Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 SPECIAL �� .r LBJ 3 4; _____ � SHIC 31 � NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER ;-.4. � - Communist Capabilicies and Intentici' in Laos Over the l4ext , - �� ;..y �-�� f�); DIRECTOR OF firma STATES � ::.;�� 4rAottotail4atiwir,:.,, I As 31 APPROVED FOR RIME � DATE _la AUG.1988 -.% � - :j.:";. 4* L �:;CA�It r(ai: � � � � .. � L--------�'-'13"4"'"44.-.'"'"-.4'-'j'61*-�L'----Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 The following intelligence orgonizotions participated in the preporonon of this astirnate: The Control Intelligence Agency and the inteirgence organizations of the Depart- ments of Stat. ond Defense, and the NSA. �i Concurring: Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, the Deputy Milt-10f, Control Intelligence Mr. Thomas L Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Deportment 'of Stote Lt. GUI. Joseph F. Carroll, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Morsholl S. Coder, the Director, National Security Agency Abstaining: Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com- mission and Mr. William 0. Cregor, for the Atoistont Director, Federal Bureau of investigation, the subject being outside of their turisdiction. This matevial conjoins information 'within the mooning of the esp;orsoge mission or revelation of which in any ' � , _ �� - Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 : 4 - Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT-YEAR CONCLUSIONS A. Over the past year the Communists have greatly strengthened their combat forces in Laos. The combined Pathet Lao (PL)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces now number about 56,000 combat troops; they could overwhelm the regular and guerrilia forces of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) in the coming dry season. And we do not think that the RV:. could expand the size or capability of its forces sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists. B. We do not believe that the Communists intend to conduct a major drive to the Mekong, lest such a move provoke US entry into the 1.4ratian corridor and perhaps upset any negotiations underway on South Vietnam. However, in the next few months, we expect the Communises to exert further military pressure on government forces, especially on guerrilla outpc6ts, in order to strengthen their ultimate hargaining i-wition. They now demand that US bombing of Laos be hake -I as a prerequisite to discussions of an Lnteraal settlement that must be based on "the realities of the current situation.' C. Even if NVA resources were released from South Vietnam, we doubt that this would in itself alter flanors intentions in Laos, since the forces already there can launch an offensive without further rein- forcement. Though developments in Vietnam could change Hanoi's calculations concerning Laos, in general we believe that the Commu- nists hope to achieve their objectives without running great risks of military counteraction. Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 DISCUSSION -1. Hanoi has ambitions to control all of Laos, but has been unwilling to take actions there which would jeopardize higher priority goals in South Vietnam. In particular. Hanoi has limited the scope of its military actions in Laos, in part, at least, out of concern for provolieg a large-scale US ground action against the vital supply routes to South Vietnam which run through Laotian territory. 2. Since the 1902 Geneva settlement, the war in Laos has been characterized by Royal Lao Government (RLC) offensives during the rainy season (May to October) when the mobility of Pathet Lao (PL) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces is restricted, and by Communist counteroffensives during the dry season (November to April) to retake lost areas, often just in time to seize the rice harvest. Thus an uneasy equilibrium has been established, with mili- tary factors operating on the RLC and political factors on the Communists to restrain actions that might provoke a major reaction by the other side. 3. In the political field, both sides have continued to pay lip service to the 1902 Geneva Accords, which neutralized Laos, and until recently to the Zurich and Plaine des Janes Agreements, which established a tripartite government� rightists, neutralists, and the PL. This arrangement has persisted despite the fact that the PL vacated their cabinet seats in April 1963. These are still kept open for them by Souvanna, the neutralist Prime Minister. Until this July it seemed as though the PL objective, despite their denunciations of Souvanna, was the restoration of the tripartite arrangements. I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 4. Several recent events, however, suggest that the C-ommunists are develop- ing a new position. For the first time, they have made a bombing halt a specific prerequisite to discussions of an internal political settlement. More- over, while still reaffirming the 1962 international agreements, they have de- manded that the internal settlement must take into account "the realities of the current situation.' 50111.16PL and Soviet spokesmen have explained that such 'realities' mean a recognition of PL control over large areas of Laos (they claim two- thirds of the territory and one-hall the population). In addition, they contend that the US and its "puppets" have destroyed the tripartite structure, that Souvarma no longer represents a neutralist faction, and that the present gov- ernment is, in effect, illegal. Apparently, the FL are laying the ground work to claim a larger role in a new government, and may demand that the neutralists aligned with them in the so-called "National United Bloc" occupy the positions now held by Souvanna's neutralist faction. 2 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 6. While thus signaling their intention to reorder the old tripartite arrange- ment, the Communists have reaffirmed their regard for the monarchy as a "permanent feature" of Lao national life. Indeed, the whole point of the rather odd visit of the North Vietnamese Ambassador in July after a four year absence seemed to be to make a dramatic distinction between the King and the present Lao government, and this line has been supported by the new Soviet Ambassador and the Neo Lao flak Xat (NLI1X) spokesman in Vientiane. The Communists have always paid deference to the King's position and may hope that the King's desire to preserve the kingdom and establish a united national community can be played upon to their advantage. 7. The Communists are taking other steps to improve their political position. During the past rainy season, they have made more of an effort than ever before to consolidate control Over their territory. After unsuccessful attempts to terrorize mountain people who have been assisting RLC guerrillas in the north, the Communists are seeking to win them over by cajolery. This is apparently part of a wider effort to improve their hold over the mountainous and sparsely populated reaches Of Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, and 'Iona Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces, where they have been stepping up their propaganda and political in- doctrination programs. Newly constructed toads give the Communists access to hitherto isolated areas. In the south, FL troops have been busy trying to con- solidate their hold over the rice-rich Sedorie Valley, where the government carried on a development program from 1965 until July 1967. There are recent reports that the PL civil administration is being reinforced by Lao political cadre who have just completed political training in North Vietnam. One report indicates that in Savannakhet Province North Vietnamese political cadre have been at- tached to the Communist administration for the firat time. 8. By the fall of 1907, the RLG had made considerable inroads on territory that the Communists held in 1962.' The Communists finally responded by turning an RLC offensive in the Nam Bac area into a debacle for the government in mid-January 1968. During the remainder of the dry season, the Comma- iliStS administered a series of defeats to the RLC which added up to the worst government setback since the precarious days of 1901 and 1962. The psycho- logical impact was considerable. There was a good deal of apprehension in Vientiane that the Communists would break out from the Faaious pattern of military action and push on to the Mekong. 9. But this did not happen, and perhaps the most notable feature of the rainy season now drawing to a close was the lack of significant new moves by either side. The Communists did not press their advantage, but devoted them- selves to a more intensive political consolidation of their territory than hereto- fore. RLG forces, who for their part, usually regain considerable terrain in the rainy season, had only some limited successes in the northeast and in the ' See cemerspread maps. Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 3 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 area .t1,)11111.1 NItimig Ilialane. ItIA. progress has been nil m the Sed.me Valles in the south, III BM-11,11:11W Provinve, and in other potentially significant regions. 10. These deselopments in du, military and political fields seem to form part of a pattern related in large part to Commtmist strategy in South Vietnam. in anticipating that 106S would b, a "decisive" phase in Vietnam, llama, moved to increase its logistic capabilities in Laos, strengthen its forces there, recover lost ground, and set back and demoralize RLC forces. And in their recent state- ments they have set the stage for demanding a new settlement on more favor- able termsshou:d the situation in South Vietnam move into serious negotiations. In short, the Communists have developed a stronger military position while at the same time.they are preparing, if the situation in Vietnam warrants, to move into a more active political phase in Laos. II. CAPABILITIES 12. PL and FAR troops are probably about evenly matched in terms of the general effectiveness of individual troops or battalions, and man for man the l'sleo guerrillas are probably better fighters than either. The NVA forces, how- ever, are definitely better than the FAR, and the psychological impact on the latter when attacked by the NVA is often sufficient to precipitate their defeat. This qualitative inferiority is somewhat corn ensated for, however, b air sup- uc success as the RLC has enjoyed since 1962 is due largely to the combination of this air support with effective use of friendly guerrilla forces. 13. For several rears, Souvanna and other RIA: leaders, includirg the mill tars, have felt that if it were not for the presence of NVA troops, !WC forces could probably quickly dispose of the Pl. threat, In our vA'NV, this is probably too optimistic. Although in ternis of present strengths on both sides. loyal Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 Lao combat forces word( then outnumbet those of the Pathet Lao by more than two to one, we do not believe that this numerical advantage would be decisive, in view of the many weaknesses and divisions that will continue to liMit FAR effectiveness whatever enemy it confronts. We do believe that the PL need a considerable amount of NVA support to mount a major attack, and that _without it, the BLG could almost certainly contain them. We also believe that in northern Laos the Meo guerrillas could put considerable pressure on the PL. But RLC forces could probably not reduce PL forces arid territory very at all�without substantial outside logistical and air support. 14. We continue to estimate, however�as we did in March 1968 4�that the combined PL/NVA forces now in Laos have the military capability to reduce Ithe BLG area of control to a few enclaves in fairly short order. They could do se: without diverting resources from South Vietnam or drawing significant reinforcements from the North. And we do not think that BLG forces could expand their size or capability sufficiently in 6 or 12 months from domestic sources alone to contain the Communists. III. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS 15. There are several options open to the Communists over the next six months or so. There are various indications of preparations to resume military activity as the dry season commences, and it is possible that the Communists have decided to exercise their military superiority and quickly overrun most of Laos. They might think this would be an effective means of putting the US under new pressures to reach a general settlement in Indochina. We believe this is unlikely. The Communists would necessarily feel considerable uncer- tainty over US countermoves in the Laotian corridor, especially at a time of changeover in American administrations. And, as long as the outcome in Viet- nam is in doubt and under some sort of negotiation, we believe that Hanoi would not run needless military risks in Laos before the chances of a new politi- cal settlement there bad been tested. 16. We do expect, however, that Communist forces will keep up substantial military pressure on MG forces in the coming dry season. In the northeast, where General Vang Pao's Meo guerrillas have long been a thorn in their side, particularly in Houa Phan and Xieng lthouang Provinces, they will prob- ably make a considerable effort to reduce a number of guerrilla ,sites and con- solidate their claims. They will probably also try to clear the guerrilla outposts along the border of northeastern Khammouane Province with North Vietnam, as well as in the northwest Provinces of Houa Khong and Luang Prabang. In the- south, they will maintain the threat to the Mekong from Thakhek to Cliampassak Province, They will attempt to disrupt US-sponsored aid and development programs. -And. of course, they will protect their vital infiltration and supply routes to South Vietnam in the Laotian corridor. 5 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 e 17. We anticipate more direct political pressures on Vientiane and the King, which these military moves will serve to reinforce. At some point, depending again on developments in South Vietnam, the Communists might offer to open negotiations, providing the bombing in LAOS ended. In any case, Hanoi would believe its military pressures would improve the chances for eventual negotia- tions on better terms. 18. Obviously, a major change in the situation in Vietnam could affect Hanoi's calculations. But we do not believe that the release of NVA assets horn South Vietnam would, in and of itself, be a decisive factor in changing Hanoi's policy in Laos. In the event of a Vietnam settlement favorable to them, the North Vietnamese would anticipate that political pressures would cause Laos to fall into their hands fairly S0011.�They would therefore see no need for ambitious moves in Laos that might risk upsetting any agreements reached on South Vietnam, particularly respecting US military withdrawals. Should the settlement be unfavorable to the Communists, we believe that military eartion in Laos would appear even more desirable to them. 19. Eventually, if the Communists cannot achieve what they want in Laos through a combination of pressures, they may resort to a vigorous military cam- paign. But for now, they appear to be moving slowly, calculating that the outcome in Vietnam will be such that a new settlement in Laos can be reached which would provide them an improved power position, from which they could ultknately take control 6 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 CHINA LAOS COMMUNIST CONTROLLED AREAS, JUNE 1962* Area Ma4 by CoNeNT.0%41 L�dAi 111e4 14,0716bit rerfAti as Owes%o, CameNentat maps n Arta NM Cammunlat aNcarra V* man Li ti." &,,ottletrS. IrriPt �The mai 04.1�&4�st beal iy #4.4-4.411 vo,miatos &ad 'mew " 444 P.-S .14.040Whe�tLre ova svirr 1,4 144;k1w, be anse beli 147 1%.**Nut art 0 25 :"5 at es 0 2 S�ara Reae Ota.�..� Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00011542 loom tCHINA Fw Feel/ own Wu mew � CHINA Ka GAng .15 k I j AO Cet Ari 51.r,st.). T-. /-1. ---- LA?(G\fit CI4GUY EN \N\A e .ttAttoP, BUR MAJ to MueN - e e fiRveAW ' .1." 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COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR- SNIE 58-1-68-THE COMMUNIST HAVE GREATLY STRENGTHENED THERIR COMBAT FORCES IN LAOS-ALTHOUGH EVENTS IN VIETNAM COULD CHANGE HANOI'S INTENTIONS IN LAOS THE COMMUNISTS HOPE TO ACHIEVE THEIR