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Document Creation Date: 
September 22, 2017
Document Release Date: 
October 4, 2017
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October 23, 1957
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Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C03030512 --Tf1P-4P4G4RET- NwO 0 PY Washington, D. C. 23 October 1957 ' Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director Central Intelligence Agency 2430 E Street, N. W. Washington 25, D. C. Dear Mr. This letter will confirm our conversation of 22 October during which we stated to you that we believed the United States is in a period of national emergency. We spent the day preceding our conversation with you in reviewing and discussing evidence regarding the Soviet guided missile program, particularly those aspects dealing with offensive ballistic missiles. The data proves beyond question that the Russians have an orderly and progressive program which is being prosecuted in an agressive and intelligent nemner. The program does not appear to us to be of a "crash" nature but rather one that has been thoroughly thought out and followed for years. One of the most distrubing features revealed is the high level of Soviet competence in achieving their planned goals. Just two points will illustrate this conclusion: EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs In this context, it should be noted that both the first firing EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs and the orbiting of their satellite were accomplished as scheduled and with practically no delays. b. Ph p eeeeracies achieved in their fie4,,. indicate an extremely high p 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs ficiency in guidance components such that no imagination is required to extrapolate these results to usable accu- racies in an ICBM. This material contains informtion affecting the national defc-n!7e cc tes wi?hin the meaning of the Tifk, 13, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, i1_. or revelation of which in any rcia:mer to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. _1012--SEeRtur- T8#115989 Ditto Copy,46 of 20 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C03030512 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C03030512 0 *tad cQp-sNANO Yge Allen W. Dulles 23 October 1957 As meetieeed above. the Progression in their ballistic missile program h__ EO 13526 and earth satellite, illustrates thoroughly te- a) 13526 soundest technical concept and execution. This program is eeeeweee supported by highly reliable rocket motors EO 13526 3.3(b)(1 This latter motor, reportedly ready fT64-1-34-46+373.4.-(b.)(1 Lu 1.3b2b .3..,3(0)(1 probably is an essential eleme in 1952, is ICBM. Inasmuch -as precise glade:ace and dependable the chief factors in an ICE% we -bust conclude that the USSR can have some (a dozen) operational missiles by the end of 1958. We must also conclude that significant vantitites ofethese missiles (with atomic warheads) are not large vantitites and could be pro- duced fairly rapidly. Our high concern has resulted from our knowledge of the US program _ 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs )>25Yrs )>25Yrs )>2bYrS )>25Yrs EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs our comparison of the US and USSR programs. Although we reaieze Intelligence has no responsibility for making comparisons of this nature, omission would remove basis for concern. US experience in ballistic missiles does not match that of the USSR and in our opinion is lagging by two to three years. We submit that there is no spot remedy that will eliminate this critical difference In capabilities within any short time. period. Rather, only by the most determined and concentrated US effort, extending over a period of several years, will me raise our experience level again to a par with the USSR. Not immediately akin abut very closely connected, it is our belief that guided miasile intelligence must be more closely interwoven both within itself and with the US research and develop- ment program such that intelligence may be able to arrive at firmer conclusions on a greatly accelerated time base. Inasmuch as national policy decisions aretet3g made in Washington, intelligence, to be timely, also needs be accomplished in Washington. For this reason, we submit that the technical competence of CIA, should be expanded without delay and that direct connections between CIA and US missile contractors be effected. . TS#115989 Ditto Copy of 20 TOP gECRET Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C03030512 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C03030512 0l.IpJ 20P?BECREIr? Mr Allen W. Dulles 23 October 1957 We note that the guided missile intelligence community has initiated some technical studies which might lead to a refine- ment in the military characteristics of an ICBM.. While refinement of estimates is required, such should not obscure nor delay the basic fact of the near existence of a Soviet operational ICBM. Your consultant panel believes, as stated before, that the country is in a period of grave national emergency and that it will only be by the most intelligent and coordinated efforts of all concerned over a period of same years before such an emergency can be eliminated. In parallel, we cannot emphasize too much that increased efforts by the intelligence community, both overt and covert, are mandatory to counter this threat. /s/ Robert R. /8/ Lawrence A. Hyland /s/ George B. Kistiakowsky /s/ Francis H. Clauser TS#115989 Ditto Copy of 20 -TOr bhui r 3 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C03030512 EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C03030512 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C03030512