COMMENTS ON AN ESTIMATE OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION, NOVEMBER 1967 - 1967/11/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00012073
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00012073
MEMORANDUM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECT 9_ eat ,,,o4
ft
22 November 1967
SUBJECT: Comments on "An Estimate of the Vietnam Situation,
November 1967"
1. We are in substantial agreement with the principal estimates
made in General Taylor's paper and have no serious prol_21.2LaLLyith.
explicit or implied intellizence tudgments contained thereip.. We agree
trat drastic escalation (Blue Option B - "All Out") would greatly increase
the risk of major Chinese, or even Soviet," intervention but would probably
not compel Hanoi to abandon the struggle. We also agree that a drastic
curtailment of the US effort (Blue Option C - "Pull-Back") would dismay
our Saigon allies, would give Hanoi considerable encouragement and hence
would stiffen Hanoi's determination and, probably, its demands.
2. On the matter of negotiations, while we do not take specific
issue with General Taylor, we do feel that any discussion of this issue should
take cognizance of the sharp distinction Hanoi draws between "talks" and
"negotiations. " In recent months Hanoi has made statements indicating some
interest in "talks, " if the price is right -- the price being "unconditional"
cessation of the bombing and "all other acts of war" against the DRV (a
deliberately ambiguous phrase). We see no sign that Hanoi has any present
interest in what the US would construe as meaningful negotiations.
3. The discussion of policy options gets into matters outside this
Agency's purview. Any schema of options, however, cannot avoid suggesting
that the range of possible alternate actions is more rigidly packaged or
compartmentalized than may in fact be the case. For example, the launching
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00012073
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of raids into the northern half of the de-militarized zone to clean out
artillery firing on Con Thien (even if such raids traversed the southern-
most portions of North Vietnam itself) would not necessarily entail the
abandonment of basic Option A in favor of Option B. Similarly, a suspension
or even cessation of bombing in North Vietnam (part of Option C) could be
coupled with intensification rather than diminution of allied efforts in the
south (i. e., part of Option A).
4. On the enemy side the same situation prevails. Without abandoning
Red Alternative A -- which, with General Taylor, is what we believe Hanoi's
present strategy to be -- Hanoi could seek new or improved weapons from
China or, particularly, the USSR. Indeed the relatively recent Viet Gong
acquisition of heavy rockets is an indication that the Soviets are already
improving the Viet Gong's weapons inventory. Hanoi would almost certainly
seek, and probably get, any new light Soviet weapons developed that would be
effective against helicopters. Even North Vietnamese acquisition of KOMAR
class patrol boats would not necessarily mean that Hanoi had adopted -- or
Moscow or Peiping sanctioned -- a policy of drastic escalation.
5. Our final comment relates to the final sentence of the memorandum
under discussion. Ho Chi Minh's political goals are cast in a doctrinal or
institutional context, not a geographic one. Ho is not interested in imposing
"northern" rule over South Vietnam as much as he is interested in imposing
Lao Dong (Communist) Party control over South Vietnam. Thus a solution
which gave the Lao Dong's controlled southern subsidiary, the PRP, a
paramount voice in the southern government would embody almost complete
fulfillment of Ho's objectives, even if technical (i. e., governmental)
reunification of the country did not immediately result.
E
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C00012073