SLOC INTERDICTION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: CIA Analysis of the Soviet Navy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0002073475
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: June 19, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2017
• Case Number: SC-2007-00006
• Publication Date: September 12, 1978

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE
PROGRAM
JUNE 2017
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
t
?
12 September 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Presidential Briefing Coordinator
SUBJECT : SLOC Interdiction
AR 70-14
1. Your note in your forward to SLOC Interdiction
paper that a joint CIA-Navy study would be nice. This issue may well
come up in the NFIB meeting this afternoon.
2. The sequence of events was roughly:
-NFAC Assessment issued.
-RADM Shapiro criticzes it and calls for joint effort
memo attached).
responds that NIE 11-14-78 & NIE 11-10-78
will cover he SLOC subject and that we should wait
until they're done to decide. In the meantime the Navy
might do its own study. (Memo attached.)
-NIE 11-10-78 drafts, in fact, say little about SLOC
Interdiction so focus was on NIE 11-14-78 which says a
good deal (pp. 11-110-121, IV-101-125 & VI-25-29).
-Issues remain unresolved ( summary attached).
-RADM Shapiro will probably say tnere sill needs to be
an interagency SLOC Interdiction study at the NFIB
meeting this afternoon.
-You will meet with SECNAV and Undersecretary Woolsey
Thursday, 14 September, to discuss SLOC Intekliction
among other things.
Attachments
pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
?
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
(? (-0
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC. 20350
IN REPLY REFER TO
JUN 3
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT
Subj: Intelligence Community Assessment of the Soviet
Navy's SLOC Interdiction Mission
Ref: (a) NFAC Monograph: The Role of Interdiction at Sea
in Soviet Strategy and Operations
1. Assessment of Soviet intentions and capabilities for
inter icting the West's sea lines of communication (SLOC) is
a complex subject that impacts heavily upon present and
future US strategy and force planning. The continuing
divergence of opinion of views on the SLOC interdiction
issue being encountered in the development of NIE 11-14-78,
Warsaw Pact Forces Facing NATO, and in ongoing intelligence
community informal discussions on the subject has demonstrated
the need for a thorough and fully coordinated interagency study
to develop a reliable assessment of the Soviet approach to
SLOC interdiction.
2. Reference (a) represents a unilateral attempt by
NFA C's Office of Strategic Research to resolve this complex
and controversial issue. Although the NFAC monograph is a
useful and revealing addition to the dialogue on this issue,
we are concerned with its analytical techniques and several
of its key judgments. These include:
--the judgments, drawn from Soviet writings, that the
Soviets assign rigid priorities to their naval missions
and that SLOC interdiction, regardless of scenario, is
secondary. Our interpretation of these and similar
Soviet writings does not support these judgments.
--the conclusion
interdiction.
that the Soviets rarely practice SLOC
? d ment, derived in part from the use of the
model, that the Soviet Navy has only a limited
capa ity for open ocean interdiction. A review by the
Navy Systems Analysis Division (OP-96) concluded that
Approved for Relea
se: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
( ?
the model was too simplistic to properly
describe the Atlantic anti-SLOC campaign. ONI's review
of the monograph supports OP-96's conclusion.
--the use of an unsubstantiated figure for the likely
amount of NATO shipping which would be available during
the early stages of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. JCS
and NATO planning studies indicate that the number of
NATO flag ships suitable for military lift would probably
be far fewer than the number assumed in the study.
3. It now appears unlikely that NIE 11-14-78 will
ad ress the SLOC interdiction issue in sufficient detail to
either resolve the differences that exist within the community
or to fully clarify areas of continuing disagreement. The
NFAC monograph thoroughly presents one line of analysis, but
fails to present contrasting views that are held elsewhere
in the community. In light of the limitations of the NIE
and Navy concerns about the NFAC monograph, it is requested
that an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet
intentions and capabilities for SLOC interdiction be produced
as soon as practicable. The Office of Naval Intelligence is
prepared to assist fully in the development of such an
interagency study.
Copy to:
Dill, DIA
Dere,' Dimtt'r taferrifiitiv
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
?
Approved for Release:. 2017/06/16 CO2073475
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
Director
0 3 JUL 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR: S. Shapiro
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
SUBJECT
Soviet Navy's SLOC Interdiction Mission
REFERENCE : Your memorandum Ser 009F215/S673696 dated 23 June 1978
1. I share your view that an objective assessment of Soviet
intentions and capabilities for interdicting the West's sea lines
of communications (SLOC) is of major importance to US policymakers
and military planners. For that reason, we have given a great deal
of time and attention to those sections of NIE 11-14-78 which deal
with this subject, and we have included an examination of SLOC
interdiction both in peacetime and during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war
in NIE 11-10-78. With respect to NIE 11-14, we have requested the
respective agencies to develop the SLOC issue even more fully than
in the current draft; I call your attention to the note in Chapter II,
page 11-92.
2. These two NIEs should cover the SLOC interdiction issue in
sufficient detail to satisfy the needs of US policymakers and planners.
I recommend that we await the completion of these Estimates before
considering whether an IIM on the SLOC interdiction issue is warranted.
Meanwhile, the NFAC monograph, which presents a detailed, exhaustive
treatment of this subject, provides a basis for a rejoinder by your
Office. I suggest that you consider producing such a monograph, which
might then aid in the preparation of a subsequent IIM.
-Int4tEL
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
?
BRIEFING NOTE: SLOC INTERDICTION
Issue: Soviet intentions and capabilities to interdict NATO Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOC) during a conventional war, and the number of
submarines deployed south of Iceland.
All agree that:
(1) The SOviets would attempt some interdiction of the NATO SLOC,
the extent of the commitment dependent upon:
-- their emphasis on operations against aircraft carriers,
amphibious forces and SSBNs.
-- course of the conflict and Soviet expectations as to the
degree and pace of escalation. _
(2) There are 175 cruise missiles and torpedo attack submarines in
the three Soviet western fleets. Succes would be dependent upon the
availability and capability of these submarines for the SLOC inter?
diction mission.
(3) Concurrent operations would limit the number of submarines
available for interdiction.
Vo, ? Ci --(k.)1(.0 ch,e4(ALA
pproved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
5 -0
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
?
(SLOC Interdiction)
Positions and Rationale
CIA/State/NSA: The Soviets would be unlikely to commit large portions of
their attack submarine fleet to SLOC interdiction unless they had
earlier defeated NATO's carrier and amphibious forces without the
loss of submarines. About 10 submarines would be deployed for this
purpose.
(1) Presence of NATO carriers in or near the Norwegian or Mediterranean
Seas almost certainly would cause the Soviets to commit large forces in
reaction.
(2) The Soviets lack sufficient submarines to simultaneously
engage in strong anti-shipping and anti-fleet operations, and Soviet
submarine losses would be great in either case.
CIA/State:
(3) Soviet capabilities to engage in interdiction would be
significantly constrained by the following factors:
(a) Insufficient torpedo loads, and submarines with no
or few reloads or with mixed loads of mines, torpedoes, anti-7t g
submarine and anti-ship missiles.
(b) Lack of replenishment opportunities outside Soviet-
controlled waters and excessive transit times required to
reach southward approaches to the UK and France: 22 days
for nuclear and 54 days for diesel submarines, round trip.
(c) Long turnaround time in ports between patrols.
(d) High anticipated attrition resulting from need to
transit the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and vulnerability of
submarines on station to land-based ASW forces.
sea.
(e) Difficulty in identifying high-value targets at
-2-
-"f711fr-cprftel2FT
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
1,-114
4.10
Approved for Release: 20171/06/16 CO2073475
?
(SLOC Interdiction)
DIA/Navy: The timing and extent of the interdiction campaign would be
more dependent upon the disposition and tactics of NATO naval forces
and upon Soviet intentions and expectations as to the course of the
conflict, than upon the prior achievement of other naval tasks.
About 20 submarines would be deployed for this purpose.
(1) Events in Central Europe leading to a stalemate on the ground
or a NATO decision not to deploy aircraft carriers to the Norwegian Sea
could lead the Soviets to mount a substantial interdiction effort.
(2) The Soviets would regard interdiction of NATO supplies and
reinforcements sufficiently important that they would be willing to
commit large forces to the effort.
(3) The planning factors and constraints listed in the previous
position would not be so formidible as to preclude a serious effort:
(a) Those submarines likely to participate clearly carry
sufficient torpedoes to conduct a significant number of attacks
on Western shipping.
(b) Soviet long-range attack submarines can operate for
sufficiently long periods of time to attack their targets
before returning to base, thereby also cutting down on the
effect of long transit distances.
(c) Turnaround times can be compressed in periods of
intense conflict.
(d) Soviet attacks on NATO ASW forces (and aircraft,
bases, SOSUS and SIGINT) would greatly impact on the degree
of threat posed.
(e) Target information could be obtained through
clandestine reporting and technical collection techniques,
offering especially good opportunities for detecting high-
value convoys.
Summary:
The two positions differ primarily in their assessment of Soviet
mission priorities between anti-shipping and anti-fleet operations,
and in their assessment of the actual capabilities and mission
k19,01
flexibility of Soviet attack submarines. 0., 1
-3-
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
I(..tAxtro: - UV-
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
Approved for Release: 2017/06/16 CO2073475
AR 70-14