NEW LINKS BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY

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0000624353
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July 30, 2014
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F-2013-02322
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Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353TITLE: New Links Between Intelligence and PolicyAUTHOR: David D. GriesVOLUME: 34 ISSUE: Summer YEAR: 1990Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353 aApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353STUDIES ININTELLIGENCEA collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in thecontents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of anarticle's factual statements and interpretations.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006243530 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353Trends in transmissionNew Links BetweenIntelligence and PolicyDavid D. GriesNo subject in intelligence has led to moredebate and less agreement than the link-age between the intelligence and policycommunities. Sherman Kent, Ernest R. May,Robert M. Gates' and others have explored thesubject in books and articles. Colleges and uni-versities teach courses on it. Yet some aspects ofthe linkage remain largely unexplored. What kindof intelligence is transmitted between the twocommunities? How is it transmitted? How dopolicy officers use it?In the first decade after passage of the NationalSecurity Act of 1947, which laid most of the foun-dations for an intelligence community, only themost senior intelligence officers maintained regu-lar contact with policy officers (deputy assistantsecretaries and up or their equivalent). Intelligenceofficers were also less numerous in those days, andintelligence agencies were only partly accepted asplayers in Washington. The situation changed inthe next three decades. The Intelligence Commu-nity grew rapidly, first during the Korean andVietnam Wars and again during the Reagan years,and intelligence agencies gradually became estab-lished in national security circles. The result isthat today intelligence and policy officers of alllevels spend far more time together.An important consequence of increased contact isthat the formal and impersonal linkages of thepast have become more informal and personal.Oral assessments delivered during face-to-facecontacts now outnumber written assessmentsdelivered through classified mail channels. Themore senior the intelligence officer involved, themore likely that oral rather than written assess-ments will be conveyed. As a result, intelligenceofficers themselves have become part of the1transmission system, and policy officers are usingintelligence in somewhat different ways.Growing Importance ofOral AssessmentsOral assessments are analytical evaluations orjudgments as distinguished from current intelli-gence. They are conveyed during discussions atthe countless informal meetings that dot the calen-dars of senior officers in national security depart-ments and agencies and at the more formal policy-coordinating meetings held at various levels fromassistant secretary to the President himself. Thesemeetings offer opportunities for intelligence offi-cers to provide direct policy support, as for exam-ple, when policy officers at a series of meetings inApril 1990 solicited assessments of policy optionsconcerning the Lithuanian situation. A seniorofficer from the mid 1970s?a deputy director, anational intelligence officer, an office directorfrom one of the intelligence agencies?wouldnotice a marked increase in this kind of contacttoday.Oral assessments are also transmitted in briefingsto a steadily widening audience. On any givenworking day dozens of intelligence officers givebriefings on everything from Soviet agriculturalpolicy to narcotics production in the Andes. Onthe receiving end are senior members of the Exec-utive Branch, as well as members of Congress.The Intelligence Community is often at its best inthese situations, because knowledgeable, working-level analysts usually deliver the briefings them-selves. They speak from firsthand exposure to allthe available intelligence.There is another link, perhaps the most importantone, that competes with meetings and briefingsApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353between intelligence and policy officers. It con-sists of casual contacts, impromptu discussions,telephone conversations, and conference calls.These channels are much less formal than meet-ings or briefings, and the oral assessments offeredin them are less structured. Arguably, the mostimportant oral assessments are transferredthrough these least formal mechanisms. Theymirror the way the government is doing businessin the 1990s: ad hoc arrangements, reliance onpersonal ties, and a high degree of informality.Casual contacts also avoid some of the pitfalls ofmeetings and briefings, where bureaucratic com-petition among agencies and principals some-times diverts attention from issues.Because people convey oral assessments, theinfluence of the messenger-can overshadow themessage. Just as a persuasive officer makes aweak assessment sound good, so a poor brieferdestroys a strong brief. When personal relation-ships also exist between intelligence and policyofficers, the dynamics of friendship come intoplay. Friends are trusted and listened to; strang-ers may not be. And when a policy officer overtime develops confidence in an intelligenceofficer, that confidence is likely to be transferredto assessments even though they may not be goodones.Changing Role of WrittenAssessmentsSeveral kinds of written assessments continue toplay a key role in linking intelligence and policyofficers. Some policy officers?former Secretaryof State George Shultz was a recent example?prefer reading to briefings. Among written prod-ucts, the President's Daily Brief stands out asinfluential, even critical, in supplying assessmentsto the President and his inner circle. TheNational Intelligence Daily and INR's MorningSummary, which circulate at subcabinet levels,are also influential, and they have a much widercirculation among policy officers.Four other categories of written intelligencedeserve special mention:2Policy? National Intelligence Estimates stretch backto 1950, when CIA's fourth Director, Gen-eral Walter Bedell Smith, responded to Pres-ident Truman's request of 10 October 1950for an assessment of Soviet and Chineseintentions in Korea to take with him to hismeeting with General MacArthur on WakeIsland. Smith assembled the heads of all theintelligence agencies that afternoon in hisconference room and, according to LudwellMontague's account, insisted that they pro-duce six Estimates on Korea by 8:00 a.m.the next morning. 2 Forty years later, thekey judgments of National Intelligence Esti-mates reach an influential audience inWashington, where they are separately circu-lated to the President and Vice Presidentand to Cabinet and subcabinet officers. As aresult, key judgments of Estimates areamong the few written intelligence assess-ments regularly read at the top of govern-ment.? Unscheduled written assessments?generallyshort papers in the form of memorandums,discussion papers for meetings, executivebriefs and typescripts?also reach high-levelpolicy officers. Such assessments often areprepared at the request of one of these officersto meet a specific need, and they are assuredof a small but influential readership. Theirkey characteristics are brevity and focus. Theydo not appear on production plans, nor arethey supported by extensive research. Yeteach year policy officers ask for more of them,thus confirming their value. They are part ofthe larger trend not only from written to oralassessments, but also from scheduled writtenassessments to unscheduled ones.? Written scientific and technical assessments,such as those that evaluate conventionaland strategic weapons systems or analyzeadvanced technologies and economic compet-itiveness, find a ready audience, especiallyat the Departments of Defense, Treasury,Commerce, and Energy. The level ofApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353Policydetail provided in these assessments is toogreat to convey in a briefing, and a writtenrecord is often needed for future use.? Unevaluated intelligence?raw reports fromclandestine agents, pieces of SIGINT orimagery that have not been subjected toanalysis?also flows to policy officers. Occa-sionally, unevaluated intelligence lands onthe desk of a high-level policy officer, eventhe President, and directly influences deci-sionmaking. More often, unevaluated intelli-gence flows at lower levels, where it con-verges with and is incorporated in writtenassessments sent to the same customers. Theconvergence has an unintended byproduct:policy officers and analysts have access tothe same unevaluated reports and thus canchallenge each other's judgments.With the foregoing exceptions, scheduled writtenassessments, formerly the Intelligence Commu-nity's chief product, today mainly influence thepolicy process indirectly. Senior intelligenceoffiers and the staffs that support policy officersare now their principal readers. They rely heavilyon them when preparing oral assessments andshort papers. Scheduled written assessments thushave assumed a new and vital role, though notthe one originally intended: they have becomepart of the foundation of the intelligence edifice,providing much of the analysis on which otherintelligence products are based. Moreover, ana-lysts who prepare scheduled written assessmentsare doing more than serving the policy processindirectly; they are honing their own analyticalskills in preparation for the time when they willbe making oral presentations.Intelligence information conveyed by video cas-settes is a special case whose market is growingrapidly. President Reagan was an enthusiastic cus-tomer. He recognized that biographic intelligencewas more digestible when images and narrativewere presented together. The picture of Qadafhidelivering a tirade has more impact than a writ-ten assessment alone. Because video intelligencecombines the trend towards oral assessment withtelevision's pervasive influence, it seems likelythat in the future more intelligence will flow intothe policy community in this fashion.Foreign Policy DecisionmakingBefore exploring how policy officers use intelli-gence, it is necessary to reflect briefly on how for-eign policy is made in today's Washington. Fewobservers believe that policy formation is anorderly process where facts are lined up, analysisapplied, and decisions made. Some would con-tend that most policy officers avoid making deci-sions, unless forced by events. Delay is preferableto making a decision that might adversely affectUS interests, disadvantage a department, orblemish the record of a policy officer by revealinghim or her as wrong. Faced with these possibili-ties, policy officers slow down the process andseek safety by spreading the responsibility withina wide circle. The larger the number of partici-pants in making a decision, the smaller the riskto any one of them.Nor are most foreign policy decisions made all atonce. Caution marks the process. The pressure ofevents almost always starts the process; incre-mental decisionmaking completes it. Of course,not all decisions are made?or avoided?in thisway. The recent US action in Panama and theNicaraguan election are examples of events thatforced policy officers to act rapidly anddecisively. But they are exceptions.Usually the events that force policy officers tomake incremental decisions are far less dramatic.They include clearing positions for meetings andinformal discussions within the ExecutiveBranch; coordination of briefing books, arrivalstatements, toasts, negotiating positions, andcommuniques for policy officers travellingabroad and for foreign visitors; approval ofspeeches, letters and talking points for senior pol-icy officers; and dealing with Congress and themedia. Contacts with the Congress require policyofficers to clear briefings and testimony andApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353respond to investigations, new laws, and legisla-tive reports. Dealing with the media requires pol-icy officers to get ready for questions andanswers at press conferences, respond to op-edarticles, prepare for discussions with journalists,and try to limit damage from leaks. Although noone of these events is likely to prompt a majorpolicy change, taken together they often nudgepolicy in new directions or make new policy.Evolving Uses of IntelligenceBecause policy officers rarely make decisions inan orderly fashion, intelligence is usually usedinefficiently. The policy process is messy andmarked by delay, sharing of risks, and incremen-tal steps. The uses of intelligence are equallymessy.Defending Policy, Policy officers spend much oftheir time shoring up support for decisionsalready in place or generating support for recentdecisions, so the use of intelligence to defend pol-icy is not surprising. Examples of this includedefense against Congressional criticism and sal-lies from bureaucratic rivals, as when a policyofficer in one department uses an intelligenceassessment to weaken the argument of anotherdepartment. During the 1980s, policy officersdealing with Nicaragua spent most of theirenergy defending policy.The policy officer as a defensive player reflects inpart the influence of Vietnam, Watergate, andIran-Contra. Vietnam spawned an aggressivepress that today challenges assumptions underly-ing policy, searches for bureaucratic infighting,and grills policy officers whenever possible.Watergate sharpened skepticism of governmentinstitutions and actions. Iran-Contra pulled moreforeign policy decisionmaking power away fromthe Executive and gave it to the Congress. Leaksto the press also play a role. The more openpolitical system that has grown out of Vietnam,Watergate, and Iran-Contra has made it difficultto keep secrets. Against this background, policyofficers have become counter-punchers.PolicySupporting Action. Next in importance among theuses of intelligence by policy officers is supportof diplomatic or other actions, sometimes to thedismay of the Intelligence Community, whichwants to protect its sources and, methods. Presi-dent Reagan used intelligence to put the responsi-bility on Libya for bombing a disco in Berlin inApril 1986 and to hold the Soviets accountablefor shooting down KAL 007 in 1983. He used itagain to accuse Libya of constructing a factory toproduce chemical warfare agents, and the Bushadministration repeated the same accusation inMarch 1990. High-level policy officers frequentlyuse intelligence to confront foreign countries withevidence of unfriendly activities, as when intelli-gence detected widespread election irregularitiesin the Philippines in 1986. 3 Subsequently, theWhite House issued a series of warnings to Presi-dent Marcos.Helping to Make New Policy Decisions. The useof intelligence assessments to assist in makingnew policy decisions is third in importance. Aca-demicians identify this kind of decisionmaking asthe principal use of intelligence assessments.Many would claim there is no other justificationfor maintaining a large intelligence community.But policy officers, as noted, spend more of theirtime defending policy and supporting directaction than in making decisions. Even when newpolicy decisions are being made, intelligence isnot always used directly or consistently.Nonetheless, intelligence assessments can and dohelp to identify policy options that will work, thusdirectly supporting decisions on new policies.This was the case in 1980, when President Carterbased policy decisions on intelligence about prep-arations for imposing martial law in Poland. 4The policy officer may use intelligence to answerimportant questions underlying portions of a deci-sion, as when intelligence was used to establishToshiba's violation of COCOM regulations. Or,after reaching a decision, policy officers mayencourage distribution of a compatibleintelligence assessment to unify the ExecutiveBranch behind the decision, as when intelligencewas used to demonstrate that the INF Treatycould be adequately monitored. On the other4Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353Policyhand, policy officers generally prefer those assess-ments that buttress their preconceptions. Conse-quently, they often use intelligence selectively.Acquiring Information. As the traditional foreignpolicy menu has lengthened to include narcotics,terrorism, and nuclear proliferation, the policyofficer's need for information has grown dramati-cally. Often too busy to read widely in their fieldsand buffeted by daily events, policy officers drawdown their intellectual capital. Intelligence assess-ments, when they are clear, concise, and timely,provide an efficient way to build capital. To fillspecific gaps in their knowledge policy officerscan also shape the flow of intelligence, thoughnot its content, by requesting assessments thatilluminate policies under review or highlightemerging issues. -Congressmen, and especially their staffs, also useintelligence to acquire information, thus helpingto create a 'common fund of knowledge. This is anew development. In the 1950s and 1960s theIntelligence Community shared few assessmentswith the Congress, so that there was little corn-monalty in the information base of the Legisla-tive and Executive Branches. The amount ofintelligence conveyed to the Congress has pickedup steadily since the 1970s, when permanentoversight committees were established. Today,the Intelligence Community supplies similarintelligence to both branches. Policy officersignore this development at considerable risk.Users of intelligence have little time for readinglengthy assessments, and they tend to acquireinformation informally over time as they encoun-ter intelligence counterparts in meetings, brief-ings, and casual contacts. Thus a general knowl-edge of the Intelligence Community's conclusionsabout an issue is slowly accumulated, ready foruse when a crisis occurs.Lost OpportunitiesIt is no accident that, with the exceptions alreadynoted, oral assessments and short papers have5pride of place in the new intelligence?policy link-age, because they most closely match the penchantof today's policy officer for informality and per-sonal transactions. That oral assessments havegained wide acceptance shows the attention intelli-gence officers are giving to their customers. Yetcurrent practice leaves much to be desired. Toomany policy officers fail to understand whatintelligence can do for them. Instead of recognizingit as a useful resource, they view it as unhelpful oras a potentially competing input into the policyprocess. They also fail to give the IntelligenceCommunity the guidance and feedback it needs.Some experienced policy officers know better.They identify a point of entry to the IntelligenceCommunity, usually a deputy director, a nationalintelligence officer or an office director in one ofthe intelligence agencies. They keep their doorsopen. When requesting assessments, they framequestions carefully to ensure that the right issuesare addressed.Writing in Lessons of the Past, Ernest R. Mayadvanced the notion that policy officers shoulddepend more on historians. When historical expe-rience is overlooked, May wrote, mistakes arecommon. 5 Similarly, when intelligence is over-looked, mistakes can occur. But the press of dailybusiness on policy officers means that the Intelli-gence Community has to find better and moreefficient ways to compete for attention.Strengthening Intelligence ?Policy LinkagesAs the transfer of intelligence assessments to pol-icy officers shifts from a predominantly writtento a predominantly oral enterprise, the Intellf-gence Community should pay close attention tothe consequences.?The Intelligence Community should reinforcethe trend towards producing oral assessments ofall kinds and short papers. A higher standard ofperformance in oral presentations can and shouldbe achieved through improved training. As shortpapers become the norm, the temptation to makeApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353 Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353them longer should be vigorously resisted. Partic-ularly important, annual production plans cover-ing scheduled written assessments should bescrapped; they are not needed in an environmentcharacterized by rapidly changing requirements.?There are pitfalls in the new game of oralassessments. Intelligence officers making oral pre-sentations often operate alone, separated fromthe traditional process that subjects analysis tocompetitive review. Furthermore, a message thatis delivered heavy-handedly runs the risk ofwearing out the messenger's welcome among pol-icy officers. For example, in 1962 Director JohnMcCone lost much of his direct access to Presi-dent Kennedy after the Cuban missile crisis. Hisoral presentations to the President were accurate,but, after missiles were discovered in Cuba, thePresident told McCone that "you were right allalong, but for the wrong reasons." 6?The Intelligence' Community does not keep ade-quate records of oral presentations, thus under-scoring its failure to recognize their importance.Production records based solely on scheduled writ-ten assessments reflect yesterday's reality. Theyare inadequate for studies of production trends,and they overlook the contribution of oral assess-ments. A simple records system is needed to keeptrack of and give appropriate weight to oral assess-ments and short papers as well as to scheduledwritten assessments.?The process through which policy officers taskthe Intelligence Community is too sporadic, com-plex, and cumbersome for a world that lives byspeed and flexibility. Tasking is most effectivewhen policy officers ask questions over the tele-phone or in face-to-face discussions, not whenquestions are submitted in writing. Similarly,most intelligence officers prefer to task their ownsystems with oral rather than written requests.The long, written tasking documents producedeach year with such effort should be shortenedand in some cases abandoned.?Intelligence officers need to understand thepolicy process better. Too often they know morePolicyabout how that process works abroad than inWashington. Few intelligence agency schoolsoffer high-quality courses on the American for-eign policy process. Rotational tours for intelli-gence officers in policy agencies offer anotherway to sharpen understanding of the policy pro-cess. Few intelligence officers should reach seniorlevels without these experiences.Modern American intelligence is not yet 50 yearsold. Much has been accomplished to bring intelli-gence and policy officers together in a productiverelationship. In 1965 Sherman Kent concluded inStrategic Intelligence that "of the two dangers?that of intelligence being too far from the usersand that of being too close?the greater danger isthe one of being too far." 7 Today, thanks to theoral assessments and short papers that flowthrough the informal and personal linkagesbetween intelligence and policy, the danger "ofbeing too far" has been reduced, though noteliminated. As resources tighten, a heavy burdenfalls on the Intelligence Community to makethese new linkages and trends work better.NOTES1. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence (ArchonBooks, Hamden, Ct., 1965); Ernest R. May,"Lessons" of the Past: The Uses and Misuse ofHistory in American Foreign Policy (OxfordUniversity Press, 1973); Robert M. Gates,"The CIA and American Foreign Policy," For-eign Affairs, Winter, 1987/88, pp. 215-230.2. Ludwell L. Montague, General Walter BedellSmith as Director of Central Intelligence, Octo-ber 1950-1953, (Washington, D.C., CIA His-tory Staff, 1970) (Declassified version releasedto National Archives under CIA's HistoricalReview Program in February 1990), Vol. II,pp. 26-30.3. Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and AmericanForeign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Winter,1987/88, p. 221.6Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353 PolicyApproved for Release: 2014/07/29 0006243534. Ibid.5. Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: TheUses and Misuse of History in American For-eign Policy, pp. 172-190.76. Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, The CIA and AmericanDemocracy (Yale University Press, 1989) pp.136-137.7. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence, p. 195.Approved for Release: 2014/07/29 000624353