SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY OUTSIDE HOME WATERS DURING 1982
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Soviet Naval Activity
Outside Home Waters
During 1982
Key Judgments Statistical analysis of Soviet naval operations indicates that Soviet naval
Information available ships spent nearly 57,000 ship-days outside home waters in 1982-almost
as of 12 March 1983 3 percent more than in 1981 but nearly 2 percent below the record high
was used in this report.
level set in 1980. Soviet presence increased only in the Pacific Ocean and
the waters off West Africa. Several changes in deployment patterns and
composition occurred:
? In the Indian Ocean, Soviet presence fell marginally. The Soviets
continued their efforts to secure naval privileges in Seychelles, Mauritius,
and other littoral states. Other activities included operations by the
Minsk vertical takeoff and landing aircraft carrier and the initial
deployment of a Victor-III nuclear attack submarine to the region.
? In the Pacific Ocean, the overall Soviet presence increased almost
16 percent. Deployment to the South China Sea expanded, helping to
create a 90-percent rise in ship-days of general purpose submarines in the
Pacific.
? In the Mediterranean, Soviet presence declined somewhat, in spite of a
moderate reinforcement of the squadron during the Lebanese crisis. The
Soviets continued to develop naval ties with Libya and to pursue
contracts for the repair of naval auxiliaries in Greek shipyards.
? In the Atlantic, the Soviet presence remained stable. The Falklands crisis
generated a minimal Soviet response. Coordinated intelligence ship and
submarine operations were conducted close to the Atlantic and Pacific
coasts of the United States.
? In the Caribbean, a Soviet task group arrived in Cuba late in the year
and conducted extensive training activities with Cuban naval forces.
Despite the task group's presence, Soviet ship-days in the region declined
more than 12 percent.
? Off West Africa, the number of Soviet ship-days increased by nearly
80 percent with substantial growth in the presence of general purpose
submarines and surface combatants. This was due principally to a
number of show-the-flag visits and to the low-level response to the
Falklands crisis.
575
Top
V 83-10110CX
? Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) continued to make up a substantial part of
the Soviet presence in 1982. Deployment days fell moderately, however,
with irregularities in deployments occurring in Ethiopia, Aden, and
Cuba.
We believe that the pattern and scope of Soviet naval deployments in 1983
probably will not change greatly. The Soviet commitment to distant
deployments is highly visible but represents only a small portion of total na-
val resources. We believe that Moscow is unlikely to undercut its readiness
to perform high-priority wartime tasks in waters close to the USSR by
significantly increasing the proportion of naval units operating in foreign
waters. The Soviets will continue to respond to situations involving
fluctuations in the level of Western naval presence in distant regions and to
pursue the operational and political benefits of new or expanded naval
privileges in Third World nations.
General Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployments
1
Measuring Soviet Naval Presence
Regional Levels
Soviet Naval Air Deployments
9
Comparison of Soviet and US Naval Presence Outside Home Waters
11
Figures
1.
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Region, 1974-82
vi
2.
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Type, 1974-82
vi
3.
Soviet Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean, 1974-82
4.
Soviet Ship-Days in the Pacific Ocean, 1974-82
5.
Soviet Ship-Days in the Mediterranean Sea, 1974-82
6.
Soviet Ship-Days in the Atlantic Ocean, 1976-82
7.
Soviet Ship-Days in the Caribbean Sea, 1974-82
8.
Soviet Ship-Days off West Africa, 1976-82
9.
Overseas Deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation, 1976-82
10
10.
Soviet and US Out-of-Area Deployments Compared by Type, 1982
11
11.
Soviet and US Out-of-Area Deployments Compared by Region
and Type, 1982
12
12.
Representative US and Soviet Ships
13.
Deployment Areas of Soviet Naval Forces Outside Home Waters
15
14.
Overseas Facilities and Anchorages Used by Soviet Naval Forces
17
Figure 1
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
by Region, 1974-82
Caribbean Sea
West African watersa
Figure 2
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
by Type, 1974-82
Mediterranean Sea
Indian Ocean
Pacific Ocean
8 West African ship-days for 1974-75 are
included in Atlantic Ocean data for those years.
g
Hydrographic and space
event support ships
Auxiliaries
Amphibious ships
Mine warfare ships
Ship-days
60,000
Surface combatantsa
General purpose
submarines
SSBNs
AT,
50,000
t
y ~,
40,000
30,000
30,000
0,000
7=
[d
77)
'The data for patrol combatants are included in
surface combatant category.
Se t
Ton- vi
Soviet Naval Activity
Outside Home Waters
During 1982
Introduction
This paper examines Soviet naval presence during
1982 in six regions.' It compares the level of naval
deployments with that of recent years and highlights
important naval activities that took place in each
region. The paper also looks ahead to developments
that are likely in 1983 as a result of the trends
established during 1982.
The US Navy provides the statistics for US naval
ships that operate abroad. The Naval Operations
Intelligence Center (NOIC) supplies similar data con-
cerning Soviet naval activity outside home waters. We
use the yearly tabulation of ship-days-the presence
of one ship away from home waters for one day-to
compare deployment levels with those of preceding
years and to identify changes in deployment patterns.
Analysis of Soviet naval activities and use of facilities
is based on
as are descrip-
tions of improvements made at major facilities. We
also use NOIC's monthly summary of port calls to
follow Soviet interest in individual countries or re-
gions. Judgments about Soviet use of naval forces for
political purposes are all-source evaluations.
General Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployments
Soviet naval presence outside home waters rose almost
3 percent in 1982, to approximately 56,800 ship-days,
but was nearly 2 percent below the record high level
set in 1980. Although the ship-day total has been
relatively stable in recent years, there have been
changes in both the number and type of ships de-
ployed to individual regions (see figures 1 and 2). In
1982 Soviet ship-days in the Pacific Ocean increased
by almost 16 percent, while the number in the Indian
Ocean dropped by about 5 percent. In the Caribbean
Sea, Soviet deployment declined about 13 percent.
West African ship-days, which fell 40 percent in
1981, increased almost 80 percent in 1982. As in
1981, changes in the two areas that have the largest
commitment of Soviet ships-the Mediterranean Sea
and the Atlantic Ocean-were minimal.
Overall changes in deployment patterns included in-
creases in deployments of general purpose subma-
rines, research and space event support ships (SESSs),
and amphibious ships. There were cutbacks in the
presence of surface combatants, ballistic missile sub-
marines, and mine warfare ships.
From Moscow's perspective, the acquisition of naval
privileges associated with distant deployments serves
both operational and political purposes. Operational-
ly, the Soviets' use of foreign facilities contributes to
their ability to sustain worldwide deployments in
keeping with the position of a major international
power. It provides an opportunity for peacetime recon-
naissance of Western naval forces that could extend
into the early stages of hostilities. Most foreign
facilities currently are not suitable for extensive logis-
tic support in time of war or for pre-positioning
supplies, however. They serve largely as secure, shel-
tered anchorages; and most would be highly vulnera-
ble in wartime. Politically, the Soviets appear to
believe that naval forces abroad can reinforce Mos-
cow's response to regional crises, underscore their
commitment to specific policies or local regimes, and
support their efforts to strengthen ties to individual
governments. Such benefits are intangible, however,
and historically transient
Measuring Soviet Naval Presence
The measurement of Soviet out-of-area presence
through ship-days can be misleading because it does
not reflect the combat potential of naval forces out-
side home waters. Although foreign deployments at-
tract significant attention, they tie up only a small
1 op
portion of Soviet warships. In 1982 the Soviets de-
ployed a daily average of about 19 surface combatants
and 39 general purpose or ballistic missile submarines
to foreign waters. This is less than 5 percent of the
USSR's surface combatant inventory and about 10
percent of its submarines.
Regional ship-day counts are also misleading if used
to indicate Moscow's wartime priorities. The Indian
Ocean Squadron, for example, fluctuates in size large-
ly as a result of the level of US forces in the region.
The sharp increase in presence in the region in 1980
did not reflect a change in Soviet wartime strategy or
make the Squadron an adequate counter to US forces
in the area
Yearly statistics for overseas deployments do not
highlight the large percentage of noncombat ships
that the Soviets maintain abroad. Because the Soviets
are less dependent on facilities ashore to support
overseas deployments, a deployed naval group gener-
ally includes more auxiliaries than its Western coun-
terpart. Logistic support ships make up just over half
of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, and Soviet
augmentation during a crisis frequently includes as
many additional auxiliaries as warships. Soviet naval
auxiliaries stationed in overseas ports, such as yard
craft, repair ships, and submarine tenders, are also
counted as naval ships deployed out of area. In 1982
the USSR had a daily average of 88 auxiliaries
deployed in distant waters.
Other Soviet operating procedures also narrow the
judgments that can be made based on ship-days:
? Analysis of the operating patterns of deployed Sovi-
et ships indicates they are less active than their
Western counterparts, operating only about one-
third of the time they are in distant waters. Our
figures, however, do not differentiate between days
spent at sea and those spent in ports or at sheltered
anchorages.
? Ships in transit for sea trials or interfleet transfer
are part of our count although they may not per-
form any operational duties.
? During a regional crisis, the Soviets usually expand
their naval presence and then gradually reduce it as
tensions abate. Their presence sometimes remains
above the precrisis level, as it has in the Indian
Ocean.
? To maintain its overseas force levels, the Soviet
Navy must commit ships both to predeployment and
postdeployment maintenance and to transits to and
from their home fleet. Thus the ship-day count,
which includes only deployed units, does not reflect
the total effort required by distant naval operations.
? In peacetime, Soviet ships occasionally perform
duties overseas for which they are not primarily
designed. For example, ships configured for antisub-
marine warfare were used to react to the movement
of US carriers to the eastern Mediterranean Sea
during the crisis in Lebanon, and minesweepers
have been used to monitor h ity of US battle
groups
Regional Levels
Indian Ocean. Soviet ship-days in the Indian Ocean
declined 5 percent during 1982 (see figure 3). The
squadron there consisted of an average of about 28
ships-down from 30 in 1981 and 32 in 1980-
including two or three general purpose submarines,
three major surface combatants, a mine warfare ship
or patrol craft, one or two amphibious ships, and at
least 15 auxiliaries and four research vessels. Several
changes in the squadron's composition were noted in
1982:
? A Pacific Fleet V-III nuclear-powered attack sub-
marine (SSN) made the first deployment of that
class to the Indian Ocean. Use of Pacific Fleet
V-Ills in the region would ease the burden on the
Northern Fleet, which has been responsible for
providing V-I and V-II SSNs for deployment to the
Indian Ocean since 1980.
Tou'Sesret 2
Figure 3
Soviet Ship-Days in the Indian
Ocean, 1974-82
Patrol combatants
Hydrographic and space
event support ships
Auxiliaries
M Amphibious ships
Ship-days
15,000
S et
Mine warfare ships
Major surface combatants
General purpose
submarines
? Surface combatant ship-days fell more than 45
percent, continuing a pattern begun in 1981 as the
tensions surrounding the American military re-
sponse to the Iranian hostage crisis faded.
? The presence of general purpose submarines also
continued to decline, dropping almost 26 percent to
a level roughly half the total for 1980. The cutback
included a gap in the presence of F-class diesel
submarines (SSs) and a total absence of submarines
for several weeks during the fall-the first such gap
since just before the hostage crisis in late 1979.
The Kiev-class carrier Minsk made its first Indian
Ocean deployment since joining the Pacific Fleet in
mid-1979. During its month of operations in the
Indian Ocean, the Minsk was observed to conduct
erratic maneuvers and trail oil.
is
Forger vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL)
demonstrated improved proficiency over its last de-
ployment in 1980-as would be expected given the
greater experience of the pilots. The Minsk's Forgers
were observed for the first time armed with AA-8 air-
to-air missiles during flight operations and intercep-
tions of US naval aircraft.
The Minsk task group made only two port calls in the
Indian Ocean-at Aden, South Yemen, and Bombay,
India. The Bombay stopover included a Soviet naval
airshow probably intended to bolster aircraft sales to
India. The departure of the Minsk group on 15
January 1983 left the Indian Ocean Squadron without
a major surface combatant.
In November 1982 the new leftist government of
Mauritius permitted the first Soviet port call since the
June election.
the Soviets have raised the issue of regular naval ship
access to Mauritian ports with the new government on
several occasions. They expressed their strong interest
in such visits and have attempted to convince various
officials of the importance of a clearly defined policy
on the issue. The Mauritian regime apparently recon-
sidered.the exclusion policy because of economic and
political considerations. Early in 1983 the government
indicated that US and UK naval ships would be
welcome.
Soviet ships also demonstrated their continuing use-
fulness in supporting regimes by calling in the Sey-
chelles during periods of unrest-in late summer
following an army mutiny and in October when
3 To
The Soviets continued to support the Indian Ocean
Squadron with auxiliary ships and yard craft sta-
tioned at Ethiopia's Dahlak Island in the Red Sea and
at Aden, South Yemen.
Sri Lanka granted Moscow permission for its naval
auxiliaries to be repaired there in 1982. Singapore's
yards, where repairs were previously undertaken, have
been closed to Soviet naval vessels to protest the
invasion of Afghanistan.
Sri Lankan shipyard officials have
expressed enthusiasm for a continuation of Soviet
contracts.
Pacific Ocean. Soviet presence in the Pacific Ocean
reached a record high in 1982, with ship-days increas-
ing almost 16 percent (see figure 4). The daily average
of 35 ships outside home waters in the Pacific includ-
ed three major surface combatants, six general pur-
pose submarines, four nuclear-powered ballistic mis-
sile submarines (SSBNs), a mine warfare ship, 13 or
14 auxiliaries, and five or six research ships.
According to our analysis of Pacific Fleet operations,
the expanded deployment in the Pacific is largely due
to a 90-percent increase in the presence of general
purpose submarines along with moderate increases in
deployments of mine warfare ships (14 percent), auxil-
iaries (29 percent), and research ships (19 percent).
The presence of both major surface combatants and
SSBNs declined.
The SSBN decline was partially due to the transfer of
two Y-class units from out-of-area operations to the
Sea of Japan. It may have also resulted in part from
the removal of units from the inventory to comply
with SALT limitations. Moreover, the age of the
Figure 4
Soviet Ship-Days in the
Pacific Ocean, 1974-82
Hydrographic and space
event support ships
Auxiliaries
Amphibious ships
Mine warfare ships
General purpose
b
i
su
mar
nes
SSBNs
a The data for patrol combatants are included
in surface combatant category.
I
Y-class submarines and attendant overhaul require-
ments make it increasingly difficult for the Soviets to
maintain them in distant patrol areas. Additionally,
D-class SSBN units, which are increasing in number
on active duty, do not have to deploy out of area to
cover intercontinental targets.
Tou 4
In both 1980 and 1981, the level of Pacific Ocean
ship-days primarily reflected expanded transits to and
from the Indian Ocean. In 1982, however, with the
drop in Indian Ocean deployment, it appears that the
primary factor in the increase of Pacific ship-days was
the group of ships operating in the South China Sea.
This included an average of two or three surface ships,
eight auxiliaries, and-in the second half of the
year-three general purpose submarines.
Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, continues to serve as the
main stopover point for units transiting to and from
the Indian Ocean and for those operating in the South
China Sea.
The Soviets may be interested in concentrating some
ship repair activity at Ho Chi Minh City. The city has
the only large graving dock in Vietnam,
the Soviets have recently
towed an 8,500-ton floating drydock there as well. A
small transporter dock was also transferred to Ho Chi
Minh City from Cam Ranh Bay, but it was returned
in early 1983 after repairs.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet reacted vigorously to Ameri-
can naval activities in the Sea of Japan.
Soviet ships conducted extensive
surveillance of the USS Lockwood in May, two US
battle groups in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk
in late 1982, and other US ships exercising near
Soviet waters. Soviet ships also monitored Chinese
naval activities in the South China Sea.
Figure 5
Soviet Ship-Days in the Mediterranean
Sea, 1974-82
Patrol combatants
Hydrographic and space
event support ships
Auxiliaries
Mine warfare ships
Major surface combatants
General purpose
submarines
? Amphibious ships
Ship-days
25,000
0
Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet naval presence in the
Mediterranean Sea decreased by nearly 4 percent in
1982 (see figure 5). The Mediterranean Squadron in
1982 normally included about 44 ships: eight or nine
major surface combatants, seven general purpose
submarines, a mine warfare ship, 23 auxiliaries, and
three or four research ships. As in the past, the size of
the squadron increased during the summer months
because of training and Moscow's use of naval forces
to respond to tensions in the eastern Mediterranean
Our analysis indicates that changes in the composition
of the squadron were marginal. The Soviets continued
to deploy C- or E-class nuclear-powered cruise missile
submarines (SSGNs) throughout the year, but there
were lengthy gaps in the presence of SSNs. No J-class
cruise missile submarine (SSG) deployment occurred
until the end of the year. The presence of all types of
Soviet ships except patrol ships declined in 1982. F_
The Soviets carried out routine exercises in the
Mediterranean. The Kiev VTOL aircraft carrier par-
ticipated in training with units of the Mediterranean
Squadron in August. Later in the year there was a
joint deployment of the Moskva and Leningrad heli-
copter carriers to the Mediterranean Sea, the first
since 1970
Most Soviet activity in the region occurred in connec-
tion with the Lebanese crisis and the subsequent
augmentation of US forces in the eastern Mediterra-
nean. Initially, the Soviets moved several large com-
batants to the eastern Mediterranean and established
surveillance of US battle groups and the coast of
Lebanon. Two cruisers-a Kynda and a Sverdlov with
the Mediterranean Squadron commander aboard-
remained in or near Tartus, Syria, from mid-June to
mid-September, and two warships patrolled the Leba-
nese coast. These gestures probably were intended to
demonstrate Moscow's commitment to Syria, but
neither joint Soviet-Syrian training nor Soviet naval
aviation deployment to Syria took place, as it had in
1981. In spite of this augmentation during the Leba-
nese crisis, the ship-day total declined
Soviet naval ties with Libya continued to develop in
1982. In October a Soviet task group conducted joint
exercises with the Libyan Navy.
class repair ship with a J-class SSG in Tobruk. The
repair ship remained after the submarine departed
until 15 February 1983, perhaps indicating that the
Soviets hope to establish limited upkeep capabilities in
Tobruk like those in Tartus. This may point to a new
dimension in Soviet-Libyan affairs. There seems to be
caution on both sides, but we believe Qadhafi is
unpredictable enough to change his mind and perhaps
give the Soviets attractive, new naval options.
Current Soviet access for repairs in the Mediterra-
nean includes routine servicing of submarines in Syria
and Yugoslavia and use of Menzel Bourguiba Ship-
yard in Tunisia for surface ships. According to Greek
media in January 1982 Papandreou's
socialist government renewed a 1979 Greek-Soviet
agreement allowing the repair of unarmed naval
auxiliaries at the Neorion shipyards on Syros Island.
Fewer than 12 ships were overhauled in 1982 under
the terms of the agreement, which required case-by-
case approval. Athens remains unwilling to provide
unrestricted access for naval auxiliaries or to permit
repairs of Soviet combatants. The Soviets do not
require access to Greek shipyards to support their
deployments to the Mediterranean; the squadron re-
lies heavily on its own auxiliaries for logistic support
and routine maintenance. Nonetheless, any improve-
ment in land-based support would ease the burden on
afloat logistics and on repair cycles at Soviet ship-
yards. As a result, we expect the Soviets to continue to
pursue repair contracts during the coming year0
In November 1982 the Turkish Government raised
the issue of access to the Mediterranean by greatly
increasing fees for transiting the Turkish Straits.
Most Soviet surface ships serving in the Mediterra-
nean come from the Black Sea, and the Soviets are
the most frequent users of the Straits. Littoral Black
Sea countries-Romania, Bulgaria, and the USSR-
as well as some other maritime nations opposed the
fee increase, and the Turks responded with threats of
sanctions against nonpaying ships.
Figure 6
Soviet Ship-Days in the Atlantic
Ocean, 1976-82
0 Hydrographic and space
n t h;
r s i
v
s
e
e suppo
p
Auxiliaries
Surface combatantsa
General purpose
submarines
SSBNs
Ship-days
15,000
The Soviets' limited use of naval forces in response to
the Falkland Islands crisis reflected a natural concern
and caution about the movement of a large Western
naval force. US Navy data show that the Soviet
Navy, which does not regularly operate in the lower
South Atlantic, did not deploy forces there in response
to the hostilities. Soviet naval units monitored the
progress of the British task force from the United
Kingdom to Ascension Island.
aThe data for patrol combatants are included
in surface combatant category.
al missions over the task group, but collection of real-
time data was limited. The Soviet and East European
7-percent drop in surface combatant deployment, a
sharp decline in the presence of amphibious ships, and
an almost 4-percent decrease in SSBN denlovmentc 3
The 1982 statistics reflect normal Soviet activity-
participation in joint Warsaw Pact training in the
North Sea, routine Northern Fleet exercises in the
spring simulating protection of SSBN operating areas
and deployment routes, and operations against US
and NATO deployments.
Atlantic Ocean. Soviet ship-days in the Atlantic
Ocean dropped less than 1 percent in 1982 (see figure
6). The Atlantic Ocean presence usually comprised
about 38 ships-eight SSBNs, 10 general purpose
submarines, two major surface combatants, a mine
warfare ship, nine auxiliaries, and eight research
ships. Changes in composition included an 8-percent
increase in general submarine presence, roughly a
' Although the number of Soviet ship-days in the Atlantic is second
only to that in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic ship-day totals do
not represent the same kind of operational naval presence that is
found in the Mediterranean, where an on-station squadron makes
up the majority of the ship-days. Ships moving from the Northern
Fleet to the Mediterranean, West Africa, and other regional
deployment areas appear in Atlantic ship-day counts, as will most
7 Too rt-
fishing fleets that normally operate in the South
Atlantic cooperated in some rescue efforts during the
crisis but generally remained well clear of the area of
conflict.
Caribbean Sea. In 1982, as in 1981, the highlight in
the Caribbean Sea was the arrival of a Soviet task
group, which entered the Caribbean late in Novem-
ber. The group-a guided missile cruiser, a frigate, a
Tango-class submarine (SS), and an oiler-called in
Havana during the first week of December in time for
the celebration of Cuban Armed Forces Day. Like
previous task groups, the Soviet ships conducted joint
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antisurface war-
fare (ASUW) exercises with Cuban forces and the
surface combatants made a cruise through the Gulf of
Mexico. The Tango and the oiler were berthed at the
Punta Movida submarine base at Cienfuegos, which
had not previously been used by Soviet ships~
In addition to the task group there was also the
normal Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean-a
small number of research, space support, intelligence-
gathering, and other auxiliary ships (see figure 7).L
West African Waters. Soviet naval presence in West
African waters increased nearly 80 percent in 1982,
close to that in 1979 and 1980 but well below that in
the late 1970s (see figure 8). The composition of the
West African patrol in 1982 also conformed more
closely to that before 1981:
? An F-class submarine operated off West Africa
after the British task force began its transit to the
Falkland Islands. No submarines had served with
the patrol throughout most of 1981.
? An Alligator-class landing ship was deployed to the
region in February. No amphibious ships had served
in 1981, although landing ships were generally part
of the force in the 1970s.
? At least one major surface combatant was present
throughout most of the year in contrast to the
irregular presence of warships in 1981. The presence
of supporting auxiliaries rose concurrently.
In 1982 the Soviets made several port calls to show
the flag. The helicopter carrier (CHG) Moskva's tour
of West African waters, the first of the Moskva-class
Figure 7
Soviet Ship-Days in the Caribbean
Sea, 1974-82
Hydrographic and space
Surface combatantsa
General purpose
submarines
event support ships
Auxiliaries
a The data for patrol combatants are included in
surface combatant category.
Sec
since 1974, provided a highly visible naval presence.
The Moskva, along with a frigate and an oiler, made
port calls in Lagos, Nigeria, and Luanda, Angola-
the first Luanda port call by a Moskva. A naval
group-cruiser, frigate, and merchant tanker-visited
Top eret_ 8
Figure 8
Soviet Ship-Days Off West Africa, 1976-82
before the outbreak of hostilities. These ships re-
mained in normal operating patterns throughout the
? Hydrographic and space
hi
event support s
ps
Auxiliaries
Soviet AGIs watched both the northern part of the
transit and the British activity at Ascension Island-
where AGIs periodically monitor US missile tests-
A Soviet minesweeper continues to patrol the West
African fisheries protection zone in the waters off
Morocco. This patrol began in 1981 after the seizure
of Soviet fishing boats by Morocco.
Soviet Naval Air Deployments
Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) provides Moscow with a
valuable tool for reconnaissance of Western naval
forces, especially US carriers and battle groups. It
also contributes to Soviet presence in distant areas
and to Moscow's capability to react to regional events.
1,000 ( I I I F- r" 1 1 0 Soviet naval aircraft deployments abroad declined
General purpose
submarines
a The data for patrol combatants are included in
surface combatant category.
about 12 percent in 1982 (see figure 9). Although the
level of presence increased in two regions, there were
also disruptions in the pattern of deployments to
several countries. The general decline in out-of-area
aviation days is due mainly to a lessened SNA
presence in the Indian Ocean. IL-38 May ASW
aircraft deployments to Aden, for example, dropped
more than 20 percent. Instead of the four aircraft
usually present, only a pair were deployed for several
months. These Mays monitored Western naval activi-
ty in the Indian Ocean. Veering from their usual
Point Noire, Congo, the first Soviet call there since pattern, they also flew to the southwest Indian Ocean
early 1976. Several Soviet port calls were also made near the Seychelles in October and November at
to Mocamedes, Angola, continuing a policy begun in about the same time that Soviet warships visited the
1981 to demonstrate Soviet support for Angola in its island to show support for the regime.
conflict with South Africa. in February 1983 the Mays at Aden
Ships deployed to West Africa contributed little to the
Soviets' limited response to the Falkland Islands
crisis. Moscow had already restored a major surface
9 op
Figure 9
Overseas Deployment of Soviet
Naval Aviation, 1976-82
Syria, IL-38 May and
TU-16 Badger
Libya, IL-38 May
Ethiopia, IL-38 May
South Yemen, IL-38 May
Vietnam, TU-142 Bear F
Vietnam, TU-95 Bear D
Angola, TU-95 Bear D
Cuba, TU-95 Bear D
Aircraft days in country
5,000
deployed to Al Anad Airfield, South Yemen, for the
first time. If permanent, this move may be designed
either to reduce Soviet visibility in Aden or to increase
security for the Soviet aircraft or both.
SNA presence at
Johannes IV Airfield near Asmara, Ethiopia, fell by a
third in 1982. The previously continuous deployment
there by a pair of IL-38 Mays was broken from early
February through May, possibly because of the threat
posed by Eritrean rebels. If this was the case, the
Soviets simply packed up and left, returning after the
danger had passed. This ease and flexibility are
typical of Soviet deployments of naval aircraft over-
seas for limited operations. These Mays carried out
surveillance of Western navies, including the first
surveillance of a US carrier in the Red Sea in
September.
Continuous SNA deployment to Cam Ranh, Viet-
nam, consists of pairs of TU-95 Bear D maritime
reconnaissance aircraft and TU-142 Bear F ASW
aircraft. The deployment pattern to Vietnam was
stable in 1982, with the aircraft averaging about 60
days per deployment.
Naval aircraft based in the Soviet Union also partici-
pated in surveillance against Western naval forces in
the Pacific The United
States conducted an exercise in the Sea of Japan in
fall 1982 involving two aircraft carriers. It attracted
particular SNA attention-the first use of an SNA
Backfire in response to US carrier deployment and
extensive flight activity by Bear F ASW aircraft for
surveillance
Pairs of IL-38s deployed four times-at approximate-
ly two- to three-month intervals-to Libya in 1982.
This is an increase of almost 70 percent over deploy-
ments to Libya during 1981, which occurred only
after midyear. The Mays conducted their first surveil-
lance from Libya of US carriers and participated in
the first joint Soviet-Libyan maritime exercise.
The Soviets increased the presence of the Bear D
reconnaissance aircraft in Cuba more than 45 percent
in 1982. Bear activity from Cuba was vigorous in
1982, with a record number of surveillance sorties
against transits of US forces. The sorties were also
Top 10
more aggressive in nature than in the past. In Janu-
ary, for example, two Bears entered the US air
defense identification zone off Virginia and flew to
within 1 nautical mile of the nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier USS Carl Vinson. The Bears also acted as
targets of opportunity for small-scale Cuban air de-
fense exercises as SNA aircraft have in other coun-
tries where they were deployed. Pairs of aircraft were
in Cuba almost continually until early November
when devloyments ceased for the remainder of the
year.
to Cuba.
the Soviets made their initial deployment of Bear
F antisubmarine warfare aircraft to San Antonio de
los Banos Airfield outside Havana. Regular Bear F
missions from Cuba would enhance Soviet ASW
capabilities in the northern Atlantic.
SNA Bear D deployment time to Angola rose about
14 percent in 1982, but the pattern of presence was
irregular. In April and May the Bears conducted six
surveillance missions against British forces transiting
to or from the South Atlantic during the Falkland
Islands crisis. During much of the crisis, however, the
Soviets had no aircraft in Angola.
According to a fairly reliable source, the Soviets
continued efforts to regain air access in Guinea in
1982. Landing rights in Conakry could improve their
capability to monitor US traffic in the eastern Atlan-
tic.
Moscow will continue to probe for the operational and
political benefits of new or expanded naval privileges.
Target nations will probably include Guinea, Mauriti-
us, Libya, Seychelles, Greece, Sri Lanka, Mozam-
bique, and North Yemen. Major improvements to
existing facilities in South Yemen, Ethiopia, Vietnam,
and Angola are unlikely and unnecessary. Nor are the
Soviets likely to make greater use of facilities in Cuba
or secure privileges elsewhere in the Caribbean unless
Outlook
We do not expect major changes in the pattern of
Soviet deployments to foreign waters during 1983.
The peacetime mission of naval forces deployed
abroad is both political and operational: to respond
either to changes in the regional presence of Western
navies or to opportunities to expand Moscow's influ-
ence. Deployments that exploit the vulnerabilities of
Third World governments and demonstrate military
power are valuable to the USSR. They cannot, howev-
er, interfere with the Soviet Fleet's preparedness for
combat; there is probably an upper limit of naval units
that Moscow is willing to commit to distant opera-
tions. The relative stability of total ship-days over the
past decade suggests that the Soviets are near that
optimum balance.
Naval forces will continue to be available for extend-
ed contingency responses, such as the resumed con-
centration of forces in the eastern Mediterranean
during January 1983. Such unforeseen activities,
however, may begin to force the Soviets to adjust
deployment levels elsewhere, particularly if changes in
their inventory resulting from retirements, overhaul of
aging units, or slowed production reduce the availabil-
ity of ships. We expect to see continued experimenta-
tion with foreign deployments of surface combatants
and submarines, like that of the V-III SSN to the
Indian Ocean this year. We also expect further
adjustments in fleet responsibilities for supporting
overseas operations as the ship and submarine inven-
tories of the individual fleets continue to evolve)
they alter their naval commitment to the region
The Soviets will vigorously pursue opportunities for
deployment of aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea,
Indian Ocean, or West Africa as well as options to
improve communications and intelligence-gathering
capabilities. Overall, however, Moscow will not per-
mit pressure for such privileges to interfere with its
pursuit of good relations with potential host states.
Figure 13
Deployment Areas of Soviet Naval Forces Outside Home Waters
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authwdatin.
Ship Deployment Areas
Pacific Ocean Mediterranean Sea
] Caribbean Sea West African waters
] Atlantic Ocean Indian Ocean
Arctic Ocean
Operating area of Soviet maritime aircraft stationed abroad
Foreign airfield to which Soviet naval aircraft deploy
North
Pacific
Ocean
Figure 14
Overseas Facilities and Anchorages Used by Soviet Naval Forces
Switz.
Dct. uno>, ? F
) A~ \,um7nd
(DNM'L
apao.W4 1
Ethiopia ew"
Soviet Union
Caribbean
1 Auxiliary
I Research ship
Thn United 31W, Oonrnnnnt Ms nw woo5nmd
an' n1 Ewony, Lahy? and Litiw. i
nto wn Unp. On... bwndwy r"-
is not nwnwwit .Mwit6w.
ti
General purpose submarine
,Q Support/repair facility
Port of call
Anchorage
Airfield
I Naval communications station
1 Mine warfare ship or amphibious ship UIJWG)A
3 Auxiliaries
1 Research ship Mocanwdlss{
I