COMMENT ON THE (BUNDY) VIETNAM WORKING GROUP PAPERS (W/ATTACHMENT)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0001403406
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2009
• Case Number: F-2007-00466
• Publication Date: November 21, 1964

(b131
(b121
APPROVED FOR RELEASE^DATE:
03-24-2009
 TSB 185786-a
copy No./
21 November 1964
dORANI i FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Ccmenent on the (Bundy) Vietnam Working Group Papers
1. in our view, the intelligence judgments of these
papers appear generally sound, untrammeled by policy wish, and
canaistent with recent SNIE's.
2. The papers represent a careful and sophisticated ex-
position of the problemjof the NS and Vietnam. We have certain
problems of shading and emphasis with the Working Group papers,
but concur in their underlying 3udanent that new US courses
are necessaryif the eventful collapse of South Vietnam is to
be avoided, and the US is to have a chance of achieving at
least reasonably acceptable objectives there.
3. This memorandum represents the agreed views of Ray
Cline, Bilk. Colby, Abbot Smith, and myself.
Harold P. Ford
CIA Member,
Vietnam Working Group
T 0
 TS# 185786-b
Copy No.
21 November 1964
. MEIORANM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Critique of the (Bundy) Viettumt Working Group Papers
We confine our remarks to certain key issues raised by the
problem of the US and Vietnam, and do not address specific
sections of the Working Group's many papers. These issues,
emdodied in the following questions, deserve particular attention
before the US makes any definite decision to embark on the recom-
mended Option C-
1. Is the rationale of the recommended Option C sound?
Ccnments The rationale of Option C is that it might make
the DRY slacken its support of the VC. And we agree -- it might.
Once the slackening occurred, there would be two possibilities:
This'memorandmm has been prepared with the assistance of Messrs.
Cline, Colby, Abbot Smith, and. R. J. Smith. They do not necessarily
concur in all of its judgments.
 TOP SECRET
(a) that we really do firm up south Vietnam for the long run, or
(b) that we negotiate ourselves out with a modicum of grace.
Given the total circumstances of the problem, however, the US
cannot be very sanguinegin embarking on option C, that (a) above
will result. Also, a beefed-up option A deserves more examina-
tion, as a possible US alternative course, than the Working Group
papers presently give it.
2. What should the US do in the event that selected
option C measures do not cause the DRV to yield, and the situ-
ation bogs down in ambiguous result?
cement: We consider such result a likely outcome of
option C measures. Would the US really be prepared at such junc-
ture to attempt to stave off defeat by marching on up the list
of the severe sanctions proposed, in search of elusive victory?
3. What should the US do in the event that hostilities
escalate seriously and the MV (and Communist Chinese) leaders
still do not yield?
Comment: Though such a contingency is perhaps unlikely,
more attention should be given to this problem than the Working
Group papers do at present.
 T O P s y n R R T
1+. In the event that the US should decide, once embarked
on Option C, that its measures were not likely to gain present
US objectives, how firm a settlement would the US expect to be
able to negotiate?
Co ent: We feel that the Working Group papers are seme-
what vague, and perhaps over-optimistic, with respect to what
might be structured in such event. We do agree with the papers
(Section II), however, that in any case short of outright US
withdrawal, the US position in the Far East would not necessarily
be undermined crucially.
~. What about the main business at hand, back at the
ranch in South Vietnam?
a. In the course of taking Option C measures. Cc mnent:
There is considerable chance that the South Vietnamese position
might collapse from under us, in the event either that the VC
reacted quickly and forcefully, or that US Option C measures did
not soon visably ameliorate the situation in South Vietnam. The
papers raise this, but do not give it sufficient weight.
-3-
 TOP SECRET
b. Subsequent to option C measures. CC...: The
papers do not give sufficient attention to the price and problems
of success. Assuring that Optics C were successful and brought
South Vietnam respite, considerable military and political progress
would be mandatory if South Vietnam were to have hope of surviving
against almost certain renewed Ccamraunist attempts to subvert it.
Is the US prepared to give South Vietnam massive support over the
long run, if need be? Cr, are we in danger of thinking that
Option a (or B) can give us success there on the cheap?
CIA Member,
Vietnam Working Group
TOP SECRET