NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE - SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: NIE
• Keywords: SOVIET
• Keywords: SOVIET
• Keywords: NIE
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005289044
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: June 22, 2015
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2008
• Case Number: F-2008-01595
• Publication Date: January 12, 1977

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NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATE
Soviet Strategic Objectives
.N~
1
E 11-4-77
January 1977
APPROVED FOR JOPY N2 16
23-Sep-2008
 NIE 11-4-77
SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
StKKET
 THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.'
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT
AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS;
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
the Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, and Treasury, the National Security Agency, and the Energy
Research and Development Administration.
Concurring:
The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, Vice
Chairman
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence
Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and
Development Administation
Abstaining:
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Deportment of the
Treasury
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Deportment of the Air Force
 FOREWORD
This Estimate is a summary analysis of how the Soviet leaders
perceive the USSR's position and prospects in the world and what
objectives underlie their foreign and military policies. It draws on a
number of other Estimates, listed below, which provide much more
detailed discussions of the major components of this question. Along
with a large measure of agreement, this Estimate sets forth some
differences of view within the Intelligence Community; these are
summarized in the final section entitled Synthesis. In most cases, we
have not attempted to attribute specific views to individual agencies;
differences exist within agencies as well as among them.
NIE 11-3/8-76, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict
Through the Mid-1980s
NIE 11-5-75, The Soviet Assessment of the US
NIE 11-10-76, Soviet Military Policy in the Third World
NIE 11-14-75, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO
NIE 11-15-74, Soviet Naval Policy and Programs
NIAM 11-9-74, Soviet Detente Policy
IIM 76-039J, Trends in Soviet Military Programs
III 76-041J, Soviet Civil Defense
This Estimate continues the trend of the last few years toward a
more ominous interpretation of Soviet strategic objectives. The single
most influential factor in this continuing reevaluation has been the fact
that neither the creation of an acknowledged Soviet deterrent nor the
achievement of acknowledged rough equivalence has caused any
observable reduction in the trend and vigor of the Soviet program to
improve the USSR's military capabilities, a program which has grown
at a more or less steady pace for two decades.' The Intelligence
Community will have as its highest priority the continuing collection
and examination of evidence bearing on these questions and the many
subquestions that underlie them.
I The Director. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State believes that this
paragraph lacks the balance reflected in the body of the Estimate. He would note inter alia that Soviet
strategic force modernization programs must be viewed in the context of the Soviets trying to move ahead
of the US and to achieve advantages where possible, but at the same time worrying that they nwy fall
behind in the qualitative military competition.
III
!NCET
 CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS ................................................. 1
THE PROBLEM ................................................... 5
TH E ESTIMATE .................................................. 5
I. Introduction ................................................. 5
II. Major Factors Entering Into Soviet Calculations ................. 5
The Soviet View of the USSR's Internal Situation .............. 5
The Soviet View of Military Power and War .................. 6
The Soviet View of the US .................................. 7
The Soviet View of China .................................... 8
The Soviet View of Europe ................................... 9
The Soviet View of Detente .................................. 9
Arms Control Policy .......................................... 10
III. The Pace and Objectives of Current Soviet Military
Programing ................................................ 10
Strategic Forces .............................................. 11
Forces Facing NATO ......................................... 12
Forces Facing China ......................................... 13
General Purpose Naval Forces ................................. 13
Forces for Distant Operations ................................. 13
Research and Development .................................... 14
IV. Synthesis .................................................... 15
 SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
KEY JUDGMENTS 2
A. This Estimate addresses two closely related questions:
- Do the Soviet leaders now base policy-and the programs and
activities which flow therefrom-on a belief that the USSR will
continue to make substantial gains toward a position of overall
dominance in the world? Do they now expect to achieve such a
position in the next ten years?
- Have they come to believe-or will they soon-that aggressive
actions on their part carry lower risks than earlier, and that these
risks have become low enough to be acceptable to prudent yet
ambitious men?
B. There is in the Intelligence Community agreement on some
matters relevant to these questions and disagreement on others. Among
the areas of agreement:
- The aims of Soviet global policy are far-reaching. The Soviet
leaders' basic perception of the world still posits a struggle of two
great systems, in which theirs will ultimately prevail. This
outlook is reinforced by both defensive and expansionist
impulses derived from Russia's history and boosted by the
remarkable growth of Soviet power and prestige since World
War II. Neither in its foreign policy nor its military policy does
the USSR aim at long-term equilibrium between the two
systems; instead it seeks a continual enhancement of its own
power and influence.
- In prosecuting the struggle on multiple fronts, the Soviets see
military power as a key instrument which can be used to attain
strategic objectives without war.
- The Soviets have never accepted the concept of mutual assured
destruction, with its connotation that some finite level of force is
sufficient for deterrence, although they recognize mutual
deterrence as a present reality that will he very difficult to alter.
Moreover, trying to forge ahead of the US and at the same time
s The Assistant Chid of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force believes the frequent use of
such words as fear, anxiety, worry, caution, and concern to describe the state of mind of the Soviet
leadership is overdone. He warns the reader that he should tint let this excessive use of these words distract
from the obvious determination and drive of the Soviet leadership to achieve strategic military superiority.
 R E T
fearful of falling behind it, they are little disposed to adjust their
military programs unilaterally so as to foster strategic stability,
or to moderate them lest they provoke US program reactions.
- The Soviets aim at advantage in their military forces. They
continue to press forward with a broad and vigorous program for
improving their military capabilities to support their political
objectives.
- The striking thing about these programs is not that they have
accelerated in the last few years but that they have grown at a
more or less steady pace for two decades. We expect this growth
to continue. Neither the creation of an acknowledged deterrent ,,
~ -s.~tj `~ ~~uza1 J
nor the achievement of acknowledged strategic parity has C.5
caused the effort to falter. Soviet militar doctrine calls for
capabilities to fight, survive, and win a nuc ear war.
- At the same time, the Soviets worry that they may fall behind in /'
the qualitative military competition, and this further reinforces
the priority of their research and development effort.
- In the struggle, they are conscious of weaknesses on their own
side, particularly those arising from economic and technological
deficiencies and conflict with China. They are working to
overcome these weaknesses, but they do not presently expect to
remove them in the next decade.
- On the other hand, beyond their obvious military strength, they
credit themselves with other important assets: disciplined policy-
making, social cohesion, and perseverance.
C. Among our major disagreements:
- Some judge that the Soviets are persuaded that the US and the
West, despite periodic rebounds, are in a long-term decline that
will be reflected in a flagging of political resolve, military efforts,
and economic growth. Others think the Soviets hope for this but
do not count on it, and indeed may think that US and Western
military effort is again on the rise.
- Some believe that, in improving their military forces, the Soviets
pursue the acquisition of a war-winning capability as a realistic
objective. Others believe that the Soviets have no realistic
expectation of attaining such a capability.
These disagreements lead to conclusions that, while not diametrically
opposed, present significant differences of emphasis.
 D. One line of argument holds that, in the Soviet view, the global
correlation of forces has in the 1970s shifted in the USSR's favor and
that this trend is likely to continue. The US and its allies have entered
upon a new stage in the "general crisis of capitalism" that will prove
irreversible even if there are periodic recoveries. The problems of the
Soviet economy and the dispute with China are serious but, on the
plane of international competition, not debilitating. In this situation,
the Soviets aim to achieve the degree of military superiority over the
West needed to permit them to wage, survive as a national entity, and
win a conventional or nuclear war. The Soviets see their improvements
in survivability and in counterforce capabilities, air defense and ABM
development, and broad hardening and civil defense programs in
particular, and their improvements in conventional forces in general, as
all contributing to this objective. While it is uncertain when the Soviets
expect to gain such a decisive strategic superiority, they view this
objective as practical and attainable in a programed fashion. They
expect to move closer to this goal over the next ten years. This trend,
they believe, will increasingly enable them to deter US initiatives and
to inhibit US opposition to Soviet initiatives, thereby advancing the
Soviet objective of gaining a position of overall dominance in the
world.
E. Another line of argument holds that, in Soviet thinking, the
question is much more open. It too perceives an increased Soviet
confidence, stemming much more from the achievement of parity in
strategic forces than from other, nonmilitary trends. But this analysis
holds that the Soviet leaders give greater weight than the preceding
argument allows to the handicaps represented by the USSR's economic
and technological weaknesses and its conflict with China. It believes
that they attribute greater resilience to the capitalist economies and do
not discount the recent turnaround in US defense spending as a short-
term phenomenon. In this view, Soviet military programing and
research is bent upon keeping pace with that of its adversaries as well as
seeking margins of advantage wherever feasible. But Moscow does not
have a realistic expectation of achieving a war-winning capability,
particularly in the next decade. Expecting Soviet foreign policy to be
assertive, this analysis nonetheless holds that Moscow's experience with
the complexities of the external world does not at this point lead the
Soviets to expect a series of advances that, by the mid-1980s, will
cumulate into a finally decisive shift in the struggle. In short, this
analysis attributes to the Soviets not a programmatic design for military
superiority but a more pragmatic effort to achieve advantages where
they can, and thus a more patient approach to continuing tough
)3kET
 competition together with a dedication to high and steady levels of
effort in the elements of power. Moscow's calculus of the risks
attending forward action may decline, but this has not yet happened
and, if it does, the process will be slow and subject to cautious testing.
F. This Estimate is obviously not a net assessment, nor our
judgment of the likely outcome in East-West competition. It is a
summary of the range of Community perceptions of Soviet objectives
and Soviet views of the prospects for significant gains in this
competition. We agree on a wide range of Soviet objectives short of
decisive military superiority over the West. Our differences are over the
Soviet leaders' perception of the feasibility of achieving such
superiority. Finally, we agree that Soviet risk-taking abroad in any
specific situation will continue to be governed by Moscow's perception
of interests and power at the particular time and place.
a
RET
 THE PROBLEM
To analyze the strategic objectives underlying Soviet military and
foreign policy, with particular attention to the next ten years.
THE ESTIMATE
1. INTRODUCTION
1. The aims of Soviet global policy are far-reaching.
The Soviet leaders' basic perception of the world still
posits a struggle of two great systems, in which theirs
will ultimately prevail. This ideological outlook is
reinforced by both defensive and expansionist im-
pulses derived from Russia's history and boosted by
the remarkable growth of Soviet power and prestige
since World War II. Neither in its foreign policy nor
its military policy does the USSR aim at long-term
equilibrium between the two systems; instead it seeks
a continual enhancement of its own power and
influence.
2. If there is disagreement in the intelligence
Community, it is not over this basic judgment. Nor is
there real dispute over the important corollary that the
Soviet leaders are prudent men, prone to minimize
risks and to seek to advance only when they judge the
chance of success to be high. Current disagreements
focus instead on two sets of questions:
- Has the last decade. to the Soviet leaders, been a
watershed, a period of decisive change in the
competition of systems? Do they believe that
their programs and activities will lead in a
systematic fashion to the achievement of mili-
tary-strategic superiority and a position of
overall dominance in the world? Do they expect
to achieve this position within the next ten
years? I
- Translating this problem into the sphere of
international behavior, do the Soviets judge-or
3 The Senior Intelligence Officer, Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration believes that the crucial issue is not whether
the Soviets "succeed" or "fair" to achieve their objectives within ten
hears, but rather whether they make substantial gains toward their
longer-range strategic objectives.
will they soon-that the USSR can push its
interests harder without facing higher risks?
Granting their prudence, have they come to
believe-or will they soon-that aggressive ac-
tions on their part carry less risk than earlier, and
in fact now have become low enough to be
acceptable to prudent yet ambitious men?
3. In this Estimate, we consider the major factors
that enter into Soviet calculations of these matters,
touching on the Soviet appraisal of the elements of
what they habitually refer to as the "correlation of
forces," mainly military and economic strength,
political organization and will, and social cohesion
and morale. A final section seeks to define, in the light
of this analysis, Soviet strategic objectives and to
illuminate differences of judgment on this question.
II. MAJOR FACTORS ENTERING INTO
SOVIET CALCULATIONS
The Soviet View of the USSR's
Internal Situation
4. As they survey their own country, the Soviets see
certain strengths and weaknesses. These factors gain
meaning for their external outlook and objectives
largely as they relate to Western strengths and
weaknesses.
- The Soviet leaders regard their political system
as strong and stable. They view political
dissidence as an embarrassment to their foreign
policy, not a challenge to their rule. They see
nationalist sentiments among the minorities as a
more serious problem, but are confident of their
ability to cope with it. Succession politics may
come to preoccupy them, but they do not expect
succession to pose a crisis for the system.
5
SE T
 - Beneath this genuine feeling of confidence there
seems to lie an abiding worry that the Soviet
system, while strong, may also be brittle. Such
matters as the harping on the legitimacy of party
rule, the very pervasiveness of control mecha-
nisms, and the lively fears about the penetration
of Western influence suggests a continuing
anxiety about how the system might stand up to
crisis. As they contemplate Eastern Europe,
Soviet fears of this sort are doubtless much
stronger. These concerns might be an inhibiting
factor in any Soviet decision about initiating
major war.4
- The Soviets regard their system as giving them a
substantial competitive advantage. Its rigorous
centralization permits little debate and alto-
gether excludes challenge from outside a small
political elite. This, they believe, makes for
steady, purposeful decisionmaking and disci-
pline and coordination in the execution of
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the senior intelli-
gence officers of the Military Departments, and the Senior
Intelligence Officer, Energy Research and Development Adminis-
tration believe that this formulation overstates Soviet concerns
about the brittleness of their system and the extent to which fear of
East European instability might inhibit the USSR in initiating a
major war. They believe that the Soviet leaders recognize that their
system, while strong, is also faced with internal differences and
difficulties, and that stress could weaken the system. Therefore, over
the years, these leaders have evolved a number of control
mechanisms-including party discipline and regulations circum-
scribing Western influence-to ensure that these potentially
debilitating elements do not become major hindrances to the USSR
in the pursuit of its objectives. As the Soviets contemplate Eastern
Europe, their concerns are doubtless much stronger-they have on
occasion resorted to drastic measures to maintain control and are
pushing economic, political, and military measures to tie the East
European states closer to the USSR. All these factors would be
reviewed carefully to ensure full control prior to a Soviet decision on
any major action that could lead to war.
The Deputy Director of Central intelligence believes that
problems of dissent and disaffection are regarded as extremely
important by the Soviets, affecting as they do not only the party
leadership's political control, but Soviet relations with the West and
with fraternal Communist parties as well. He believes, however,
that in comparison to other inhibitions which would have to be
overcome before taking so cataclysmic a step as initiating a major
war, concerns about internal dissent would not have major
significance. Indeed, he questions to what extent dissent in any
form would survive if the USSR were placed on a war footing. He
agrees that the Soviets would be more affected by misgivings about
the reliability of their Warsaw Pact allies than by concerns about
their own population.
policy. In particular, they regard their system as
able to sustain the priority of defense at present
and perhaps even higher levels of effort.
- The Soviet leaders do not discount their eco-
nomic problems. They know that their agricul-
ture is backward and that industrial productivity
is low. They acknowledge a general lag in the
application of advanced technology in the
economic sector and fear that it may be growing.
The Soviets see these problems as becoming more
complex and more difficult to solve and, while
they expect a moderate rate of growth, they no
longer speak of overtaking the leading capitalist
economies in a stated period of time.
5. Particular importance attaches to the question of
whether the Soviet economy can sustain current or
higher rates of growth in military spending in coming
years.' In addition to the general economic problems
mentioned above, modern military spending is in-
creasingly driven by the technological complexity and
quality requirements of advanced weapons, and these
are, in general, areas in which the Soviet economy
does not enjoy an advantage over the US. The Soviet
leaders worry about this problem. But it seems clear
from their present military programing, and from the
research and development efforts that herald produc-
tion and deployment of future systems, that they do
not now feel compelled to reduce the priority of
defense for the sake of other economic goals. Their
concentration upon military power is so strong that
only severe and prolonged economic stringencies
could force them to relax this priority. On this matter,
the shared background and values of Soviet political
and military leaders leave little room for internal
dispute.
The Soviet View of Military Power
and War
6. For the Soviet leaders, ideology legitimizes all
means, including military means, in the prosecution
of the political struggle;it also posits the danger of
imperialist attack Force plays a central role in Soviet
S The Central Intelligence Agency's recently revised estimates
show that the USSR has been devoting about one eighth of its gross
national product to defense during the 1970s; the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency and the senior intelligence officers of the
Military Departments think the share probably is higher. Research
is underway to determine the corresponding ratio in the 1960s.
All
 thinking, and military power bulks large in Soviet
policy. The Soviets explicitly state that their military
doctrine-which they define as "official views and
positions determining the direction of military devel-
opment and the preparation of the nation and its
armed forces for war"-is premised upon the notion
that war is an instrument of policy, and success in
war, even a nuclear war, is attainable. While there is
disagreement over the extent to which military
doctrine determines political decisions on military
matters, we do not believe that the Soviets aim at war.
In fact, they aim to avoid not only general nuclear
war, but also direct armed conflict with the US that
risks escalation to nuclear war. They recognize that,
even if they enjoyed military advantages that seemed
to constitute, in their perceptions and those of others,
a general strategic superiority, nuclear attack on the
USSR would put at risk all their achievements and
prospects.
7. But the Soviets strongly believe that the implied
or actual threat of the use of force is a way to
influence the attitudes and decisions of states and to
attain strategic objectives without war. Moreover,
they see military power as a means of ensuring that
their gains in the world will not be reversed. They
intend their military might to secure their homeland
and their position in Eastern Europe and to deter their
opponents from interfering against those processes of
political change. particularly in the Third World, that
they are promoting, in part with their own military
resources. With regard to North America, Western
Europe, and Japan, they see their military strength as
having political' utility in enforcing respect for Soviet
power and receptiveness to Soviet policies.
8. In a world characterized by struggle, the Soviets
expect conflict, most probably arising out of local
disputes but often involving the superpowers and, at
least implicitly, their total military strength. In this
context, Soviet military doctrine sets a goal of creating
war-winning capabilities and then defines this posture
as the best deterrent. The Soviets have never accepted
the concept of mutual assured destruction, with its
connotation that some finite level of force is sufficient
for deterrence, although they recognize mutual
deterrence as a present reality that will he very
difficult to alter. Moreover, truing to forge ahead of
the US and at the same time fearful of falling behind
it, they are little disposed to adjust their military
programs unilaterally so as to foster strategic stability,
or to moderate them lest they provoke US program
reactions. Beyond these points, however, there are
differences of view in the Intelligence Community as
to whether the Soviets see as an achievable objective a
strategic relationship in which they escape the
constraints of mutual deterrence. These differences are
discussed in paragraphs 56 and 57.
9. Finally, it is difficult, and in the end perhaps not
fruitful, to try to separate offensive and defensive
elements and purposes in the Soviet approach to
military prover, as Soviet military doctrine looks at
them in an integral fashion. For example, the Soviets
see nuclear weapons and the long-range means of
delivering them as both offensive and defensive, in
that they can attack the enemy's military forces,
thereby reducing his capability to attack the USSR.
10. On this subject there are within the Intelligence
Community points of agreement and divergence.
11. There is agreement that the Soviets admire and
fear American economic capacity and technological
prowess. Further, they have a respectful appreciation
of US military strength, current and potential. The
Soviets see the US as having considerable advantage
over the USSR in the economic and military potential
of the NATO Alliance in comparison with the Warsaw
Pact. At the same time, they see weaknesses in US
society that they attribute to the factors of individual-
ism and materialism in American culture: a reluctance
to make sacrifices for state goals and an inconstancy
in policy deriving from the play of plural interests.
They are scornful of what they see as a public appetite
for sensation and a general disrespect for authority.
12. In foreign affairs, the Soviets see the US as
enjoying great influence by virtue of its economic and
military power, and they lay special stress on US
ability to impose its views on its allies because of that
power. In the Third World the Soviets see the US as
enjoying stronger economic and political ties than
they do, as well as having substantially greater
potential for projection of military power. But they
also clearly perceive differences between the US and
its allies. And they are eager to discover how
much-in the wake of Vietnam and Angola-the US
is determined to uphold its interests and commitments
abroad when these are challenged.
 13. The divergencies within the Intelligence Com-
munity arise from different emphasis upon these
themes.
14. One line of analysis holds that the Soviets have
probably concluded that the US has already passed its
zenith as a competitor and that, given skillful Soviet
policies, the chances are that this trend can be made
irreversible. While acknowledging countervailing fac-
tors, the Soviets believe that in the long run the US
will be forced by inherent defects in the American and
international economy to be a progressively less
effective competitor. They believe they are gradually
overcoming the US advantage in technology. They
expect continued long-run erosion, relative to their
side, in the Western military, political, economic,
social, and moral spheres. They think they will be able
to plan their programs and conduct their policies in
the expectation of greater opportunities resulting from
this continued slow improvement in the global
"correlation of forces." In particular, they see US
vulnerabilities-to the denial of oil and other raw
materials, among others-growing in the Third
World, and they expect increasingly to be able to
exploit these vulnerabilities. A final element of this
interpretation of their view is, however, that the
Soviets fear that as the US sees its position weakening,
it may strike out to redress the balance. In this period,
therefore, the Soviets require superior military forces
and a careful weighing of risks.
15. Another line of analysis holds that, even when
these factors are taken into account, the Soviet view of
these matters is much less optimistic. It notes that
nothing in the Soviet outlook posits a weakening of
US advantages in the area of science and technology.
Recognizing the vigor and scope of Soviet military
programing, this analysis adds that, in Moscow's eyes,
the US is a formidable military competitor that is
seeking to improve its counterforce capabilities, and
even thinking about strategic superiority, considering
such US programs as the B-1, Trident, M-X ICBM,
and strategic cruise missiles. It argues that the Soviets
perceive indications of US recovery from the disillu-
sionments of recent years, are impressed by the
recuperative powers of the US and the world
economies, and appear genuinely concerned that the
current defense budget and political discourse in the
US augur a more than temporary increase in
competitiveness vis-a-vis the USSR. By this reading,
the Soviets may hope for a continued slow improve-
ment in their relative position, but not at a pace that
justifies new global calculations or substantial new
departures in their own behavior.
The Soviet View of China
16. On this subject, the Intelligence Community
shares some uncertainties but has no major disagree-
ments.
17. The aims of the USSR's China policy are clear
enough:
to combat and reduce Chinese influence both
among nations and within the international
Communist movement;
- to limit Sino-US rapprochement;
- to exert military pressure designed to deter
Chinese jabs along the border while impressing
upon Chinese leaders the folly of making the
Soviet Union their enemy;
- meanwhile to maintain a public posture of
readiness to normalize relations against the time
when Mao's successors might unfreeze China's
implacable hostility.
18. The schism with China has severely heightened
the Soviet sense of insecurity and undercut its
ideological position. We have considerable evidence
indicating that Moscow sees no prospect of a complete
restoration of the relationship of the 1950s; this is our
analysis as well. As for the possibility of an early
amelioration of active competition, the Soviets appear
to be more glum than hopeful.
19. Nevertheless, this will be the aim of Soviet
policy, and indeed their tactical moves in the weeks
after Mao's death have been intended to begin this
process. The roots of the dispute are deep, and the
USSR in its conciliatory approach is not prepared to
give up the option of military pressure. But if we try to
look a decade ahead, there is a good chance of some
normalization, probably at the level of state relations,
which would make the conflict less burdensome to
Soviet global policy.
20. In military-strategic terms, however, we doubt
that the Soviets during this period will judge that they
can afford to reduce the forces devoted to the Chinese
problem, or to exempt them from the normal pace of
modernization. We feel confident that, at least, that is
 their own present outlook. And depending upon
China's post-Mao course, it is entirely possible that
fears of Chinese collusion with the West, or even of a
stab in the back in the event of war elsewhere, will
continue to burden Moscow's policy as heavily as they
do today.
The Soviet View of Europe
21. Ultimately the Soviets would like to become the
dominant power in Europe through the breakup of
the NATO Alliance and the elimination of US
influence and forces in Western Europe. Viewed in the
light of what is achievable in the next decade,
however, they intend to work to reduce US power and
influence and to undermine the cohesion of NATO,
thereby creating more room for the expansion of their
own influence. The Soviets hope to manage this
process in a way that avoids the emergence of West
Germany or a united Europe as a strong, independent
rival to their policies. Moscow's detente posture has
particular application to this region, and to the related
Soviet objectives of acquiring technology and credits
from the developed industrial states and encouraging
reduced defense efforts. The Soviets meanwhile seek
military forces that will increasingly influence West-
ern European attitudes through the reality and
proximity of Soviet power.
22. While the Soviets applaud the growing strength
of Communist parties in Western Europe, they are
concerned about their increasing independence. They
tolerate the anti-Soviet gestures of these parties only
with great difficulty; they are concerned that power-
sharing between Communists and non-Communists
would undermine orthodoxy in Eastern Europe; they
worry about a rightist backlash if the process moves
too fast. On balance, however, they see more gains
than losses for themselves in this trend, realize that it
is not within their control, and will assist it cautiously.
As for Yugoslavia, they would like to bring that
country closer to their own camp after Tito's death
but are also concerned to ensure that it not move
westward. They may apply military pressure to this
problem, but they probably see major local dangers
and international risks in the actual use of force.
The Soviet View of Detente
23. In its broadest aspect, detente is looked upon as
a framework for nurturing changes favorable to Soviet
interests while avoiding direct challenges to the US
and its allies that would provoke them into concerted
and effective countermeasures. Detente provides for
limited spheres of cooperation and relaxation of
tensions within a larger context of continued competi-
tion. It is meant to facilitate more specific policies
designed:
- to give the West, and particularly the US, a
stake in fruitful relations with the USSR as a
means of limiting Western interest in collabora-
tion with China against Soviet interests;
- to develop precedents and mechanisms for
consulting with the US during crises and
influencing its behavior, thereby reducing the
likelihood of nuclear war;
- to develop an atmosphere that would serve to
reduce public and parliamentary support for
Western defense efforts;
- to create a political climate in which economic
relations, and particularly a flow of Western
credits and technology, can improve the Soviet
economic base and provide militarily useful
technologies;
- to sustain formal Western acknowledgement of
the USSR's postwar gains in Eastern Europe, to
extend Soviet influence in Western Europe, and
to weaken alliance cohesion.
At the same time, the Soviets have stated from the
outset-and emphasized recently in response to
Western criticism-that detente, like "peaceful coex-
istence," in no way involves a renunciation of Soviet
support and assistance to "progressive forces," includ-
ing those engaging in armed struggle in the Third
World, but in fact creates a political climate that
enhances the prospects for these forces.
24. Since this is a fairly durable set of Soviet
interests, we expect Moscow to continue to adhere to
the detente line. They regard the improvement of
their position, and particularly their gains in strategic
weaponry, as having forced the West to accept the
detente framework and enter into negotiations with
the USSR. Specific policies are another matter;
Moscow has been reluctant to accept Western
prescriptions about the proper content of a detente
relationship. The Soviets have suffered their own
disappointments with it, particularly in US trade
9
RET
 legislation and Middle Eastern diplomacy. They are
sensitive to increasing Western skepticism about
detente, and evidently would like to see this trend
reversed. But their diplomacy is extremely patient,
and if they do eventually make concessions to Western
demands, these will usually be forthcoming only after
prolonged bargaining, during which the Soviets will
have thoroughly tested the Western position and
discovered the response needed on their part to sustain
momentum.
Arms Control Policy
25. The Soviets have both strategic and political
objectives in pursuing arms control negotiations. On
the political side, the USSR is assiduous in initiating
proposals in this area in order to appear as the
champion of disarmament and to determine as much
as possible the subjects chosen for negotiations.
Moscow has at times seen Soviet security objectives
served simply by propaganda on possible arms control
arrangements. The Soviets, for example, evidently
calculate that proposals to ban use or first use of
nuclear weapons might appeal to public opinion and
affect Western policy and strategy even in the
absence of negotiations. The very process of negotia-
tions, the USSR believes, strengthens its image as a
superpower equal to the US and increases the chances
that the West will reduce the vigor of its military
programs.
26. In disarmament negotiations the Soviets are
zealous in protecting their military and security
interests, and have a proven record of being very hard
bargainers. They view SALT as a means through
which the USSR may be able further to improve its
strategic position vis-a-vis the US, particularly if they
succeed in limiting US weapon systems now in
development. In negotiating on ABM, Moscow
evidently judged that, in view of the US technological
lead and potential, severe limits on deployment would
be to its military benefit. The Soviets have sought to
use MBFR largely as a vehicle for constraining
German as well as US force levels, and encouraging a
decrease in defense spending in NATO. They prob-
ably hope thereby ultimately to affect NATO strategy
and to obstruct possible future European defense
cooperation. Security concerns have also accounted
for the seriousness of the Soviet approach to nuclear
proliferation.
27. Nevertheless, the Soviets recognize that the
process of arms control negotiations is continuous,
that periodic agreements are needed to sustain it, that
they cannot always count on a favorable outcome at
each stage, and that partial agreements can often
advance their interests. And while they are prepared
for prolonged bargaining, they would be highly
dismayed at the prospect of a breakdown in the
negotiating process, not only for its military conse-
quences but also for its implications for detente and
for Western concerns about Soviet military programs.
These considerations played an important part in
Moscow's agreement to the Vladivostok understand-
ing; they proved willing to accept equal quantitative
ceilings, requiring a slight reduction in their own
forces, and to defer the question of forward-based
systems, largely in order to sustain the momentum of
SALT and detente after the US changed presidents in
mid-1974. It is possible that such considerations also
might lead the Soviets to be more forthcoming on
SALT 11 after the new US administration comes into
office.'
28. The Soviets will seek in corning years to draw
the US and others into specific negotiations on some
of the broad array of arms control proposals that they
regularly purvey. These efforts will he meant to pursue
the same political and military ends that SALT and
M BFR now serve for them, plus broadening the
agenda as insurance against the consequences of
failure in any single forum.
III. THE PACE AND OBJECTIVES OF
CURRENT SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAMING
29. In this section we examine Soviet military
programing to see what definable objectives emerge
from the evidence and whether the pace in recent
years has increased, slowed down, or remained
constant. We do not attempt a thorough description
of these programs, which is available in other
Estimates. From this standpoint we examine strategic
6 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the senior officers
of the Militant Departments, and the Senior Intelligence Officer:
Energy Research and Development Administration believe that, in
sum, the Soviets are unlikely to make concessions in either SALT or
MBFR unless. after extensive probing, they are convinced that
concessions are required on their part to continue the detente
process, keep the West from expanding its military capabilities, or
score gains which they confider more important.
10
ET
 offensive and defensive forces, ground and air forces
facing NATO and China, naval forces, forces for
distant intervention, and research and development
activities.
Strategic Forces
30, The USSR, having succeeded over the past
decade in overcoming a marked inferiority, continues
to press forward with a broad and vigorous program
for improving its strategic capabilities. In offensive
forces:
- The ICBM force is becoming more survivable
and flexible and better able to attack hard
targets through deployment of a new generation
of ICBMs (many with MIRV's) and through
modifications to deployed systems and develop-
ment of yet newer ones.
- The introduction of successive new models with
longer-range missiles has increased the capability
and survivability as well as the size of the SSBN
force. Soviet SSBNs will, in the near future,
acquire MIRVed missiles, and a new, large
ballistic missile submarine may be under con-
struction.
- In bomber aviation, older aircraft are being
retained in service, the Backfire is being de-
ployed, and there is evidence of the development
of a new long-range bomber.
On the defensive side, the USSR continues:
- to expand capabilities for obtaining early warn-
ing of missile attack;
- to pursue developmental work on ABM systems;
- to improve capabilities against air attack, espe-
cially low-altitude attack;
- to starch for ways to solve the antisubmarine
warfare problem, including those based on novel
possibilities;
- to improve, by hardening and other means, the
protection of command and control facilities;
- to carry forward a civil defense program that is
more extensive and better developed than was
previously believed and that includes measures
that, if effectively carried out, would have a
significant impact on both US and Soviet
perceptions of the likely outcome of a nuclear
exchange;'
to acquire capabilities to interfere with US space
systems.
3I. The striking thing about these programs is not
that they have accelerated in the last few years but
that they have grown at a more or less steady pace for
two decades. We expect this growth to continue.
Neither the creation of an acknowledged deterrent nor
the achievement of acknowledged strategic parity has
caused the effort to falter. Soviet military doctrine
calls for capabilities to fight, survive, and win a
nuclear war. There is disagreement regarding the
extent to which Soviet strategic policy and force
developments are determined by this doctrine, but
these programs are compatible with efforts to achieve
these objectives. Soviet positions at SALT, in turn, do
not rule out these same doctrinal objectives.' But at
the same time it must be recognized that, from the
USSR's point of view, US military technology is so
dynamic that constant Soviet efforts are needed even
to keep pace, that US SALT positions do not constrain
that dynamism, and that arms control measures to
limit many qualitative advances appear in any event
infeasible. Thus the Soviet stress has shifted consider-
ably from quantity to quality.
32. We are divided in our views as to what
objectives the Soviets have set for themselves in
adding to their strategic capabilities.
33. In one view, Soviet strategic programs are
fundamentally the result of decisions in support of
Soviet strategic doctrine and objectives of obtaining a
war-winning capability, and are not merely reactions
to individual US weapon programs. These programs
are extensive, embracing improvements in surviv-
ability and in counterforce capabilities, air defense
and ABM development programs, and a broad
hardening and civil defense effort, and each comple-
' The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State believes this statement exaggerates the likely impact of
Soviet civil defense efforts. He believes that these efforts will not
materially increase Soviet willingness to risk a nuclear exchange and
will not undermine the deterrent value of US strategic attack forces.
' The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of Stale believes this sentence could be misleading since Soviet
positions of SALT are consistent with a broad range of possible
objectives, including maintenance of rough equivalence with the
US.
11
I$KT
 ments the others. The Soviets see their extensive and
growing research and development effort as support-
ing these programs in an increasingly effective
fashion, and as enhancing the chances of technologi-
cal breakthroughs.
34. In this view, Soviet strategic programs represent
a serious Soviet commitment to obtain a strategic
posture vis-a-vis the United States s~ uSent to win a
nuclear war should it occur and to survive as a viable
national entity. While it is uncertain when the Soviets
expect to gain such strategic superiority, they now
view this objective as practical and attainable in a
programed fashion. They expect to move closer to this
goal over the next ten years.9
35. Another view holds that the Soviet leadership
does not at present regard the achievement of decisive
strategic superiority as a feasible objective, particu-
larly over the next decade. This view puts more stress
on Soviet respect for present and potential US
strategic strength as an ingredient in Moscow's
projections. It also notes that failure thus far to solve
such key problems as strategic missile defense and
antisubmarine warfare are bound to have a discourag-
ing effect on Soviet expectations.
36. Those who hold this view believe that the
Soviets will be active, driving competitors in the
strategic arms race, and will aim at such margins of
superiority as are available. Their programs aim at the
development of capabilities to fight and to survive
nuclear war. But despite the comprehensive and
vigorous character of these programs, the Soviet
leaders know that the US need not concede the USSR
a meaningful overall advantage, and they probably
do not now count on gains that would be substantial
enough to give them confidence about their ability to
survive and win an all-out nuclear war. Nor can they
now confidently expect to move substantially closer to
these goals over the next ten years.
37. Beyond differing views about goals for strategic
forces, there are differences about the broader goals of
the USSR in the global balancing of forces in which
strategic forces are only one factor-albeit probably
e The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the
Air Force believes that the Soviets have additionally made great
strides toward achieving general military superiority over all
perceived constellations of enemies and for attaining a war-winning
capability at all levels of conflict.
the most important one. We consider these broader
issues further in the final section of this Estimate.
Forces Facing NATO
38. In the European theater, the Soviets aim at a
capability that will enable them, should war occur, to
prevail quickly at either the conventional or theater
nuclear level. They see themselves as having superior-
ity in conventional forces in Central Europe, but they
are aware of the complexities and uncertainties that
tactical air power and nuclear weapons introduce into
such assessments. They are substantially improving
forces for defending the seaward approaches to the
Soviet Union and conducting offensive operations
against NATO's northern and southern flanks and
against the North Atlantic lines of communications.
They are preparing for the possibility that, in the
event of war, the Warsaw Pact would conduct major
offensive operations without prior reinforcement from
the USSR-and therefore with a minimum of
warning; a forthcoming Estimate will examine this
problem in detail.10 But, mindful of the unpredicta-
bility of nuclear conflict in particular and of the
uncertainties about expansion to a broad European or
intercontinental scale, they are inclined to be very
cautious in considering the use of military force in
Europe.
39. Enjoying a substantial quantitative advantage
over NATO in such elements as divisions, tanks,
artillery, and combat aircraft, the USSR conceives of
future competition between the Warsaw Pact and
NATO primarily in qualitative terms. In this regard,
the Soviets are impressed by NATO's strengths and
potential in such areas as antitank weapons, tactical
nuclear weapons, and combat aircraft. Their own
modernization programs cover a broad spectrum and
10 The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State believes that this paragraph exaggerates the USSR's
confidence in its theater forces against NATO. While the Soviet
forces are formidable, there is a body of evidence that the Soviets
are extremely conservative in their reckoning of the balance and
that they believe they have reason to doubt whether their forces
could succeed in carrying out the kind of massive offensive which
Soviet strategy for a war in Europe requires.
He takes a different view of the significance of exercise scenarios
in which reinforcement does not precede initiation of hostilities. Inl
his view, the exercise evidence seems to fit better with the'
hypothesis that the West struck before the Soviets could reinforce i
than with the conclusion that the East chose to attack before
reinforcement.
12
RET
 feature greatly improved air defense systems, self-
propelled artillery, and tactical aircraft with greater
range and payload. The Soviets also have substantially
increased the nuclear strike capabilities of their theater
forces, providing them with new options for limited
nuclear warfare at the theater level and reducing their
dependence on USSR-based nuclear forces.
40. We assess the overall pace of Pact programs for
improvement of conventional forces as steady and
high. We doubt that the Soviets now expect a marked
change in the present complex balance in the next
decade. Their hopes for any such change rest
primarily on political factors, such as a flagging of
West European efforts or a weakening of the US
commitment to NATO."
Forces Facing China
41. The main Soviet objectives in this region are:
- to deter the Chinese from provoking armed
incidents or incursions in a region where Soviet
cities and railroads are close to the border;
- to be capable of making a major ground thrust
across the border, although not of occupying all
China;
- to maintain a large lead in tactical and strategic
nuclear capabilities;
- to maintain military pressure on Peking for a
change in its hostile policies.
42. The buildup that began in the 1960s has
evidently met these requirements, and the growth of
Soviet forces in the Far East has slackened. The
Soviets are, however, continuing to improve their Far
Eastern naval forces capable of operations against
Chinese domestic and foreign sea lines of communica-
tion. Throughout its course, this buildup was not
allowed to affect significantly the development of
forces facing NATO. Given their concerns over China,
" The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the senior intelli-
gence officers of the Military Departments, and the Senior
Intelligence Officer, Energy Research and Development Adminis-
tration believe that the Soviets are striving for a marked change in
their favor in the complex balance in Europe in the next decade by
continued improvements in their current programs in nuclear,
chemical, night fighting, mobility, electronic u-urfare, and mass fire
capabilities. They believe Soviet expectation of political movement
reinforces their hopes for such a change.
we doubt that the Soviets feel themselves able to plan
to draw on these forces in the event of a European
war, or vice versa; they seem instead to regard it as
necessary to be able to fight on either front-or both
together-with the forces already there. The future
growth of Chinese nuclear capabilities will reinforce
Soviet motivations to maintain and modernize their
forces facing China.
General Purpose Naval Forces
43. In the decade following World War II, the
Soviets' main objective in developing their general
purpose naval forces was to acquire capabilities to
defend Soviet coastal waters and key approaches from
the open oceans against any naval force threatening
the Soviet Union. Since the early 1960s, however, a
pronounced shift in emphasis has taken place. The
Soviets are now also developing forces capable of
offensive action throughout the world oceans, main-
taining a continuous long-term presence in the
Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and
increasing the range of their overseas involvements.
These developments strongly suggest that the Soviets
hold, as a continuing objective, the development of an
open-ocean force capable of performing, to varying
degrees, the traditional functions of major naval
powers. The pace of this expansion has been measured
and evolutionary, and is expected to continue
unabated over the next decade, with somewhat
greater emphasis on correction of their present
deficiencies in logistic support forces to permit more
flexible employment of their growing global capa-
bility. The result will be a broader range of options
available to Soviet policymakers to use or threaten to
use naval forces in pursuing their global interests.
Forces for Distant Operations
44. Soviet military objectives in this category derive
from the USSR's view of the Third World as an arena
of East-West struggle. The Soviets are convinced that,
despite setbacks, these regions are shifting from the
capitalist to the socialist camp, and that this process is
contributing to Soviet national security. Two decades'
experience of successes and failures, however, have
given them a realistic view of the complexities of the
Third World, and their behavior is pragmatic and
alert to opportunities to exploit Western vulnerabili-
ties.
13
S
 45. Among the means for expanding Soviet influ-
ence in this arena, military instruments have proven
by far the most effective.
- Military assistance programs have built ties with
a number of important states and political
movements, resulting in dependence upon the
USSR that has often, though not always,
provided political leverage.
- Naval deployments into new waters have mani-
fested the global scope of Soviet might and
affected regional calculations of power.
- The USSR is able to airlift and sealift military
aid to clients at war.
- It has some potential-as yet only marginally
utilized-for intervening with its own forces in
distant conflicts.
46. The Soviets have used these military instru-
ments to provide assistance to its clients in Third
World crises and have even intervened abroad with
their own military forces. The Soviets have also
endeavored to inhibit possible US actions and to
provide a visible symbol of Soviet support by
interposing naval forces. They have been concerned,
however, not to confront Western interests in the
Third World directly; thus they are working for
change by providing military aid to legitimate
governments and a number of guerrilla movements
throughout the world.
47. The Soviets will continue to strongly support the
process of change in the Third World and will expand
their military instruments at a steady but moderate
pace. Over the next decade, force improvements will
continue to enhance Soviet capabilities to assist clients
by supplementing local defenses. The USSR will be
able to make more credible demonstrations of force
and the Soviet navy will have better capabilities for
interposition. The Soviets will- also improve their
capabilities for direct assault. But beyond the range of
land-based air support, Soviet capabilities will still he
deficient to carry out a direct assault against
determined opposition by sizable armed forces.t"
12 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
notes that Soviet success and failure in any such intervention would
be heavily affected by a number of other variables-particularly the
stance of regional states and the disposition of the forces of the other
major powers.
Research and Development
48. The inherent limitations of evidence present us
with more uncertainty about the scope and progress of
Soviet military research and development than about
programs that have reached the stages of testing and
deployment. It is nevertheless clear that R&D enjoys a
particularly high priority.
49. The Soviets are well aware of the importance of
basic scientific research, and they support it gener-
ously. They also have devoted major resources to
building up industrial technology in support of R&D
goals for the military and in space. They have
decreased, but not eliminated, their dependence on
foreign technology in such key areas as instrumenta-
tion and computers. Recent Soviet statements reflect
special attention to the impact of technological
developments on the strategic military balance.
50. In their approach to weapons development, the
Soviets have traditionally emphasized long-term evo-
lutionary development of existing system concepts or
narrowly focused efforts to develop specific types of
systems. While some of their programs in the past
have involved innovative concepts and some of their
deployed systems are technically advanced, until the
mid-1960s they tended to concentrate on programs
that had direct weapon system applications.
51. Since the mid-1960s, however, the Soviets have
in addition embarked on a broader range of explora-
tory military R&D programs. This approach, while it
runs the risk of a lower percentage of successful
applications, offers the Soviets a better basis for
evaluating Western technological efforts, a better base
for the evolutionary development of existing systems,
and improved chances for technological break-
throughs.
52. Prime examples of Soviet interest in revolu-
tionary technological concepts are in the areas of ASW
sensors and directed-energy weapons. In both ASW
and high-energy lasers (HEL), the Soviets have an
extensive R&D effort in progress, even though the
potential in terms of practical weapons development
is uncertain. The ASW efforts involve investigation of
a variety of techniques that seemingly have limited
prospects for success-detection of submarine wakes
with radar, infrared, and nuclear-trace detectors;
extremely low frequency electromagnetic sensors; and
lasers. The Soviets are also conducting basic research
14
SET
 in technologies relevant to the nonnuclear electromag-
netic pulse and particle beam weapon concepts.
Although there is a large body of evidence for the
existence of a Soviet HEL weapons program, there is
no such body of evidence on the other directed-energy
concepts. Some of the laser work is being done under
sponsorship of the air defense forces, but the
development of HEL for practical applications is not
likely before the 1980s.
53. There is little doubt that both their own
ambitions and their fears of US advances will sustain
a high-priority Soviet effort in military R&D during
this period. The Soviets know a great deal more about
the direction and progress of our military R&D than
we do about theirs. Even so, the scientific and
technological uncertainties that abound in this area
almost certainly prevent them from reaching any
confident judgment now as to whether, over the next
ten years, either side will achieve breakthroughs that
will be perceived as altering the strategic balance.
IV. SYNTHESIS
54. What, then, of the questions with which we
began?
- Do the Soviet leaders now base policy-and the
programs and activities which flow therefrom-
on a belief that the USSR will become the
world's strongest single power? Within the next
ten years?
- Have they come to believe-or will they soon-
that aggressive actions on their part carry lower
risks than earlier, and that these risks have
become low enough to he acceptable to prudent,
yet ambitious men?
There is disagreement on some matters and agreement
on others. In the latter category:
- The Soviet approach to the external world
remains one of struggle between two systems, in
which Moscow believes it will ultimately prevail.
- In prosecuting the struggle on multiple fronts,
the Soviets see military power as a key instru-
ment which can be used to attain strategic
objectives without war.
- The Soviets aim at advantage in their military
forces. However, they worry that they may fall
behind in the qualitative military competition,
and this further reinforces the priority of their
research and development effort.
- In the struggle, they are conscious of weaknesses
on their own side, particularly those arising from
economic and technological deficiencies and
conflict with China. They are working to
overcome these weaknesses, but they do not
presently expect to remove them in the next
decade.
- On the other hand, beyond their obvious
military strength, they credit themselves with
other important assets: disciplined policy-mak-
ing, social cohesion, and perseverance.
- Since the Soviet strategies are not the same as
those of the US, they do not seek to build forces
corresponding to those of the US across the entire
spectrum. For example, they place much higher
priority on strategic forces and forces opposite
NATO than on forces for distant military
intervention.
Among our disagreements:
- Some judge that the Soviets are persuaded that
the US and the West, despite periodic rebounds,
are in a long-term decline that will be reflected
in a flagging of political resolve, military efforts,
and economic growth. Others think the Soviets
hope for this but do not count on it, and indeed
may think the US and Western military effort is
again on the rise.
- Some believe that, in improving their military
forces, the Soviets pursue the acquisition of a
war-winning capability as a realistic objective.
Others believe that the Soviets have no realistic
expectation of attaining such a capability.
55. These disagreements lead to conclusions that,
while not diametrically opposed, present significant
differences of emphasis. The following discussion
simplifies these differences by grouping them into two
syntheses.
56. One line of argument holds that, in the Soviet
view, the global correlation of forces has in the 1970s
shifted in the USSR's favor and that this trend is likely
to continue. The US and its allies have entered upon a
new stage in the "general crisis of capitalism" that
will prove irreversible even if there are periodic
15
S A,RfT
 recoveries. The problems of the Soviet economy and
the dispute with China are serious but, on the plane of
international competition, not debilitating. In this
situation, the Soviets aim to achieve the degree of
military superiority over the West needed to permit
them to wage and win a conventional or nuclear war.
The Soviets see their improvements in survivability
and in counterforce capabilities, air defense and ABM
development, and broad hardening and civil defense
programs in particular, and their improvements in
conventional forces in general, as all contributing to
this objective. While it is uncertain when the Soviets
expect to gain such a decisive strategic superiority,
they view this objective as practical and attainable in
a programed fashion. They expect to move closer to
this goal over the next ten years. Although Soviet
capabilities for the projection of military power will
continue to have significant shortcomings within the
foreseeable future, Moscow not only is prepared to
employ its present naval, merchant, and air forces in
seeking objectives in areas of high Soviet interest but
also is developing additional forces more capable of
influencing events in distant areas. This growing
propensity to use military forces as instruments of
foreign policy, coupled with the perceived favorable
trend in the strategic balance, will, in the Soviets'
view, increasingly enable them to deter US initiatives
and to inhibit US opposition to Soviet initiatives,
thereby advancing the overall Soviet strategic objec-
tive of gaining a dominant position in the world.
57. Another line of argument holds that, in Soviet
thinking, the question is much more open. It too
perceives an increased Soviet confidence, stemming
much more from the achievement of parity in
strategic forces than from other, nonmilitary trends.
But this analysis holds that the Soviet leaders give
greater weight than the preceding argument allows to
the handicaps represented by the USSR's economic
and technological weaknesses and its conflict with
China. It believes that they attribute greater resilience
to the capitalist economies and do not discount the
recent turnaround in US defense spending as a short-
term phenomenon. In this view, Soviet military
programing and research are bent upon keeping pace
with that of its adversaries as well as seeking margins
of advantage wherever feasible. But Moscow does not
have a realistic expectation of achieving a war-
winning capability, particularly in the next decade.
Expecting Soviet foreign policy to be assertive, this
analysis nonetheless holds that Moscow's experience
with the complexities of the external world-and
particularly with the intractable force of nation-
alism-does not at this point lead the Soviets to expect
a series of advances that, by the mid-1980s, will
cumulate into a finally decisive shift in the struggle.
In short, this analysis attributes to the Soviets not a
programmatic design for military superiority but a
more pragmatic effort to achieve advantages where
they can, and thus a more patient approach to
continuing tough competition together with a dedica-
tion to high and steady levels of effort in the elements
of power. Moscow's calculus of the risks attending
forward action may decline, but this has not yet
happened and, if it does, the process will be slow and
subject to cautious testing.
58. This Estimate is obviously not a net assessment,
not our judgment of the likely outcome in East-West
competition. It is a summary of the range of
Community perceptions of Soviet objectives and
Soviet views of the prospects for significant gains in
this competition. We agree on a wide range of Soviet
objectives short of decisive military superiority over
the West. Our differences are over the Soviet leaders'
perception of the feasibility of achieving such
superiority. Finally, we agree that Soviet risk-taking
abroad in any specific situation will continue to be
governed by Moscow's perception of interests and
power at the particular time and place.
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