyed the Shah's foolhardy and powerless order to arrestwell-entrenched Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddio. In 1978, while Nassiriwas serving as Ambassador in Islamabad, the Shah bent to pressure to recall andinvestigate Nassiri for his years as Savak chief. When the Shah issued a formalorder that Nassiri return to Tehran, he sent a second and personal messagethrough a Savak telephone call to Nassiri that he should disregard the Shah'sformal summons and slip off to South Africa. Nassiri ignored the Shah'spersonal message and returned to Iran, because the Shah would not rescind theformal order. Former Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda and others weresacrificed in similar fashion by the Shah. Each example undermined loyalty tothe crumbling monarchy, but the Shah lacked the courage to resist.During the fall of 1978, the Shah made similar missteps which had theeffect of undermining his own rule while reintroducing the sense that theunarmed opposition was irresistible. A good example was the Shah's decision on5 November to allow mobs to run riot throughout Tehran. Military and policeforces were withdrawn into the background by the Shah in order to allow themob to have its day. Instead of facing up to the forces he had unleashed, theShah chose to withdraw.US ReactionsThe cumulative effect of the Shah's collapse ultimately determined whatUS policy was to be in the late days of the Shah's reign. Bill concentrates on theinability of the Shah's -Rockefeller- supporters to face the reality of hiscondition. There was no such ambivalence among US officials on the scene. Asearly as mid-October 1978, they had correctly determined that a fatalistic and  broken Shah would not survive I  (b)(1)  (b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(c)58 --ereerfrApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356(b)(3)(n)- ShahApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356E-enEf (b)(3)(n)(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062135659 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356 lu/lo/li IVShah(b)(1)(b)(3)(c)(b)(3)(n)?SECRETApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356(b)(3)(n) ShahApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000621356(b)(3)(n)(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(c)Looking AheadThe factors contributing to the Shah's ouster are important, because theyrelate to predictions over the fate of Iran's current government. Bill's volcanotheory obscures the serious differences within the clergy over the Question of itsright to temporal rule, and, ultimately, whether the clergy wants to maintainresponsibility after Khomeini is gone for the blood debts incurred by hisgovernment. It also obscures the centuries of monarchical rule in Iran and thepast attractions of that system for Persians. In fairness, it should be noted thatBill correctly senses these underlying problems in his refusal to condemn thesearch during the Iran-contra affair for elements within the clergy who may beamenable to the earliest stages of a rapproachment witb the US.Bill exaggerates the political distance between Iran and the US. He choosesto scorn the ordinary Americans who manned the many public and privateprograms in Iran for their lack of academic understanding of Iranian culture.Bill's scorn leads him to discern a palpable anti-Americanism he describes as  having been' created by this lack of cultural awareness.(b)(1)(b)(3)(n)(b)(3)(c)I acknowledge that there are still those in Iran who want to poison relationsthrough bloodshed to preserve their positions, and we should be most wary ofplaying into their hands. More important, however, we should not be too Quickto accept conventional but flawed theories about the past, such as thosecontained in Bill's book. To do so would risk blinding ourselves to furtheropportunities to resume more normal relations with a country where many willcontinue to view the US as leader of an attractive Western alternative to harshIslamic rule, not to mention US potential as an antidote to Soviet imperialism.(b)(3)(n)Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 00062135661