WARNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 00016882
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

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amain%) COPY
tARNINO OP niaBirtirr OFFENSIVi
At your meeting In February Mr..Eelus discussedv.:
tte qaestion of intelligence warning of the let. �
_
Offensive.-Bas presentation was pl.necessity7;g2,
brief and -tentative., After thatueeting General ,
asking that a deeper look be taker.......
A. tiore specifically, enteral Taylor asked us
to eine both the intelligence available
and what vas :done with it. ,
B. Did warning reach the poliey-pakers in
tashington and the coola4nders in the field?
rnw well were they able to respond7T.',
it. nese questiamarcanired'a detalled'finrestigatliWL-
.
beyond our Customary :"post-torten" procedures:, -
A.
Ibis vas a big tazk.. Blessages'andreporti7E:
� .. �� .
run perhaps into the hundreds of thousands.. .
Liternlly thonsands.of ocranders snd intelli-
gence officers played a direct role. Uoreover,
.hese 4. people are all stilt' engaged in fighting .
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WARNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE
I. At your meeting in February Mi. Helms discussed
the question of intelligence warning of the Tet
Offensive. His presentation was of necessity
brief and tentative. After that meeting General
Taylor wrote to Mt. Helms on behalf of the Board
asking that a deeperAook be taken.
A. More specifically, General Taylor asked us
to examine both the intelligence available
and what was done with it.
B. Did warning reach the policy-makers in
Washington and the commanders in the field?
How well were they able to respond?
These questions...reqUit6ia detailed investigation
beyond our customary �'post-mortem" procedures.
A,. This was ..a big task.: Messages and-reports
run perhaps into the hundreds of thousands.
Literally thousands of commanders and intelli-
gence officers played a direct role. Moreover,
these people are all still engaged in fighting
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the war in Vietnam or in producing intelli-
gence here in Washington on the war. We
therefore had to compromise between our
desire for absolute thoroughness and
over-riding operational requirements. We
could not see everyone we wanted to. We
were forced instead to sample the documen-
tation. We think we got the answers, but
we do not pretend to have pursued every
thread.
B. A formal working group was formed under
myself as Chairman with representatives
from State (Fred Green), JCS (General Dewy),
DIA (General Glass), and NSA (Milton Zaslow).
This group Steered the enterprise and examined
intelligence production at the Washington end.
C. The group in turn sent a delegation to Saigon
under (sanitized) from CIA, with General
Glass from DIA, Colonel Viney from JCS, and
observers from CINCPAC to interview senior
commanders and their intelligence officers
and collect documents.
D. The DelegationY
1. On the US side interviewed Bunker,
Westmoreland, Abrams, Korner, Cushman,
Rosson, Peers, Eckhardt, (IV Corps
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Senior Adviser) 3-2 MACV, all C-Vs
and G-2 advisers at Field Force/Corps
level, DI 7th AF,
(sanitized)
2. On the Vietnamese side, talked to
Commanding Generals of I and II Corps,
3-2 of JGS and Deputy Director of National
Police.
3. Visited Phu Bai, Da Nang, Pleiku,
Camp Enari, Nha Tx ag, Bien boa, Long
Binh, Can Tho.
E. Upon return, the working group prepared a (Sic)
interim report, which the DCI sent to
General\Taylor last week. After further review, we
believe this report is a .good summary of our
findings, and we are confident we cannot
improve it except perhaps to add some de-
tails, if desired. Our agencias will continue
to study the materials, of course, to digest
the lessons we have learned.
F. We have a mass of back-up material. We have
included a selection of these studies, sum-
maries, and documents in a supplementary
book which I am now delivering to the Board.
We can, of course, provide additional copies
if you wish them.
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III. Our findings essentially confirm
told you in February.
what Mr. Helms
A. There was convincing evidence, both in
Washington and in Saigon, that the enemy was
preparing for a series of coordinated attacks,
probably on a larger scale than ever before.
B. This intelligence had been analyzed and
had been made available to commanders.
In general, we found that US units were
on higher state of alert than normal
and that some unit redispositions had been made.
C. The intelligence available did not,
however, pinpoint the time of attack, or
give a full picture of the extent and
intensity of the enemy offensive.
IV. We believe this reflects a considerable achieve-
ment for the US intelligence apparatus in Vietnam:
Problems:
A. The dual US-Vietnamese intelligence systems,
ranging in parallel down from Saigon to
Corps to Province to District, are most
complex-. .The Voluhflf low.devel human-source
reports is immense.
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The CIA (sanitized) recerzea
ceives about 600 a day from military
The niture-of..the'Mar means that many of
these will be low-level reports of impending
Enemy security measures before the offensive
sacrificed coordination to security.
Probably no Communist officer below
"front" level knew the full extent of
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3. Attack orders were not disseminated
until the last possible time, 24 to
72 hours before attack.
(sanitized)
V. A sample of the kinds of warning provided:
A.".COMUSMACV (20 January)
, "The enemy is presently developing a
� threatening posture in several areas in
order to seek victories essential to
achieving prestige and bargaining power.
He may exercise his initiatives prior to,
during, or after Tet."
B.
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(sanitized)
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C. State (27 January)
"Communist forces have significantly improved
their capability to launch major offensives
simultaneously or alternatively in several
areas in South Vietnam."
D. CIA (28 January)
"Within the past week (sanitized) intelli-
gence has provided evidence of a widespread
coordinated series of attacks to be launched
by the Communists in the near future. Although
the bulk of this evidence indicates the most
critical areas to be in:the northern section
of South Vietnam, there are strong indications
that key Communist military . units throughout
most of the country may also be involved. It
is not yet possible to determine if the enemy
is indeed planning an all-out, country-wide
offensive during, or just following, the Tet
holiday period."
E. DIA (29 January)
"Reports of a forthcoming 'N-Day' have been
received from enemy units in all corps areas;
they may indicate an increase in activity
only or could mark the beginning of coordinated
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attacks against allied installations and bases
throughout the country. If the latter is
the case, it would be the first such coordinated
campaign the enemy has attempted. Indica-
tions point to N-Day being scheduled in
the Tet period, but it still seems likely
that the Communists would wait until after
the holiday to carry out a plan."
VI. The timing was the key question.
A. Although there were some indications that the
attack might came in Tet, most analysts thought
the Tet holiday too meaningful for the VC to
take advantage of it.
1. Westmoreland believed the enemy would
attack just before.lor just after Tet.
B. By attacking during the holiday the enemy
could expect two things.
1. ARVN forces would be off-guard and many
would be on holiday leave.
2. The presence of large numbers of VC in
the cities would not cause alarm.
VII. Next to timing, the most serious question was the
basic one of enemy capabilities.
A. Most commanders and intelligence officers did
not believe the enemy could do what his propa-
ganda about the "winter-spring" offensive and
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the "general uprising" :said--in general
terms - -he would do.
B. Prevailing estimates of attrition, infil-
tration and recruitment, reports of low
morale, and a long series of defeats had
degraded our image of the enemy.
C. As a result, we did not expect the enemy:
1. To attack on the scale he did or with the
coordination he showed (although we gave
him the capability of attacking individually
almost all the targets he hit).
2. To aim for the cities, and specifically
the civiliatutommand and control apparatus.
(We did not think he would attempt a
general uprising because we did not think
he could bring it off: in this we were
right.)
VIII. Although the full scope of enemy intentions was not
known, as early as 10 January General Westmoreland
canceled certainoperatiOnsin Northern I Corps
and ordered General Weyand to reposition forces
nearer to Saigon.
A. In subsequent days he issued warnings to US
and Vietnamese commanders-; and to the US Mission.
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On 15 January, he discussed with President
Mien the possibility of canceling the Tet
truce, and on 25 January he: and Ambassador
Bunker succeeded in having the truce
canceled for I Corps.
B. Westmoreland recegnized the significance of
the enemy's premature attacks in MR-5 and on
30 January placed all his units on full alert.
1. This measure " saved Tan Son Nhut," accord-
ding to 7th AF, and may have saved other
bases as well.
2. When attacks did not occur before Tet,
the JGS had allowed 50 percent leaves
for ARVN. Thus on the 30th it was too
late to restore ARVN units to full
strength.
IX. We sense that in the day or so before the attack
the "adrenalin level" in Saigon was a little
higher than in Washington.
A. That is, the sense of urgency felt in
Saigon does not fully come through in the
words received in Washington by the Washington
agencies. Atmosphere is not transmitted well
over a teletype,
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B. This is a subjective judgment, and one which
had no effect on the outcome of the battle,
but it does help explain why there was more
of a sense of being "taken by surprise" in
Washington than in Saigon.
X. Within:" this general picture, there were notable
differences among the four Corps Tactical Zones.:
A. I Corps was in the best shape.
1. III Marine Amphibious Force expedted
attacks on Khe Saab and Quang Tri, and
(sanitized)
but did not have a date for
this attack.
2. General Cushman expected to be attacked
during Tet.
3. With the truce canceled, most ARVN units
were at full strength and all units were
on a high state of alert.
4. The extent and coordination of the enemy's
attacks, and his focusing on the cities,
was not expected.
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B. In II Corps, warning was better in the
highlands than on the coast.
L._ On the coast attacks were launched
by MR-5 a day early. US units were
on alert, but primarily against
ceasefire violations, rather than
city attacks, and the enemy achieved
some initial successes.
2. In the highlands, the intelligence
picture was the best in Vietnam, with
all sources combining to warn of several
enemy attacks. The defense of Pleiku
was the most successful US operation
during the offensive.
3. ARVN division commanders in the highlands
canceled leaves on their own,. Neverthelesai:
in some units, strength was far below normal.
C. In Corps had good strategic warning.
1. A reorganization of MR-4_ in the fall had
pointed to an attack on Saigon
2. Other indicators (sanitized) led to
a move of US units closer to the city.
3. All units were alerted on the 30th, but
most ARVN units were in their normal Tet
posture nonetheless.
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4. During the 30th II Field Force received
specific information from prisoners that
Saigon, Tan�Son Nhqt, etc, were to be
the target. Tet, and the responsibility
of ARVN for defense of Saigon proper, led
to the enenes initial successes in that
:city.
D. In .IV Corps the enemy's attacks were almost
:totally unexpected.
1,: The VC were known.to_be in'the cities in
large numbers, hat this was traditional
during let.
General Eckhardt, Senior Adviser, said the.
only warning he received was General
WestmOreland's alerting message of 30
January.
3. He had no US maneuver battaltue under his
command; he tried to alc-rt ARVN units, but
was unable in the time available to restore
their readiness.
These then are our general.findings:
Senior officials in Washington and Saigon were
_ . _
given a high degree of 'general warning. They
,were led to expect that-wide-Spread coordinated
attacks were imminent.'
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B. They were not given a picture of the extent and
intensity of the attacks, or of the precise
timing. An attack during Tet was thought less
likely than one before or after.
C. Field commanders were specifically warned of a
number of individual attacks, and were warned
of a wide-spread enemy offensive. They too
were not warned of the timing.
D. This intelligence was sufficient for alerting
measures to be taken throughout Vietnam,
although these measures were not too effective
in certain areas and units.
E. As a result, intelligence considerably re-
duced the impact of the enemy offensive.
This map shows those cities attacked, and
indicates those from which the enemy was
easily thrown back with heavy, losses.
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