WHITHER ARGENTINA: NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM OR MORE OF THE SAME? - 1976/02/01
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Research Study
�
.Whither Argentina: New Political
System or More of the Same?
V
85.
FR 76-10012
February 1976
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OIRECTORAYE_OF_INTFLLIGENCE
OFFICE OF POLITICAL-RESEARCH
February 1976
WHITHER ARGENTINA: NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM OR MORE OF THE SAME?
by
NOTE: This Study was prepared-by the Office of Political Research.
- Other agencies and CIA offices were consulted, but the study has
- not been formally coordinated and does not represent an official
-CIA position; The Issuing office Is aware that the complex
mailers discussed lend themselves-to other Interpretations.
Comments on th ...er wIILe welcomed by the author, who may
be reached
PR 76 10012
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CONTENTS-
.i-
flat
SUMMARY 1
THE DISCUSSION . . . .� . � . . ....... -. . . � 5
. --INTRODUCTION 5.
II. THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM . . . ��.99.6�.� 5
A. The Ni Mary . . . . . . . ... 6
B.- The PerOnists , . � . . . . . . � ,� � � . 8
C. Other Political Fortes- .' .- .,..O. 9
. � . 9. :
D. The Traditional Political Culture .
III. THE FORCES _OF CHANGE . � � � � 12
A. New Political forceS ... 12
8. Effect on Established Political Forces . 13
C. The Changing Political Culture . . . . 14
1Y. THE FUTURE 18
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- SUMMARY -
WHITHER ARGENTINA: NEW POLITICALSYSTEM OR MORE OF THE SA
:Argentina seems on the verge of repeating a familiar
poIIIcal cycle.1 an elected civilian government is falling
Into lower and tower repute bs it is progressively overwhelmed
by problems of Its own making and by political and economic
dilemmas that have remained unsolved for the last forty years.
In the wings a 'divided and reluctant armed forces ieiheing - -
propelled to take over the government agatn._ Locked in an
Immobilism of their own making,-Argentine political forces
have been unable to break this political cycle in which the
military intervenes to take-power_from an ineffectual civilian
government, only to give it back when they cannot govern effec-
tively either. -
--:The Immobilization of the Argentine system has two underlying
dimensions. Politically, the basic deficiency is a lack-of respected
institutions through which conflicts among groups: can be mediated.
Thus, the efforts of any one group_to_stImelate_major political
change are quickly cancelled out by the opposition of competing
groups. On the economic side no grouphas had sufficient strength
to take the measures necessary to revitalize a stagnant economy.
For decades two or three-years of-slight or moderate .growth
have been followed by one or more-disastrous-years-in-which
the previous increment of growth-is-wiped out.
This time, howevere-Argentine politIcsemay not repeat Itself.--
The argument of this paper Is that there are new forces loose
In the Argentine society which have-so-undermined the traditional
institutions and processes-that a basic change in the political
system is likely to occur itIlhe-next one to three years.
These new forces are both political and economici-and their
effect is to erode the consensus that allowed.the traditional system
to function. This consensus rested on respect for two implicit rules
of Argentine politics:
-- violence was permissabie-to express grievances
and show strength, but only if carefully limited.
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No political group sought the total elimination
of an other (i.e. any defeat was perceived as
only a temporary setback).
These rules prevailed because no group was afraid, hungry
or angry enough to challenge them. None had as much political
power or economic wealth as It wanted, but each was comfortable
enough to avoid taking the chance of losing permanently what
'It did have.
Since about 1970 this common understanding of how politics
should be played has been threatened by the riseief guerrilla/
terrorist groups which disregard the rules of limiting vio-
lence and of not seeking to-eliminate other power contenders.
Violence has changed in kind and intensity. Where once strikes
and demonstrations were the common occurrence, these have now
been supplanted by kidnappings, assassinations, bombings,
and armed attacks. Less of life from political violence has
risen dramatically from an average of 40 deaths per year during
1967-72 to over 1,000 in 1975.
The breakdown in polltical_rules is now being exacerbated
by the most virulent inflation Argentine has ever eXperienced.
Prices rose 335 percent In 1973 compared with an average yearly -
rise of 30 percent during 1967-74. The effect has been to intensi-
fy the pursuit of narrow_sectorakinterests by Argentine political
and economic groups. PerticularlyAn-Ate labor 'sector, fear
Is growing that the old methods- will to protect the
working class' share-of-the-Argentine economic pie Militancy
Is rapidly increasing as unemployment grows and real. wages decline
And the Army and security forces are being brought ln to break
up strikes declared "Illegal" ane_SubVersivell_by the government.
What is the probable outcome of the sharp, upward spiral
In political violence and Increasing perceptions of economic
disaster? HOe possibility isfor:_the:old system of political
Immobilism to continue. Another is for_civil war. Neither of
these alternatives seems very likely.
Preservation of the old system for more than another year
or so depends on the re-establishment of-the old political rules
and the minimum consensus that.used_to exist.: But the likeli-
hood of this seems increasingly-40Uhttul. As violence by both
the left and right increases, -the previously respected norms
--on expected treatment of politicalopponents-seem-likely to
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erode further. Moreover, there Is little prospect that the
Old consensus can be revived unless the economy can be
stablized. This cannot be done, however, without a severe
austerity program which would be almost certain to hurt
organized labor's ecenomic position and further undermine
Its faith In the old system.
The odds for civil war are greater than for the indefinite
centinuation of political immobilism. More turmoil is likely
since the strength of the guerrilla/terrorists is growing and
greater labor militancy Is developing, especially at the local
union level.- But sustained internal war is not likely unless
the Armed Forces stand aside or split into warring factions --
neither of which seems in the cards at this point.
Indeed, the most probable-course of events Is for the spiral
of increasing political violence and economic breakdown to lead
to an Indefinite takeover of the government by the Army. This
time the rule of the Army would likely.be much harsher and '
more authoritarian than any time in the past because:
�
The.Argentine society will be much closer to
erarchy than on any previous occasion of Army
intervention and, hence, the measures to
restore order and stimulate economic recovery
will have to be much more severe in order to
succeed.
-- The limits on using violence will hive
largely disanpeared, so that the Army will be
lest inhibited by cultural constraints from
forcibly suppressing any political opposition.
Up to now the Army has lacked the unity of will and pur-
pose.to use force to restructure the Argentine political System.
It has always been a loose_assemblage of highly politicized
factions which formed short-lived coalitions to remove Ineffec-
tual civilian leaders but which generally began to fall apart
after taking over direction of the government. Past faction-
alism in the Army may be about to give way to a new unity,
however.
The evidence is uncertain but thereare-indlcations that
a new "hardline" mentality Is growing among many military
officers, particularly those who have fought the guerrillas.
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These officers are reported to feel that the guerrillas, and
the social and economic conditions that spawn them, can only
be eliminated by a total change in the existing political
and economic system.
While this mentality may be spreading as officers who
have fought guerrillas are rotated outside the combat zone,
It apparently has not yet reached the high command level.
The top Army leadership still remains reluctant to take power
directly because of the immensity-of-the problems they would
face and their memories of the frustrationsof past military
rule. They are hoping that, If they must take power again,
they can do so on a wave of-popular support that,w411 enable
theMito govern without major opposition.
:This tiMe, however, It seems-increasingly unlikely that
the Generals could rule benignly for long, The most likely
scenario Is that they will take power again with the super-
ficial backing of a wide:spectrum of political forces but that
-political-and economic problems have assumed such proportions
that-partial-and patchwork solutions simpty will not hold.
Thus, eitherJhey will eventually be forced to respond by imposing
severe eulhoritarlan-rule-themselves, or -a rising generation
of Arp',Intine.Army-officersi increasingly unfettered by the
constraints and divisions of the past, will impose it in their
place.
In short, .basic and far-reaching changes stem likely
In Argentina To Monitor these land their implicationsfor
US interests) will require increased scrutinyof-the attitudes'
of Argentine military offic,:-Ts at the middle as well as the
top ranks.
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INTRODUCTION
for twenty years (ever since the overthrowof Juan Peron in
-.1955) Argentina has stagnated both politically and economically
Wherher_reled by civilians or the military it has known only
brief periods of political calm or economic-growth.--Elected
civilian _regimes have alternated in office w1-i coop-installed
military governments, and both have ruled with equal Ineffective-
ness- 4-
THE DISCUSSION
Argentiqa seems on-the-verge of the same charade that has
_been played out twice since 1955 an erected civilian government
Is telling into lower and-lower repute as it is progressively
overwhelmed by problems of-its own making and by political and
economic dilemmas that:have remained unsolved for the last forty
years. In the wings Is a diVideerArmed Forces; being propelled
.... by events to again take-over the government, yet unwilling to be
pulled into another no-win situation: - i.e., because it has
neither-the strength nor the-will to govern decisively, it will
reign but not rule.
This time, howevereArgentleeeeotitles may not repeat it-e
self. The argument of this paper Is that there are new forces
at loose in the Argentine society that have so undermined the
traditional institutions and processes which have set the boun-
daries for past politics thata basic change In the Argentine -
political system Is likely to occur In the next one to three
yeers. This paper will (I) describe the political forces and
rules-of-behavior which characterized the crumbling old system,
(2) outline the evidence which suggests that change is underway,
and (3) speculate about what new political system may rise out
of the debris of -the old.
II. THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM
. On the surface the Argentine political system aepears to
change each time an elected-civillan-goveremeht is removed in
favor of an auttoritarianemtlitary_regime. In actuality,- until
very recently, the political forces, the rules that govern their
behavior, and the issues over which they have struggled have
changed ,Nardly at all.
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Argentina has been the epitome of Samuel Huntington's
�praetorian society .n in such a society all major Social forces
are highly politicized. Groups oppose each other directly on a
wide range of basic issues since there are no respected politi-
cal Institutions through whichtheir conflicts can be mediated.
Furthermore, there are no generally accepted means for resolving
differences; each group tends_to use the"coin" which makes maxi-
mum use of the resources most available to it. "The wealthy
bribe, students riot;- workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the
thilitary coup.�*
In the Argentine setting the two most powerful forces, and
the only ones capable of taking significant political initiatives,
have long been the military and_the Peronist movAlent. They have
.been the crucial actors for several decades. and their relationship
Is the pivot around which most of Argentines politics have turned
since 1955.
A. T122211121:1
Argentina's Army (the primary military political actor) was
modeled deliberately after the Prussian Army with its strong em-
phasis that the military should_function as a professional, apoli-
tical guardian of society's institutions. Yet almost simultaneously
with the professionalization of the Argentine Army it also became
one of the most politicized armies in Latin America. These two
processes are opposites. One tends to orient the loyalties of
the officer corps towards the military_as an independent institu-
tion. The other pulls loyalties towards individual ooliticians
or political parties and involves the officer corps in factional
politics. The effect of these countervailing pressures has been
to create tensions In individual_officers and in the corps as a
whole.
These tensions have been present within the Army through-
out the 20th century-and underlie much of the ambivalence that
the Army high command has demonstrated as to whether it should
Or should not be directly involved in running the coaltry. The
political pattern that has consequehtly_developed has been fairly
consistent.' The pattern-begins-with an already factionalized
*Samuel P. H4ntington,
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968) p. 196.
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Army in which some officers have close personal and party ties
with various middle or upper class party leaders. Most of the
others are generally apolitical but are quite susceptible to
being led by officers who feel strongly about professional or
political issues. On numerous occasions over the last several
decades this existing disunity has been exacerbated by the de-
liberate efforts of elected civilian Presidents to develop a
secure political base in the military by manipulating military
promotions ane assignments In order to reward followers and
punish critics. In almost every case a counter-reaction has
then set in, and a movement to re-establish military profes-
sionalism and to remove the Army from politics burgeons. Even-
tually, an ad hoc coalition Is formed between-those.wanting
the Army to return to the barracks and those whose careers have
been adverseiy affected by the political maneuvers of the
President, and the President Is removed from office by
temporarily united Army. A military government is next
Installed. Direct involvement In ruling the country, rather
than unifying the Army, results in even greater deterioration ,
of professional norms. Eventually, a grbuadswell develops
within the military to return the government to elected civilian
rule in the vain hope that the military can, once again, get out
of politics and find a unifying professional identity.*
*This was the pattern-that-occurred when took power
In 1955 from Juan Peron and filen gave way to elected civilian
President Arturo Prondizi-in-1958. SiMilarly,:aondizi was
overthrown in 1962 but the Army, after briefly ruling through
his constitutional successor7as-a7puppet President, permitted
the election of Arturo Illia In 1963. Next, it forced Illia
from office in 1966 but, after-sevenyears of indecisive
military rule, allowed elections and the return to the Presidency -
of Peron in 1973.
The dilemma ofthe Argentine professional soldier Is
best ceptured in a-communique issued by the Army Secretary of
War in April 1966. when the "legalists" In the Army were strug-
gling with self doubts over whether to remove illia and subject
the military to the divisive pressures of governing: "The Army...
makes known to public opinion.-that it does not believe in
'military government' as a solution for Argentine p roblems...that
experience has demonstratedthat the-Army,-In-the-function of
government, Is converted into a deliberative body and discipline
is corrupted,: which leads to anarchy destroying what so much
vigilance and sacrifice have cost the institution."
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Since 1955 the tension between politicization and profes-
sionalization has been complicated by another basic division
within the military about what to do with the Peronist movement.
- Although the Army has been generallyanti-Peron throughout this
period, two major factions have continued to dispute the issue.
One group has believed that Peronism must be eradicated entirely
for the country to regain its political health. This group has
tended to coincide with those officers who believe that the miliw
tary should take over the government indefinitely and impose
harsh rule. The other, more broadly-based and influential group,
has also been. against Peronism as a movement but has supported'
the rt-integration of Individual. Peronists into the political pro-
cess in Order to defuse them as a unified, populist'political
force, it has also generally supported the return Of the government
to civilian hands after a period of "cleansing." Most recently,
this group came to believe that the only salvation of the Argentine
society and, especially, the milltaryas an -institution would be
to remove itself from power and let a chastened and aged Juan Peron
take office, hoping that the responsibilities and pressures of.
power Might cause the Peronist movement'elther to destroy or reform
itself. This feeling led-tolte Army's Withdrawal from politics
and the return to power of Peron in 1973.
In summary, the Army as a political actor Is most accurately
seen as a rooSe assemblage of interest groups which come together
-in-short-lived coalitions on occasion to overthrow ineffectual
national leadership butwhich almost always begins to fall apart
as soon as itJakes over the government-.
B. The Peronists
The most important of the other political forces in
Agentina is the Peronist movement. like every other group
in Argentina it has always been faction ridden. The move--
-ment itself can only be defined very imprecisely as an aggre-
gate which, after Peron's-overthrow-in-1955;--WaS-iinified
- primarily by the demand that he, or those purportedly associated
with him, be returned to political power. In total Strength
its adherents have numbered from about one-fifth to one-half
of adult Argentines,- with the exact numberdepending on
the issue in dispute. The one issue that has best served
to unite Peronists has been their determination to keep
the advances in economic well-being and status they made
under Peron and to resist beingmade.thesacrificial lambs
of any government program, whether civilian or military,
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to reinvigorate the stagnant economy. Their power Iles
in their control of the labor movement. Over the last two
decades the trade union sector, based on the General Confeder-
ation of Labor (COT) with a total affiliation of over three
million workers, developed a reasonably efficient and well
financed bureaucratic structure. As befits a powerful, well-
entrenched movement, it has not been revolutionary or radical
in orientation, but rather has usually pursued bread-and-butter
union, issues. And, although the economy has stagnated for
twenty years, union leaders have generally succeeded in
keeping wages up and the prices down of items most critical
to workers' welfare (such as wheat and beef).
C. Other Political Forces
For the purposes of tbis essay-the_other-major-traditional
epolitical forces can be mentioned very_briefly�_One set of
these forces comes from a fairly highly developed middle class
and consists of commercial-interests-estoerated with theexport
economy, native fedustrialistsi-professional politicians, and
government civil servants Some are more organized than others,
but the interests of these groups are often diverse and in con-
flict. In most cases the influence of these forces on the poli-
tical system has. been narrowly directed to the defense of the
_Interests of their own particular-group, and they have demonstrated
little ability, unlike the military and_Peroniste, to affect the
system as a whole.
- The tonservative rural oligarchy_is the final sector worth
noting.---it has little organized national-political-expression
but has, when defending its own interests, considerable political
Power, Its influence comes from-itsTcontrol-oVer the production
of Argentinats two major exports, grain andbeef, and through
personal ties with Important government and military leaders
D. :The Traditional Political Culture
Despite appearances to the contrary the Argentine'political
system, at the level of basic institutions, political forces, and
the rules by which politics is played, has-been remarkably consis-
tent and stable, at least until recently.- It can essentially be
-described as a veto system ie which- all political actors or forces
follow these basic rules:
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I. No single political force Is strong enough
to Impose its will permanently on the others.
2. Each Is strong enough to block the major
political initiatives of the other, and
3. There is no commonly accepted basis for
-the formathan of governing-coalitions although
temporary coalitions to overthrow the govern--
meat-of-the-moment can be formed.
These rules work (if only to prevent efficient governMent)
because they are imbedded In a commonly-shared political culture in
which each of the actors subscribes to basicallyithe same values
and expectations of behavior. The most important elements of this
common culture are the following:
I. Political institutions have not modernized
as rapidly as economic-Institutions so that the
ttwo systems are Increasingly incongruent. The
economic system demands that the citizen respond
in a highly rational and-functional manner, In
contrast, in the political sphere the citizen
responds In a much-more-particularistic way and
"national" interest is defined in-e very narrow
manner, usually encompassing the welfare of only
the specific group making the-definition. Each
group tends to believe thatAmprovements in
economic-and political benefits cannot te mutual:
what other groups_gain, it must lose.
2. Limited violence has become-instUtutionalized
as a legitimate method-of-expressingirievances or
bringing about. political change. Because-of the
weakness of political institutions for managing
change "...the component elements of the power elite
In Argentina -- such-as-officers, officials, and
party leaders - ere-prepared to press their dis-
agreements to a point that calls for a show of force,
or even a limited-usepf force, instead of relying
on mutual consent that Is achieved after:peaceful
persuasion."*
*Jeane Kirkpatrick, Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study
Of Peronist Argentina (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971) p. 93.
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- The amount of violence that Is permitted under
the rules of the game has generally had very
:definite. limits, however.: It has also been highly
--stylized, particularly on the part of the military,
- and has 'led to little bloodshed. These limits.
are clearly evident in the recent abortive rebellion
of a portion of the Argentine Air Force and the
way Ii whichit was put down: threats to bomb
each side into submission were uttered but actual
bombing and strafing runs were made only on runways
and other unoccupied areas.
3.: A final point-is that for most of modern
Argentine history a common understanding has .
existed that no political force will seek permanently
to eliminate any other political force.* Peronist,
military, oligarchy or middle class, each group -
has believed that a culture In which political .
defeat Is perceived as_only temporary best serves
its own interests sincerit-can never besure_
of being on the winning-side of the resolution .
of any particular issue. - Nor has any group,
because-of factionalism in Its ranks and the
power of other groups, ever been confident It
could win In a terminal struggle. Finally,
even while the Argentine economy-has stumbled�
along, it has been beneficent enough to give
every important group at least a good part
of what it wants. In essence then. until-very
recently, no group has been-afraid, hungry, or
angry enough to take the chance of losing permanently
Oat it already has.
* This is commonly the rule in Iraitional-Latin-American
political systems. Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic
chylge In Latin America (Princeton, New Jersey i D. Van
Nostrand Co., inc.:7767) pp. 104-106.
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III. THE FORCES OF CHANGE
A. New_Polittcal Forces:
Since about 1970, new po:Itical forces have developed on
the left whichpose a serious threat to the continued functioning
of theold political system. These forces exist mainly as rural
guerrillas/urban terrorists, but they also have some expression
-in organized political party groupings, in the student movement
and, most recently, at the local level In organized labor.
The first signs of Argentine participation in guerrilla/
terrorist activities appeared in the-late 1950's.1and, especially,
in the early 1960's when two Marxist groups sent members to Cuba
for training. Then, in 1966,TrOtSkylte party, the Revolutionary
Workers Party (PRT), began_to_sponsor bank robberies and kidnappings,
primarily to secure financing. By 1970 the PRT spawned a faction
- calling itself the People's ReVolution'ary Army (EIRP), which
launched a-sustained guerrilla campaign,-especially,in Tucuman
"Province. While ERP fortunes have fluctuated considerably since
1970, it has remained steadfastly dedicated to the violent
overthrow of the government-and-the imposition of a Marxist
revolutionary political systeM, it held to this position even
when the supposed worker's hero, Juan Peron,- returned to power
In 1973.
The,other major current of: uerritietterrortSt activity has
.been sponsored by radical Peronists. -As previously noted, the
Peronist movement has always had factions of varying colorations,_ ,
but the polarization into moderate and radical camps accelerated
greatly with the return of Juan Peron to power in 1973. After his
return as President, Peron took generally conservative positions
on most important political and economic -issues Most old-line,-
labor-oriented Peronist-leaders-responded-favorably to this con-
servatism,!but many of theyounger leaders who were associated
with the youth and student sector were7severely disillusioned.
They reacted In traditional Peronist_fashion by assassinating
selected cOnservative Peronist-leaders, but they-did not directly
attack the:government.-tThis changed in September 1974 after
Mrs. Peron took office, following her husband's death, and showed
herself to be even more conservative than he. The radical Peronists
broke with her, went underground as-tte Montoneros terrorist
-movement, end began a violent campaign against the political
establishment and, especially, against the police.
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Effect on Established Political forces
The existence of active and often successful forces engaged
in Political terrorism has had a heavy impact on most other Argentine
political forces. The effect on the military has been at least.
three-fold. First, it has created some degree of unity in the
Officer corps. The Army, which has not fought a war In over
100 years, is now engaged in combat against an enemy which the
Armed Forces high command has declared must be exterminated.
Secondly, combatting the guerrillas-In-the-countryside and the
terrorists In the city has inexorably dragged the military deeper
into politics. Extraordinary powers were-given to the Armed Forces
by Anti-Subversion laws, an-expanded National Defenso.law, and a
State of Siege, all declared by the congress In 1974 and 1975. And
in Tucuman Province the Army has taken some civil as well as
military powers as It attemps to _destroy the ERA. All this has
served to heighten the ever present tension between professional-
ization and politicization: a growing numberof military men
-believe Mrs. Peron must be replaced by an administration, if
necessary military controlledo-icapable of giving Argentina law and
order. Other officers, particularly those In the high command who
have the freshest memories-of the frustrations of past military
rule, are desperate-to keep the Army at least one step removed
from direct control of government.
A third military reaction to the-existence-of new guerrilla/
terrorist political forces hasbe n-the growth of a "hardlin0 political
mentality amon s e officers.
re beg nn ng to eetthat-both-the-gueerillas and the
social and economic conditions that spawnthem can only be eliminated
by a total change in the political and-economic system.--They: - -
have grown to despise the civilian politicians (and even some
of the military leaders associated with-them)-who run the corrupt
old system. This, of course,: IS parallel_ to the-attitudinal- -- -
change which Many Brazilian, Peruvian-and Chilean-officers underwent
prior to deciding that only the military can govern effectively
and that national defense and national development are inextricably
linked.
- The Peronist movement has also been deeply influenced by the
emergence of the new-radical left political forces. In part the
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effect has been even more direct than on the military since the
Montoneros terrorists are formerly loyal Peronists who are now in
violent opposition to a Peronist administration. The existence
of this alternate pole of attraction for Peronists seems to be
contributing to the breakup of the movement as an even vaguely
unified political force. The split appears to be three-way.
One ever-diminishing faction remains loyal to Mrs. Peron. It
no longer controls a majority in the congress and it Is rapidly
16sing control over the all-important base of the Peronist move-
ment, the trade union structure. A second faction, also poli-
tically conservative, wants Mrs. Peron to step down In order to
-save Peronism. It has strength at the national level In both
the labor union movement_and Justicialista (Peronist) Party.
The third grouping is composed of radicalized workers who formerly
supported the Peronist movement but now seem increasingly at-
tracted to the Montoneros cause. Their influence Is showing at
the local union level, where wide-spread strikes are breaking
out that the once-dominant national labor leadership seems unable
to control.
C. The Changing Political Culture
One of the major.consequences_of_the_emergence of the
guerrilla/terrorists and_their_associated political:allies as
Important actors on the Argentine political stage is that the
values that underlay the behavior of the traditional political
forces and the stability Of-the-established system are under-
going serious challenge.: The challenge threatens to undermine
the old system and cause_its-breakdown. _
-This Change In values and the erosion of the former
Implicit agreement on_acceptable political behavior are'most
clearly demOnstrated_in_two areas�first, the previously accepted
limitations on political violence seem to have been permanently
breached. Secondly, the unspoken agreement that defeat Is only
temporary and that no political group should seek the final -
elimination of-any other group appears to have broken down.
Political violence In Argentina has changed in the last few
years In both kind and Intensify,- Where once strikes and demonstra-
tions were the common occurrence, these have eow been sup lanted by
kidna.l,in.s, assassinations, bombin s, and armed attacks
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The change along the second dimension --that actors seek
to dominate but not eliminate other actors -- Is most clearly
seen In the at of the guerrilla/terrorlsts and in the
feetUngs that seem to be evolving In a large part ofithe Army and
security services. The ERP and the Montoneros are both dedicated
to the violent overthrow of the current 'bourgeois" democratic
system and Its replacement by a radical authoritarian form of
government. At the moment, In pursuit of this goal,-the ERP
Is concentrating on assassinatUan-of military officers and the
disruption of the Army as an-institution while the Montoneros
are directing a large part of their terrorist activity at the
police and other security officials.
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The Army is responding to this threat with corresponding
brutality. As one headline expressed it, "Guerrillas in Argentina
Battle Army In a War Without Prisoners." Torture, battlefield
"Justice," a fuzzing of the distinction between active guerrilla
--and -civilian supporter, the use of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment,
and the support of right-wing-"death" squads have all been
noted as increasingly common Army (and police) tactics. As
more and more military and police are exposed to the notion
that all means are justified in order. to eliminate subversion .
and the threat to the state posed by .the guerrilla/terrorists, the
previously obeyed norms on expected treatment of political opponents
- seem likely to erode further.--
A change in attitude-and-values, less obvious than that
occurring because of the conflict betwee;1 the guerrilla/terrorists
and the Arry, may also be-taking place in the labor sector. The
once-hierarchical trade union movement-seems-to be breaking apart,
primarily because of increasing-doubts on the part of many workers
that, In the face of the worst-infielonAn-Argentina's history,
their natiCnal leadership can.adequately protect their economic
interests. : Unauthorized_loCarStrikes are taking place with
increiting frequency which protest both economic grievances and
what local union members perceiveas-a-lack of responsiveness to
labor's needs on the part of an unrepresentative and self-perpetuating
clique of national union-leaders.
Labor's problems will probably_worsen_for at least the next-
year. Inflation soared_to_335:percent_in 1975 (the highest In the -
world) from an average-of-about 30 percent yearly -during-1967-7C.:
Meanwhile, ln 1975 wages rose-1150175 percent at the most and
unemployment climbed steeply from negligible levels to over six
percent. Massive wage Increases, the tool traditionally used
by Argentine labor to _keep real wages up,-111.11 only accelerate -
the deterioration of the economy by:feeding-inflation. Moreover,
severe political infighting-is occurring among national trade
union leaders (some-want Mrs. Peron to step -down, some do -
not) which will weaken the ability oi the labor movement to act
as a coherent pressure group in Making both economicand political
demands. The probable result of thesetrends Is that the fragmen-
tation of the labor movement will grow and some workers, particularly
those exposed to reported penetration of local.unlons by the
Montoneros, will resort to increasingly desperate and violent
measures to attempt to protect their interests. --
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Labor strife and the spectre of uncontrollable agitation is
causing a hardening of attitudes towards unionized workers among
the military and security services, both of which have recently
been Involved in breaking strikes declared "Illegal" and "sub-
versive" by the government. Generally opposed to Peronism as a
political movement, a growing number of officers are beginning
to perceive workers and even their "normal" economic demands as
a threat to national security which must be suppressed. One
Argentine general is quoted as having said that "In order to save
20 million Argentines from socialism, it may be necessary to
sacrifice 50,000 lives."
Confrontation between labor and.the militaryihas occurred
In the past, most notably In 1969=.70 during the Military regime
of General Ongania. In order to bring Argentina's political
and economic problems under control-,--Ongania,--when he took office
--in 1966, attempted to-establish euthoritarlan_controls on
the political System by closing Congress and suspending all
political parties. He also tried, with considerable initial
success, to impose an austerity program on the economy by,
among other things,- a temporary wage freeze. in late 1967
d1968 the economy began to recover and, although real wages
declined through this period, strikes and demonstrations were
few and Only partially successfu1 because the labor movement
was divided about to what-extent-it-should-cooperate with
government. In May 1969, however, serious disorders broke
out. There was a general strike on 30th-May which led to
a violent confrontation with the polict_irwhich f0-30 people
were killed. _Onganla responded to the labor agitation by sus-
pending some unions, intervening and reorganizine-the COT
to place it under government control, and declaring a state
of emergency. At this critical juncture, however, he faced
a united labor movement under Peronist-tontrol but. had at
his back a divided Army which would not support-his authoritarian
policies if that meant violently suppressing organized labor
and other political opposition-. By October 1969 the Onganla
government began to grant massive gage increases anda general
strike Called in November by a supposedly government-controlled
COT Was 75 percent successful. Erosion of thestabilization
program continued through 1970 and by early 1971_control over
the country's economic problems had_been:lost-_,
The old veto system continuedto function under Onganla
and prevented him from holding to effective policy initia-
tives In major part because the consensus on how to play
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politics prevailed. That consensus was minimal In that It
prescribed what behavior to avoid -- unlimited violence and
the total elimination of one's opponent -- rather than general
agreement on what procedures and institutions to use to resolve
conflict. Now, however, under the Impact of the emergence of
new political forces uncommitted_to past political values and
whose grievances are directed at the traditional political system
and not just the way it functions, even that "negative" commitment
appears to be dissolving. Thus, there is a strong possibility
that the old veto system itself may soon breakdown.
IV.
THE FUTURE
i:The fact that a politital'culture is probably changing and
that new political forces are7enterinethe scene does not lead
immediately_to conclusions-about_when_a change_in the political
system may occur or,what-form the new system may take:. Certainly,
the overt political emphasis In-Argentinatoday is to make the old
system last one day longer by_linding some "constitutional" way of
persuading Mrs. Peron--+1 step down In favor of a legal successor.
The top Armyleadership still remains extremely reluctant to take
power directly. If economic and political conditions deteriorate
further and the milittry_is_forced to:step in, the-top commend hopes
that Mrs. Peron and her croniesin government will have so discredited
themselves that the military-will be able_to take over on a wave_of -
broad public (including labor) support. In short,- there are no.
Indications the current top military leadership has plans to radically
restructure the political systemAn-order to-endithe political-- - -
and economic immobilism to which_the_old veto system had led.
How long can-the-old system-persist, with or -without
military in power? its continued functioning for-mote than another
year or so depends on the re-establishment of the old political
rules and the minimum consensetJhatutedto:exist-The likelihood
of this seems Increasingly doubtful. As violence by both the left
and the right grows-,---the-previously7reSpected norms on expected
treatment of political opponents seem likely to erode further.
In addition the economic and political_issues now demanding resolu-
tion are becoming so intensely felt that they cannot be temporized
for long. Important social and political forces -- workers, business-
- men, the military and security services -- are being injured to a
degree never experienced before.
The dilemma-for the old political system is that dealing ef- -
eCtively with these issues ranging from hyper-inflation to the
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threat of anarchy from the guerrilla/terrorists -- will take severe
measeres which will also hurt powerful groups. No government,
civilian or military, functioning within the present system has
either the political muscle or institutional strength to overcome
the veto of these political forces who would have to make the
sacrifices necessary_to resolve Argentina's problems. Nor is there
-MUCh hope that the particularlistic political culture will disappear
overnight so that labor, business, government workers, professional
t-politicians, agricultural interests and othar important groups can
be persuaded voluntarily to make the essential sacrifices In the name
of some higher national Interest., e.
One possible outcome of the spiral of-increesing political
:violence and economic breakdown Is civil war.- The odds for this
are greater than for the -indefinite continuation of political im-
mobllism, but-internal war-is still not the most likely outcome
of the current situation The guerrilla/terrorists have probably
not reached the peak of their potential to Wreak havoc, especially
if they continee to infiltrate and gain sympathizers In the labor
--moVeMent. This increases the likelihood of higher levels of turmoil
as work stoppages and demonstrations spread at the local union level.
- Simultaneously, however, greater militancy'at.the local level Is
contributing to the splintering of:theT-Peronist movement, and it is
losing whatever tenuous unity It had as a national Political force.
It Is doubtful:the guerrilla/terrorists could spark a civil war
unless (l) they draw widespread support from moderate as well as
radical Peronitts and the Army stands aside, or (2) the military
Itself splits into warring factions. Neither ofethese developments
seems likely at this point.
Rather than-continuation of the status .9112 or civil war it
seems more likely that the sense ofAesperation developing among
Argentine political forces will propel,one of them to overcome its
past factionalism and to seize-power in order to attempt to impose
its will on the soCiety. -There are three groups that theoretically
have the capability to seize power and suppress opposition: the
PeronIsts, the guerrilla/terrorists, and the Army.
Of these three the Army Is the only group, now or In the
foreseeable future, with sufficient national-pgwer and organiza-
tion to be able to undertake-successfully-the forcible restructuring
-of the politiCal systert4 What_the Army still lacks to play this
role is unify of will and purpose There are indications that
this unity is developing, as cited earlier, but the biggest
Imponderable today is how extensive is-the belief within the
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Army that It must take over and change the political system to
save the country, and how fast hat mentality Is growing.
For this reason, it may be a mistake to see the sudden
seizures of power by the military in Brazil, Peru, and Chile and
their subsequent, almost Immediate, Implantation of far reaching
authoritarian rule as the model for the probable course of events
In Argentina. It is likely to happen more slowly in Argentina*
in two cot more stages rather than in a single move. Thus, one
possible scenario is for Mrs. Peron to be removed in favor of a
civilian successor, who will also be unable to control events; for
a still divided military subsiquently to take over in an ostensibly
temporary capacity to attempt to restore calm; anO.finally,
when traditional techniques have worked neither for the civilians
nor the military, and, as violence and economic disorder continue
to escalate, for a "hardline mentality""to rise to dominate
the Army. At that point, either the current Army leadership
would be forced to impose harsh, authoritarian rule or a new
generation of Army officers, Increasingly unfettered by the
constraints and divisions of the past, would probably remove
them and impose it in their place.
Whatever the exact scenario, the conditions seem ripe for
permanent changes in the Argentine political system. New political
forces have emerged and are having a heavy impact on the traditional
political forces, political and economic problems have assumed
proportions that will not long admit to temporizing or inaction,
and the basic value consensus-that made the oldlsystem possible has
probably broken down. To monitor the likelihood of basic and
far-reaching changes in Argentina (and their implications for US
interests) continued scrutiny of the attitudes of military officers
at the middle as well as top ranks will be required.
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