THE IMPERATIVE OF CRITICISM

• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Collection: Declassified Articles from Studies in Intelligence: The IC’s Journal for the Intelligence Professional
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0000624307
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2014
• Case Number: F-2013-02322
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985

Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307TITLE: The Imperative of CriticismAUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel ShmuelVOLUME: 29 ISSUE: Winter YEAR: 1985pproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307cipproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307STUDIESINTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Israeli devil's advocate shopTHE IMPERATIVE OF CRITICISM *A cardinal intelligence lesson of the surprise Arab attack of the 1973 YomKippur War was the need to strengthen the intelligence research bodies whichhad operated in Israel on the eve of the war. The underlying assumption wasthat the greater the number of intelligence bodies (and hence, the number ofanalysts), the lesser the probability of all making the same, sometimes critical,mistake. It is for this reason that parallel bodies of analysis (in addition to thatalready existing in the Military Intelligence) were developed. The civilian bod-ies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expanded the scope of their strategic-political research, and the intelligence sections of the regional military com-mands were given additional resources and functions in the field of militaryassessment.Another conclusion was to appoint an Intelligence Adviser to the PrimeMinister. The function of this adviser was to compare, analyze, and confront thedifferent estimates of the various intelligence bodies. This appointment, how-ever, was short-lived., These well-known lessons relied, to a great extent, on tradition and practiceof intelligence work common both to Israel and elsewhere. Less known, andmore novel, was the decision to create, within the military intelligence frame-work, an internal function, which would independently review and criticize thefinal intelligence assessment product published by the Military IntelligenceResearch Unit. The innovation of this review function lay primarily in the factthat it expressed a recognition of the need to add yet another safety measure.Presumably, this function, by virtue of its in-house standing, would be betterequipped and better able to express itself more freely, with more immediacy,and with a greater accessibility to the top military command?thus giving itgreater powers of persuasion and warning in time of need. In this sense, theestablishment of the Review Section was, and still is, unparalleled, not only inIsrael's intelligence community, but also within larger and more establishedWestern intelligence services.The ten years that have elapsed since the creation of the Review Sectionprovide an adequate perspective to examine this experiment, determinewhether it has indeed been justified, and consider whether changing circum-stances should not obviate its existence today.Review as an Independent Analytical FactorThe production of intelligence in all military research bodies in the IDF,on the General Staff level, in IDF Regional Commands, the Air Force, and the' This article is reprinted, with permission, from IDF Journal Volume II. Number 3, May 1985, apublication of the Israeli Defense Forces. The author is identified as Lieutenant Colonel Shmuel, a seniorintelligence officer.65Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307CriticismNavy, undergoes a routine process of substantive and qualitative review withinthe usual command hierarchy. The creation of the Review Section was neverintended?nor has it ever presumed?to replace this orderly chain of control.Its importance lies in the fact that it established a new independent level ofreview, whose attention was to be directed solely at the final intelligence assess-ment product. That being its main mission, the Review Section receives and isauthorized to obtain all data relevant to every intelligence product it seeks toexamine. As a result, it has the flexibility to choose and criticize (according toinstructions, or more commonly, upon its own initiative) any subject it deemsimportant. Experience has shown that the status which Review graduallyacquired enables it to express itself without fear of veto from higher echelons,and exempt from the usually prevailing environmental pressures.Review and Its DiscontentCritics of Review question its ability to encompass the broad range ofsubjects dealt with by the Research Unit of Military Intelligence. -How,- theyask, -can the few people in Review deal in depth with the problems handledby the many seasoned analysts of the regional and functional desks?"In principle, such criticism may be leveled against any review function,even a judicial one. In practice, however, the declared purpose of Review, as wella.. the expectations of it, have tended to minimize the relevance of this criticism.The personal qualifications of the officers selected to man the Review Sectionhave typically been more than adequate to enable them to approach even a newsubject with a fair degree of understanding and common sense. What is expectedof the Review analysts is that they illuminate the subject under examination froma different angle; and it is precisely the combination of familiarity and distancethat is apt to produce different-conclusions. Had the opinions of the opponentsof Review prevailed, the very system in which Intelligence Research operateswould have been put in doubt. Here, too, commanding echelons review productswritten by subordinates, sometimes on subjects alien to the commanders' fieldof expertise. The fact that they do so reflects the same imperative and logic thatapply to the workings of Review. To a large extent, the power of Review hasderived from its purposely modest size. The fact that it did not grow beyond avery small nucleus of military and political experts means that, while it was neverperceived as a threat by the regular research establishment, it was still able toconcentrate on the few select issues that usually occupy the attention of mostintelligence bodies at any given time.Perhaps the main lesson of Review's work over the years is that it standsto gain the respect and approval of analysts in Research only if it concentrateson the final products and not on their authors. To achieve this end, Review mustadopt rigid criteria of objectivity. It must relate, above all, to the internal logicof a completed intelligence assessment by first asking not if it is right or wrong,but whether it is self-consistent. Review must decide if a given assessment'sconclusions actually arise from the available data, or whether there can beanother important, legitimate conclusion. It must also determine if all therelevant data have been taken into account, and if those facts which have notbeen included are capable of altering the product's basic premises. Finally,Review must examine the conclusions of the assessment in order to make sure66Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Criticismthat the description of the situation is neither exaggerated nor underrated. Overa period of time, Review should also seek to find incongruities between product-A- and product -B- which deal with the same matter.The record of Review proves that it has, indeed, been able to cope with thecentral strategic problems of Israeli intelligence. Moreover, its flexible missionand structure have permitted it to broaden its range of concern to additionalareas. These include:Non-military intelligence products: Even though the Review Sectionis a military body, it does not consider itself bound to review militarypublications only. As a result, it has at times fulfilled wider needs ofIsrael's general intelligence community. Review has thus taken uponitself to react, when the need arose, to the publications of the Mossad,the General Security Services, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, andfound these bodies willing to cooperate with it.Special examinations: Review has been conveniently able to carry outexaminations of subjects not necessarily related to a specific researchproduct, but rather to problems of the intelligence gathering process.Unpublished analyses: Finally, Review has allowed itself to scrutinizenot only the logic of published but also of unpublished documents. Itsrequest, -Justify why you didn't write,- could at times provide analystswith a second opportunity and incentive to bring forth ideas andreservations that otherwise would not find adequate expression in theregular analytical product.Review as a Devil's AdvocateMany intelligence officers tend to identify Review only with its role of a-devil's advocate,- entrusted with producing converse assessments. The majorfunction of intelligence review is thus popularly viewed as being the writing ofantitheses.In point of fact, this oft-described impression represents a narrow and arather atypical dimension of the function of Review. Notwithstanding theimportance and uniqueness of the devil's advocate function, in practice thewriting of converse products has occupied but a small part of Review's work.As stated, the reason for creating the devil's advocate function was rooted in thewish to prevent another, Yom Kippur-like, collective misperception. Since anintelligence failure in Israel could spell a disaster, Review was authorized, incertain cases, to produce tendentious assessments by resorting even to uncon-ventional and?from the point of view of honest intelligence work--unacceptable- gimmicks of analysis. When the end (avoiding an enemy sur-prise) justifies all means, Review sometimes undertakes to prepare special doc-uments, which draw selectively on data that support a preconceived conclusion.The guiding assumption of such writing is that the adverse documents wouldhave persuasive logic, be based on actual intelligence materials, and present analternate and internally consistent intelligence picture.The expectation of a devil's advocate analysis, unlike that of other plainestimates, is that it would necessarily provoke an immediate re-examination of67Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Criticismthe positive assessments, and in the rare case that they may be found to be lackingin their persuasiveness, replace them altogether. In any event, the storm of ideasthat would follow a devil's advocate publication was thought, in itself, to be ablessing to a sometimes overly confident, too self-content, group of analysts.While complacency has not been a common feature of Israeli intelligence, thedevil's advocate was considered to be a useful whip for shaking up possiblynegative group-think tendencies.Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, actual use of the devil's advocate func-tion has been scant, mainly for the following methodological reasons:Negation's overkill capacityWhen building his -case-, the devil's advocate deviates from the naturalorder of the research. Instead of arriving at conclusions based on all the existingdata, he seeks only those facts which fit and corroborate his preconceptions. Inother words, he rejects the -signals- in favor of the -noises--discarded in theprocess of the positive intelligence production. As a rule, the work of the devil'sadvocate almost always ends up in a -tailor-made- report which in othercircumstances would be regarded as the ultimate manifestation of analyticalbankruptcy:- Since such reports aim at the prevailing estimates, they inevitablyare bound to produce a vigorous response. As experience shows, the danger hereis that in their hasty desire to refute the devil's advocate's -negative" thesis,opponents will ignore or attack even those elements in the analysis that cast areal doubt on the validity of some aspects of the positive analysis. Rather thanrefuting shaky estimates, the devil's advocate may thus actually entrench them.The "cry-wolf" syndrome.The use of the devil's advocate function must be reserved almost exclusivelyto truly critical events. It came into being for one express purpose: to warnagainst war, when a whole system dismisses such a probability, and that hascontinued to be its raison detre ever since.It follows, therefore, that when risks of the enemy's potentially threateningactions are analyzed in the positive assessments, the need for adverse estimatesdiminishes. Devil's advocate documents may be written also in order to exposepotentially positive developments; but while -war-search- may be said to be amandatory obligation of the devil's advocate role, its parallel -peace-search-mission could be described in terms of a useful bonus only.The various devil's advocates who have manned this position over the yearshave been sparing ir. their use of this aspect of Review. All have concluded thatoveruse of the devil's advocate system would erode its value and undermine theircredibility in time of real need. The cry-wolf alarm thus has its drawbacks, evenwhen it is qualified in a devil's advocate bulletin.Nevertheless, the role of opposing estimates is justified, even if not a singleone of them will ever be proven correct. The devil's advocate needs to be rightonly once in order to justify his existence. Although he will remain a complexfigure in Israeli intelligence, his role will continue to be important. Since he isthe only prosecutor who wishes to lose his case, his successes could be measured,68Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Criticismparadoxically, by the number of his failures. Each of them invariably means thatthe whole system is right. The need for the devil's advocate will continue to existas long as will the risk of sudden war.ConclusionOn balance, it appears that the main significance of Review in the ResearchUnit of Israel's Military Intelligence lies in the fact that, having been establishedas a separate, independent body, it succeeded in becoming an instrument for theexpression of minority opinions. There is hardly an intelligence service whichdoes not encourage its members to voice dissenting views.It is precisely because of the inherent uncertainties that affect most intel-ligence analyses, and the measured skepticism expected to characterize the goodintelligence officer, that everyone recognizes the need to allow contrary ideas toreach the highest levels.However, like the proverbial weather, everybody admits that somethingshould be done about it, but no one actually does anything. Israel's IntelligenceCorps is no exception. Despite repeated, almost ritual requests over the years bythe Corps command echelon, only very few officers have chosen to present adissenting opinion in writing. Even fewer have dared to append a minorityopinion to a published estimate (as is permitted and encouraged in Israel'sMilitary Intelligence). The contribution of Review in this regard cannot bedenied, as it has actually institutionalized dissent. Its products, which pass nosupervision, are often read by military and political decision-makers. Thus, evenofficers who were inhibited from stating differing opinions have been known touse Review as a convenient conduit for transmitting their views to higher levels.Fear of angering colleagues and superiors, or even mere laziness, discouragesmany from going to the trouble of recording, in writing, their dissenting views.While not helping them to fight independently for their own opinions, Reviewhas, nevertheless, provided them with a satisfactory alternative to just keepingquiet.Review's direct access to the Director of Military Intelligence gives it anadvantage in rebutting conclusions which, it believes, reflect individual or col-lective misperceptions. Still, it is not necessary for Review to overrule that whichit criticizes. The important point is that the adverse view be heard. Whatdistinguishes Israel's Military Intelligence from other similar institutions is that,for over ten years now, it has actually paid officers for the sole task of injectingsecond opinions- into the system.The existence of the Intelligence Review Section has, of course, not beenwithout its problems. It has not been able to completely solve personal recrim-inations which its documents sometimes raise. Even though Review officerscriticize papers, not people, in the final analysis it is the live writers of the paperswho tend to feel that they bear the brunt of the criticism. One finding in thisrespect is the direct correlation that exists between an analyst's professionalinvolvement and his personal sensitivity. Thus, reactions to the formal, widely-distributed criticism of Review may at times become more personal than sub-stantive. In their attempt to defend their theses, some, though admittedly notmany, analysts have preferred to disparage every document issued by it. Review69Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307Criticismhas often tried to take a philosophical stand toward such reactions, realizing thatpride, honor, and jealousy, and not merit alone, will continue to affect Research'sreactions to its criticism. In any event, Review's final address is the officers atthe top of the Research pyramid. Once they are convinced, no other reactionshould really matter.Outbursts against Review are therefore expected to continue, especially, ofcourse, when its views are proven wrong. Unfortunately, such outbursts willoccur even when opinions of Review are proven to be right. Review is expectedto fulfill in itself what it demands from others: to be able to draw conclusionsfrom its own errors. Here, however, Review has always found itself to be in amore comfortable position. Since it has no direct functional responsibility overany given area, it could bear no penalty for incorrect criticisms that it issues.This will continue to be both its advantage and handicap. Still, the Directorof Military Intelligence and his second in command for Research (who are thetwo prime targets of Review) must remain open enough to justify Review, evento the point of mercilessly enforcing its view upon reluctant subordinates whenit presents a sounder case.In summary, it would be correct to state that over the years Review hascome to be accepted as a legitimate feature of the Israeli Intelligence Researchenvironment. This reality stems partly from the fact that the officers who havefilled the posts of Review grew up and were all familiar faces within IntelligenceResearch. It also reflects the fact that many of the senior Research officers hadthemselves served in the Review Section, prior to their assignment and promo-tion to the different regional desks.The mission of Review, by its very essence, induces unease and frictionamong Israeli military intelligence analysts. It is perhaps because of its dishar-monious (though, of course, not disfunctional) character that foreign intelligenceservices have not adopted it. It is noteworthy, however, that despite its specialnature, no one has ever suggested that Review be eliminated. On the contrary:the trend has been rather to strengthen the Review Section in both manpowerand rank. The existence of Review has allowed many officers to give vent to theirhidden, and sometimes repressed, views. This may be demonstrated by the factthat, from time to time, even those officers who reacted with fury againstcriticism of their own product nevertheless congratulated Review for daring toexpress their own critical opinion of a colleague's product.So long as Review continues to receive backing from above and feedbackfrom below; inasmuch as its officers are, and are perceived to be, impartial andintellectually honest; and as long as all recognize the proposition that the intel-ligence system, as a whole, is comprised of fallible human beings, the need willremain to preserve Review as an independent, unique body within Israel'sMilitary Intelligence.70Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624307