EFFECT OF THE VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE ON THE GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00011922
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011922
MEMORANDUM
t
7 February 1968
SUBJECT: Effect of the Viet Gong TET Offensive on
the GVN Pacification Program
� L.
:. The data in this memorandum was compiled from all province
and corps situation reports received as of 1500 hours EST 7 February 1965.
Followina the Surzamary and Conclusions is data for in.dividuai provinces.
Summary and Conclusions
Z. The Viet Cong TET offensive appears to have caused a major
disruption of the (]VN/US pacification program in a majority of the provinces.
Reporting is still too spotty to assess the full extent of damage caused the
pacification program but it is likely that resources previously allocated to
rural areas will be required to rebuild the heavily damaged urban areas
and that the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) Teams will be re-
quired in several cities to assist in reconstruction. In many areas the
RDC Teams have been withdrawn from hamlets to more secure urban
centers or as protection for urban centers. ARVN Battalions-in support
of the RDC have also been pulled into urban centers as security forces in
many provinces. Throughout I and II Corps the Viet Cons are reported at-
tacking hamlets in the 1967 and 1968 pacification plan. In Cyan Nam all
17 of the RDC Teams contacted by Z February had been in action against
the Viet Cong. In Binh Dinh province the Senior Advisor's estimate is that
the VC attacks have set the pacification program back 1$ months. In
r...uang Tri and Ninh Thuan provinces the VC are occupying the pacification
areas. Only Phu Bon, Quang Dac and Lam Deng provinces and the Cam
Ranh Bay area have not reported setbacks ia their pacification programs.
Reporting from III and IV Corps is more spotty but it appears that four of
the eleven provinces in III Corps have suffered major damage and six of
the remaining seven provinces have reported some setback in their paci-
fication programs. In IV Corps it appears that 1Z of its 14 provinces have
suffered major damage and only in An Giang and Chuang Then does it
appear that.the pacification program has not suffered. The map attacked
displays our initial estimate of the degree of setback in the pacification
program by province.
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It is still too early to estimate, with any degree oi accuracy,
how long it will take to recover from these setbacks. In some provinces
the records installations, equipment, and vehicles were destroyed which
may cause lengthy administrative delays. In other provinces, key personnel
were lost and must be replaced. In some provinces RD cadre have melted
away under VC pressure and the teams must be reorganized and replace-
ment recruited and trained. Much will depend on how long it takes to re-
secure the rural areas so that the RDC Teams can return to work. How
many resources will be drawn from the RD program to rebuilding the urban
areas is a matter of conjecture. It is unlikely that GVN officials will be
able to put as much attention on the pacification program as they have in
the past because of the damage done to the cities. In fact, the rural paci-
fication program may take second place to rebuilding the cities. There is
also the refugee problem which increases as the VC Tet offensive and
allied counter action creates more refugees who must be cared for.
There will undoubtedly be some lessening of confderice in the GVN in
those areas that had previously been pacified and are now occupied by the
VC. Hamlets must be rebuilt, confidence restored, and the government
apparatus re-established. This will be made more difficult where the
district officials assume a fortress mentality. Our tentative estimate
from the limited data available is that the overall pacification program
has been set back six months though some provinces will recover more
rapidly and others more slowly.
4. In most instances the RD Cadre have performed well during
the TET YC offensive but only a small number of teams have been con-
tacted (see table below) so the casualties suffered and damage inflicted
has not been toted. There is only limited reporting on the Static Census
Grievance program but at least in IV Corps it appears to have been a
major target of the Viet Cong. The Provincial Reconnaissance Units
have been heavily engaged and have :quitted themselves well. To date,
casualties reported for all programs are Z9 KIA. 32 WIA, and 5 MIA.
The situation of the Truong Son (Montagnard) teams is unknown because
of the heavy fighting in Ken:turn. Pleiku, and Darlac.
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STATUS OF RDC TEAMS
PROBABLY
REGION ACCOUNTED HEARD UNKNOWN TOTAL
FOR FROM
I
17
74
38
129
II
41
79
42
162
III
7
44
32
33
IV
a
54
119
131
TOTAL
73
251
231
555
PERCENTAGE
13
45
42
100
I Corps
5. Danang
A. All four RD Teams had been pulled into Danang City hail as
security force, as of 1890 hours 5 February, Saigon time. Approximately
20 cadre are detailed to assist in various medical facilities in the city and
to assist in various "help the people" projects an a temporary basis.
6. Quarks Nana
A. Thirteen of the 30 R13 Teams in C�)uang Nam had not been in
radio contact, as of 1800 hours 2 February. Saigon time. Six teams,
1 KM each; one team. 2 RIA; i teara, 1 VVIA; and 9 teams had contact with
the VC but suffered no casualties. The RD control group was again in
operation and more details are expected soon. Six of the teams were being
used in Hoi An on other duties.
7. Cluing Ngai
A. RDC con2petmd received small arras and recoilles rifle fire
the night of 30 - 31 January. The VC captured a RD driver and held him
for 12 hours. He said the VC claimed their target was ib.e RD house and
compound. The status of RD teams is generally unknown. RD Team No.
J4 at An Luang Hamlet, BS 649750, Son Long Village, Son Trinh District
claimed to have captured more than 300 VC laborers. Americans con-
sider this probably an exaggeration. The PRUs are on the job. The RD
compound was well organized, as of 1200 hours 1 February Saigon time,
indigenous guards have done a good job, exhibiting fire discipline as at
stood by their pests.
B. Only three RDC have been reported KIA, as of 1000 hours
3 February Saigon time, but this figure may increase when all reports
are in.
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C. Quang Ngai reported at Z000 hours February Saigon time
that the VC generally by-passed the LtD Teams. Some teams were moved
in close to district compounds to support lo-al GYN forces. The PRUs
were showing a good count, keeping casualties low (two WIA) and disrupting
the enemy. All districts were happy with the PRU effort.
D. During the early morning of 6 February the RD Control Group
Headquarters was attacked by a VC company using B-40 rockets and RR fire
with six hits being registered. Friendly losses were 1 RDC KIA and 15 WIA.
Enemy losses were not reported.
E. It is not possible to provide an accurate assessment of the
RD teams at this time in terms of casualties and engagements with the VC
during the recent actions in i..tuang Ngai Province. At the present time there are
about 250 RD Cadres inc...stisaig Ngai City. These include the RD Control
Group Headquarters and members of teams who were in the city on leave
over the Tet holiday. This group has centered around the RD Headquarters
building and successfully defended their building and its surrounding area
from a VC attack on the morning of 6 February. In addition, many of the
cadres have been working with Regional and Popular Force units stationed
in and around the city on sweep operations and cleaning out small pockets
of resistance. Morale among these cadres remains high. (Reported as
of i 700 hours 7 February Saigon time)
-3. Queen& Tin, Tam Ky
A. During the 31 January attack PRU members captured 19 VC
individual and crew-served weapons. including one 57Turn recoilless rifle.
PRUs killed 23 VC (U.S. advisors body count) and captured one VC. Two
PRUs slightly wounded and damage to PRU camp was minimal. One VC
battalion attacked from northwest striking PRU compound and ARVN com-
pound on PRU East flank. ARVN soon withdrew to PIC leaving flank open.
The FRU. put the area under fire with 3 MG and 5 M 79s plus their individual
weapons. At about 0515 hours the PRUs began to receive intense machine
gun fire from the area abandoned by ARVN. At 0645 hours 30 PRUs moved
toward area from which the MG fire came and captured the MG. which later
turned out to have been left behind by the ARVN unit.
9. Luang Tri
A. Reports received, as of 0900 hours Z February Saigon time.
intEcate RDC Team No. I has killed 10 VC and captured seven weapons;
Team No. 12 has killed five VC and captured one weapon.
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B. As of 0400 hours 2. February Saigon time, the enemy was
holding about two-thirds of the RD campaign area mostly in Trion Phong
District. The allies are going to be forced to go in and root out these
forces, which may wreak havoc on the hamlets in the process.
C. Casting Tri reported at �000 hours 3 February Saigon time
that becuase of withdrawal of ARVN battalions to Quang Tri City RD Teams
have been relocated to provide them with the best possible security under
the circumstances. The teams have encountered few VC attacks and sus-
tained few casualties, but their field strength sr* low due to the confusion
resulting from TET and the current VC offensive. The teams have been
resupplied with ammunition where required. The RD control group has
shown definite ineptitude in reorganizing teams, exploiting the psywar
opportunities, and conducting required administration.
D. At 2000 hours 4 February Saigon time, it was reported that
Palls served as reaction units in Quang Tri City and sped from one spot to
another clearing out enemy activity.
�0. Thua Thien, Hue
A. As of 1330 hours 1 February Saigon time, the 50 PRUs in
their Hue compound had repulsed five attacks, were surrounded by approxi-
mately two VC companies, were short of ammunition. and had had no food
for two days.
B. As of 2220 hours I February Saigon time. the PRU had been
forced out of its compound south of Hue City by the VC and were moving
towards YD 768204. The VC occupied the compound and were destroying
it. The PRU required ammunition and resupply was to be attempted the
morning of Z February bi helicopter.
C. The 50 man FRU, reportedly twice driven from its com-
pound in the southwest part of Hue. withdrew to Hatong Twf District Head-
quarters for resupply, as of 2400 hours 4 February Saigon time. Huong
Tuy is about five miles southeast of Hue along Route 1. The PRU has been
providing tactical information of value to Marine forces via a radio link
with a PRU advisor now attached to the Marine Regimental Headquarters.
11. Binh Dinh
A. As a result of recent enemy activity in the city of Qui Mien
and Binh Dinh province, at least 20 RD teams have been temporarily re-
moved from the hamlets they occupied before the attacks. The withdrawal
of supporting troops to be used against the enemy necessitated the removal
of these teams. There were 8 RD teams still in Qui Nhon conducting
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Igecurlty operations, searching local residences for enemy supply caches
and helping root out snipers that remained in the city. These temporary
duties were all assigned by the province chief. Although these duties did
not represent, in any way, an RD activity, the teams provided an effective
force for containing and removing the enemy. In an Nhon. and Thy Phisoc
districts, a large number of hamlets constructed in 1966 and 1967 were
attacked. The province senior advisor and lin province officers feel
that it will take IS months to reach the :erne stage of development that
existed 6 months ago, and this will be only possible if the security situa-
tion improves to what it was 6 months ago. It was also felt that the 1968
RD plan would now have to conform to more realistic goals and return to
areas previously worked. An opinion was expressed by local officials that
most of the teams should be able to return to their hamlets in about 4 days,
if the security situation remained at the same level currently held. Many
of the refugees presently in the province formerly resided in the RD
hamlets that were overrun. 6 Feb 66)
Ti Corps
12. Binh Thuan
A. As of i545 hours 2 Feburary Saigon time, RD Teams were
in their original locations and were operational with oniy one wounded in
action. Quarter Zone teams are also operational and unharmed. PRUs
operating in Thien Giao District had been hit by air strikes, casualties
unknown.
13. Darlac
A. As of I i 00�hours 4 February Saigon time, no information
had been received for five days by American advisors concerning the sit-
uation of Vietnamese RD Teams in the province.
B. As of 6 February, the RDC program appeared almost in-
operative largely due to the fact that only two out of seven RD teams in
the area have been provided any security by lo:al forces. The remainder
of the teams have been pulled out of their areas of responsibility because
of lack of security.
14. Khanh Hoa
A. Titer* is no information on the RD teams but the VC mounted
their attack on Nha Trang from the RD area.
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5. Konturn
A. There is no information on the RD teams but heavy fighting
has been reported in the RD areas.
16. Lam Dong
A. There is no information on the RD teams. This province has
not been attacked.
17. Ninh 'Thuan
A. The PRU were in contact with a VC force ten kilometers
southwest of Phan Rang in the evening of 4 February. At 2150 hours
4 February, a. regional force unit was in contact with VC force in a 1967
RD hamlet seven and one-half kilometers southwest of town. The VC have
been concentrating their destructive efforts against all hamlets in the
province that were included in the 1967 RD plan and which are currently not
protected by RD Teams. They have been collecting rice from these hamlets
and destroying everything that represents the GVN. The 1968 RD hamlets,
in which there are RD teams located* are not being hit. At present approxi-
mately 300 RDC who have not yet been deployed in 1968 program hamlets
are being used to augment Phan Rang internal security forces. (See
IIIMIIIMEN11111 5 February 1968 for list ox hamlets.)
18. Phu Bon
A. There is no information on the RD teams. This province has
not been attacked..
19. Phu Yen
A. RD Teams had encountered only light attacks and appeared
to be in a. little trouble, as of 1545 hours Z February Saigon time. However,
the heavy fighting in and around Thy Hoa is where the major pacification
area is located.
20. Pleiku
A. On the night 31 January 1968 PRU personnel set up listening
posts and road blocks around American advisors compounds and the Pleiku
Montagnard Training Center. Because of heavy fire from unknown sources,
some thought to be ARVN, these people pulled back into the compound areas.
One PRU WIA from what was considered ARVN fire. There is no reporting
on RD or Truong Son teams.
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ZL,Quang Duc
A. There is no information on the RD teams. This province has
not been attacked.
22. Tweet% Duc
A. As of 1330 hours 5 February Saigon time. Census Grievance
sources reported VC were tired and hungry but plan to stay in Dalat City
until 7 February. They will resume attack on 10 February. RDC and TSRD
Tuyen Duc Province reported negative action with all teams in good con-
dition and in place. (There has been no reporting on the teams since the VC
forces in Dalai were increased. The RD teams are located around Dalat.)
III Corps
23. The pacification program ***Ms to have been by-passed by the
VC. No single RD team is known to have been the target of an attack and
there are no reports of Provincial Reconnaissance Unit or Census Grievance
casualties. Apparently the targets were the towns, with the RD groups being
unimportant in this instance. Undoubtedly some of the cadres on TET visits
will have been injured or have become so discouraged so as not to return,
but all in all it appears as though the pacification personnel may have
escaped serious injury. 2 February 19634
Z4. Bien lloa
A. Five of the seven RD Teams have been contacted and are in
no immediate danger, as. of 2400 hours 1 February Saigon time. Team No.
4 in Cong Thank District and Team No. 6 in Long Thank District have not
been contacted. The last contact with Team No. 4 prior to TEl holidays
revealed 20 cadre present. No means exists to contact Team No. 4 because
bridge is out. Two members Team No. 4 reported captured but untested
source suggests that they managed to escape. The SCG office in Leng Thanh
District reportedly destroyed but CG chief store all papers were removed
and hidden prior to destruction.
25. Binh DUCtig
A. Phu Loc Village, about two kilometers from province capital,
was mortared and attacked at 0345 hours 3 February. Two RDC KIA, 2 WIA.
(There has been VC activity throughout the province.)
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26. Binh Lon
A. Fifty perc.ent of RDC are in their assigned positions because of
TET holidays. In spot check at one RD site south ot the province capital on
1 February, only three RDC were found on duty even though two teams were
assigned to the sit.. The advisor wa$ told there were other cadre on duty
but they had gone to town to shop. (Most of Binh Long province outside of
An Loc is under VC control.)
27. Binh Thy
A. On PRU KIA in Ham Tan District during engagement with local
VC company during the morning of 7 February.
23. Gia Dinh
A. One RDC was reported KIA the night c-4 February 1968 and
possibility exists that he was killed by friendly troops.
B. Two RDC were KIA during the early hours of 6 February in
An Phu Hamlet, Binh Chat& District when the hamlet was attacked by a tiVA
company. RD Groups 2 and 10 in Binh Trung, Thu Duc District, were not
at effective strength as of noon 7 February. Group Z was operating with 24
niembers and group i 0 had only 10 men present, the remainder of both teams
have not returned from TET leave.
29. Han Nghisk
A. There is MO information on the RD teams but there are reports
of considerable VC movement throughout the province.
30. Long An
A. There is no information on the RD teams but there is consid-
erable movement of VC forces in the province and the VC have announced
the elimination of the PR.Ue.(untxue)
31. Long_ Khanh
A. One Trung Son cadre was missing along with nine weapons.
As of 2400 hours 3 February, 11 PRU augmented security force at U. S.
civilian compound.
Z. Phuoc Lons
A. There is no information on the RD teams but the VC appear
to control the countryside and have cut lines of communication.
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33. Phuoc Tuy
A. There is no information on the RD teams but Baria, the
province capital, was heavily attacked and the RDC advisor killed.
34. Tay Nin
A. RDC were evacuated from their hamlets to respective district
towns to augment existing district security forces, on 3 February.
IV Corps
35. An Giang
A. There was no VC activity reported and no apparent problem
with the RDC teams.
36. An Xuyen
11111111.1
communications knocked out early Z February.
B. In Camara City three PEW E.T.A and five WLA by late
2. February.
1.3(4(
C. SCG reporting of VC activities, military strength. etc. FRU
losses light - threeeKIA. five WIA. PRU assisted ARV1C during daylight
hours hunting down VC in the city. On night of the attack the FRU captured
the secretary of the U Minh II Battalion along with a village party chapter
member who were caught coming out of a movie theater. (Report of 2400
hours 3 February Saigon time.)
37. Ba Xuyern
A. No information is available on the teams but there has been
heavy fighting in Sec Trang.
38. Bac Lieu
A. One PEW ICLA on 3 February.
B. Both VC TET attacks were thwarted by FRU intelligence
and action (4 February IV Corps Sitrep)�
39. Chan Doc
A. Small Pith element helped drive off VC with advisor aria
Navy Seale on 31 January,
LT
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B. There were 40 ?RU E in Chau Doc town during night of
February.
40. Chuang Thien
A. No VC activity reported in the province
41. Dinh Thong, My Tho
A. RDC advisorecompound was held and re-established contact
with operations center on 2 February.
B. The RD and CG houses and equipment were destroyed during
the seige. (Report of 2,February)
C. RD warehouse was occupied by VC and is ten percent. destroyed.
All RD office and team supplies along with arms and ammunition which were
stored at the warehouse are gone and rumors have it that it may have been
looted or moved to province chief's house for safekeeping. The status of RD
teams throughout the province is unknown at this time. Special Police came
to defense of RDC compound which except for few bullet holes is unscathed.
(Report of 2400 hours 3 February Saigon time.)
42. Go Gong
A. The PRU made contact with an estimated VC battalion in the
late afternoon of 5 February. No casualties resulted. The deputy province
chief who was also acting as the chief of the RDC in Go Cong was reported
killed.
43. Kien Criang �
A. RDC advisory office communications in Rach Gia, capital of
Kien Giang, were knocked out prior to 2 February.
B. The PRUs took part in defense of Rach Gia 31 January. RDC
house was one of first targets and received 15 explosive projectiles, both
B-40 rockets and rifle grenades. from 20 man terrorist group. Although
house was largely destroyed. the YC failed in their mission to occupy the
position, as guards, even though wounded, continued to deliver effective
fire. All personnel took cover safely on the roof and survived without
asualties. (Report of 2400 hours 3 February Saigon time.)
C. All units. including PRUs have done excellent job in defending
the city and at taking offensive action. (Report of 1800 hours 5 February
Saigon time.)
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44. Kien Hoa� Ben Tre City
A. RDC advisory personnel at office with 17 PRUs have good
defensive position -- all other civilian* in MACY compound, as of
Z February.
45. Kien Phong
A. As of 1800 hours 5 February, the status of the RDC in the
province was listed as follows: Total strength 381 oi which 177 are ac-
counted for and 5 reported captured. 1 cadre was beheaded while on
Tet leave. Also, I SGG inspector was captured and beheaded.
46. Men Tuong, Moe Hoa
A. The VC tried to blast the ROC advisory compound wall but
guards curtailed their action with automatic weapons fire. Personnel in
the compound were originally going to retreat to their bunker but the
province chief asked them to hold off until dawn. It appeared primary
targets of VC were province chief's house and RDC compound. One guard
and PRU WLA and have been evacuated to hospital. (Report of 0900 hours
Z February Saigon time.)
B. Third target of VC was pacification advisor's compound.
Two RDC MA including one who was believed leading VC from point to
point, showing them where the installations were. One RDC was WIA by ARVN a
he was leadin4 a captured VC out of a house. This matt was the RDC deputy
leader. The PRU and RDC were used as defensive forces -- did an excellent
job and are still effective units. (Report of 2 February.)
47. Phong Dinh �
A. RD command post at Xeo Kim in Phong Phu District was at-
tacked during night of Z - 3 February and results are unknown although
believed insignificant.
B. 303 out of 810 RDC have been accounted for on 6 February.
All of the teams in the Tan not area have been assembled at the RDC
command post in Tinian Dec. Team 11 in Gist Xuan has been called back
to Can The to act as a security force along with cadres already in the city.
The PRU are giving security to the province chief and this far have sustained
one killed and four wounded, onset whom was the FRU Chief.
48. Sadec
A. The VC reportedly have taken some outposts in the RD area
and have raised the VC flag over the poets, as of 6 February. The RDC
reportedly saw this display of the VC and decided to melt away in the
conntrytide after donning civiliaa clothes.
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49. Vinh Binh, Tra Vinh
- A. There was little known, as oi 3 February, about the RD Teams
although there have been no indications of casualties or disruption. SCG is
intact and PRU had one KIA.
50. Vinh Long
A. RDC advisory personnel were evacuated to the Vites Long City
airport on night of 1 - Z February.
B. PRU and armed propaganda team formed defense around PRU
compound and although VC made no attack they suffered heavy casualties from
friendly air strikes on 3 February.
Saigon
51. Responding to Gen Thanes operation recovery ten-day plan for
Saigon and environs. 2.500 NTC Trainees and instructors arrived in Saigon
130 hours 5 February by one LST and two LCIPs. FAC and helicopter gun-
ship air cover provided entrants. Tor personal safety, cadres changed from
black paijam.as to ARV N supplied fatigues with RD cadre emblem on jacket.
Cadres arrived with weapons, one combat load of ammunition, two days
rations and some HT-1 radios. RDC/MACV/CORDS will support the cadres
with the same food allowance as received at the NTC. medical supplies as
needed, and radios. Latter on loan basis. Cadre Directorate and ARVN
to provide trucks, drives, and POL. RDC Division Joined staff with
Vietnamese directorate composed of Chief Ops, DC/Ops and Security.
Finance/food, support and Psy/ops /CORDS/POD. Juspao movie, still
photo and audio team of three on the job to exploit CYN efforts assist the
peoples and the city's recovery from vicious VC attacks. Plans are for two
to three days clean-up of trash and garbage in downtown Saigon.. Security
permitting, groups supervised by NTC instructors, will assist 24 to 29
refugee areas on Saigon's periphery in reconstruction and medical assistance.
Expect MACY and NLD assistance for former. Cadres are billeted at Saigon
University and later will live in the refugee ;trews with the people. Cadres
are to return to the NTC on or about 16 February, graduate 19 February,
and commence returning to their provinces on 20 February.
Additional Material, as of 0904 Hours EST 8 February
52. Probably one of the most depressing aspects about
the current VCiNVA offensive is that the pacification program will suffer a
severe setback. Illustrative of this was the 6 February necessity of practically
obliterating Cam Nam Island (BT 1656) with Napalm and 750-pound bombs
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because it was being used as a staging area for VC attacks against Hoi An.
Cam Nam Island consisted of three hamlets, all prosperous, all very much
GVN oriented. containing RD teams, and recipients of the best inputs in the
revolutionary development program. Facilities completed or under con-
struction included three new schools, many wells, sanitary toLlet facilities,
a. maternity dispensary, and new bridges. Years of hard work by the GVN
and the U.S. was destroyed in 30 minutes of military action, not to mention
the propaganda value such destruction gives to the VC.
7 February 1968)
53. II Corp.:
A. .Pleikti: The Mosita.grutrd Training Center was Mt the night of
7 - 8 February with mortar and small arms fire resulting in 4 friendly killed
and 3 wounded.
B. Tuyen Duc: On 3 February the province chief had requested
all RDC Teams to move to district headquarters for security reasons but
the senior advisor was recommending against this action.
54. III Corp.: In Long Khanh Province the Truing Son RD Chief
was assigning his teams to check points and patrolling in support in province
security forces (7 February).
55. IV Corps:
A. Chuang Thien province reported on 7 F.'ebruary that the PRU
had killed 10 VC and captured 1.
B. Phong Dinh province reported the PRU had spotted a large
VC concentration near the Chau Thanh. District capital of Chai Rang on
8 February and were directing air and artillery strikes on this area.
C. Vitsh Binh province reported that the PRU broke off contact
with the VC element north of Tra Vinh City at 1600 hours 6 February after
having I PRU killed and 7 wounded.
D. Vinit Long province reported that the PRU, as of 7 February,
had lost 10 KIA, 17 WIA, and 30 MIA. The PRU dependents housing was
destroyed by friendly fire and appears to be the hardest hit of any place in.
Vinh Long city. There are no figures available on RDC Teams.
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.111=116 13(8)(4)
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ESTIMATE* OF STATUS Approved for Relsa,s.e: 3919/01/17 C00011922
J_JX, v r-ix-'MENT CADRE PROGRAM
AS 0. 0900 HOURS EST 8 FEBRUA T 1968
Major Disruption
Probable Major
Disruption.
Probable Minor
Disruption:
No ReportedDisruptio
--- International boundary
Province boundary
...ma+ Military corps boundary
� National capital
26_1,61 Autonomous municipality
Railroad (some Vietnam
sections inopembia)
Road
55980 6.67
�NtliNONW, ON N.
NO, NC< 66666 0.� NLITNONITATIN
pproved for Release: 2019/01/17 C00011922